UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4620
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY WATSON,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:12-cr-00390-MOC-1)
Submitted: January 22, 2015 Decided: February 6, 2015
Before KING, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Arza Feldman, FELDMAN & FELDMAN, Uniondale, New York, for
Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Richard
Lee Edwards, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Watson appeals the five concurrent 235-month
sentences imposed by the district court following his guilty
plea to four counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a) (2012), and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(e) (2012). On
appeal, Watson contends that the district court erred in
applying a threat of death enhancement in calculating the
offense level applicable to one of the robbery counts, rendering
that sentence unreasonable. The Government seeks to enforce the
appellate waiver provision in Watson’s plea agreement. We
conclude that Watson validly waived his appellate rights and
that the sentencing issue raised on appeal is barred by the
waiver provision. We therefore dismiss the appeal on that
basis.
We review de novo a defendant’s waiver of appellate
rights. United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 126 (2013). “A defendant may
waive his right to appeal if that waiver is the result of a
knowing and intelligent decision to forgo the right to appeal.”
United States v. Amaya-Portillo, 423 F.3d 427, 430 (4th Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, if a
district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of
appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record
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indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of
the waiver, the waiver is valid.” United States v. Thornsbury,
670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012). The magistrate judge’s
failure to specifically question Watson’s understanding of the
waiver provision is not, however, dispositive of the question of
whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent. United
States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002). To answer
that question, we consider “the totality of the circumstances,
including the experience and conduct of the accused, as well as
the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the
terms of the plea agreement.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). We will enforce a valid waiver so long as “the issue
appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” Copeland, 707 F.3d
at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted).
After considering the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that Watson’s waiver of appellate rights was knowing
and intelligent. Further, the sentencing issue Watson raises on
appeal falls within the scope of the appellate waiver provision.
Therefore, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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