SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
State v. Diana M. Palma (A-41-12) (071228)
Argued September 23, 2013 -- Decided September 30, 2014
RODRÍGUEZ, P.J.A.D. (temporarily assigned), writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court addresses the appropriate factors to be considered when sentencing a person to
careless driving under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.
On February 22, 2010, defendant was driving a sport utility vehicle (SUV) in Red Bank. As defendant
made a left turn, she struck a pedestrian who was crossing the street. The victim became pinned between the SUV’s
undercarriage and the pavement. Defendant continued to drive, unaware of the collision or that the victim was being
dragged under the SUV. Another driver alerted defendant that she had struck the victim and defendant stopped her
SUV. Emergency personnel freed the victim and transported her to a local hospital. The victim died two months
later as a result of the injuries sustained from the accident.
Defendant was not under the influence at the time of the accident. She received citations for careless
driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97, and failure to yield to a pedestrian, N.J.S.A. 39:4-36. The Monmouth County
Prosecutor’s Office reviewed the police investigation reports and declined to present criminal charges against
defendant to the county grand jury. The prosecutor forwarded the traffic summonses to the Red Bank Municipal
Court for adjudication.
In the municipal court, pursuant to an agreement, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the careless-driving
charge. The remaining charge was dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to a fifteen-day term in the Monmouth
County Jail to be served on weekends; a ninety-day license suspension; and fines and costs totaling $241. The
municipal court judge stayed the custodial sentence and license suspension pending appeal. Subsequently, by
agreement, the stay of the license suspension was vacated.
Defendant appealed only the custodial sentence to the Law Division. On de novo review, the Law Division
judge imposed the same sentence. Defendant then appealed to the Appellate Division. In a published opinion, the
Appellate Division vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. State v. Palma, 426 N.J. Super. 510 (App.
Div. 2012). The panel concluded that the Moran sentencing factors, State v. Moran, 201 N.J. 311, 328-29 (2010),
provided controlling guidance in arriving at an appropriate sentence. The panel also concluded that judges may only
impose a license suspension or custodial sentence in careless driving cases that present aggravating circumstances,
and that such circumstances must come from evidential sources in the record, which shall be recited in the judge’s
factual findings.
This Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 213 N.J. 45 (2013).
HELD: The factors outlined by this Court in State v. Moran, 202 N.J. 311 (2010), should be followed by judges in the
municipal court and Law Division when imposing sentences for careless driving.
1. In New Jersey, custodial sentences for criminal and quasi-criminal violations are governed by different codes
depending on the classification of the offense. Sentencing for crimes and disorderly persons offenses are governed
by the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. Offenses arising from violations of motor vehicle and traffic
regulations are governed by the Motor Vehicle Code. In this category of cases, custodial terms and license
suspensions are characterized as consequences of magnitude. In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, one of
the principal goals, under either the Criminal Code or Motor Vehicle Code, is the elimination of disparity in order to
ensure uniformity and predictability. The Court often has taken affirmative steps to ensure that sentencing and
disposition procedures, whether authorized by statute or court rule, will not produce widely disparate results for
1
similarly situated defendants. (pp. 8-10)
2. The leading case in New Jersey with respect to sentencing guidelines or principles in Motor Vehicle Code cases
is Moran. Defendant, Laura Moran was found guilty in municipal court of reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, as
well as other motor vehicle offenses. The sentencing court suspended Moran’s driving privileges for forty-five days
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5-31. This provision is a sentence enhancer that empowers the court to suspend a
defendant’s license for a willful violation of certain offenses, including reckless driving. The Court vacated the
forty-five-day period of license suspension and remanded for resentencing. The Court directed the sentencing court
to consider seven factors in determining a new sentence including the nature and circumstances of defendant’s
conduct, defendant’s driving record, whether a license suspension would cause excessive hardship to defendant and
her dependents, and the need for personal deterrence. The Court also instructed that any other relevant factor clearly
identified by the court may be considered. The Court further held that the sentencing courts are required to
articulate their reasoning when imposing a license suspension to enhance appellate review and further safeguard
against arbitrariness in sentencing. (pp. 10-13)
3. As the Court did in Moran, it exercises its supervisory function in this appeal in order to provide guidance for the
municipal courts and Law Division judges in fashioning a sentence for those convicted of careless driving. This
case differs from Moran in two respects. First, this is a careless driving case, and the sentencing enhancer of
N.J.S.A. 39:5-31 does not apply. Second, here defendant challenges a custodial sentence, not a license suspension.
