J-S57039-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
DEONTE SATCHELL
Appellee No. 610 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 12, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004850-2011
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2015
The Commonwealth appeals from the July 12, 2013 judgment of
sentence, imposing an aggregate term of time served, i.e. 167 days’, to two
years less one day’s incarceration plus seven years’ probation on Appellee,
Deonte Satchell, following his conviction by a jury for rape, involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), and simple assault.1 After careful review,
we affirm.
The trial court provided the following summary of the facts of this
case.
[Appellee] was charged with rape and related
offenses following an incident that occurred on June
20, 2011. The victim and [Appellee] were/are
boyfriend and girlfriend. This incident occurred at
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), and 2701(a)(1), respectively.
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the Barkley Square Apartments, located at 1600
Garrett Road in Upper Darby. Prior to this incident,
[Appellee] and [the] victim had been dating for more
than a year. The two had been living together for
several months before this incident. During their
relationship, the victim had become pregnant by
[Appellee] with a set of twins, but had suffered a
miscarriage twenty-one weeks into her pregnancy.
This miscarriage occurred on January 26, 2011,
approximately five (5) months before the crime.
Both the [Appellee] and victim had a difficult time
dealing with the miscarriage.
On the night before this incident, [Appellee]
and victim argued and victim told [Appellee] that she
wanted to break up with him. This was because she
believed that [Appellee] was being unfaithful.
[Appellee] also believed that the victim was being
unfaithful. The two wanted to examine each other’s
cell phones for text messages containing any
evidence of their alleged infidelity.
On the night of June 20, 2011, [Appellee] and
victim continued to argue and each accused the
other of infidelity. They were also arguing about
cooking, and [Appellee] was planning to leave the
apartment. Before he did so, [Appellee] asked the
victim if she would “give him some.” She did not
realize that [Appellee] was referring to sex, and
thought that he was referring to food. She explained
that she wasn’t feeling too well and didn’t feel like
cooking, so she replied “no.” [Appellee] became
angry at her refusal, turned around, and approached
her, saying that he “wanted it now.” In fear, she
backed into a sliding-glass door. [Appellee] then
grabbed her arms and began to drag her into the
bedroom, a distance of “10 [to] 15 feet.” [Appellee]
also smacked her wrists. The victim continued
yelling and saying “no,” and [Appellee] repeatedly
said that he “wanted it now.” In vain, she tried to
pull herself away from [Appellee].
After [Appellee] got her into the bedroom, he
forced her to perform oral sex on him. [Appellee]
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raised his hand and yelled at her. She did not want
to perform oral sex on [Appellee], and only did so
because of his anger and also out of fear that he
would hit her. [Appellee’s] penis did enter her
mouth.
At some point, [Appellee] told the victim to get
on the bed. During this time, she told [Appellee] to
stop. When [Appellee] asked her to take off her
pants, she refused. [Appellee] then pulled off her
pants. [Appellee] then vaginally penetrated her with
his penis. She did not want to have intercourse with
[Appellee].
[Appellee] told her that he “want[ed] to get
[her] pregnant again.” [Appellee] continued having
intercourse with the victim until he ejaculated. Soon
after, [Appellee] said that “he didn’t want to do this
anymore.” [Appellee] then left the victim alone in
the room. Later, [Appellee] told her that he loved
her and told her to stop crying. [Appellee] then tried
to give her a hug. No weapons were used at any
time by either person.
The victim called 911 from the apartment. She
then went to Delaware County Memorial Hospital. At
the hospital, she was examined by a Sexual Assault
Nurse Examiner. She also gave a statement to a
detective while at the hospital.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/14, at 1-3 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Appellee was arrested on June 21, 2011, and charged with the
aforementioned crimes and related offenses. The trial court notes that the
prosecution proceeded despite the contrary wishes of the victim.
[The victim] immediately began to have doubts
about reporting what had happened. Several
months after the incident, the victim said that she
still cared for [Appellee]. She did not want the case
to be prosecuted, and she did not want [Appellee] to
go to prison. She testified that she was told that,
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because she had called 911, the case had to be
prosecuted. Consistent with her express wishes, she
did not appear at the first two scheduled definite
trials [sic] dates for [Appellee], and only appeared
the third time because a warrant was issued for her
arrest.
