An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-901
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 6 January 2015
IN THE MATTER OF:
A.B. Cumberland County
No. 12 JA 311
Appeal by respondent mother from order entered 9 May 2014
by Judge Edward A. Pone in Cumberland County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 December 2014.
Christopher L. Carr and James D. Dill for petitioner-
appellee Cumberland County Department of Social Services.
Assistant Appellate Defender Joyce L. Terres for
respondent-appellant mother.
Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for
guardian ad litem.
DIETZ, Judge.
Respondent mother appeals from the trial court’s permanency
planning order awarding legal and physical custody and
guardianship of A.B. (“Abby”)1 to the juvenile’s maternal great
aunt. Respondent argues that the trial court did not make
1
The parties agreed to the use of this pseudonym.
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sufficient findings in its permanency planning order. For the
reasons set forth below, we reject this argument and hold that
the trial court’s fact findings satisfy the statutory criteria.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
Facts and Procedural History
On 22 May 2012, the Cumberland County Department of Social
Services (DSS) filed a juvenile petition alleging that Abby and
her two cousins were neglected, seriously neglected, and
dependent. At the time DSS filed the petition, Abby lived with
her mother, grandmother, aunt, and two cousins. In the juvenile
petitions, DSS alleged that the family lived without electricity
from 10 October 2011 to 8 November 2011 and that the juveniles
frequently asked neighbors for food. DSS further alleged that
Abby’s cousin was withdrawn from her public school in September
2010 and had not been enrolled in a public school since that
date. Abby’s grandmother stated that the children were
homeschooled, but Respondent could not produce any documentation
or proof of proper homeschooling. DSS also alleged that the
family had a history of unstable housing and were uncooperative
with DSS since 2011.2
2
The family unit was also the subject of a DSS referral in 2011.
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DSS was unable to locate the family until 18 June 2012 when
they were found near the Cape Fear Valley Medical Center. Abby
and her cousins were disheveled, dirty, and smelled bad. The
three children told social workers that they had not eaten all
day. The juveniles also stated that they had been sleeping in a
storage facility and on the floor of the nearby hospital, that
they bathed in the hospital bathroom, and that they had to
resort to stealing food from hospital carts to get enough to
eat. DSS obtained non-secure custody of Abby and her cousins
and the juveniles were placed with their maternal great aunt.
At a hearing on 7 January 2013, the parties stipulated that
Abby and her cousins were dependent and the allegations of
neglect and serious neglect were dismissed. The trial court
adjudicated Abby dependent and found that “among the issues
which led to the removal of the juveniles was the unstable
lifestyle of the Respondents, lack of appropriate housing,
failure to obtain appropriate medical care, and failure to
[provide] appropriate education for the juveniles.” Respondent
was ordered to submit to a psychological evaluation and a
parenting assessment, to successfully complete life skills
training, and “to obtain and maintain stable and suitable
housing, to include more than a month-to-month lease.”
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Respondent was granted one hour of supervised visitation with
Abby, to be supervised by the maternal great aunt, and to take
place at a public location as agreed upon by both parties.
On 27 June 2013, the trial court entered an order following
a review hearing held on 29 April 2013. The court found that
there was no substantial change since the entry of the
adjudication order and that the issues that led to the removal
of the juveniles had not been alleviated. The trial court also
found that Respondent provided insufficient documentation of
counseling services to assess her progress and still possessed a
month-to-month lease for housing.
On 31 January 2014, the trial court entered a permanency
planning order after a hearing held 26 August 2013. The court
again found that there had been no substantial change in the
case and the issues of unstable housing, inappropriate care and
supervision, and lack of appropriate alternative child care
arrangements had not been alleviated. DSS’s report, which was
incorporated into the trial court’s order, stated that
Respondent was facing eviction from her home after falling four
months behind in rent. The court also found that Respondent had
failed to maintain contact with the social worker and had
cancelled face-to-face appointments. The trial court further
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found that it would not be possible for the juveniles to be
returned home at that time or within the next six months as the
mothers were still “in need of services to assist in alleviating
the conditions which led to the removal of the juveniles.” Abby
also told the social worker that “although she misses her
Mother, she is happy with living with her Aunt and would rather
remain there.”
On 9 May 2014, the trial court entered another permanency
planning order. The court incorporated into the order the
contents of both the DSS and guardian ad litem reports, as well
as the findings from all previous orders. The trial court again
found that it was not possible for the juveniles to be returned
home immediately or within the next six months and awarded legal
and physical custody and guardianship of Abby and her cousins to
their maternal great aunt. The trial court also ordered that
DSS be allowed to close Abby’s juvenile case file and “shall be
relieved of further duties in this matter.” The order stated
that no further judicial reviews were necessary, “unless upon a
Motion for Review filed by any party, or upon the Court’s own
motion.” Respondent timely appealed.