The holding in Moran introduced the concept of using certain enumerated factors or principles when imposing a
sentence that constitutes a consequence of magnitude in a motor vehicle conviction case. That holding, the Court
concludes, should be extended to include sentencing for careless driving, which carries a potential custodial term.
Consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Moran, the Court holds that the Criminal Code sentencing factors per se are
not to be used in determining whether or not a custodial term should be imposed for a careless driving conviction.
The Court also concludes that the Criminal Code sentencing factors should not be used as guidance in sentencing
decisions for careless driving convictions. (pp. 13-14)
4. With respect to what other information the sentencing judge should consider in fashioning a sentence, the Court
notes that in sentencing, trial courts consider all relevant information, including hearsay, unrestrained by the rules of
evidence. The whole person concept authorizes the sentencing court to comprehend in its deliberations a wide range
of information that might otherwise be excluded by evidentiary norms. However, any such information must come
before the court in the due course of its proceedings and the sentencing court should take care to prevent extraneous
material from seeping into the process, even if a matter of personal knowledge. (pp. 14-15)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED to the municipal
court for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and
FERNANDEZ-VINA join in JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ’s opinion. JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) did not
participate.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-41 September Term 2012
071228
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DIANA M. PALMA,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued September 23, 2013 – Decided September 30, 2014
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at 426 N.J. Super. 510 (2012).
Paul H. Heinzel, Special Deputy Attorney
General, Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for appellant (Christopher J.
Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney; Monica L. do Outeiro,
Special Deputy Attorney General, Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
Paul E. Zager argued the cause for
respondent.
JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (temporarily assigned) delivered the
opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we address an issue similar to the question
addressed in State v. Moran, 202 N.J. 311 (2010), where the
Court identified the appropriate factors to be considered when
sentencing a person convicted of reckless driving, N.J.S.A.
39:4-96. The factors were provided in order to channel the
1
discretion afforded to the sentencing court under the reckless
driving statute. Here, defendant pleaded guilty to careless
driving under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97, a statute that similarly
provides considerable discretion to a sentencing court. In this
instance, a fatality resulted from the incident. The municipal
court and Law Division judge imposed a fifteen-day custodial
term as part of defendant’s sentence. The Appellate Division
reversed the custodial term and remanded for resentencing after
consideration of sentencing factors identified in Moran. We
affirm and, pursuant to our supervisory function, N.J. Const.
art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3, and in order to provide guidance for the
municipal court and Law Division judges, hold that the Moran
factors provide the appropriate guidance and should be followed
in this and similar cases involving sentencing pursuant to the
careless driving statute.
I.
On February 22, 2010, defendant, Diana M. Palma, was
driving a Ford Expedition sport utility vehicle (SUV) in Red
Bank. As she traveled east on Bergen Place, she made a left
turn onto Broad Street. A forty-four-year-old woman, Alla
Tsiring (victim), who was wearing a pink jacket, was crossing
Broad Street at that moment. She was struck by the driver’s
side of defendant’s SUV. The victim became pinned between the
SUV’s undercarriage and the pavement. Defendant continued to
2
drive, unaware of the collision or that the victim was being
dragged under the SUV. Another driver, Jules Slewski, alerted
defendant that she had struck the victim. Defendant stopped her
SUV and saw the victim. Shortly thereafter, emergency personnel
freed the victim and transported her to a local hospital. About
two months later, the victim died as a result of injuries
sustained from the accident.