Id. at 3-4.
At the conclusion of a two-day jury trial held February 20-21, 2013,
Appellee was convicted of rape, IDSI, and simple assault. Sentencing
hearings were held on May 24, 2013, and July 12, 2013, at which latter date
Appellee was sentenced to an aggregate term of 167 days’ to two years less
one day’s incarceration plus seven years’ consecutive probation. Appellee
was not determined to be a sexually violent predator but is required to
register for life under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act,
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(3).
Prior to sentencing [Appellee], the victim testified on
[Appellee’s] behalf. Before imposing its sentence,
the [trial] court considered his psychosexual
evaluation, presentence investigation, and Megan’s
Law evaluation. The [trial] court considered the
nature and seriousness of the crime, [Appellee’s]
age, his family status, his vocation, his employment
status, statements from the Commonwealth,
statements from defense counsel and witnesses,
[Appellee’s] allocution, and the sentencing
guidelines.
Trial Court Opinion at 4 (citations omitted). On July 16, 2013, the
Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration and modification of
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sentence.2 The trial court denied the Commonwealth’s motion on October
4, 2013. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on
November 4, 2013.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following question for our
review.
Did the sentencing judge abuse his discretion by
imposing a sentence that was such an extreme
departure below even the mitigated range of the
Sentencing Guidelines that it was manifestly
unreasonable not only because it was not consistent
with the seriousness or gravity of the offenses
committed, but also because the court’s reasons for
going so far outside of the Guidelines did not justify
such a radical departure[?]
Commonwealth’s Brief at 5.
The Commonwealth’s issue implicates the discretionary aspects of the
sentence imposed by the trial court in this case. We acknowledge the
following criteria guiding our review of this question.
The right to appellate review of the
discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute,
and must be considered a petition for permission to
appeal. An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to
invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the
discretionary aspects of a sentence.
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to
determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely
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2
Appellee did not file any post-sentence motion but did file a pro se notice
of appeal on July 19, 2013. That appeal was dismissed on March 5, 2014,
for failure to file a docketing statement in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 3517. Commonwealth v. Satchell, 3127 EDA 2013
(Pa. Super. 2014)
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notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider
and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant’s brief
has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from
is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265-1266 (Pa. Super.
2014) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014).
Instantly, the Commonwealth’s appeal is timely filed, and its issue is
preserved in its motion for reconsideration and modification of sentence.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth has included in its appellate brief a
statement of the reasons relied on for appeal of the discretionary aspects of
the instant sentence pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
2119(f). We therefore proceed to determine if the Commonwealth has
advanced a substantial question permitting review.
The determination of what constitutes a substantial
question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
A substantial question exists only when the appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentencing
judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a
specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2)
contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie
the sentencing process.
Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 774 (Pa.
2013). “We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine
whether a substantial question exists. Our inquiry must focus on the
reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying
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the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.”
Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis in original).
In its Rule 2119(f) statement, the Commonwealth “submits that the
trial judge abused his discretion by imposing an excessively lenient sentence
outside of the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. It further
claims the “sentence was not consistent with the seriousness and gravity of
the felony offenses,” and the trial court “inappropriately relied upon factors
already integrated in the formulation of the Sentencing Guidelines for the
standard range, typical case of the same offense.” Id. At 12. The
Commonwealth also asserts the trial “court also improperly gave defendant
consideration for factors that, if they had existed, would have placed
defendant into a higher sentencing guideline range.” Id. These contentions
raise a substantial question permitting our review. Commonwealth v.
Daniel, 30 A.3d 494, 497 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding the Commonwealth’s
allegations, inter alia, that a sentence “was unreasonably lenient, was
dependent upon improper factors…, [and] disregarded the serious nature of
the offenses,” posed a substantial question for review). We therefore
proceed to a consideration of the merits of the Commonwealth’s appeal.
