NO. COA13-1330
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 16 September 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Pitt County
v.
No. 12 CRS 55715
LYNWOOD EUGENE HARRIS, JR.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 29 May 2013 by
Judge Quentin T. Sumner in Pitt County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 5 June 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Kimberly N. Callahan, for the State.
New Hanover County Public Defender Jennifer Harjo, by
Assistant Public Defender Brendan O’Donnell, for defendant.
ERVIN, Judge.
Defendant Lynwood Eugene Harris, Jr., appeals from
judgments based upon his convictions for misdemeanor sexual
battery and contributing to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile.
On appeal, Defendant contends that his trial counsel provided
him with constitutionally deficient representation by failing to
properly preserve his challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction for contributing to the abuse
or neglect of a juvenile for the purpose of appellate review,
incorrectly instructing the jury concerning the issue of his
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guilt of contributing to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile,
failing to intervene ex mero motu for the purpose of addressing
certain remarks made during the prosecutor’s final argument, and
allowing the admission of testimony that was irrelevant and
improperly vouched for the prosecuting witness’ credibility.
After careful consideration of Defendant’s challenges to the
trial court’s judgments in light of the record and the
applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s judgments
should remain undisturbed.
I. Factual Background
A. Substantive Facts
On 23 June 2012, Diane Phillips had a birthday party at her
house. Among those in attendance were Defendant and J.W., Ms.
Phillips’ eight-year-old granddaughter.1 As of the date of the
party, Ms. Phillips and Defendant had been involved in a
romantic relationship for approximately 14 years. On the day of
the party, Defendant came and left the house on a regular basis
and consumed alcohol throughout the course of the day.
On the evening of the party, Jessica was lying in Ms.
Phillips’ bed when Defendant entered the room with a cup full of
liquor. Defendant offered Jessica a drink from the cup and
1
J.W. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this
opinion as Jessica, a pseudonym used for ease of reading and to
protect J.W.’s privacy.
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tried to hand the cup to her. Jessica claimed that Defendant
played with her hair, squeezed her buttocks, and “kept on
talking about if I let him suck on my chest they’ll grow up
really big and pretty.” According to Jessica, Defendant “kept
on squeezing [Jessica’s] bottom and then he--he stuck his thumb
in [her] mouth and said--Suck it, baby. Suck it.”
During the evening, Jessica came to the screen door leading
to the porch and said that she needed to tell Ms. Phillips
something. Jessica told Ms. Phillips that she was scared, that
she thought that Defendant had tried to rape her, and that
Defendant was “feeling on [her] buttocks,” “talking about
sucking on [her] breasts,” and asking if she would “let [him]
suck on [her] breasts so they’ll [be] big and pretty when [she
got] big.” After receiving this information, Ms. Phillips threw
Defendant out of the house and threatened to kill him if he ever
returned. Subsequently, Ms. Phillips laid down with Jessica and
began crying, stating that she “shut down” after her
conversation with Jessica because she “was in shock.”
Early the next morning, Ms. Phillips called the police.
When the investigating officers arrived, Ms. Phillips told them
what had happened. After speaking with Ms. Phillips, Officer
Tabitha Johnson of the Greenville Police Department interviewed
Jessica, who stated that
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[her brother] was asleep and she was
watching TV and eating Cheetos, and
[Defendant] came into the room. [Defendant]
asked her what she was doing. She told him
she’s eating Cheetos and drinking a Pepsi.
He asked her if she wanted something
stronger to drink, referring to his
alcoholic beverage in his hand. [Jessica]
told--stated that she told him no, but he
tried to make her drink his beverage. She
also reported to me that he said to her,
while putting his finger in his mouth--Suck
it, baby. Suck it. Started trying to put
it in her mouth. I apologize.
She reported that he then began kissing her
neck and her face and rubbing and squeezing
her butt. [Defendant] asked her to kiss—
asked her if she could kiss his chest and
saying--If you let me suck on your chest,
your breasts will grow in nice and pretty.
She said that she moved away, and he grabbed
her hand and tried to put it--his hands in
his pant--put her hands in his pants near
his private. She snatched her hand away.
[Defendant] told her--I was just trying to
have a little fun with you. And this is
her--me quoting what she’s saying--and
walked out of the room. She said he
returned with another alcoholic beverage and
put some in a cup and tried--and made
[Jessica] drink it. She said she pushed him
away but continued to rub on her hair and
kiss her neck and telling her just to go to
sleep. [Jessica] said she would not to go
sleep, and he left out of the room.
