RENDERED: MARCH 15, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2023-CA-0402-MR
LLOYD JACKSON STEVENSON APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JOE W. HENDRICKS, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 22-CR-00153
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GOODWINE, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
MCNEILL, JUDGE: In 2022, Appellant, Lloyd Stevenson (Stevenson), was
indicted by a Logan County grand jury for first-degree sexual assault of a minor
under sixteen years of age, and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender
(PFO-1). With the advice of counsel, Stevenson pleaded guilty to the sexual
assault charge and an amended charge of PFO-2. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969). As a result, he agreed to serve a five-year prison sentence, enhanced
to eight years. Stevenson retained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. He then filed a motion to withdraw the previous motion to withdraw,
and to enter an Alford plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
The circuit court addressed this pending motion at the final sentencing hearing, and
specifically inquired whether there were any remaining issues. The parties
articulated their desire to proceed, and the court sentenced Stevenson in
accordance with his plea agreement. He appeals to this Court as a matter of right,
on the basis that his plea was invalid. For the following reasons, we affirm.
When determining whether a guilty plea was entered
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, trial courts
must consider the totality of the circumstances. This
inquiry is inherently fact-sensitive and we review for
clear error.
Commonwealth v. Patton, 539 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
If, however, the trial court determines that the guilty plea
was entered voluntarily, then it may grant or deny the
motion to withdraw the plea at its discretion.
This decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. A trial court abuses its discretion when it
renders a decision which is arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by legal principles.
Rigdon v. Commonwealth,144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004) (footnotes
omitted).
In support of his argument on appeal, Stevenson asserts that he did not
believe that his sentence would be subject to the PFO enhancement and, therefore,
-2-
that he would be parole eligible after serving twenty percent of a five-year term,
instead of an eight-year term. See Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558,
567 (Ky. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“A defendant’s eligibility for
parole is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea the ignorance of which would
render the plea involuntary.”). Stevenson further asserts that, because it is alleged
that the plea was entered involuntarily, that a hearing on his motion to withdraw
was required. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 229 S.W.3d 49, 51 (Ky. 2007).
Having reviewed the arguments and record presented, Stevenson’s
specific assertions either lack adequate preservation, or are otherwise unpersuasive.
More precisely, the court engaged Stevenson during the plea colloquy concerning
the specific matters with which he now takes issue. The court also reminded
Stevenson that his sentence was ineligible for probation. Stevenson’s responses
indicate that he understood and lawfully consented to the plea. And he was
permitted to obtain conflict counsel to challenge his plea. Instead, all parties
agreed to move forward with sentencing. Therefore, a hearing on the motion to
withdraw would have been either moot or futile. In consideration of the totality of
the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the circuit court committed clear error,
or that it ultimately abused its discretion. Therefore, we AFFIRM.
ALL CONCUR.
-3-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Erin Hoffman Yang Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew F. Kuhn
Rachel A. Wright
Assistant Attorneys General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-4-