When reviewing the discretionary aspects of a sentence imposed by a
trial court, we are heedful of the following principles. “The imposition of
sentence is vested in the discretion of the trial court, and should not be
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disturbed on appeal for a mere error of judgment but only for an abuse of
discretion and a showing that a sentence was manifestly unreasonable.”
Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 735, 740 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “The proper standard of
review for an appellate court is to focus on the pertinent statutory provisions
in the Sentencing Code, specifically 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and (d), and 42
Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).” Id. at 741 (citation omitted).
Section 9781 provides in pertinent part as follows.
§ 9781. Appellate review of sentence
…
(c) Determination on appeal.--The appellate court
shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to
the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
…
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
sentencing guidelines and the sentence is
unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the
sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
(d) Review of record.--In reviewing the record the
appellate court shall have regard for:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to
observe the defendant, including any
presentence investigation.
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(3) The findings upon which the sentence was
based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the
commission.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781. “Thus, the statutory unreasonableness inquiry is a
component of the jurisprudential standard of review for an abuse of
discretion.” Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 519 (Pa. Super.
2007) (citation omitted).
Section 9721 provides in pertinent part as follows.
§ 9721. Sentencing generally
…
(b) General standards.--In selecting from the
alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the court
shall follow the general principle that the sentence
imposed should call for confinement that is
consistent with the protection of the public, the
gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on
the life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The court shall
also consider any guidelines for sentencing and
resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing…. … In every case
where the court imposes a sentence or resentence
outside the guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing …, the court shall provide
a contemporaneous written statement of the reason
or reasons for the deviation from the guidelines to
the commission…. Failure to comply shall be
grounds for vacating the sentence or resentence and
resentencing the defendant.
…
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).
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Generally, our review of a sentence [for abuse of
discretion] is limited [] to whether the sentencing
court explicitly or implicitly considered the section
9721(b) factors, and we may not re-weigh the
significance placed on each factor by the sentencing
judge. Given such a deferential standard of review,
our Supreme Court recognized that rejection of a
sentencing court’s imposition of sentence on
unreasonableness grounds would occur infrequently.
Williams, supra at 742 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)
see also Commonwealth v. Jones, 565 A.2d 732, 734 (Pa. 1989) (holding
that respecting the sentencing “equation, reasonable men can obviously
differ and thus the law has seized upon the wise decision to give great
deference to the trial judge’s decision in this area”). “[T]he appellant must
establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or
misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.”
Commonwealth v. Zirkle, --- A.3d ---, 2014 WL 7212598 at *4 (Pa.
Super. 2014) citing, Hoch, supra at 517–518.3
In fashioning a sentence, the trial court must impose
a term of confinement consistent with the protection
of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates
to the impact of the victim and to the community,
and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant….
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3
With respect to its contention that the trial court abused its discretion, the
Commonwealth acknowledges the trial court was “well-intentioned,” and
gave “plenty of reasons” for the sentence. Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. We
are focused, therefore, not on whether the trial court acted for reasons of
“partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” See Zirkle, supra Rather, we are
focused on the Commonwealth’s claim that the resulting sentence is
manifestly unreasonable even in light of the trial court’s reasons. See Id.
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Although the trial court must consider the
Sentencing Guidelines, the court is not obligated to
impose a sentence deemed appropriate under the
Sentencing Guidelines. At the same time, the trial
court cannot justly sentence a defendant unless it
possesses sufficient and accurate information about
the circumstances of the offense and the character of
the defendant to formulate its judgment. In
imposing a defendant’s sentence, the trial court must
state the reasons for the sentence on the record. As
long as the trial court’s reasons demonstrate
that it weighed the Sentencing Guidelines with
the facts of the crime and the defendant’s
character in a meaningful fashion, the court’s
sentence should not be disturbed.
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1018-1019 (Pa. Super.
2003) (emphasis added), quoting Commonwealth v. Begley, 780 A.2d
605, 642-643 (Pa. 2001); see also Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d
1280, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding where “the record as a whole reflects
that the trial court considered the facts of the crime and character of
Appellant in making its determination, we cannot re-weigh the sentencing
factors to achieve a different result”), appeal denied, 13 A.3d 475 (Pa.