B. Procedural History
On 24 June 2012, a warrant for arresting charging Defendant
with misdemeanor sexual battery and contributing to the abuse
and neglect of a juvenile was issued. On 23 January 2013, Judge
David A. Leech found Defendant guilty as charged in the Pitt
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County District Court. On the following day, Judge Leech
entered a judgment sentencing Defendant to a term of 150 days
imprisonment based upon his conviction for misdemeanor sexual
battery, with this sentence being suspended and with Defendant
being placed on supervised probation, subject to certain terms
and conditions, for a period of 24 months, and to a consecutive
term of 120 days imprisonment based upon his conviction for
contributing to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile, with this
sentence also being suspended and Defendant being placed on
supervised probation, subject to certain terms and conditions,
for a period of 24 months. Defendant noted an appeal to Pitt
County Superior Court for a trial de novo.
The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the
trial court and a jury at the 28 May 2013 session of the Pitt
County Superior Court. On 29 May 2013, the jury returned a
verdict convicting Defendant as charged. At the conclusion of
the ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial court entered a
judgment sentencing Defendant to a term of 150 days imprisonment
based upon his conviction for misdemeanor sexual battery and to
a consecutive term of 120 days imprisonment based upon his
conviction for contributing to the abuse or neglect of a minor,
with this second sentence being suspended and with Defendant
being placed on supervised probation for a period of 18 months,
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subject to certain terms and conditions. Defendant noted an
appeal to this Court from the trial court’s judgments.
II. Substantive Legal Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his initial challenge to the trial court’s judgments,
Defendant contends that he received constitutionally deficient
representation from his trial counsel based upon his trial
counsel’s failure to move to have the contributing to the abuse
or neglect of a juvenile charge dismissed for insufficiency of
the evidence. More specifically, Defendant contends that his
trial counsel’s failure to move that the contributing to the
abuse or neglect of a juvenile charge be dismissed for
insufficiency of the evidence fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and that, had such a motion been made, it
would have been allowed given that the State failed to prove
that Defendant was Jessica’s caretaker and that merely offering
Jessica an alcoholic beverage did not constitute an act of abuse
or neglect. Defendant is not entitled to relief from his
conviction for contributing to the abuse or neglect of a
juvenile on the basis of this claim.
As Defendant candidly concedes, he failed to move that the
contributing to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile charge be
dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence at trial. As a
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general proposition, a defendant’s failure to make a dismissal
motion after the State’s evidence precludes the defendant from
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction on appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(3). “However,
pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 2, we will hear the merits of
[D]efendant’s claim despite the rule violation because
[D]efendant also argues ineffective assistance of counsel based
on counsel’s failure to make the proper motion to dismiss.”
State v. Fraley, 202 N.C. App. 457, 461, 688 S.E.2d 778, 783
(2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted), disc. review
denied, 364 N.C. 243, 698 S.E.2d 660 (2010).