Red Bank Patrolman Beau Broadley verified that defendant
had a valid driver’s license and was not under the influence of
intoxicants at the time of the accident. He issued motor
vehicle citations to defendant for careless driving, N.J.S.A.
39:4-97, and failure to yield to a pedestrian, N.J.S.A. 39:4-36.
The Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office reviewed the
pertinent police investigation reports and declined to present
criminal charges against defendant to the county grand jury.
The prosecutor forwarded the traffic summonses to the Red Bank
Municipal Court for adjudication.
In the municipal court, pursuant to an agreement, defendant
entered a plea of guilty to the careless-driving charge. The
remaining charge was dismissed. Defendant gave an adequate
factual basis, and the guilty plea was accepted.
According to N.J.S.A. 39:4-104, a person convicted of
careless driving, reckless driving, speeding, and other traffic
offenses defined in Article 12 of Title 39 (N.J.S.A. 39:4-95 to
3
-103(1)), “shall, for each violation, be subject to a fine of
not less than $50.00 or more than $200.00, or imprisonment for a
period not exceeding 15 days, or both,” unless otherwise
provided.
The municipal court judge imposed the following sentence: a
fifteen-day term in the Monmouth County Jail to be served on
weekends; a ninety-day license suspension; and fines and costs
totaling $241. The municipal court judge stayed the custodial
sentence and license suspension pending appeal. Subsequently,
by agreement, the stay of the license suspension was vacated.
II.
Defendant appealed only the custodial sentence to the Law
Division. On a de novo review the Law Division judge imposed
the same sentence.
Defendant then appealed to the Appellate Division. In a
published opinion, the Appellate Division vacated the sentence
and remanded for resentencing. State v. Palma, 426 N.J. Super.
510, 520 (App. Div. 2012). The panel concluded that the Moran
sentencing factors, Moran supra, 202 N.J. at 328-29, provided
the controlling guidance in arriving at an appropriate sentence.
The panel distinguished this case from Moran by noting that
Moran involved a charge for reckless driving, which is a more
serious offense than careless driving. Palma, supra, 426 N.J.
Super. at 517. Moreover, in Moran, no custodial sentence was
4
imposed, only a period of license suspension. Moran, supra, 202
N.J. at 315. The panel also concluded that “[j]udges may only
impose a license suspension or custodial sentence in careless
driving cases that present aggravating circumstances,” and such
circumstances must come from “evidential sources in the record,
which shall be recited in the judge’s factual findings.” Palma,
supra, 426 N.J. Super. at 519.
The Appellate Division rejected the Law Division’s use of
the Criminal Code factors to justify the custodial sentence.
Id. at 517. The panel then vacated defendant’s sentence and
held that the Moran factors were “equally apt in determining
whether to impose a custodial sentence in this matter” as they
were to impose a license suspension in Moran. Id. at 518.
The State petitioned for certification. We granted the
petition. 213 N.J. 45 (2013).
III.
The State argues on its appeal that the Appellate Division
incorrectly interpreted Moran, conflating the statutory language
of the reckless driving statute with that of the careless
driving statute. The State contends that the reckless driving
statute, at issue in Moran, contains a “willful violation”
provision, necessitating a finding of “aggravating
circumstances” in order to impose a license suspension.
However, the careless driving statute has no such provision, and
5
thus, no requirement of aggravated carelessness as a
prerequisite to the imposition of the fifteen-day custodial
term. The State also argues that the Appellate Division
substituted its own judgment for the judgment of the sentencing
court contrary to State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010).
The State contends the Appellate Division improperly held that
the victim’s death, the ultimate result of defendant’s careless
conduct, could not, “in and of itself[, be] dispositive of
whether a custodial sentence should be imposed.” See Palma,
supra, 426 N.J. Super. at 520.
