An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-437
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 2 December 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Rutherford County
Nos. 12 CRS 52994 & 13 CRS 927
WILLIAM TODD SCRUGGS
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 9 October 2013 by
Judge J. Thomas Davis in Rutherford County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 September 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Teresa M. Postell, for the State.
Anne Bleyman, for defendant-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
The trial court properly charged the jury on the statutory
requirement that defendant’s violation of a domestic violence
protective order must be knowing. Defendant was not entitled to
the requested jury instruction on intent. Where defendant has
no right to appeal issues regarding his guilty plea, those
arguments are dismissed.
-2-
I. Factual & Procedural History
William Todd Scruggs (“defendant”) and Sandra Scruggs
Mulray (“Sandra”) were married, but separated on 16 June 2010.
On the day before the separation, 15 June 2010, defendant
assaulted Sandra and threatened to kill her. Following this
incident, defendant moved out of their marital residence and
Sandra obtained a one-year domestic violence protective order
against defendant, which was valid from 28 June 2010 until 28
June 2011. The domestic violence protective order required that
defendant “not assault, threaten, abuse, follow, harass (by
telephone, visiting the home or workplace or other means), or
interfere with [Sandra]” and that defendant “stay away” from
Sandra’s residence.
On 18 August 2010, defendant was convicted of three
separate counts of violating the domestic violence protective
order. The protective order was later renewed for another two
years, making the expiration date 28 June 2013.
On 14 September 2012, at approximately 8:40 p.m., Sandra
and Tracer Malray (“Tracer”), Sandra’s then boyfriend, arrived
at Sandra’s residence. As Sandra and Tracer walked to the front
door of the residence, they observed a truck suddenly turn its
headlights off and come to a stop on the road in front of the
-3-
residence. Sandra recognized the truck as belonging to
defendant. A male voice from the truck started shouting
obscenities at Sandra including: “[y]ou effed up. I am going to
kick your ass”; “[y]ou F-ing whore”; and “[t]his ain’t over,
Sandra.” Sandra identified the voice as being that of
defendant. The truck remained stopped on the road for two or
three minutes, revving its engine and spinning its tires before
it drove away.
After the truck left, Sandra called 911 and spoke with
Deputy Thomas Keever of the Rutherford County Sheriff’s
Department. Several days later, Deputy Keever spoke with
defendant over the telephone. Defendant told Deputy Keever that
he had been drinking on the night in question when “he saw the
mother fucker standing out in the yard” and then proceeded to
ask “where was his bitch, slut, whore was at.”
On 22 April 2013, defendant was indicted by the Rutherford
County grand jury for feloniously violating a domestic violence
protective order,1 and for attaining the status of an habitual
felon. On 7 October 2013, defendant’s case was tried before
Judge Davis and a jury. Defendant stipulated to the three prior
1
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1(f) provides that a knowing violation
of a valid protective order becomes a felony when the defendant
has previously been convicted of two offenses under chapter 50B.
-4-
violations of the domestic violence protective order.2 Defendant
also pled guilty to attaining the status of an habitual felon.
On 9 October 2013, defendant was found guilty of violating a
domestic violence protective order. Defendant was sentenced as
an habitual felon to an active prison term of 84 to 113 months.
Defendant appeals.
II. Jury Instructions
In his first argument, defendant argues the trial court
should have instructed the jury in accordance with defendant’s
requested instruction on intent because intent is a substantive
or material feature of the crime of violating a domestic
violence protective order. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“Assignments of error challenging the trial court’s
decisions regarding jury instructions are reviewed de novo[.]”
State v. Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 458, 466, 675 S.E.2d 144, 149
(2009).
This Court reviews jury instructions contextually and
in its entirety. The charge will be held to be
sufficient if it presents the law of the case in such
manner as to leave no reasonable cause to believe the
jury was misled or misinformed. The party asserting
2
By admitting the prior violations of the domestic violence
protective order, defendant avoided having the State introduce
evidence of the prior offenses before the jury. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-928.