“To survive a motion to dismiss in a criminal action, the
State’s evidence must be substantial evidence (a) of each
essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense
included therein, and (b) of defendant’s being the perpetrator
of the offense. The trial court must view all evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, including evidence that was
erroneously admitted.” State v. Denny, 179 N.C. App. 822, 824,
635 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2006) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted), aff’d in part, modified on other grounds in
part, and rev’d on other grounds in part, 361 N.C. 662, 652
S.E.2d 212 (2007). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
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conclusion.” State v. Tabron, 147 N.C. App. 303, 306, 556
S.E.2d 584, 585 (2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted),
disc. review improvidently granted, 356 N.C. 122, 564 S.E.2d 881
(2002). “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57,
62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). “‘Under a de novo review, the
court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams,
362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re
Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642,
647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)). We will now utilize this
standard of review to evaluate the validity of Defendant’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction for contributing to the abuse or neglect of a
juvenile.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-316.1 provides that:
[a]ny person who is at least 16 years old
who knowingly or willfully causes,
encourages, or aids any juvenile within the
jurisdiction of the court to be in a place
or condition, or to commit an act whereby
the juvenile could be adjudicated
delinquent, undisciplined, abused, or
neglected as defined by [N.C. Gen. Stat. §]
7B-101 and [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B-1501 shall
be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) defines an abused juvenile as “[a]ny
juvenile less than 18 years of age whose parent, guardian,
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custodian, or caretaker” (1) inflicts or allows to be inflicted
upon the juvenile a serious physical injury; (2) creates or
allows to be created a substantial risk of serious physical
injury to the juvenile; (3) uses or allows to be used on the
juvenile cruel or grossly inappropriate procedures or devices to
modify behavior; (4) commits, permits, or encourages the
commission of a variety of specific sexual assaults, acts of
prostitution, and obscenity offenses by, with, or upon the
juvenile; (5) creates or allows to be created serious emotional
damage to the juvenile evinced by a juvenile’s severe anxiety,
depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior toward himself or
others; (6) encourages, directs, or approves of delinquent acts
involving moral turpitude committed by the juvenile; or (7)
commits or allows to be committed acts of human trafficking,
involuntary servitude or sexual servitude against the child. A
neglected juvenile is defined as
[a] juvenile who does not receive proper
care, supervision, or discipline from the
juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or
caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who
is not provided necessary medical care; or
who is not provided necessary remedial care;
or who lives in an environment injurious to
the juvenile’s welfare; or who has been
placed for care or adoption in violation of
law.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). Finally, a caretaker, for
purposes of the abuse and neglect statutes, is defined as
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[a]ny person other than a parent, guardian,
or custodian who has responsibility for the
health and welfare of a juvenile in a
residential setting. A person responsible
for a juvenile’s health and welfare means a
stepparent, foster parent, an adult member
of the juvenile’s household, an adult
relative entrusted with the juvenile’s care,
any person such as a house parent or cottage
parent who has primary responsibility for
supervising a juvenile’s health and welfare
in a residential child care facility or
residential educational facility, or any
employee or volunteer of a division,
institution, or school operated by the
Department of Health and Human Services.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(3).
In seeking to persuade us that the record did not support
Defendant’s conviction for contributing to the abuse or neglect
of a juvenile, Defendant initially argues that the record does
not suffice to support a determination that he was Jessica’s
caretaker. Defendant’s argument is, however, simply
inconsistent with our recent decision in State v. Stevens, __
N.C. App. __, __, 745 S.E.2d 64, 67, disc. review dismissed, 367
N.C. 256, 749 S.E.2d 885, disc. review denied, 367 N.C. 256, 749
S.E.2d 886 (2013), in which this Court explicitly held that a
finding of guilt for violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-316.1 “does
not require a parental or caretaker relationship between a
defendant and a juvenile” and stated, instead, that “[d]efendant
need only be a person who causes a juvenile to be in a place or
condition where the juvenile does not receive proper care from a
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caretaker or is not provided necessary medical care.” See also
State v. Cousart, 182 N.C. App. 150, 153, 641 S.E.2d 372, 374-75
(2007) (stating that the gravamen of the act of contributing to
the delinquency, abuse, or neglect of a minor is “conduct on the
part of the accused” in willfully “caus[ing], encourag[ing], or
aid[ing]”) (alterations in original). As a result, as long as
Defendant’s conduct placed Jessica in a position in which she
did “not receive proper care from a caretaker or is not provided
necessary medical care,” Stevens, __ N.C. App. at __, 745 S.E.2d
at 67, he is subject to the criminal sanction for violating N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-316.1.
In apparent recognition of the problems with his initial
argument, Defendant also contends that the record did not
suffice to support a determination that his actions placed
Jessica in a position in which she could be found to be abused
or neglected. As the record clearly establishes, however,
Defendant entered the bedroom in which Jessica was attempting to
go to sleep, tried to get her to take a drink from the cup of
liquor that he was carrying, played with her hair, and squeezed
her buttocks. As Defendant squeezed Jessica’s buttocks, he
asked her to suck his thumb and requested that she allow him to
suck on her chest so “they’ll grow up really big and pretty.”
