NO. COA13-775
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 4 February 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Sampson County
No. 13CRS54
TRAVIS ANTONIO LEE,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from Judgment entered on or about 2 April
2013 by Judge W. Douglas Parsons in Superior Court, Sampson County.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2013.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III by Assistant Attorney
General Andrew O. Furuseth, for the State.
Yoder Law PLLC by Jason Christopher Yoder, for defendant-
appellant.
STROUD, Judge.
Travis Lee (“defendant”) appeals from the judgment entered on
or about 2 April 2013 revoking his probation and activating his
sentence. We remand for correction of the clerical errors in the
judgment.
I. Background
In June 2012, defendant was indicted in Harnett County for
obtaining property by false pretenses, felony larceny of a motor
vehicle, and felony possession of a stolen motor vehicle. On 24
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September 2012, defendant pled guilty to larceny of a motor vehicle
and was sentenced to 10-12 months imprisonment, suspended for 24
months of supervised probation. On 17 January 2013, defendant’s
probation officer filed a violation report in Sampson County
alleging that defendant had violated four conditions of his
probation: (1) that he report as directed to the supervising
officer, (2) that he pay all fees owed, (3) that he participate in
substance abuse treatment through TASC, and (4) that he commit no
criminal offense. On 2 April 2013, the superior court in Sampson
County found that defendant had violated his probation as alleged
in paragraphs one through four of the violation report, revoked
his probation, and sentenced him to 8-10 months imprisonment.
Defendant filed written notice of appeal to this Court on 12 April
2013.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because Sampson County was not in a judicial district
which had jurisdiction over his probation and because he received
inadequate notice of the State’s allegations against him. We
disagree.
A. Correct County
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Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation because Sampson
County was not in the judicial district where probation was
imposed, Judicial District 11A, there was no evidence he lived in
Sampson County, Judicial District 4A, and there was no evidence
that any of his alleged violations took place in Sampson County.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) (2011),
probation may be reduced, terminated,
continued, extended, modified, or revoked by
any judge entitled to sit in the court which
imposed probation and who is resident or
presiding in the district court district as
defined in G.S. 7A-133 or superior court
district or set of districts as defined in
G.S. 7A-41.1, as the case may be, where the
sentence of probation was imposed, where the
probationer violates probation, or where the
probationer resides.
Defendant fails to note that both his affidavit of indigency
and the violation report filed by his probation officer list his
residence as one on County Manor Lane in Dunn, North Carolina. The
State contends that this address is situated in Sampson County.
Defendant does not argue on appeal—and did not argue to the trial
court—that this address is not actually in Sampson County, nor
that he did not live at that address at the relevant time.
Therefore, we deem such arguments abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(a).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction
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over defendant’s probation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a)
because he was residing in Sampson County, part of Judicial
District 4A.
B. Notice
Defendant next argues that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because he had inadequate notice that the State
intended to revoke his probation on the basis of a new criminal
offense. He contends that “[b]ecause the violation report alleged
only criminal charges, and not convictions, it cannot be the sole
basis for revoking probation.”
Under the Justice Reinvestment Act, a defendant’s probation
is subject to revocation if he violates the normal condition of
probation that he “[c]ommit no criminal offense in any
jurisdiction.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(1) (2011); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1344(a) (2011). A conviction by jury trial or guilty
plea is one way for the State to prove that a defendant committed
a new criminal offense. See State v. Guffey, 253 N.C. 43, 45, 116
S.E.2d 148, 150 (1960) (“[W]hen a criminal charge is pending in a
court of competent jurisdiction, which charge is the sole basis
for activating a previously suspended sentence, such sentence
should not be activated unless there is a conviction on the pending
charge or there is a plea of guilty entered thereto.” (emphasis
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added)). The State may also introduce evidence from which the trial
court can independently find that the defendant committed a new
offense. See, e.g., State v. Monroe, 83 N.C. App. 143, 145-46,
349 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1986), State v. Debnam, 23 N.C. App. 478,
480-81, 209 S.E.2d 409, 410-11 (1974).
The State is required to give defendant notice “of the
[probation] hearing and its purpose, including a statement of the
violations alleged.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1345(e)(2011). Thus,
the relevant piece of information is the violation alleged, not
the manner of proving the violation. “The purpose of the notice
mandated by this section is to allow the defendant to prepare a
defense and to protect the defendant from a second probation
violation hearing for the same act.” State v. Hubbard, 198 N.C.
App. 154, 158, 678 S.E.2d 290, 293 (2009).
Here, the violation report specifically alleged that
defendant violated the condition of probation that he commit no
criminal offense in that he had several new pending charges which
were specifically identified, including that “on 12/18/12 the
defendant was charged with possession of firearm by felon in
12CR057780 and possess marijuana up to 1/2 oz in 12 CR 057779 in
Johnston County.” The violation report went on to state that “If
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the defendant is convicted of any of the charges it will be a
violation of his current probation.”
Defendant is correct that charges alone are insufficient to
show that he committed a new criminal offense. See Guffey, 253
N.C. at 45, 116 S.E.2d at 150. Nevertheless, the issue here is
notice—i.e., whether the information provided was sufficient “to
allow the defendant to prepare a defense and to protect the
defendant from a second probation hearing for the same act.”
