Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Sep 26 2014, 9:34 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
BRIAN REITZ
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TASHA JONES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1401-CR-1
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Kimberly J. Brown, Judge
Cause No. 49F07-1206-CM-42919
September 26, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
PYLE, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tasha Jones (“Jones”) appeals her conviction, after a bench trial, for Class A
misdemeanor conversion.1 On appeal, Jones claims that the State did not prove that she
knowingly exerted unauthorized control over the property in question. Concluding that
the State presented sufficient evidence at trial, we affirm Jones’s conviction.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Whether sufficient evidence supports Jones’s conviction.
FACTS
On June 23, 2012, Stacy Rushton (“Rushton”) was working at an Indianapolis
Walmart as an Asset Protection Officer. Jones was in the Walmart that day with her two
children and her father. Rushton began watching Jones on the store’s security cameras at
the request of a co-worker, though she had previously noticed Jones in another area of the
store before her co-worker’s request.
Jones selected a bag and numerous towels and made her way to the cash register.
Jones eventually met her son at the register; her father and daughter were already in line
paying for items. Jones proceeded down a closed aisle, picked up a magazine, and stood
next to the cashier who was ringing up her father’s purchases. The security video appears
to show that Jones leaned in and handed an item to the cashier. However, several items
remained in her arms, and she did not place them down at the register for checkout. After
1
IND. CODE § 35-43-4-3(a).
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her father completed his purchase, Jones walked away from the register and toward the
exit, still holding a number of items. Before Jones could exit the store, Rushton and her
co-worker stopped Jones and asked her to come with them.
Rushton took Jones to an office and requested that she return the merchandise in
her possession. Rushton also asked Jones for her identification. Jones refused to tell
Rushton her name. Rushton then called the police, and an officer came to the Walmart
and placed Jones under arrest.
On June 24, 2012, the State charged Jones with Class A misdemeanor conversion.
A bench trial was held on December 9, 2013. At trial, Jones testified on her own behalf
and admitted during cross-examination that she knew that the items were still in her
hands when Rushton stopped her. The trial court found Jones guilty of conversion and
sentenced her to a suspended term of 365 days with no probation, forty (40) hours of
community service, and imposed fines and costs. Jones now appeals.
DECISION
Jones argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support her conviction because
the State failed to prove that she knowingly exerted unauthorized control of the
merchandise in question.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not
that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence
to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve
this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting
evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder
could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It
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is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may
reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
To convict Jones of conversion as charged, the State had to prove that she
knowingly exerted unauthorized control over Walmart’s property. I.C. § 35-43-4-3(a). A
person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when she engages in the conduct, she is aware
of a high probability that she is doing so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2.
Here, the security camera footage initially shows that Jones was essentially empty-
handed except for the bag she had previously selected but had not purchased. By the
time Jones made her way to the cash register, she had the bag hanging from her wrist and
several folded items underneath her arm. Jones walked away from the register and
toward the exit without making any attempt to pay for the items. Furthermore, she
admitted during cross-examination to knowing that she had the items when Rushton
stopped her. Nevertheless, on appeal, Jones contends that she “was inadvertent in leaving
the store without [paying for the items].” (Jones’s Br. 6). This is simply an invitation for
this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146-47.
Accordingly, we affirm Jones’s conviction.
We affirm.
BAILEY, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.
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