-5-
error bears the burden of showing that the jury was
misled or that the verdict was affected by the
instruction. Under such a standard of review, it is
not enough for the appealing party to show that error
occurred in the jury instructions; rather, it must be
demonstrated that such error was likely, in light of
the entire charge, to mislead the jury.
State v. Blizzard, 169 N.C. App. 285, 296–97, 610 S.E.2d 245,
253 (2005) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses
omitted) (quoting Bass v. Johnson, 149 N.C. App. 152, 160, 560
S.E.2d 841, 847 (2002)).
B. Analysis
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1 provides that it is a criminal
offense for a person to “knowingly violate[] a valid protective
order” entered pursuant to chapter 50B. With respect to this
offense, the trial court instructed the jury:
For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense,
the State must prove three things beyond a reasonable
doubt: First, that a valid domestic violence
protective order had been issued pursuant to North
Carolina law; second, that the defendant violated the
valid domestic violence protective domestic order by
stopping in front of the residence of Sandra Lynn
Scruggs and yelling at her; [and] third, that the
defendant did so knowingly.
The instruction given by the trial court substantively and
accurately conveyed to the jury what constitutes the offense of
violating a valid protective order under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-
4.1. Defendant argues that intent is a substantive or material
-6-
feature of violating a protective order, and contends that the
trial court should have given the instruction on intent
requested by defendant. However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1 only
requires that a defendant must have knowingly violated a valid
protective order. The trial court correctly charged the jury
that they must find that defendant knowingly violated the
domestic violence protective order.
Further, even if the trial court had given the requested
instruction on intent, it would not have changed the outcome of
the trial. Defendant’s requested instruction would have
informed the jury that intent “must ordinarily be proved by
circumstances from which it may be inferred.” N.C.P.I. Crim.
120.10. The circumstances present in this case show that
defendant parked his truck on the road in front of Sandra’s
residence while shouting obscenities at her. It strains
credibility that a jury could examine defendant’s actions and
conclude that defendant did not have the intent to violate the
terms of the valid protective order. Defendant did not simply
drive by Sandra’s residence. Instead, he parked his car on the
road in front of Sandra’s residence, and repeatedly yelled
threats and obscenities at her. Given defendant’s conduct and
the clear provisions of the protective order, there is no
-7-
reasonable likelihood that a jury would have found that the
State failed to prove an intent to violate the order. Defendant
cannot demonstrate that the jury’s verdict was affected by the
trial court’s refusal to give defendant’s requested instruction
on intent.
Defendant’s argument is without merit.
III. Habitual Felon Guilty Plea
In his second, third, and fourth arguments, defendant
contends that the trial court erred in accepting his plea of
guilty to habitual felon status; and sentencing him as an
habitual felon because: (1) there was not a sufficient factual
basis for the plea; (2) the trial court failed to inform
defendant of the maximum possible or the mandatory minimum
sentence that he could receive, and therefore the plea was not
an informed choice; and (3) that the status of habitual felon
violates defendant’s constitutional right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. We disagree.
“[U]nder N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(e), a defendant who has
entered a plea of guilty is not entitled to appellate review as
a matter of right, unless the defendant is appealing sentencing
issues or the denial of a motion to suppress, or the defendant
has made an unsuccessful motion to withdraw the guilty plea.”
-8-
State v. Pimental, 153 N.C. App. 69, 73, 568 S.E.2d 867, 870
(2002). None of defendant’s claims regarding his guilty plea
involve an issue that is entitled to appellate review and all of
defendant’s arguments regarding his guilty plea are dismissed.
Defendant has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. In our
discretion we deny defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari.
Even assuming arguendo that these issues were properly
before this court, defendant’s arguments are without merit.