In view of the fact that a juvenile who found herself in the
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position that Jessica occupied and was subject to the attentions
that Defendant attempted to pay to her was clearly placed in a
location in which and subject to conditions under which she
could not and did not receive proper care from her caretakers,
the State’s evidence clearly sufficed, given the test enunciated
in Stevens, to support Defendant’s conviction for contributing
to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile.2 As a result, the record
evidence clearly sufficed to support Defendant’s conviction for
contributing to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile, a fact that
necessitates the conclusion that Defendant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim has no merit.3
2
As the State notes in its brief, Defendant’s conduct as
described in Jessica’s testimony clearly constituted the taking
of an indecent liberty with a minor in violation of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-202.1, which is one of the offenses that can underlie
an abuse adjudication. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1)(d). In
addition, this Court has held that a father’s decision to offer
marijuana and beer to a child, while not rising to the level of
abuse, constituted neglect. In re M.G., 187 N.C. App. 536, 551,
653 S.E.2d 581, 590 (2007), rev’d on other grounds, 363 N.C.
570, 681 S.E.2d 290 (2009). Thus, given the absence of any
requirement that Defendant be Jessica’s parent, guardian, or
caretaker and the fact that Defendant’s conduct placed Jessica
in a position and subject to conditions under which she could be
found to be abused or neglected, the relevant statutory
provisions and decisions of this Court clearly support
Defendant’s conviction for contributing to the abuse or neglect
of a juvenile.
3
The warrant charging Defendant with contributing to the
abuse or neglect of a juvenile alleged, in pertinent part, that
“the defendant named above unlawfully and willfully did
knowingly, while at least 16 years of age, cause[], encourage,
and aid [Jessica], age 8 years, a juvenile, to commit an act,
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B. Jury Instructions
After the completion of the evidence and the arguments of
counsel, the trial court instructed the jury with respect to the
issue of Defendant’s guilt of contributing to the abuse or
neglect of a juvenile as follows:
The defendant has also been charged with
contributing to the abuse and neglect of a
juvenile. For you to find the defendant
consume alcoholic beverage, whereby that juvenile could be
adjudicated abused and neglected.” In his brief, Defendant
argues, in reliance upon State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 100, 107,
253 S.E.2d 890 894 (stating that “[i]t has long been the law of
this state that a defendant must be convicted, if convicted at
all, of the particular offense charged in the warrant or bill of
indictment”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 874, 100 S. Ct. 156, 62 L.
Ed. 2d 102 (1979), that the only basis upon which Defendant
could lawfully have been convicted of contributing to the abuse
or neglect of a juvenile was by encouraging her to consume
alcohol. We do not find this argument persuasive for two
reasons. First, as this Court held in Stevens, __ N.C. App. at
__, 745 S.E.2d at 66, an indictment that fails to allege the
exact manner in which the defendant allegedly contributed to the
delinquency, abuse, or neglect of a minor is not fatally
defective. Unlike the situation at issue in Faircloth, in which
the State sought to convict the defendant of a completely
different offense from the one alleged in the indictment, the
State did, in fact, proceed against Defendant on the grounds
that he committed the offense of contributing to the abuse or
neglect, rather than the delinquency, of a juvenile. State v.
Tollison, 190 N.C. App. 552, 557, 660 S.E.2d 647, 651 (2008)
(stating that, since “a victim’s age is not an essential element
of first degree kidnapping,” “the variance in the indictment was
not fatal”). Secondly, and more importantly, Defendant’s
argument relies upon an unduly narrow reading of the
contributing to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile warrant that
completely overlooks the context in which Defendant attempted to
persuade Jessica to consume alcohol. As a result, Defendant’s
argument in reliance upon the language of the contributing
warrant is not persuasive.
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guilty of this offense the State must prove
four things beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that the defendant was at least 16
years old.
Second, that the defendant caused,
encouraged, and aided the juvenile to commit
an act whereby the juvenile could be
adjudicated abused and neglected.
Third, that [Jessica] was a juvenile. An
abused and neglected juvenile is a person
who has not reached her 18th birthday, and
is not married, emancipated, or a member of
the armed forces of the United States.
And [f]ourth, that the defendant acted
knowingly or willfully.
As Defendant candidly concedes, he failed to object to the
trial court’s contributing to the abuse or neglect of a minor
instruction at or before the time that the jury retired to begin
its deliberations, so that our review is limited to determining
whether plain error occurred. State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506,
518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334, (2012). A plain error is an error
that is “‘so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements
that justice cannot have been done[.]’” State v. Odom, 307 N.C.
