[Cite as State v. Borden, 2015-Ohio-333.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-140245
TRIAL NO. 14CRB-5134A
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
O P I N I O N.
vs. :
KINSEY BORDEN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 30, 2015
Paula Boggs Muething, City Solicitor, Charlie Rubenstein, City Prosecutor, and
Marva K. Benjamin, Assistant City Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Richard A. Magnus, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
D E W INE , Judge.
{¶1} Christine Hargis burst into her neighbors’ apartment half-dressed,
bruised and bloodied. At trial, she claimed that she had tripped and fallen on a coffee
table in the midst of an argument with her boyfriend. But a police officer testified that
he had heard her say that her boyfriend had struck her. The boyfriend, Kinsey Borden,
was convicted of assault on Ms. Hargis. Mr. Borden argues that the court erred when it
allowed the police officer to testify about the statement. We agree and remand the case
for a new trial.
I. Background
{¶2} Ms. Hargis celebrated her 25th birthday at a bar with Mr. Borden. After
several rounds of drinks, the pair returned to their apartment. According to Ms. Hargis,
her memory of the night after leaving the bar was hazy. She testified at trial that she
remembered picking a fight with Mr. Borden. “I kicked a couple of doors. I slipped and
fell chasing him and fell on the coffee table and smacked my face.” Mr. Borden left the
apartment and took off in Ms. Hargis’s car. The next thing she remembers is being in
her neighbors’ apartment crying. Ms. Hargis denied at trial that Mr. Borden had hit her.
{¶3} Ms. Hargis’s neighbors called 911. Officer Mark Wherle responded to
the call, and Ms. Hargis’s father came to the apartment as well. Officer Wherle testified
that Ms. Hargis did not want to talk to him about the incident. But while Ms. Hargis
spoke with her father, Officer Wherle heard her say “that [she and Mr. Borden] got in an
argument and he struck her and left in her vehicle.” Ms. Hargis’s father took her to a
hospital where she was treated for a broken nose.
{¶4} At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found Mr. Borden guilty of
assault and sentenced him accordingly.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
II. Ms. Hargis’s Hearsay Statement
{¶5} Because it impacts our discussion of his other assignments of error, we
first consider Mr. Borden’s third assignment. In it, Mr. Borden asserts that the trial
court erred when it allowed Officer Wherle to testify about the statement he heard Ms.
Hargis make to her father about Mr. Borden striking her. He contends that the hearsay
statement was not admissible under any exception. We review the trial court’s
evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510
N.E.2d 343 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. We conclude that the court abused
its discretion.
{¶6} At the trial, the court overruled Mr. Borden’s objection to Officer
Wherle’s testimony, stating, “The hearsay objection is overruled and the basis, her
making inconsistent statement with that.” Presumably, the court was referring to
Evid.R. 801(D)(1), which provides that a declarant’s prior inconsistent statement is not
hearsay if it was made under oath and subject to cross-examination. That was not the
case here. Ms. Hargis’s statement to her father was not under oath.
{¶7} The state does not dispute that Officer Wherle’s testimony about Ms.
Hargis’s statement to her father was hearsay—“a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). Instead, it argues that it was
admissible under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
{¶8} An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition.” Evid.R. 803(2). The rationale for the excited-utterance
exception is that the stress of the excitement does not allow the declarant “a
meaningful opportunity to reflect on statements regarding the event.” State v.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 87, 88, 524 N.E.2d 466 (1988). “Without opportunity to
reflect, the chance that a statement is fabricated, or distorted due to a poor memory,
is greatly reduced.” Id. Here, the circumstances surrounding the statement indicate
that Ms. Hargis had had an “opportunity to reflect.” Officer Wherle responded about
20 minutes after the 911 call was made by the neighbors. And although, according to
Officer Wherle, Ms. Hargis had been crying and “was visibly upset,” she had made
the decision not to speak to the police officer. Based upon the amount of time that
elapsed and her ability to make a deliberate decision not to discuss the incident with
the police, we conclude that the statement was not an excited utterance. The court
abused its discretion when it allowed Officer Wherle to testify about the statement. See
State v. Clark, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100693, 2011-Ohio-6030, ¶ 10.
{¶9} Having determined that the court erred in allowing the hearsay
testimony, we must decide whether the error was harmless or requires that we grant Mr.
Borden a new trial. To do so, we “must consider both the impact of the offending
evidence on the verdict and the strength of the remaining evidence after the tainted
evidence is removed from the record.” State v. Morris, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-
5052, syllabus. See State v. Kelley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140112, 2014-Ohio-
5565.
{¶10} We cannot say that testimony about Ms. Hargis’s statement to her
father did not have an impact on the verdict. No other evidence was presented
connecting Mr. Borden to Ms. Hargis’s injuries. Further, absent Ms. Hargis’s
statement that Mr. Borden had struck her, the evidence of his guilt was far from
overwhelming. Thus, we cannot conclude that the error was harmless. The third
assignment of error is sustained.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
III. Sufficiency and Weight
{¶11} We consider the remaining assignments of error together. In the first,
Mr. Borden asserts that his conviction was not based on sufficient evidence, and in
the second, he asserts that his conviction was against the weight of the evidence. Mr.
Borden argues that without the admission of Ms. Hargis’s hearsay statement, the
state did not present sufficient evidence that he had caused the harm to Ms. Hargis.
{¶12} “The Ohio Supreme Court has rejected the notion that we must only
consider admissible evidence in evaluating whether a conviction was supported by
sufficient evidence.” State v. Benton, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-130556, C-130557
and C-130558, 2014-Ohio-2163, citing State v. Brewer, 121 Ohio St.3d 202, 2009-
Ohio-593, 903 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 1, 19. Thus, even if the hearsay statement should not
have been admitted, we consider it to determine sufficiency. In addition to Ms.
Hargis’s hearsay statement that Mr. Borden hit her, the state presented evidence that
Ms. Hargis had suffered two black eyes and a broken nose, that her neighbors had
heard such a commotion that they called 911, that Mr. Borden was with Ms. Hargis
that night, and that they had fought. Based on the record, the court could reasonably
have found all the elements of assault to have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. See State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two
of the syllabus.1 And on the record presented to the court, we cannot say that the
trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
we must reverse the conviction. See State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-87,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The first and second assignments of error are overruled.
1 This case is distinguishable from our decision in State v. Heard, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
130789, 2014-Ohio-4643, where we discharged the defendant from further prosecution because
the court had improperly considered impeachment evidence as substantive evidence. In that
case, had the hearsay been properly considered only as impeachment evidence, there was no
substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt presented.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶13} Because the court’s error in admitting Ms. Hargis’s hearsay statement
was not harmless, we reverse the court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial
and further proceedings consistent with the law and this opinion.
Judgment accordingly.
H ENDON , P.J., and F ISCHER , J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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