An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1263
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 15 April 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
J.M., Sampson County
A Juvenile. No. 11 JT 9
Appeal by respondent from orders entered 30 March 2012 by
Judge Sarah C. Seaton and 24 July 2013 by Judge Leonard W.
Thagard in Sampson County District Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 31 March 2014.
Warrick and Bradshaw, P.A., by Frank L. Bradshaw, for
petitioner-appellee Sampson County Department of Social
Services.
K & L Gates, LLP, by Leah D’Aurora Richardson, for guardian
ad litem.
Mark Hayes for respondent-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
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Respondent-mother (“Respondent”) appeals from the trial
court’s orders ceasing reunification efforts and terminating her
parental rights to her child “Jill.”1 We affirm.
Respondent is the mother of Jill. Jill was born 15 October
2009 in Cumberland County, North Carolina and is the subject of
this case. On 10 November 2010, the Sampson County Department
of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report that Respondent had
inappropriately disciplined Jill’s sister. The report stemmed
from an incident in which a school employee discovered a wound
on Jill’s sister’s buttocks. Pursuant to the investigation, DSS
asked Respondent about the wound and how it occurred.
Respondent stated that “she beat the child until the wound got
sticky.” However, at trial, Respondent stated that the injury
resulted from her sister spanking the child with a board.
During this investigation, DSS visited Respondent at her
home and observed that the house was unkempt and in complete
disarray. As a result of the investigation, DSS placed Jill and
her sister outside of the home and provided Respondent with a
case plan. DSS asked Respondent to complete a psychological
evaluation, attend parenting classes, and attend food and
nutrition sessions. Respondent completed the psychological
1
The pseudonym “Jill” is used throughout this opinion to protect
the identity of the child and for ease of reading.
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evaluation which yielded a diagnosis of mild mental retardation
and depressive disorder. As a result of the evaluation, it was
recommended that any contact between Respondent and her children
should be directly supervised and that Respondent attend
mentoring classes. Respondent failed to complete parenting
classes, food and nutrition classes, or the mentoring classes.
On 24 January 2011, DSS filed a petition alleging that Jill
was a neglected and dependent juvenile. DSS alleged that
Respondent had intellectual limitations, demonstrated an
inability to provide a proper home environment, and had poor
parenting skills. DSS also alleged that Jill’s father was not
capable of caring for her. DSS obtained nonsecure custody of
Jill and placed her in the home of P.B., who is the paternal
grandmother of Jill’s sister.
By order filed 13 July 2011, the trial court adjudicated
Jill to be neglected and dependent. After holding a disposition
hearing, the trial court ordered DSS to retain custody of Jill,
with placement continuing with P.B. The trial court conducted
subsequent review hearings and, on 30 March 2012, ceased
reunification efforts.
On 6 June 2013, DSS filed a motion to terminate
Respondent’s and the father’s parental rights to Jill. DSS
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alleged that Respondent’s parental rights were subject to
termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)
(neglect), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (failure to make
reasonable progress), and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6)
(dependency). A termination of parental rights hearing was held
on 23 May 2013, after which the trial court found that all three
grounds for termination alleged in the petition existed. The
court determined that termination of Respondent’s parental
rights was in the best interests of Jill and entered an order
terminating Respondent’s rights.2 Respondent gave timely notice
of appeal.
Analysis
I. Cessation of Reunification Efforts
In her first argument on appeal, Respondent contends the
trial court erred when it ceased reunification efforts without
making the requisite findings of fact. We disagree.
“This Court reviews an order that ceases reunification
efforts to determine whether the trial court made appropriate
findings, whether the findings are based upon credible evidence,
whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Jill’s
father. Because he did not appeal, that portion of the order is
not before us.
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conclusions, and whether the trial court abused its discretion
with respect to disposition.” In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207,
213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007). “When a trial court ceases
reunification efforts with a parent, it is required to make
findings of fact pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b).” Id.
at 213-14, 644 S.E.2d at 594. “A trial court may cease
reunification efforts upon making a finding that further efforts
‘would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s
health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a
reasonable period of time[.]’” Id. at 214, 644 S.E.2d at 594
(quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1)). Though characterized
as a finding or “ultimate finding[,]” see In re I.R.C., 214 N.C.
App. 358, 363, 714 S.E.2d 495, 499 (2011), the determination
that grounds exist to cease reunification efforts under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1) is, in substance, a conclusion of law
that must be supported by adequate findings of fact. Id. at
363, 714 S.E.2d at 498-99.
The trial court made the following pertinent findings of
fact:
10. That the Juvenile has been in the care
of the Sampson County Department of Social
Services or placed outside the removal home
in excess of twelve (12) months and is
placed in a structured environment.
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11. That the Respondent Mother has not
completed her service agreement with the
Department of Social Services.
12. That the Respondent Mother suffers from
mild mental retardation.
. . . .
16. That the Respondent Mother relies
heavily on the oldest Juvenile with caring
for the siblings.
17. That the Respondent Mother desires to
live in a home by herself.
. . . .
22. That it is not likely that the Juvenile
will be returned within the next six (6)
months.
. . . .
25. That the Department has made reasonable
efforts in this matter to prevent or
eliminate the need for placement of the
Juvenile with the Department and to reunify
this family.
26. That the Department is no longer
required to make reasonable efforts in this
matter to reunify this family pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-507 as those efforts
would clearly be futile or would be
inconsistent with the Juvenile’s health and
safety, and need for a safe, permanent home
within a reasonable time.
27. That the Court finds that the
conditions which led to the removal of the
Juvenile from the Juvenile’s home still
exists and that a return of the Juvenile to
said home would be contrary to the welfare
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of the Juvenile.