Hubbard, 198 N.C. App. at 158, 678 S.E.2d at 293. Additionally,
because of the changes effected by the Justice Reinvestment Act,
we have required that defendants be given notice of the particular
revocation-eligible violation alleged by the State. See, e.g.,
State v. Tindall, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 742 S.E.2d 272, 275
(2013) (holding that defendant received insufficient notice
because “defendant did not have notice that her probation could
potentially be revoked when she appeared at the hearing.”), State
v. Kornegay, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 745 S.E.2d 880, 883 (2013)
(“Under Tindall, which violation is alleged dictates whether the
trial court has the jurisdiction to revoke a defendant’s probation
or not.” (emphasis added)).
Unlike Tindall and Kornegay, the violation report here put
defendant on notice that the State was alleging a revocation-
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eligible violation, namely that he committed a new criminal
offense. The probation officer specifically alleged in the
violation report that defendant had violated the condition that he
not commit any criminal offense. The violation report identified
the criminal offense on which the trial court relied to revoke
defendant’s probation—possession of a firearm by a felon—and the
specific county and case file number of that alleged offense. Given
such notice, defendant was aware that the State was alleging a
revocation-eligible violation and he was aware of the exact
violation upon which the State relied. Defendant could have denied
the violation and presented evidence in his own defense had he
chosen to do so. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court had
jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation for violation of the
“commit no criminal offense” condition.1
III. Findings of Fact
Defendant next argues that the trial court made inadequate
findings to support its judgment revoking his probation. We agree
that the trial court’s written judgment is missing several key
findings, including findings that, “[u]pon due notice or waiver of
notice,” defendant admitted the violations and that that defendant
1 Because we conclude that the notice provided was adequate we do
not address the issue of waiver.
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had violated the condition that he not commit a new criminal
offense. We conclude that these omissions are clerical errors and
remand for entry of a corrected judgment.
The form which was used here, “Judgment and Commitment Upon
Revocation of Probation—Felony,” AOC Form CR-607 Rev. 12-12,
includes five potential findings of fact with various optional
subsections. Finding 1 addresses the particular probation
violations alleged against the defendant. Finding 2 addresses
“due notice,” waiver of notice, and hearing. Finding 3 addresses
the specific conditions which the court finds that defendant has
violated. Finding 4 addresses the willfulness and timing of
violations, and does not require that a box be “checked,” unless
the subsection is applicable (and here it was not marked, nor
should it have been). Finding 5 includes the direction: “NOTE TO
COURT: This finding is required when revoking probation for
violations occurring on or after December 1, 2011” (emphasis in
original), gives the Court two optional findings, and at least one
of these is necessary to revoke probation.
Here, the trial court made only two findings: No. 3(a), which
was “checked” and Finding 4, which does not require any additional
notation. The only optional finding on Form AOC-CR-607 that the
trial court checked was 3(a), where it found that “The condition(s)
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violated and the facts of each violation are as set forth” in
paragraphs 1-4 of the violation report. By failing to check the
right boxes, the trial court failed to incorporate the violation
reports by reference (Finding 1(a)), made no finding that defendant
admitted the violations (Finding 2), and failed to find a willful
violation of one of the revocation-eligible conditions under the
Justice Reinvestment Act (Finding 5). Finding 5 is particularly
important here because only one of the four alleged violations was
revocation-eligible. See State v. Jones, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___,
736 S.E.2d 634, 637-38 (2013) (concluding that “the trial court
should have checked the box finding that it had the authority to
revoke defendant’s probation under the Justice Reinvestment Act
‘for the willful violation of the condition(s) that he/she not
commit any criminal offense, G.S. 15A–1343 (b)(1), or abscond from
supervision, G.S. 15A–1343(b)(3a), as set out above.’”).
But in this case, the record clearly supports the grounds,
reasoning, and authority for the trial court’s order of revocation
of probation, so any error in failing to check a box on the
revocation form is clerical only. See id. at ___, 736 S.E.2d at
637-38 (concluding that the trial court made a clerical error when
it failed to check the right boxes on the AOC form to revoke
probation). Defendant admitted the alleged violations through
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counsel, including that he had been convicted of a new criminal
offense on 18 December 2012. The trial court found from the bench
that defendant had admitted the violations. Nevertheless, the
order must document the findings necessary to the trial court’s
decision to revoke defendant’s probation. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-1345(e) (2011) (“Before revoking or extending probation, the
court must, unless the probationer waives the hearing, hold a
hearing to determine whether to revoke or extend probation and
must make findings to support the decision and a summary record of
the proceedings.”); State v. Williamson, 61 N.C. App. 531, 534,
301 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1983) (noting that due process requires “a
written judgment by the judge which shall contain (a) findings of
fact as to the evidence relied on, [and] (b) reasons for revoking
probation.”). The failure to check the appropriate boxes
constitutes a clerical error. Jones, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 736
S.E. 2d at 637-38. Therefore, we remand for correction of the
clerical errors.
IV. Conclusion
Although we conclude from the current record that the trial
court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate defendant’s
alleged probation violations, due to the failure to “check the
boxes” on the order, the trial court’s written findings are
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inadequate to support its decision to revoke defendant’s
probation. Therefore, we remand for the trial court to correct
the clerical errors in the judgment.
REMANDED.
Judges MCGEE and BRYANT concur.