J-S14033-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ROBERT LEE DAVIES, :
:
Appellant : No. 2165 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on June 24, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,
Criminal Division, No. CP-39-CR-0003101-2010
BEFORE: DONOHUE, OLSON and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2015
Robert Lee Davies (“Davies”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following the revocation of his parole and probation. Additionally,
Davies’s counsel, Carol A. Marciano, Esquire (“Marciano”), has filed a Petition
to Withdraw as Counsel, and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant Marciano’s Petition to
Withdraw and affirm.
The trial court set for the relevant underlying facts as follows:
On September 2, 2010, [Davies] entered a negotiated
guilty plea to one count of Retail Theft and one count of
Recklessly Endangering Another Person. He was sentenced by
the Honorable William H. Platt to not less than one year less one
day to not more than two years less one day in Lehigh County
Prison on November 1, 2010.
[Davies] was paroled on or about April 20, 2011.
[Davies’s] parole was revoked on December 6, 2011[,] following
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a Gagnon II[1] hearing where he conceded that he violated his
parole. He was resentenced to serve the balance [of his
sentence], but granted immediate parole. He was also
sentenced to two years’ consecutive probation.
On May 28, 2013, [Davies] appeared before the [trial
court] for a second Gagnon II hearing. At that time, he
conceded the allegations of the violation, and his probation and
parole were revoked. He was remanded to Lehigh County Prison
to serve the balance of his sentence, followed by probation for
two years[,] consecutive to a Berks County sentence. He was
given immediate [parole].
On November 24, 2013, [Davies] was arrested for Retail
Theft in Berks County. He was sentenced to not less than one
nor more than five years [in prison] on May 8, 2014. This new
arrest and conviction served as the basis for a third violation in
this case.
On June 24, 2014, [Davies] again appeared before the
[trial c]ourt for a Gagnon II hearing. He conceded the
allegation that he violated his parole and probation by incurring
another retail theft arrest on December 24, 2013[,] for a crime
that occurred on November 24, 2013. After that hearing,
[Davies] was remanded to serve the balance of his sentence.
His probation was revoked and he was resentenced to an
additional twelve to twenty-four months’ incarceration in a State
Correctional Institution.
On July 24, 2014, [Davies] filed a Notice of Appeal
challenging his sentence. He was directed to serve a Concise
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on the [trial
c]ourt, and said Concise Statement was filed on August 18,
2014.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/20/14, at 1-2 (footnote added).
Davies’s counsel, Marciano, has filed a brief pursuant to Anders that
raises the following question for our review: “Whether the trial court abused
its discretion after probation revocation[,] and imposed an excessive and
1
See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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disproportional sentence by resentencing [Davies] to a state sentence and
then running that sentence consecutive to all the other sentences [Davies]
was then serving?” Anders Brief at 4. Marciano filed a separate Petition to
Withdraw as Counsel on October 17, 2014. Davies filed neither a pro se
brief, nor retained alternate counsel for this appeal.
“When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the
merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to
withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citation omitted). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is
frivolous and wishes to withdraw from representation, he/she must
(1) petition the [C]ourt for leave to withdraw stating that after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief
referring to any issues that might arguably support the appeal,
but which does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a
copy of the brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to
retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points
he deems worthy of this Court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.
2009), our Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders,
i.e., the contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
with citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal;
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(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. “Once counsel has satisfied the [Anders]
requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the
trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether
the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Edwards, 906 A.2d at 1228
(citation omitted).
Here, Marciano has complied with each of the requirements of
Anders. Marciano indicates that she has conscientiously examined the
record and determined that an appeal would be frivolous. Further,
Marciano’s Anders brief comports with the Santiago requirements. Finally,
the record includes a copy of the letter that Marciano sent to Davies,
advising him of his right to proceed pro se or retain alternate counsel and
file additional claims, and stating Marciano’s intention to seek permission to
withdraw. Accordingly, Marciano has complied with the procedural
requirements for withdrawing from representation, and we will review the
record to determine whether Davies’s claim on appeal is frivolous.