Finally, the State argues that the Appellate Division
improperly imposed an inordinately high burden on the municipal
judge to establish a record gleaned only from evidential
sources. The State argues that requiring the municipal judge to
rely solely on evidential sources is contrary to this Court’s
directive that sentencing courts “‘consider all relevant
information, including hearsay, unrestrained by the rules of
evidence.’” State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 486 (2005) (quoting
State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 619-20 (1984)).
Defendant argues that the appropriate sentencing guideline
for a careless driving case in which a fatality occurs should be
derived from State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div.),
aff’d on other grounds, 50 N.J. 361 (1967). Defendant argues
that the Law Division and municipal court judges erroneously
6
ignored Zucconi and each used “different guidelines in an
attempt to ‘make law’ on an ad hoc, outcome-determinative
basis.” Defendant also argues that “[b]ased on Zucconi and
Moran, it is clear that something beyond mere carelessness is
required before jail [sic] can be imposed.” Defendant argues
that “[e]ven if the carelessness results in a fatal accident,
the driver should expect nothing more than a moderate fine.”
Defendant urges the Court to adopt Zucconi’s rationale as the
uniform standard for careless driving cases and find that
defendant should not be jailed for the offense because she “was
guilty of nothing else beyond mere carelessness.”
In the alternative, defendant argues that even if the Court
finds that the holding in State v. Henry, 418 N.J. Super. 481
(Law Div. 2010), adopting the Criminal Code factors, should
apply to this case, the Law Division nevertheless misapplied the
factors based upon an incomplete municipal record. In reaching
the conclusion that a fifteen-day custodial term was
appropriate, the Law Division judge relied in part on Henry.1
1 The Henry case was decided several months after the Moran
decision was announced. The Law Division judge in Henry, on a
de novo review, imposed sentence on a defendant upon a third
driving under the influence (DUI) conviction. The judge relied
on the Criminal Code sentencing factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-(a)(1) to
–(b)(13) in arriving at the appropriate sentence, concluding
that these factors provide a comprehensive structure for
sentencing decisions in certain motor vehicle cases. Id. at
488-89.
7
Defendant’s arguments also challenge the actions of the
municipal court judge. However, appellate review of a municipal
appeal to the Law Division is limited to “the action of the Law
Division and not that of the municipal court.” State v. Joas,
34 N.J. 179, 184 (1961); State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244,
251 (App. Div. 2001). For that reason, we do not consider
defendant’s arguments in respect of the municipal court judge’s
actions.
IV.
The issue in this case involves the propriety of a
custodial sentence given the facts presented. The traffic
offense at issue here is careless driving, which is defined as
follows:
A person who drives a vehicle carelessly, or
without due caution and circumspection, in a
manner so as to endanger, or be likely to
endanger, a person or property, shall be
guilty of careless driving.
[N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.]
In New Jersey, custodial sentences for criminal and quasi-
criminal violations are governed by different codes depending on
the classification of the offense. Sentencing for convictions
for murder, first-, second-, third- or fourth-degree crimes, as
well as disorderly persons offenses and petty disorderly persons
offenses, are governed by the New Jersey Code of Criminal
Justice (Criminal Code), N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 to 104-9. Offenses
8
arising from violations of motor vehicle and traffic regulations
are governed by the Motor Vehicle Code N.J.S.A. 39:1 to 13-8.
In this category of cases, custodial terms and license
suspensions are characterized as consequences of magnitude.
Moran, supra, 202 N.J. at 325; State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 8,
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967, 111 S. Ct. 429, 112 L. Ed. 2d 413
(1990). As a general matter, “proceedings involving motor
vehicle violations in the municipal courts are quasi-criminal in
nature.” State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573, 585 (1983).
In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, one of the
principal goals, under either the Criminal Code or Motor Vehicle
Code, is the elimination of disparity in order to ensure
uniformity and predictability. The objective is to treat all
offenders in similar situations in the same manner. “Random and
unpredictable sentencing is anathema to notions of due process.”
Moran, supra, 202 N.J. at 326 (citing United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 2204, 60 L. Ed.
2d 755, 764 (1979)). “[T]here can be no justice without a
predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing.” State v.
Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 379 (1984).
“This Court often has taken affirmative steps to ensure
that sentencing and disposition procedures, whether authorized
by statute or court rule, will not produce widely disparate
results for similarly situated defendants.” Moran, supra, 202
9
N.J. at 326-27 (citing State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1, 22-25
(1998) (ordering the Attorney General to promulgate new plea
offer guidelines to ensure uniformity in inter-county
sentencing); see also State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44
(1985) (adopting six criteria to guide the decision to sentence
defendants concurrently or consecutively), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 1993, 89 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1986) superseded
in part by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5; State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85,
115-22 (1976) (requiring the implementation of a statewide
pretrial intervention program that follows uniform guidelines
and introducing procedures for judicial review to “alleviate
existing suspicions about the arbitrariness of given
decisions”), aff’d on reh’g, 73 N.J. 360, 366-67 (1977)).
The leading case in New Jersey with respect to sentencing
guidelines or principles in Motor Vehicle Code cases is Moran.
In Moran, supra, defendant Laura Moran represented herself and
was found guilty in a municipal court of reckless driving,
N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, as well as other motor vehicle offenses. 202
N.J. at 316-18. The municipal court judge reviewed Moran’s
history of numerous motor vehicle infractions and suspended
Moran’s driving privileges for forty-five days pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 39:5-31. Id. at 318. This section “empowers the court
to suspend a defendant’s license.” Ibid. This sentence
enhancer applies when a defendant has been found guilty of a
10
willful violation of certain offenses, including reckless
driving. N.J.S.A. 39:5-31.
Moran, represented by appointed counsel, appealed to the
Law Division. Moran, supra, 202 N.J. at 318. After a trial de
novo, the Law Division judge upheld Moran’s reckless driving
conviction and imposed the same sentence, finding that her
willful violation of the reckless driving statute, combined with
her past driving infractions, justified the license suspension.
Ibid. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed. Id. at 319.
This Court granted Moran’s petition for certification,
vacated the forty-five-day period of license suspension, and
remanded to the municipal court for resentencing. Id. at 330.
The Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the sentencing-
enhancer provision, N.J.S.A. 39:5-31, by rejecting defendant’s
claim that she was not given “fair notice” of a potential
license suspension for reckless driving. Id. at 320.
The Court directed that the sentencing court consider seven
factors in determining a new sentence. Id. at 328-29. These
factors are as follows:
[1] the nature and circumstances of the
defendant’s conduct, including whether the
conduct posed a high risk of danger to the
public or caused physical harm or property
damage;
[2] the defendant’s driving record,
including the defendant’s age and length of
time as a licensed driver, and the number,
11
seriousness, and frequency of prior
infractions;
[3] whether the defendant was infraction-
free for a substantial period before the
most recent violation or whether the nature
and extent of the defendant’s driving record
indicates that there is a substantial risk
that he or she will commit another
violation;
[4] whether the character and attitude of
the defendant indicate that he or she is
likely or unlikely to commit another
violation;
[5] whether the defendant’s conduct was the
result of circumstances unlikely to recur;
[6] whether a license suspension would cause
excessive hardship to the defendant and/or
depend[e]nts; and
[7] the need for personal deterrence.
[Ibid.]
The Court also held that “[a]ny other relevant factor clearly
identified by the court” may also be considered. Id. at 329.
Thus, Moran allows the flexibility of a case-specific factor.
In addition, the Court explained that the analysis need not
be based on the quantity of the factors identified in any given
case, but instead on the weight each factor or factors is given.
Ibid. Also, the sentencing courts are required to articulate
their reasoning when imposing a license suspension so as to
“enhance appellate review and . . . further safeguard against
arbitrariness in sentencing.” Id. at 329-30.
12
By outlining the above framework in Moran, the Court
implicitly rejected that part of the Appellate Division’s
decision in Moran that suggested utilizing the Criminal Code
sentencing factors in order to determine the imposition or
length of suspension.