655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting U.S. v. McCaskill,
676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018,
103 S. Ct. 381, 74 L. Ed. 2d. 513 (1982)). “To establish plain
error, defendant must show that the erroneous jury instruction
was a fundamental error—that the error had a probable impact on
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the jury verdict.” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at
334. As a result, in order to establish the existence of plain
error, a “defendant must convince this Court not only that there
was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would
have reached a different result.” State v. Jordan, 333 N.C.
431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993).
As Defendant correctly asserts in his brief, the trial
court’s instructions misstated the applicable law by instructing
the jury that it should find that Jessica was an abused or
neglected juvenile in the event that it found beyond a
reasonable doubt that she had not reached her 18th birthday and
had not been married, emancipated, or entered military service.4
For that reason, the only issue that remains for our
consideration is whether Defendant is entitled to relief from
his contributing to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile
4
As we have already noted, in order to convict Defendant of
the offense made punishable by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-316.1 in
light of the allegations set out in the warrant that had been
issued against him, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Defendant caused, encouraged, or aided Jessica to be
placed in a location or situation in which she could be
adjudicated abused or neglected. A cursory reading of the trial
court’s instructions establishes that the trial court totally
failed to instruct the jury concerning the meaning of the
statutory references to abuse or neglect and, in essence, told
the jury to find the existence of those prerequisites for a
conviction on the sole basis of Jessica’s age and the fact that
she had not been married, emancipated, or entered military
service. Thus, the trial court’s instructions, which are
consistent with the applicable pattern jury instruction, clearly
misstated the applicable law.
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conviction based upon this erroneous instruction. As a result,
the ultimate question raised by Defendant’s challenge to the
trial court’s instructions concerning the issue of his guilt of
contributing to the abuse or neglect of a minor is the extent to
which it is probable that the outcome of Defendant’s trial would
have been different had the trial court correctly instructed the
jury concerning the issue of whether Defendant had placed
Jessica in a place or set of circumstances under which she could
be adjudicated abused or neglected.
The only evidence before the jury concerning the issue of
Defendant’s guilt of contributing to the abuse or neglect of a
minor consisted of Jessica’s testimony and evidence concerning
statements that Jessica had made to other persons that was
offered for corroborative purposes. As we read the record, the
argument that Defendant advanced before the jury in support of
his request for an acquittal on both the contributing to the
abuse or neglect of a minor charge and the misdemeanor sexual
battery charge rested on a contention that Defendant had no
motivation for engaging in the conduct described in Jessica’s
testimony, an assertion that Jessica was biased against him, a
description of certain inconsistencies in the accounts
concerning Defendant’s conduct that Jessica provided on
different occasions, and a claim that certain statements that
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Jessica had made were unlikely to be true given other
surrounding circumstances. Thus, the ultimate issue presented
for the jury’s consideration at trial was whether Jessica was a
credible witness, an issue that the jury clearly answered in the
affirmative.
A careful review of the record satisfies us that, even
though the trial court’s instructions rested on a clear
misstatement of the applicable law, it is not probable that the
outcome at trial would have been different in the event that the
jury had been correctly instructed. The description of
Defendant’s conduct contained in Jessica’s testimony, which the
jury obviously believed, sufficed to support a determination
that he contributed to the abuse or neglect of a minor. We are
unable to see how the trial court’s erroneous instruction in any
way enhanced the likelihood that the jury would have resolved
the underlying credibility contest in Defendant’s favor. Having
determined, contrary to the arguments vigorously advanced by
Defendant’s trial counsel, that Jessica’s testimony was
credible, the jury would necessarily have determined that
Defendant placed her in a location or set of circumstances under
which she “[did] not receive proper care from a caretaker or
[was] not provided necessary medical care.” Stevens, __ N.C.
App. at __, 745 S.E.2d at 67. As a result, given that “the term
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‘plain error’ does not simply mean obvious or apparent error,
but rather has the meaning given by the court in” Lawrence,
Odom, 307 N.C. 660, 300 S.E.2d 378 (holding that the failure to
instruct on the issue of the defendant’s guilt of a lesser
included offense did not rise to the level of plain error), see
also Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 519, 723 S.E.2d at 334-35 (holding
that the omission of an element from the trial court’s
instruction to the jury concerning the issue of Defendant’s
guilt of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon
did not rise to the level of plain error), we conclude that the
trial court’s instructional error did not constitute plain error
and that Defendant is not, for that reason, entitled to relief
from his conviction for contributing to the abuse or neglect of
a minor based upon the trial court’s erroneous instruction.