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Analysis
I. Findings Concerning Reunification Services
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by
failing to make sufficient findings as to services offered to
reunite Abby with Respondent. We disagree.
On appeal, the “review of a permanency planning order is
limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to
support the findings and the findings support the conclusions of
law.” In re J.C.S., 164 N.C. App. 96, 106, 595 S.E.2d 155, 161
(2004). “If the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by
any competent evidence, they are conclusive on appeal.” Id.
Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s findings but
contends that those findings are insufficient. Thus, the trial
court’s existing findings are binding on appeal and we review
whether those findings support its conclusions. In re J.M.W.,
179 N.C. App. 788, 792, 635 S.E.2d 916, 919 (2006).
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1, at a permanency
planning hearing the trial court “shall consider the following
criteria and make written findings regarding those that are
relevant.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(d) (2013). Among the
criteria listed, the court shall consider reunification
services, visitation reports, whether efforts to reunite the
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child and parent would be futile, placement reports, and any
other criteria the court deems necessary. Id.
Here, the trial court found
[t]hat the [c]ourt approves of the permanent
plan of guardianship with relatives, and
finds that the plan is consistent with the
juveniles’ best interests. The [c]ourt
further finds that [DSS] has been making
reasonable efforts, as required by N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 7B-507 and 7B-906, to eliminate the
need for continued placement of the
juveniles outside of the home to include,
but not limited to: monitoring the
juveniles’ placements; coordinating services
for the juveniles; and ensuring that the
needs of the juveniles are being met.
The Juvenile Code defines “reasonable efforts” as:
[t]he diligent use of preventive or
reunification services by a department of
social services when a juvenile's remaining
at home or returning home is consistent with
achieving a safe, permanent home for the
juvenile within a reasonable period of time.
If a court of competent jurisdiction
determines that the juvenile is not to be
returned home, then reasonable efforts means
the diligent and timely use of permanency
planning services by a department of social
services to develop and implement a
permanent plan for the juvenile.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(18) (2013).
Respondent argues that the court’s finding quoted above is
insufficient. Although it states that DSS is “making reasonable
efforts . . . to eliminate the need for continued placement of
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the juveniles outside the home,” and the statutory term
“reasonable efforts” includes “the diligent use of preventive or
reunification services,” Respondent contends that the findings
are insufficient because they do not list the particular
reunification services that were offered. Respondent argues
that without specifically identifying those services in its
findings, the findings do not comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
906.1(d).
We disagree. The trial court’s findings of fact must only
“be sufficiently specific to enable an appellate court to review
the decision and test the correctness of the judgment.” In re
J.S., 165 N.C. App. 509, 511, 598 S.E.2d 658, 660 (2004)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In making fact
findings, a trial court “must through processes of logical
reasoning from the evidentiary facts find the ultimate facts
essential to support the conclusions of law.” In re Harton, 156
N.C. App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the trial court did not simply adopt the DSS and
guardian ad litem reports, but made its own additional findings
pertaining to the relevant factors laid out in N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-906.1(d). Among those findings, the trial court expressly
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found that DSS made “reasonable efforts” to eliminate the need
for continued placement, a statutory term that includes use of
“preventive or reunification services.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
101(18).
This finding is supported by competent evidence presented
at the hearing. The social worker testified that she provided
housing information to Respondent in the summer of 2013 and
again the day before the February hearing. DSS’s report also
stated it arranged for Respondent to attend parenting classes—
which she did—and further recommended that she continue
individual counseling.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s findings are
sufficiently specific to show that the trial court considered
the necessary statutory factors, including reunification
services, and made written findings regarding those that are
relevant, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(d). We
therefore reject Respondent’s argument on this issue.
II. Finding Concerning Possible Reunification Within Six Months
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by
failing to make a specific finding on whether it was possible
for Abby to be returned to Respondent within six months and why
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such placement was not in Abby’s best interest, as required by
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e)(1). We disagree.
In the permanency planning order, the trial court found
That it is not possible for the juveniles to
be returned home immediately, or within the
next six (6) months, inasmuch as the
Respondent Mothers remain in need of
services to assist in alleviating the
conditions which led to the removal of the
juveniles. That return of the juveniles to
the custody of the Respondents would be
contrary to the welfare and best interests
of the juveniles in that the juveniles
remain in need of more care and supervision
than can be provided by the Respondents.
The court also found that “among the issues that led to the
removal of the juveniles was unstable housing; that continues
through today’s date.”
Respondent first argues that the court erred because it
combined all the juveniles together and did not make separate
findings as to each juvenile. But at the time of the DSS
referral, and during the entire two years after DSS’s
involvement, Respondent lived with her sister and mother.
Respondent also has no income to obtain her own housing.
