IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION'
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2U1b
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
oSttiarrutt Court of TArttfuritv
2014-SC-000303-MR
JARED R. MCSTOOTS APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
NO. 13-CR-00096
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Jared R. McStoots pled guilty to second-degree controlled substance
endangerment to a child, manufacturing methamphetamine (first offense),
fourth-degree controlled substance endangerment to a child, first-degree
wanton endangerment, and second-degree criminal abuse in Ohio Circuit
Court. Accordingly, McStoots was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.
He now appeals as a matter of right, Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b), asserting that the
trial court erred by denying his requests to withdraw his guilty plea and hold
an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND. •
McStoots poured drain cleaner into a Styrofoam cup and left it an area
where it was accessible to his girlfriend's children, who were four and two years
old, respectively. The two-year-old child, Susie,' ingested the drain cleaner.
Although McStoots and his girlfriend knew of the child's ingestion of the
cleaner, they did not seek medical treatment for several hours. By the time
McStoots and his girlfriend finally took Susie to the local emergency room, she
was in critical condition and had to be flown to another hospital for treatment.
Hospital employees reported the incident to the Ohio County Sheriff's
Department. The employees also opined that McStoots and his girlfriend
appeared intoxicated from methamphetamine while at the hospital. As a
result, law enforcement officers obtained a warrant to search McStoots's home.
The search revealed numerous items used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine.
Consequently, a grand jury indicted McStoots for the following eight
offenses: second-degree controlled substance endangerment to a child, fourth-
degree controlled substance endangerment to a child, first-degree wanton
endangerment, manufacturing methamphetamine (first offense), unlawful
possession of a methamphetamine precursor, first-degree possession of a
controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and first-degree
criminal abuse. The Commonwealth initially offered McStoots a plea bargain
recommending a fifteen-year sentence and eighty-five percent parole eligibility.
Upon advice of his public defender, McStoots rejected the offer. McStoots then
accepted the Commonwealth's second offer, which increased the number of
years of his sentence but decreased the percentage of his sentence he would
1 "Susie" is an alias used to protect the minor child's identity.
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have to serve before becoming eligible for parole. McStoots agreed to a total
twenty-year sentence, with twelve years at eighty-five percent parole eligibility
and eight years at twenty percent parole eligibility. As such, he pled guilty to
five of the charges and the others were dismissed.
After entry of the plea but before sentencing, McStoots procured private
counsel. His private counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea, and he asked
the trial court to schedule an evidentiary hearing on the motion. In the
memorandum and affidavit accompanying the motion, McStoots asserted that
the public defender had ineffectively advised and represented him regarding the
guilty plea. Without conducting the requested evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied McStoots's motion. McStoots was then sentenced in accordance
with the plea agreement. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS.
The sole issue that McStoots presents on appeal is whether the trial
court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to whether
McStoots's prior counsel had ineffectively assisted him. We hold that it did
not.
McStoots moved to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing pursuant
to RCr 8.10. Motions that fail adequately to specify grounds for relief may be
summarily denied, as may motions asserting claims refuted or otherwise
resolved by the record. Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 874
(Ky. 2012). Motions adequately alleging valid claims not refuted by the record
entitle the movant to an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 875. We review the trial
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court's factual findings for clear error and its application of legal standards and
precedents de novo. Id.
McStoots alleges that he asserted a valid ineffective assistance of counsel
claim and, thus, was entitled t6 an evidentiary hearing by the trial court.
However, after reviewing McStoots's motion to the trial court, we believe it
failed to specify adequate grounds for relief and there was enough evidence in
the record to refute it. So it was proper for the trial court summarily to deny
the motion without an evidentiary hearing.
To be entitled to relief from a guilty plea on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel, McStoots must show that counsel provided deficient
assistance and that he was prejudiced as a result. Stiger v. Commonwealth,
381 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Ky. 2012) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984)). "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground
of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed." Strickland,
466 U.S. 668 at 670. We hold that McStoots has failed, before both this Court
and the trial court, to allege sufficient prejudice that could entitle him to relief.
So we need not address whether his counsel's assistance was deficient.
To establish prejudice in the guilty plea context, the challenger must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that—but for counsel's errors—he would
not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Stiger,
381 S.W.3d at 237. This Court has explained:
[T]o obtain relief on an ineffective assistance claim a petitioner
must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances. . . . [A]t the
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pleading stage it is movant's burden to allege. specific facts which,
if true, would demonstrate prejudice. A conclusory allegation to
the effect that absent the error the movant would have insisted
upon a trial is not enough. The movant must allege facts that, if
proven, would support a conclusion that the decision to reject the
plea bargain and go to trial would have been rational, e.g., valid
defenses, a pending suppression motion that could undermine the
prosecution's case, or the realistic potential for a lower sentence.
Id. at 237 (internal citations omitted).
In the present case, McStoots has made only conclusory allegations
about the prejudice he has suffered. He broadly asserts that his counsel failed
to inform him of potential mental health defenses and possible suppression
motions, but he fails to articulate specifically what these defenses or motions
might have been and how they would have undermined the Commonwealth's
case against him. For example, McStoots asserts that he had been awake for
more than twenty-four hours by the time he was interviewed by police, which
might have rendered his statements involuntary. However, neither party has
asserted that McStoots made any incriminating statement during the interview
upon which the Commonwealth intended to rely in McStoots's prosecution. So
even if we assume that McStoots would seek to suppress a statement from the
interview, he has not suggested how this would change the landscape of his
case or increase the likelihood that he would reject a ) plea offer and go to trial.
Additionally, McStoots broadly suggests that the five-year addition to his
sentence in the second plea offer is evidence of prejudice. However, this
assertion ignores the substantial favorable change in iVIcStoots's parole
eligibility in that plea offer.
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In sum, the question is whether there was a reasonable probability that
McStoots would have rejected the Commonwealth's offer and taken his chances
at trial. See id. For the two controlled substance endangerment to a child and
one manufacturing methamphetamine charges alone, McStoots was facing a
potential maximum sentence of forty-five years. He was also facing prison time
for five other charges, four of which were felonies. Moreover, the
Commonwealth had substantial evidence against McStoots from Susie's
hospital medical records, hospital employees' observations, and the resultant
search of McStoots's home. We do not find any basis upon which that evidence
could have been excluded. And, given the harm that a small child suffered, we
cannot perceive how McStoots would rationally believe that a jury would be
sympathetic to him at trial. As such, we can say with fair assurance that going
to trial would not have been a rational decision.
III. CONCLUSION.
Because it was clear from the record that McStoots could not meet his
burden of showing prejudice from the public defender's alleged errors, the trial
court did not err by denying his motion to set aside his guilty plea without an
evidentiary hearing. So we affirm McStoots's convictions and sentence.
Minton, C.J.; Abramson, Cunningham, Keller, Noble, and Venters, JJ.,
sitting. All concur.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Steven Russell Dowell
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James Coleman Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
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