C. Prosecutor’s Final Argument
Thirdly, Defendant contends that he is entitled to relief
from his convictions based upon remarks that the prosecutor made
during his closing argument. More specifically, Defendant
contends that the prosecutor’s comments to the effect that
Defendant had ruined Jessica’s childhood and that, in the event
that the jury failed to find Jessica’s testimony to be credible,
it would be sending a message that Jessica would need to be
hurt, raped, or murdered before an alleged abuser could be
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convicted, were improper. Defendant is not entitled to relief
from his convictions based upon this set of contentions.
Statements made during closing arguments to the jury are to
be viewed in the context in which the remarks are made and the
overall factual circumstances to which they make reference.
State v. Jaynes, 353 N.C. 534, 559, 549 S.E.2d 179, 198 (2001)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 934, 122 S. Ct. 1310,
152 L. Ed 2d 220 (2002). As a general proposition, counsel are
allowed wide latitude in closing arguments, State v. Johnson,
298 N.C. 355, 368-69, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979) (citations
omitted), so that a prosecutor is entitled to argue all
reasonable inferences drawn from the facts contained in the
record. State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103, 135, 711 S.E.2d 122,
145 (2011) (citations omitted), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S.
Ct. 1541, 182 L. Ed. 2d 176 (2012). “Unless the defendant
objects, the trial court is not required to interfere ex mero
motu unless the arguments stray so far from the bounds of
propriety as to impede the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”
State v. Small, 328 N.C. 175, 185, 400 S.E.2d 413, 418 (1991)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, given
that Defendant did not object to the prosecutorial comments that
are addressed in his brief, the ultimate issue raised by
Defendant’s challenge to the prosecutor’s closing argument is
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the extent, if any, to which the challenged comments were so
egregiously improper as to necessitate judicial intervention
despite the absence of an objection.
In the course of his closing argument, the prosecutor
asserted that:
[The Defendant] has no right to ruin
[Jessica’s] childhood, because how--what
memories is she going to have as--of her
eight-year old time? What’s going to be the
dominant thing in her life when she thinks
back to being eight and nine? It’s going to
be this man groping her, having to come in
and testify and face him.
. . . .
So it comes down to is it sufficient to
listen to an eight-year-old girl--convict
somebody of this crime? And if it’s not,
then this case is never going to be--we’ll
never prove it. Never. So why shouldn’t we
believe her? Because she’s eight? Is that
why? Do we say that no eight-year-old is
ever going to be believable? . . . Now, if
you don’t believe her because she’s eight or
because there’s no forensic evidence, then
what you’re saying is --Well, maybe we
should let it go a little further so we can
get more evidence. Is it fair to tell an
eight-year-old--Well, you know, honey, we’d
like to help you, but you got to get hurt
first. You got to get hurt first. Now,
we’ve got some evidence then. You get hurt,
get raped or murdered, we got some evidence
then. But just your word, just your word,
nah.
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We do not believe that either of the challenged comments
necessitated ex moro motu intervention on the part of the trial
court.
1. Ruining Jessica’s Childhood
In arguing that Defendant had ruined Jessica’s childhood,
the prosecutor simply made a reasonable inference, based upon
the record evidence, that Jessica would be traumatized by the
events in question. According to the record, Jessica was eight
years old at the time of the incident underlying this case. In
addition, Jessica told Ms. Phillips that she believed that
Defendant, whom she had known for her entire life, was
attempting to rape her. Under that set of circumstances, the
prosecutor’s inference that Jessica had been traumatized by
Defendant’s actions was a reasonable one. As a result, since
the prosecutor’s comment to the effect that Defendant had ruined
Jessica’s childhood represented a reasonable inference drawn
from the record, the trial court did not err by failing to
intervene ex mero motu to address the challenged prosecutorial
argument.
Although the Supreme Court has held that an argument that
undermines reason and is designed to viscerally appeal to the
jurors’ passions or prejudices is improper, see State v. Jones,
355 N.C. 117, 132-33, 558 S.E.2d 97, 107 (2002) (holding that
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references to the Columbine school shooting and Oklahoma City
bombing during a murder trial was improper, in part, because it
attempted to lead jurors away from the evidence by appealing to
their sense of passion and prejudice), a prosecutor may argue
that the jury should use its verdict to “send a message” to the
community. State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 367, 572 S.E.2d 108,
140 (2002) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040, 123
S. Ct. 2087, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (2003); State v. Nicholson, 355
N.C. 1, 43-44, 558 S.E.2d 109, 138 (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 845, 123 S. Ct. 178, 154 L. Ed. 2d 71 (2002).