2010). “Even with the advent of the sentencing guidelines, the power of
sentencing is a function to be performed by the sentencing court. Thus,
rather than cabin the exercise of a sentencing court’s discretion, the
guidelines merely inform the sentencing decision.” Commonwealth v.
Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961-962 (Pa. 2007) (citations and footnote omitted).
Instantly, the Commonwealth claims the trial court’s reference to the
particular circumstances of this case as distinguishing it from other rape
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cases “mistakenly removed this case from the heartland (to borrow a federal
term) of the typical domestic rape case embodying the conduct that the
guideline range describes.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 15. The
Commonwealth asserts that, “[a]lmost every case of domestic violence or
domestic sexual assault involves the same dynamic.” Id. “The
Commonwealth submits that the case at bar was typical of the domestic
rapes that are encompassed in the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. “Moreover,
a number of factors relied upon by the court are neither valid nor have any
legal efficacy to differentiate this case from the typical conduct associated
with a domestic Rape/Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse prosecution.”
Id. at 17-18.
It is undisputed the trial court considered the sentencing guideline
recommendations in this case. Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. The trial court
notes that it “is in no way diminishing the seriousness of [Appellee’s] crimes”
by remarking on the particular circumstances of the case, especially the
personal history between Appellee and the victim, the victim’s support for
Appellee at sentencing, the mutual desire for potential reconciliation, and the
insights offered by the psycho-sexual evaluation of Appellee. Trial Court
Opinion, 3/10/14, at 14. In compliance with Section 9721, the trial court
assessed the “gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of
the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (emphasis added).
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We disagree with the Commonwealth’s assertion that the trial court’s
considerations of the history and relationship between Appellee and the
victim made this a “lesser rape” than other scenarios mentioned by the trial
court. Commonwealth’s Brief at 20. Rather, the trial court was properly
assessing the seriousness of the offense in relation to the other statutory
sentencing concerns. For example, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court
admonished Appellee about the seriousness of his offense. “Rape, by
definition, is a serious offense. You asked the [victim] for sex, and she said
no. Then you dragged her by her arms to your bed.” N.T., 7/12/13, at 9.
However, the trial court also noted the particular circumstances of the
offense, e.g. that the offense was in the nature of domestic violence in the
shadow of the personal tragedy of the victim’s earlier miscarriage. Trial
Court Opinion, 3/10/14, at 13. This was not meant to diminish the
seriousness of the offense as claimed by the Commonwealth, but to provide
context for weighing the seriousness of the offense against the other
sentencing considerations.
Thus the trial court noted the attitude of the victim, who supported
leniency at sentencing.
The victim testified that she does not want anything
bad to happen to [Appellee]. She said the same
thing prior to trial in a notarized letter to the Court.
She wrote that she, “cares about his well being, and
does not want to see his life ruined behind bars from
never getting the help that was desperately needed.”
She expressly wrote that she, “did not want
[Appellee] to do any jail time.”
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N.T. 7/12/13, at 5. The trial court also observed the sincerity and
intelligence of the victim, noting she was not experiencing “battered victims
syndrome” in which some individuals persist in self-destructive choices. Id.
at 7-8.
The trial court also reviewed the numerous character witnesses
attesting to Appellee’s good character. “Going to the history and character
of [Appellee], … by the victim’s own statements, [Appellee] is a good person
who made a bad choice, in fact, a criminal choice. This -- his character was
corroborated by numerous sentencing witnesses.” Id. at 10. These
witnesses also indicated that Appellee has an extensive support network in
the community that even the Commonwealth conceded at the sentencing
hearing.
[BY THE ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]
He has a whole side of the courtroom here who are
going to help him set up a parole plan.
…
I’m confident and more than anything else in this
case that these people will be able to provide, these
good people will be able to provide him a place once
he’s paroled. I don’t think that should be a concern
for the Court at all.
Id. at 54.
The trial court, further commented on its own observations of
Appellee.
