Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 24 2014, 11:00 am
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN M. CHRIST GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
FRANCES BARROW
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN RE: THE SUPPORT OF V. B. and S.B., )
)
JEFFERY A. ROACH, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1401-JP-44
)
VICKY LYNN BISHOP, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Louis F. Rosenberg, Judge
The Honorable Marcia Ferree, Commissioner
Cause No. PT83005769
September 24, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Petitioner, Jeffery Allen Roach (Father), appeals the trial court’s Order
which denied his request to eliminate his child support arrearage.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Father raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court
abused its discretion by ordering Father to pay his child support arrearage.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Through a paternity action commenced in 1983, Father was declared to be the
biological father of V.B., born August 21, 1979, and S.B, born January 30, 1983.
Consequently, the trial court ordered Father to pay $25 per week in child support. On
September 10, 1999, the trial court determined V.B. emancipated as of August 21, 1997,
and set Father’s child support arrearage at $37,985. Thereafter, on March 31, 2000, in
the course of a compliance hearing, the trial court ordered child support for S.B. abated
because the minor child had been living with the maternal grandmother since she was
five years old. As a result, the trial court closed the contempt citation. No child support
has been charged to Father since this hearing.
In 2011, Roach’s driver’s license was suspended and his tax refund intercepted.
On November 3, 2011, Father filed his motion for abatement of child support, arguing
that the abatement order issued on March 31, 2000 eliminated not only future child
support but also the delinquent child support. Following a hearing on October 2, 2012,
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the trial court denied his motion. On November 5, 2012, Father filed a motion to
reconsider, which was denied by the trial court after a hearing.
Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Father contends that the trial court’s order issued on March 31, 2000 not only
abated any future child support owed for S.B. but also voided his child support arrearage,
set by order of September 10, 1999.
Here, the trial court entered hand-written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Therefore, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: first, we determine whether the
evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support
the judgment. Dedek v. Dedek, 851 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We disturb
the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail
to support the judgment. Id. The challenger must establish that the trial court’s findings
are clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when a review of the record
leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. However, we do not defer
to conclusions of law, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal
standard. Id.
Initially, we note that Father’s argument relates to the interpretation of the trial
court’s March 31, 2000 order that abated his child support. He now contends that this
order not only eliminated his future child support but also the child support arrearage set
by order of September 10, 1999. Father never appealed either of these orders. If Father
perceived either of these order to be ambiguous, he should have appealed the order within
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thirty days of its entry. See Ind. Appellate R. 9(A). Father failed to so, therefore he has
waived his argument for our review.
Waiver notwithstanding, we will address Father’s contention on its merits. It has
long been established in Indiana that once child support arrearages have accrued, a court
may not retroactively reduce or eliminate such obligations. Whited v. Whited, 859 N.E.2d
657, 661 (Ind. 2007). However, retroactive modification is permitted when: (1) the
parties have agreed to and carried out an alternative method of payment which
substantially complies with the spirit of the decree, or (2) the obligated parent takes the
child into his or her home, assumes custody, provides necessities, and exercises parental
control for such a period of time that a permanent change of custody is exercised.
Neither of these exceptions comes into play here.
Accordingly, even though the trial court could abate Father’s future child support
obligations with respect to S.B., Father’s child support arrearage had been established
and can no longer be modified. The trial court properly rejected Father’s attempt to
impermissibly abate delinquent child support.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Father’s request to eliminate his child support arrearage.
Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J. concurs
CRONE, J. concurs in result without opinion
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