Finally, a prosecutor is entitled to argue that the jury should
or should not believe a witness and explain the reasons that the
prosecutor believes should cause the jury to reach such a
credibility-related conclusion in his or her final argument.
See State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 425, 683 S.E.2d 174, 200
(2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1074, 130 S.
Ct. 2104, 176 L. Ed. 2d 734 (2010); State v. Augustine, 359 N.C.
709, 725, 616 S.E.2d 515, 528 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S.
925, 126 S. Ct. 2980, 165 L. Ed. 2d 988 (2006); State v. Scott,
343 N.C. 313, 344, 471 S.E.2d 605, 623 (1996) (citation
omitted).
2. Jessica’s Credibility
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As we have already noted, the ultimate issue before the
jury in this case was Jessica’s credibility. The obvious
purpose of the second set of challenged prosecutorial comments
was to urge the jury to find Jessica’s testimony to be credible
despite the fact that the record did not contain physical
evidence that supported her description of Defendant’s conduct.
Admittedly words like “murder” and “rape” are, without doubt,
emotionally charged. Although Defendant attempts to analogize
the prosecutor’s second set of challenged remarks to those at
issue in Jones, that analogy is unpersuasive given that the
remarks under consideration in Jones referred to information
outside the record and compared the defendant’s conduct with
infamous acts committed by others, neither of which is true of
the prosecutorial comments at issue here. As a result of the
fact that the prosecutorial comments at issue here were grounded
in the evidentiary record and represented nothing more than an
assertion that the jury should not refrain from believing
Jessica because the record did not contain corroborative
physical evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not err
by failing to intervene ex mero motu to address the second set
of prosecutorial comments that Defendant has challenged in his
brief. Thus, Defendant is not entitled to relief from his
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convictions based on allegedly improper comments by the
prosecutor.
D. Ms. Phillips’ Testimony
Finally, Defendant contends that the trial court committed
plain error by allowing Ms. Phillips to deliver testimony that,
in Defendant’s opinion, improperly appealed to the jury’s
sympathy and impermissibly vouched for Jessica’s credibility.
According to Defendant, the trial court should have excluded
this evidence despite the fact that he failed to object to its
admission at trial on the grounds that the evidence in question
was irrelevant and constituted impermissible lay opinion
testimony. We do not find Defendant’s argument persuasive.
1. Relevance
“The admissibility of evidence is governed by a threshold
inquiry into its relevance.” State v. Griffin, 136 N.C. App.
531, 550, 525 S.E.2d 793, 806 (citations omitted), disc. review
denied, 351 N.C. 644, 543 S.E.2d 877 (2000). Relevant evidence
is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401. Evidence that is
“not part of the crime charged but pertain[s] to the chain of
events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime,
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is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with
the charged crime, or if it forms an integral and natural part
of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the
story of the crime for the jury.” State v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542,
548, 391 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1990) (quoting U.S. v. Williford, 764
F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985)) (internal brackets omitted).
A trial court’s ruling with respect to relevance issues is
“technically . . . not discretionary and therefore is not
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard[,]” but is,
nevertheless, entitled to great deference on appeal. Sherrod v.
Nash General Hosp. Inc., 126 N.C. App. 755, 762, 487 S.E.2d 151,
155 (1997) (quoting State v. Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502,
410 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 290, 416
S.E.2d 398, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915, 113 S. Ct. 321, 121 L.
Ed. 2d 241 (1992)) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 348
N.C. 526, 500 S.E.2d 708 (1998). As a result of the fact that
Defendant failed to object to the admission of the challenged
evidence at trial, we review Defendant’s challenge to the
admission of this evidence using a plain error standard of
review.
At trial, Ms. Phillips testified that, after Jessica told
her about Defendant’s conduct, Ms. Phillips “got scared and shut
-26-
down,” “was in shock,” laid down with Jessica, and “started
crying.” Subsequently, Ms. Phillips saw Defendant coming out of
the bathroom, “grabbed him by the shirt,” “threw him out the
screen door,” and “told him if he ever come back to [her] house
again,” she “would kill him, because [she] was mad and scared at
the time.” Finally, Ms. Phillips also stated that she told
Jessica’s father about Defendant’s actions and “he got up
raging.”