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Now another factor, the [trial c]ourt had the
opportunity to observe [Appellee]. And that’s a fact
the [trial c]ourt must consider. The [trial c]ourt did
observe [Appellee] at trial and sentencing. Though
the Commonwealth argued at sentencing that he was
– [Appellee] was feigning remorse, the [trial c]ourt
feels otherwise.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/14, at 11. The Commonwealth, in its brief, now
“accepts that there is a basis for the [trial] court’s perspective on the
showing of remorse.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 17.
Finally, the trial court noted the results of the psycho-sexual report of
Appellee prepared by Dr. Surbeck. “[The trial] court has read many
evaluations by Dr. Surbeck, and has found that she favors extensive post-
sentence restrictions. In the case sub judice, however, Dr. Surbeck’s
evaluation was to a certain extent favorable to [Appellee].” Trial Court
Opinion, 3/10/14, at 18. The trial court particularly noted “[Appellee] can
receive counseling, as Dr. Surbeck said, on the street [], and I think -- he
can get the counseling he needs, the counseling, the victim[] believes that
he needs so much.” N.T., 7/12/13, at 9.
Weighing all these legitimate and statutorily required factors, the trial
court concluded “that [Appellee] is [not] such a threat to community that
would require a -- the prolonged incarceration asked for by the
Commonwealth, and that otherwise could not be addressed by the jeopardy
of a long prison sentence while he is on supervision, as a result of any future
violations.” Id. at 10-11.
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That the Commonwealth, or indeed that this Court, might weigh those
considerations differently is no basis for a determination that the trial court
abused its discretion. See Crump, supra; Walls, supra at 966 (holding
the trial court’s generalized statements about the nature of an offense did
not preclude a finding based on the record, as a whole, that the trial court
imposed the required individualized sentence).
The Commonwealth also claims the trial court relied on factors that do
not support mitigation, as they are factors already subsumed in the
sentencing guidelines or are collateral consequences. Commonwealth’s Brief
at 9. “Hence, the fact that a 24 year old man has no prior convictions
would not be a reason to go outside of the standard guidelines sentencing
range because it has already been counted in the defendant’s favor in
arriving at the applicable guidelines.” Id. at 17. “Clearly, the requirement
that defendant is a lifetime registrant provides no justification for an
extreme downward departure and imposition of a sentence outside of the
Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. at 19. “[Appellee] should not get double
consideration regarding his lack of prior convictions.” Id. “The
Commonwealth recognizes and respects the trial court’s broad discretion in
sentencing. However, this is not simply a case where the court weighed the
appropriate sentencing factors, but chose to emphasize certain factors more
heavily than others.” Id. at 21. We disagree.
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We do not conclude the trial court “double counted” guideline
considerations when it departed from the guidelines. Its mention of
Appellee’s prior record, the fact no weapon was employed, and the SORNA
consequences was, as noted above, to describe the particular circumstances
of the case. The Commonwealth parses individual comments made by the
trial court out of context to justify a reweighing of the sentencing factors
rather than viewing the trial court’s entire analysis in light of the whole
record.
The fallacy of the Commonwealth’s arguments is in supposing that
each observation or consideration by the trial court was an attempt to
distinguish and or mitigate Appellee’s crime, where most of the
considerations concerned the rehabilitative needs of Appellee and the impact
of the crime of the victim and the community in light of the particular
circumstances of the offense. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/14, 10-15. In
reviewing the reasonableness of the trial court’s sentence under the factors
of Section 9781(d), the circumstances of the offense and character of
Appellee, the opportunity of the trial court to observe Appellee and review all
relevant considerations, the trial court’s findings and the sentencing
guidelines, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. See
Anderson, supra; Crump, supra. Neither do we conclude the sentence is
manifestly unreasonable in light of the entire record, including the position of
the victim, the results of the psycho-sexual evaluation by Dr. Surbeck, the
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contrition displayed by Appellee, and the circumstances of the crime.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s July 12, 2013 judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Donohue joins the memorandum.
Judge Stabile files a dissenting memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/9/2015
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