The trial court concluded:
4. That pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
507, the Sampson County Department of Social
Services in no longer required to make
reasonable efforts in this matter to reunify
this family as those efforts would clearly
be futile or would be inconsistent with the
Juvenile’s health and safety, and need for a
safe, permanent home within a reasonable
period of time.
In finding of fact 26 and in conclusion of law 4, the trial
court made the ultimate finding required under section 7B-
507(b)(1) that reunification efforts “would clearly be futile or
would be inconsistent with the Juvenile’s health and safety, and
need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of
time.”
Respondent challenges the trial court’s ultimate finding on
the grounds that it did not specify which prong, “futile or
inconsistent[,]” was the basis for ceasing reunification
efforts. Respondent argues that the trial court’s failure to
specify the prong upon which it relied prohibits this Court from
applying the proper standard of review. Moreover, Respondent
contends that the trial court’s use of boilerplate language
lifted directly from the statute results in a failure by the
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trial court to link any of its findings to the two prongs set
forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1).
We conclude that unchallenged findings of fact 10 through
17, 21 and 27 support the trial court’s ultimate finding that
further reunification efforts would be futile and inconsistent
with Jill’s health and safety and her need for a permanent home
within a reasonable period of time. The court found that Jill
has been in DSS custody for over twelve months, she has been in
a structured environment for this period of time, Respondent
relies on others in caring for Jill, Respondent did not complete
her services agreement, and Respondent desires to live in a home
by herself. These findings are uncontested by Respondent and
are thus binding on appeal. In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 147,
669 S.E.2d 55, 59 (2008), aff’d per curiam, 363 N.C. 368, 677
S.E.2d 455 (2009). We conclude that the trial court’s findings
are sufficient to support its conclusion of law under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1), and we discern no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s decision to cease reunification efforts under
these circumstances.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
In her second argument, Respondent asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion in concluding that the termination
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of Respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of
Jill. We disagree.
“After an adjudication that one or more grounds for
terminating a parent’s rights exist, the court shall determine
whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s
best interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). When
determining whether it is in the juvenile’s best interest for
the parent’s rights to be terminated, the trial court is
required to make written findings regarding the relevant factors
enunciated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). Id.
“We review the trial court's decision to terminate parental
rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App.
94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). Abuse of discretion results
where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or
is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision. State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372
S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).
Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact
to support its conclusion that it was in the best interests of
Jill for Respondent’s parental rights to be terminated:
3. That the Juvenile has been placed with
[P.B.] since January 24, 2011.
4. That the Juvenile is currently placed
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in the aforesaid home with the Juvenile’s
sibling.
5. That the Juvenile has adapted well in
the current placement.
6. That the Juvenile is thriving in the
current placement.
7. That the Juvenile is developing
appropriately for her age.
8. That [P.B.] desires to adopt the
Juvenile.
9. That [P.B.] and the Juvenile have
developed a close bond to one another.
10. That there is little to no bond between
the Juvenile and the Respondent Parents.
11. That [P.B.] understands the legal
significance and the financial obligation of
adopting the Juvenile.
12. That the current permanent plan for the
Juvenile is adoption.
13. That the termination of parental rights
of the respondents would aid in the
completion of the current permanent plan for
the Juvenile.
Respondent asserts finding of fact 10 — that there is
“little to no bond” between her and Jill — is unsupported by the
evidence. To support her argument, Respondent relies on
evidence suggesting that a bond did, in fact, exist between Jill
and Respondent. Respondent points to her father’s testimony
that Jill and her sister “have a loving relationship with
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[Respondent]” and that they miss Respondent. Respondent also
cites Social Worker Dana Sutton’s testimony that (1) Jill knows
Respondent; (2) Jill and Respondent have a “loving
relationship”; and (3) DSS was recommending bi-weekly visits
between Respondent and Jill after termination because P.B.
“would like for the girls to have contact with their mom.”
However, Respondent’s argument ignores the well-established
principle that “[f]indings of fact supported by competent
evidence are binding on appeal, despite evidence in the record
that might support a contrary finding.” In re C.I.M., 214 N.C.
App. 342, 345, 715 S.E.2d 247, 250 (2011).
Here, there is competent record evidence supporting the
trial court’s finding that there is “little to no bond between
Juvenile and Respondent.” First, it is the adoptive parent who
has taken the initiative to involve Respondent in Jill’s life by
taking Jill once a month to Sampson County to visit with
Respondent. Indeed, the fact that Jill – at three years of age
— only visits with her mother once per month at her adoptive
parent’s initiative is evidence supporting the trial court’s
finding that there is little to no bond between Jill and
Respondent. Moreover, competent evidence shows that Jill has
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been living with P.B. since she was only one year of age, which
is more than half of her life.
While Respondent cites other evidence that may have
supported a finding that there was a bond between mother and
child, the trial court’s finding of fact 10 is supported by
competent evidence and is binding on appeal. “It is not the
function of this Court to reweigh the evidence on appeal.”
Garrett v. Burris, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 735 S.E.2d 414, 418
(2012), aff'd per curiam, 366 N.C. 551, 742 S.E.2d 803 (2013).
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that termination of Respondent’s parental rights was
in Jill’s best interests. See In re S.C.R., 198 N.C. App. 525,
536, 679 S.E.2d 905, 912 (2009) (holding that trial court's
findings reflected reasoned decision based upon statutory
factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–1110(a) and that,
therefore, trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding termination of mother's parental rights was in best
interests of child).
Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders
ceasing reunification efforts and terminating Respondent’s
parental rights.
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AFFIRMED.
Judges HUNTER, JR. and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).