The challenged portion of Ms. Phillips’ testimony was
relevant to show what occurred immediately after Defendant’s
alleged assault upon Jessica. The fact that Jessica reported
the incident to Ms. Phillips immediately after it occurred,
rather than waiting until a later time to make her accusation,
tends to bolster the credibility of her testimony and was
relevant for that reason. Similarly, the challenged portion of
Ms. Phillips’ testimony tends to show that Jessica had given a
consistent account of her interaction with Defendant from the
time of her first conversation with Ms. Phillips immediately
after the incident occurred until she testified at trial.
Finally, the challenged portion of Ms. Phillips’ testimony,
which details her reaction to Jessica’s allegations and the
events that led up to Defendant’s arrest, helped complete the
story of Defendant’s assault upon Jessica for the jury. As a
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result, the trial court did not err by failing to exclude the
challenged portion of Ms. Phillips’ testimony on relevance
grounds.
2. Vouching for Jessica’s Credibility
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 701, the
testimony of a non-expert witness “in the form of opinions or
inferences is limited to . . . opinions or inferences [that] are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of his [or her] testimony or
the determination of a fact in issue.” The admission of opinion
testimony intended to bolster or vouch for the credibility of
another witness violates N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 701.
State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 334-35, 561 S.E.2d 245, 255,
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1006, 123 S. Ct. 488, 154 L. Ed. 2d 404
(2002). “As long as the lay witness has a basis of personal
knowledge for his [or her] opinion, the evidence is admissible.”
State v. Bunch, 104 N.C. App. 106, 110, 408 S.E.2d 191, 194
(1991).
In addition to questioning its relevance, Defendant
contends that the challenged portion of Ms. Phillips’ testimony
impermissibly vouched for Jessica’s credibility. However, Ms.
Phillips never directly commented on the issue of Jessica’s
credibility. Put another way, Ms. Phillips never specifically
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stated whether she believed Jessica or not. Although Defendant
argues that the challenged portion of Ms. Phillips’ testimony
contained an implicit expression of confidence in Jessica’s
veracity, we are unable to read such an implication into what
Ms. Phillips actually said. Finally, even if Ms. Phillips’
testimony did, in some manner, amount to an impermissible
comment concerning Jessica’s credibility, any error that the
trial court may have committed by allowing the admission of that
testimony did not rise to the level of plain error. In view of
the relatively incidental nature of any vouching for Jessica’s
credibility that might have occurred and the fact that most
jurors are likely to assume that a grandmother would believe an
accusation of sexual abuse made by one of her own grandchildren,
see State v. Freeland, 316 N.C. 13, 18, 340 S.E.2d 35, 37 (1986)
(stating that a jury would naturally assume that a mother would
believe that her daughter was telling the truth concerning a
sexual assault allegation); State v. Dew, __ N.C. App. __, __,
738 S.E.2d 215, 219 (stating that “most jurors are likely to
assume that a mother will believe accusations of sexual abuse
made by her own children.”), disc. review denied, 366 N.C. 595,
743 S.E.2d 187 (2013) we are simply unable to conclude that the
outcome at Defendant’s trial would probably have been different
had the trial court refrained from allowing the admission of the
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challenged portion of Ms. Phillips’ testimony. As a result, the
trial court did not commit plain error by allowing the admission
of the challenged portion of Ms. Phillips’ testimony.5
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that
none of Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s judgments
have merit. As a result, the trial court’s judgments should,
and hereby do, remain undisturbed.
NO ERROR.
Judge ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., concurred in the result only
prior to 6 September 2014.
Judge DAVIS concurs.
5
In his brief, Defendant contends that, even if he is not
entitled to relief from his convictions based on a single error,
the cumulative effect of the errors that he contends that the
trial court committed deprived him of a fair trial. However,
given that “the plain error rule may not be applied on a
cumulative basis,” State v. Dean, 196 N.C. App. 180, 194, 674
S.E.2d 453, 463, disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 376, 679 S.E.2d
139 (2009), and given that none of Defendant’s challenges to the
trial court’s judgments were properly preserved for purposes of
appellate review, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to
relief from the trial court’s judgments on the basis of the
cumulative error doctrine.