Officer Benjamin Baldassarre of the Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department testified that while on patrol during the night in
question, his suspicion was aroused when he spotted "a brand new
Hyundai" parked in the carport of a vacant house. The dome light inside
the vehicle was on and Officer Baldassarre could see two people in the
front seat. The officer made a U-turn and shined his spotlight on the
vehicle, at which point, he saw Hull "standing outside of the driver's seat"
and the other individual, a female, still seated on the passenger side of the
front seat. Officer Baldassarre testified that Hull "looked directly at me"
and that he "got a really good look at him." Hull left the scene before the
officer could make contact with him. Officer Baldassarre encountered
Hull nearly two weeks later during a traffic stop and Mirandized him.
Hull acknowledged being in the Hyundai on the night in question, and
admitted to Officer Baldassarre "that he took off from the car when he saw
me shine my spotlight on him because he got spooked. And I asked him . .
. why did you get spooked and he said, I didn't want to be caught in a
stolen car." Officer Baldassarre testified that Hull later "contradicted
himself' and told the officer that "he didn't know it was stolen," only
offering that "he knew it did not belong to himself, the girl he was with or
the male that was the third one involved."
Circumstantial evidence alone may sustain a conviction.
Buchanan v. State, 119 Nev. 201, 217, 69 P.3d 694, 705 (2003). It is for
the jury to determine the weight and credibility to give conflicting
testimony, McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992), and
a jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, sufficient
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evidence supports the verdict, Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20,
20 (1981); see also NRS 205.273(1)(b). Therefore, we conclude that Hull's
contention is without merit.
Second, Hull contends that the district court erred by
overruling his objection and denying his motion for a mistrial after
allowing testimony about an uncharged prior bad act in violation of NRS
48.045(2). Hull claims that Officer Baldassarre's reference to "a vacant
house," where the officer saw Hull with the stolen vehicle, amounts to
improper character evidence. We disagree with Hull's contention.
A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Mclellan a State, 124 Nev. 263,
267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008). Here, the district court heard arguments
from counsel and, citing to Brackeen v. State, 104 Nev. 547, 553, 763 P.2d
59, 63 (1988), denied Hull's motion for a mistrial after determining that
"Mlle Officer's statement about why his attention was drawn to the
vehicle is just part of. . . his narration of why he stopped, why he looked in
that direction." The district court also noted the following: the matter of
the vacant house "was not dwelled upon," an inference could also be made
that the house was not vacant based on other testimony from the same
officer, and "the evidence was more probative than prejudicial."
Additionally, we agree with the State that the evidence in question did not
implicate a prior bad act and was admissible independent of NRS
48.045(2) and Tinch a State, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65
(1997), modified by Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev. „ 270 P.3d 1244,
1249-50 (2012). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not
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abuse its discretion when it overruled Hull's objection and denied his
motion for a mistrial. See Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 206-07, 163 P.3d
408, 417 (2007) (we review a district court's decision to deny a motion for a
mistrial for an abuse of discretion). Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
Pickering Saitta
cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge
Jonathan L. Powell
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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