Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of FILED
Oct 19 2012, 9:23 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KEVIN WILD GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
AARON J. SPOLARICH
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JEFFERY SANDERS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1203-CR-150
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robert Altice, Judge
Cause No. 49G02-1110-FB-69697
October 19, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, Jeffrey Paul Sanders (Sanders), appeals his conviction for
theft, a Class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a) and his adjudication as an habitual
offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Sanders raises one issue for our review, which we restate as: Whether the State
presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Sanders’ conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 27, 2011, Sandria Beasley (Sandria) was sleeping when she was
awakened by the sound of someone opening a door to her home in Indianapolis, Indiana.
She called out to ask if it was her brother, Gale Beasley (Gale), who lived with her.
Peering out from the stairs, Sandria saw a man leave her home. Sandria investigated and
found that a sliding glass door at the rear of her home had been removed. She contacted
her other brother, Alonzo Beasley (Alonzo), to come over to the house to help. Alonzo
and Sandria waited for Gale to come home from work.
After Gale arrived, Alonzo and Sandria left to obtain plywood to board up the area
where the sliding door had been. Following her return, Sandria and Gale discussed
whether the person who broke in would come back. Gale noticed that their lawnmower
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was inside the house and mentioned it to Sandria, who believed that the person would
return to take it. Gale thereafter called his employer to request the day off.
Thereafter, Gale was taking photographs of the door when he saw Sanders pushing
the mower across their yard. Although Gale had never met Sanders, Sandria later
remembered him from two weeks before when she had caught him trespassing. Gale
then confronted Sanders and demanded that he return the mower. Sanders said that the
mower was his. The two men squared off and a struggle ensued.
During the struggle, Gale called Sandria for help. Sandria entered the fray armed
with an ice pick, scissors, and a baseball bat. As Gale, Sanders, and Sandria struggled,
Sandria hit Sanders with the baseball bat and stabbed him with the scissors. Sandria
dropped the scissors and Sanders retrieved them, stabbing Gale, until Sandria stabbed his
hand with the ice pick. At one point, Sanders wrestled the bat away from Sandria and
said that it was his turn. Sandria and Gale tried to wrest the bat away from Sanders, who
was stabbed or poked in the eye along the way. The struggle continued until the police
arrived. Sanders was transported to the hospital to treat “severe lacerations” to his right
eye and scalp which required surgery and stitches. (Appellant’s App. p. 21). He was
later arrested.
On October 3, 2011, the State filed an Information charging Sanders with Count I,
burglary, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35-43-2-1; Count II, battery, a Class C felony, I.C. §
35-42-2-1; and Count III, theft, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-43-4-2. On November 28,
2011, the State charged Sanders with being an habitual offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8. On
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December 2, 2011, a bifurcated bench trial was held. At the close of evidence, the trial
court found Sanders not guilty of Counts I and II but found him guilty as charged on
Count III. Subsequently, Sanders admitted he was an habitual offender.
On December 14, 2011, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced
Sanders to two and a half years on the theft conviction, enhanced by an additional year
and a half for his adjudication as an habitual offender. The sentences were ordered to run
consecutively for an aggregate sentence of four years. In addition, the trial court issued a
no contact order and ordered restitution in the amount of $1,017.06.
Sanders now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Sanders argues that there was insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to
support his conviction for theft. When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we
do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Perez v. State, 872
N.E.2d 208, 212-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Only that evidence which is
most favorable to the verdict, as well as reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, will be
considered. Id. at 213. We will affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute
substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Id. We will reverse
only if reasonable persons could not form inferences for each material element of the
crime. Id. A judgment may be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone if that
circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt. Hayworth v. State, 798
N.E.2d 503, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
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In order to convict Sanders of theft, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Sanders knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control
over the Beasleys’ lawnmower, with the intent to deprive them of the mower’s value or
use. See I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a). Intent must be determined from a consideration of the
conduct, and the natural consequences of the conduct. See Mason v. State, 944 N.E.2d
68, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Accordingly, intent may be proven by
circumstantial evidence. Id.
Sanders’ sole argument consists of his allegedly mistaken belief that he owned the
mower and therefore lacked the culpability required to convict him of theft. A mistake of
fact may constitute a defense under certain circumstances:
[i]t is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was
reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact if the mistake negates the
culpability required for commission of the offense.
I.C. § 35-41-3-7. Three elements must be satisfied for a mistake of fact to constitute a
valid defense: (1) the mistake must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake must be
about a matter of fact; and (3) the mistake must negate the culpability required to commit
the crime. Nolan v. State, 863 N.E.2d 398, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
Sanders relies on an excerpt from Gale’s testimony to assert that the evidence was
insufficient to prove his intent to deprive the Beasleys of their mower. During their
struggle, Gale testified that Sanders said “[i]t’s not your mower, it’s my mower.” (Tr. p.
30). Sanders contends that this proves he was mistaken about the ownership of the
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mower and therefore lacked the intent to deprive the Beasleys of the mower’s value or
use. We do not find this argument persuasive.
At trial, Sanders testified that he knew Gale owned the mower but took it because
Gale owed him money from a drug deal. Gale, however, denied knowing Sanders at all.
Faced with these contradictory accounts, the trial court refused to believe Sanders’
ownership claim. Thus, Sanders’ argument is simply an invitation to reweigh the
evidence, which we may not do on appeal. See Perez, 872 N.E.2d at 212-13.
Instead, the evidence most favorable to the verdict establishes Sanders’ guilt.
Both Gale and Sandria testified that the lawnmower was kept inside their home. Sandria
had confronted Sanders two weeks earlier for trespassing. Prior to seeing Sanders with
the mower, Gale confirmed that it was in their house during his discussion with Sandria.
Gale confronted Sanders and demanded the return of the mower. Both he and Sandria
testified that they never gave Sanders permission to use the mower. Following the
confrontation, Sanders and Gale fought over the mower. Finally, Sanders testified that
the mower belonged to Gale. The foregoing evidence supports a reasonable inference
that Sanders intended to commit theft when he took the Beasleys’ mower. Based on the
facts before us, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence from which the
trial court could reasonably conclude that Sanders had committed theft.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Sanders’ conviction.
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Affirmed.
BAILEY, J. and CRONE, J. concur
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