Respondent contends that Abby was removed from the home for
different reasons than her cousins because one of Abby’s cousins
also was found to not be receiving proper medical care for her
seizure disorder. However, DSS’s report stated that the
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educational neglect of both Abby and her cousin was concerning
and that the children’s immunizations were not kept current.
Thus, Abby was removed from the home for reasons that were
equally applicable to her and her two cousins, and which had not
been alleviated at the time of the hearing. The family was
living together as a unit and the court did not err by not
including separate findings as to each juvenile.
Respondent next argues that the above-referenced findings
are not sufficiently specific because they do not identify the
particular services needed by Respondent and do not clarify how
the conditions that led to the removal still persisted at the
time of the hearing. But as explained above, the trial court
need not reference every underlying piece of evidence supporting
its fact finding. Instead, the trial court must “from the
evidentiary facts find the ultimate facts essential to support
the conclusions of law.” Harton, 156 N.C. App. at 660, 577
S.E.2d at 337.
Here, the applicable statute required the trial court to
make findings about whether it was “possible for the juvenile to
be placed with the parent within the next six months and, if
not, why such placement is not in the juvenile’s best
interests.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(e)(1). The trial court
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made the precise findings required by the statute. If
Respondent believed those findings were not supported by
competent evidence in the record, she should have challenged
them on the ground that they were unsupported by the record (she
did not). But even if Respondent had done so, we readily would
have concluded that the findings are supported by competent
evidence.
The trial court expressly found that unstable housing was
among the issues that led to the removal of Abby and that the
unstable housing continued through the date of the order at
issue. Additionally, the permanency planning order incorporated
all previous orders and their findings as well as the DSS and
guardian ad litem reports. In the DSS report, the social worker
indicated that prior to the February 2014 hearing, Respondent
had moved again and left no forwarding address.
During the hearing, the social worker testified that “in
the past two years, [DSS] has not seen the progress on the part
of the Respondent mother that would make them feel comfortable
allowing the child to go back to her custody and be with her
permanently.” The social worker also stated in the report that
“it is not possible for the juveniles to return home immediately
or within the next six months. [Respondent] and [her sister]
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continue to have unstable housing and have not actively
participated in their case plan reviews for the past six
months.”
The court also found that the placement with the great aunt
was going well, Abby was receiving proper care and supervision,
the placement was stable, and that “the continuation in this
placement would be consistent with the best interests of the
juveniles.” Abby also was doing well in school and expressed a
desire to continue living with her great aunt.
In short, the trial court satisfied the statutory criteria
by finding that reunification was not possible within the next
six months and that reunification would be contrary to the
child’s best interests. The court’s fact findings also are
supported by competent evidence in the record. Thus, we reject
Respondent’s argument on this issue.
III. Visitation in a “Public Location”
Finally, Respondent argues that the trial court erred by
ordering that visitation between Respondent and Abby be at a
“public location” as agreed upon by the parties, without
specifying in the order the particular “public location” at
which visitation must occur. We disagree.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1, if the juvenile is
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placed in the guardianship of a relative, “any order providing
for visitation shall specify the minimum frequency and length of
the visits and whether the visits shall be supervised.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(c) (2013). Here, the trial court complied
with Section 7B-905.1(c) by specifying that Respondent “be
allowed a minimum of one (1) hour supervised visitation every
Saturday from 4:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m. . . . to be supervised
by the Maternal Great Aunt . . . at a public location as agreed
upon by the parties.”
Respondent argues the trial court erred because the order
did not state the specific place of visitation, relying on In re
Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971). But Stancil
is readily distinguishable from the facts here. In that case,
the court did not specify any visitation plan and left it to the
custodian of the child to determine the time, place, and
conditions in which the mother may visit with her child. Id. at
552, 179 S.E.2d at 849. Here, Respondent was given a specific
day and time to visit with Abby and was told the visitations
must be in a public location supervised by the great aunt.
Respondent contends that Abby’s guardian could deny her
visitation by stating that they could not agree on a place to
visit. But there is no evidence that Respondent has ever been
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denied visitation or that designating a visitation place has
been an issue. Indeed, the record indicates that Respondent has
been visiting with Abby weekly and that the visits are going
well. Additionally, our Court previously has upheld an order
stating that visitation shall be in a “public place.” In re
A.A., 176 N.C. App. 189, 625 S.E.2d 917, 2006 WL 387972 (2006)
(unpublished). And, to the extent the parties are unable to
agree on an appropriate “public location” at some future date,
Respondent can return to the trial court to resolve the issue.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s visitation plan
complies with N.C. Gen. Stat § 7B-905.1(c).
Conclusion
The trial court made sufficiently specific findings in its
permanency planning order and those findings are supported by
clear and convincing evidence. The court’s findings, in turn,
support the trial court’s conclusions of law. Therefore, the
trial court’s order granting physical and legal custody and
guardianship of Abby to her maternal great aunt is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges BRYANT and DILLON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).