Defendant asserts that there was not a sufficient factual basis
for his guilty plea. This assertion is based solely upon the
argument that the allegations contained in the indictment were
the sole factual basis for the plea. However, this claim is
belied by the record. At the close of the State’s evidence,
defendant elected to admit his prior convictions of violating a
domestic violence protective order. At this time, defendant
also pled guilty to having obtained the status of an habitual
felon. The trial court went over the three prior felonies that
were the basis for the habitual felon charge as follows:
THE COURT: At this time, too, I need to know whether
your client is going to admit, deny, or remain silent
as to the habitual felon status and admit the guilt as
to that status set out in that indictment . . .
consisting of a conviction on March 20, 1991 for
felony to sell marijuana, and file No. 91 CRS 1017,
and the date of that occurrence of that offense was
November 6 of 1990.
-9-
The second felony that is alleged in the indictment
was a felony attempted possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. It’s in file No. 10 CRS 52176,
conviction date of that was August 18, 2010, and the
occurrence date of that offense was June 15 of 2010.
The third felony conviction that is alleged in the
indictment, it is a felony offense of domestic
violence protective order violation. The file No. 11
CRS 52549, conviction date of September 29, 2011, the
occurrence date of July 31, 2011.
Is your client going to admit the guilt as to those
matters, also?
([Defendant’s counsel] nods head up and down.)
THE COURT: We will need a separate transcript for
those, also, that needs to be prepared. I will go
over the transcript with him in that regard.
A plea transcript was subsequently prepared, and defendant
pled guilty before the trial court. The only elements of the
offense of habitual felon status were the three prior felony
convictions. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1 (2013). Since the
trial court had just gone over the three prior felonies with
defendant, the trial court stopped the prosecutor from
enumerating the three prior felonies as a factual basis for the
plea, and referred to the three felonies set forth in the
indictment. We hold that the State presented a sufficient
factual basis for defendant’s plea to being an habitual felon.
Defendant’s assertion that his plea was not valid because
-10-
he was not informed of the sentence he was facing is undermined
by the prior decisions of this Court. “When reviewing the
validity of a defendant’s plea, our courts have declined to
adopt a technical, ritualistic approach to determining whether
or not the plea was voluntary and intelligent. Instead, we
review the totality of the circumstances and determine whether
non-compliance with the statute either affected defendant’s
decision to plead or undermined the plea’s validity.” State v.
Szucs, 207 N.C. App. 694, 701-702, 701 S.E.2d 362, 367-368
(2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also
State v. Williams, 133 N.C. App. 326, 515 S.E.2d 80 (1999).
While discussing the State’s pre-trial plea offer with
defendant, the trial court informed defendant that “[i]f you are
found guilty you could have to – assuming a Class D felony,
assuming a level 4 – you could have to serve as much as a 97
month minimum, 129 month maximum term”, which defendant stated
he understood. When defendant later decided to plead guilty to
having obtained an habitual felon status, the trial court asked
defendant if he understood that an habitual felon status would
increase his potential punishment for feloniously violating a
protective order from a Class H to a Class D felony. Defendant
stated he understood the consequences of his plea. Although
-11-
defendant’s plea transcript form is blank where the maximum and
minimum sentences should be set forth, this does not invalidate
his plea. Under the totality of the circumstances, we hold that
defendant was aware of the direct consequences of his guilty
plea and he entered into the plea voluntarily and
understandingly.3
Finally, defendant asserts that habitual felon status
violates his constitutional rights to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. However, this assertion contradicts well-
established precedent. Defendant acknowledges that our Supreme
Court has repeatedly rejected arguments contesting the
constitutionality of habitual felon status. See e.g., State v.
Todd, 313 N.C. 110, 326 S.E.2d 249 (1985). This Court does not
have the authority to overrule decisions of our Supreme Court of
North Carolina.
Defendant’s arguments are without merit.
NO ERROR.
Judges CALABRIA and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
3
In the written transcript of defendant’s plea, he swore under
oath that he was aware of the maximum punishment, that his
lawyer had explained the charges to him, that the plea was
freely and voluntarily entered, and that he acknowledged that
the recited terms of his plea arrangement were correct.