In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-13-00363-CR
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MONICA RAYSHELL JONES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 295232
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting her
conviction, Monica Rayshell Jones appeals from a jury verdict resulting in her
conviction for assaulting a family member, her aunt. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
22.01(a)(1), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2014); 1 see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 71.003
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We cite to the current version of the statute because the subsequent
amendment does not affect the outcome of this appeal.
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(West 2014) (providing that “‘[f]amily’ includes individuals related by
consanguinity or affinity”). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Standard of Review
Legal and factual sufficiency challenges are reviewed under the standard
articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In reviewing a sufficiency challenge to a
conviction in a criminal case, we view all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict. Id. at 899. Based on the evidence admitted during the trial,
together with the reasonable inferences that are available from the evidence, we
then determine whether a rational factfinder could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743,
746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This standard allows the jury to weigh the evidence,
to fairly resolve any conflicts in the testimony, and to draw reasonable inferences
from the basic facts. Id.
Analysis
The State charged Jones with unlawfully injuring C.R. by using her fist to
strike her in the head and chest. To prove that a defendant unlawfully assaulted
someone, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to another. See Tex.
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Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1). “‘Bodily injury’ means physical pain, illness, or
any impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 1.07(8) (West Supp. 2014). The Court
of Criminal Appeals has explained that “[a]ny physical pain, however minor, will
suffice to establish bodily injury.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012).
Jones does not dispute that C.R. is her aunt. According to C.R., she was
helping Jones raise her four children; she had temporary joint conservatorship of
two of Jones’ children when the assault occurred. C.R. indicated that she was
attempting to exercise her visitation rights when Jones assaulted her. Anticipating
that Jones might not allow the children to go with her when she came to pick them
up, C.R. indicated that she called 911 to request that someone be sent to standby
when the exchange occurred. According to C.R., she was waiting in her car near
Jones’ house when Jones pulled up beside her, came up to her window, and hit her
in the chin and chest. When C.R. was assaulted, no one had yet arrived in response
to her request for assistance. C.R. described the blows Jones inflicted as painful.
Photographs depicting C.R.’s injuries and the recording of C.R.’s calls to 911 were
admitted as evidence during the trial.
Officer William Gilmore was dispatched in response to the report of an
assault. When he arrived, he saw that C.R. was upset, that she had an injury to her
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lip, and that she had a scratch on her chest. C.R. told him that Jones had assaulted
her.
Jones also testified during her trial. According to Jones, she was not at home
when C.R. claimed she was assaulted. She testified that she was at her uncle’s
house when C.R. claimed the assault occurred. According to Jones, she neither
knew that C.R. had been given visitation rights, nor did she know that C.R. was
coming to her house to pick up her children. Jones explained that had she known
that C.R. had been given visitation rights, she would have allowed her children to
go with C.R. because she had no reason to prevent C.R. from taking the children.
According to Jones, C.R. fabricated the claim of assault because C.R. wanted to
have custody of two of the children.
In her brief, Jones describes the evidence relating to the assault as poor to
nonexistent, but does not explain why the jury was not free to believe C.R.’s
testimony that she knew Jones to be the person who assaulted her. The jury could
reasonably infer from the evidence that Jones had knowingly, intentionally, or
recklessly inflicted a painful injury to C.R.’s head and chest. The jury was also free
to reject Jones’ testimony and to believe the testimony given by C.R.
In reviewing a case where the issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to
support a verdict, we are not to substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s;
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instead, we are required to give the jury deference, so that it can exercise its
responsibility to fairly resolve any conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts admitted in the case at
trial. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence allowed the jury to find that
Jones assaulted C.R. beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;
Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746. We overrule Jones’ sole issue, and we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on July 22, 2014
Opinion Delivered November 5, 2014
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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