V.
As we did in Moran, in deciding this appeal, we exercise
our supervisory function in order to provide guidance for the
municipal courts and Law Division judges in fashioning a
sentence for those convicted of careless driving. N.J. Const.
art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3.
We are mindful that this case differs from Moran in two
respects. First, this is a careless driving case. Therefore,
the N.J.S.A. 39:5-31 sentencing enhancer for a willful violation
of reckless driving does not apply. Second, here defendant
challenges a custodial sentence, not a license suspension. The
holding in Moran introduced the concept of using certain
enumerated factors or principles when imposing a consequence of
magnitude in a motor vehicle conviction case. We conclude that
holding should be extended to include sentencing for careless
driving, which carries a potential custodial term. As a result,
municipal court and Law Division judges should consider the
factors outlined in Moran when they decide whether to impose a
license suspension and/or a custodial sentence. Consistent with
13
our reasoning in Moran rejecting the suggestion that the
Criminal Code sentencing factors are appropriate in determining
whether or not to impose a period of suspension, we hold that
the Criminal Code sentencing factors per se are not to be used
in determining whether or not a custodial term should be imposed
for a careless driving conviction.
Sentencing guidance is needed when the range of sentencing
options varies from a fine to a ninety-day county jail term.
All careless driving situations are not the same, even if each
offense meets the same statutory elements. On a “scale of
opprobriousness,” some offenses will weigh in at the highest end
of the scale, while others do not. State v. Jefimowicz, 230
N.J. Super. 42, 53 (App. Div. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 119 N.J. 152 (1990). Therefore, in order to promote the
goals of predictability and elimination of disparity, we
conclude that the Moran factors should be used to guide
sentencing decisions in careless driving convictions.
We also conclude that the Criminal Code sentencing factors,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) to (b)(13), should not be used as
guidance in sentencing decisions for careless driving
convictions. Careless driving is not a crime but rather a petty
offense. Palma, supra, 426 N.J. Super. at 517 (citing State v.
Hammond, 118 N.J. 306, 311-12 (1990)).
14
It is clear from the existing case law that the Legislature
and this Court have expressed an intent to keep motor vehicle
violations separate and apart from criminal convictions. This
Court has so stated this intent in the context of DUI
convictions. See, e.g., State v. Schreiber, 122 N.J. 579, 584-
85 (1991) (concluding that a violation of the DUI statute is not
a “crime” because motor vehicle violations are not “criminal”
offenses but merely petty offenses). That same analysis applies
to careless driving, reckless driving, and other Title 39
convictions that carry the potential for a custodial sentence.
With respect to what other information the sentencing judge
should consider in fashioning a sentence, we note that “[i]n
sentencing, our trial courts consider all relevant information,
including hearsay, unrestrained by the rules of evidence.”
Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 486 (citing Davis, supra, 96 N.J. at
619-20). “The whole person concept authorizes the sentencing
court to comprehend in its deliberations a wide range of
information that might otherwise be excluded by evidentiary
norms.” State v. Humphreys, 89 N.J. 4, 14 (1982) (citing State
v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 566 (1973)). However, “[a]ny such
information must come before the court in the due course of its
proceedings and the sentencing court should take care to prevent
extraneous material from seeping into the process, even if a
matter of personal knowledge.” Ibid. (emphasis added) (citing
15
State v. Gattling, 95 N.J. Super. 103, 111 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 50 N.J. 91 (1967)).
VI.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as
modified and the matter is remanded to the municipal court for
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA; ALBIN, PATTERSON,
and FERNANDEZ-VINA join in JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ’s opinion. JUDGE
CUFF (temporarily assigned) did not participate.
16
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-41 SEPTEMBER TERM 2012
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DIANA M. PALMA,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED September 30, 2014
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Judge Rodríguez
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST AFFIRM/REMAND
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE PATTERSON X
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X
JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (t/a) X
JUDGE CUFF (t/a) ------------------------ --------------------
TOTALS 6
1