In this appeal, Davies challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992
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A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Prior to reaching the merits of a
discretionary sentencing issue,
[this Court conducts] a four[-]part analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether
there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from
is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [see] 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation omitted). “A substantial question exi[s]ts
only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing
judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the
Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie
the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 1286-
87 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
Here, Davies filed a timely Notice of Appeal, but failed to preserve his
claim regarding the probation revocation sentence at sentencing or in a
motion to reconsider the sentence. Thus, we cannot review Davies’s
sentencing claim. See Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1251
(Pa. Super. 2006) (concluding that challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing following a probation revocation was waived due to the
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defendant’s failure to preserve the issue at sentencing or in a post-sentence
motion).2
Nevertheless, in light of the fact that Marciano has filed an Anders
brief and Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, we will address Davies’s
sentencing claims. See Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa.
Super. 2009) (stating that while appellant failed to properly preserve his
discretionary aspects of sentencing claim, this Court would address the
merits of the claim due to appellant’s counsel’s petition to withdraw as
counsel); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 783 A.2d 784, 787 (Pa. Super.
2001) (concluding that Anders requires review of issues otherwise waived
on appeal).
Davies argues that “the trial court abused its discretion in re-
sentencing him after a probation violation to a state term of incarceration,
2
Davies has included a Statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance
of appeal in his brief, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P 2119(f). Davies claims that he
has raised a substantial question because his sentence is excessive in light
of the fact that the trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to a
state prison term that was consecutive to his other sentences. Anders Brief
at 9. Davies argues that the imposition of this sentence consecutive to his
other sentences “amounted to an unduly harsh and excessive sentence that
was disproportional to the nature of the violation.” Id. Generally, “[a]
challenge to the imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences
does not present a substantial question regarding the discretionary aspects
of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 961 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. Super.
2008). However, Davies also asserts that the trial court did not properly
consider the factors under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Anders Brief at 9. This
latter assertion would raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.
Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042-43 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that
arguments that the sentencing court failed to consider the factors under 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 present a substantial question).
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and in running that sentence consecutively to his other sentences, for an
aggregate term of approximately 3 to 9 years of state incarceration.”
Anders Brief at 10. Davies contends that his sentence was unduly harsh
and excessive and disproportional to the nature of the violation. Id. Davies
claims that his mental health and substance abuse problems caused him to
violate his parole and probation. Id. at 10-11. Davies asserts that in light
of these problems, the trial court should not have imposed a prison sentence
for the probation violation. Id. at 11.
The trial court set for the relevant law, addressed Davies’s sentencing
claims and determined that the probation revocation sentence was
appropriate in light of Davies’s lengthy criminal history, including his third
violation in this case, his mental health challenges, his rehabilitative needs,
and the needs of the community. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/20/14, at 3-4;
see also N.T., 6/24/14, at 4-5 (wherein prior to sentencing, Davies stated
that he was 51 years old; he had suffered from mental health issues his
entire life; he had spent a lot of time in prison; he has substance abuse
problems; and he has panic attacks and self-medicates); id. at 7-8 (wherein
the trial court considered a pre-sentence investigation report detailing
Davies’s prior criminal history, including committing crimes while on
supervision); id. at 10-12 (wherein the trial court explained its reasons for
the sentence, including that the prison term would provide Davies with the
mental health treatment necessary to treat his problems that influence his
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propensity to commit crimes); id. at 11 (wherein the trial court
recommended placing Davies at SCI-Waymart for treatment of his mental
health issues). Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of the
sentencing court’s discretion in imposing the challenged sentence. See Trial
Court Opinion, 8/20/14, at 3-4; Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910,
914-15 (Pa. Super. 2000) (concluding that the trial court’s imposition of a
prison sentence following probation/parole violations was proper where the
court considered the defendant’s age, prior criminal history, substance abuse
problems, mental health problems, defendant’s statements at sentencing,
and the ineffectiveness of parole and probation in rehabilitating the
defendant); see also Johnson, 961 A.2d at 880 (stating that “the
imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences lies within the
sound discretion of the sentencing court.”).
Additionally, following our independent review of the record, we
conclude that Davies’s appeal is wholly frivolous, and that there are no other
non-frivolous issues that Davies can raise on appeal. Thus, we grant
Marciano’s Petition to Withdraw as Counsel and affirm the judgment of
sentence.
Petition to Withdraw as Counsel granted. Judgment of sentence
affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/9/2015
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEHIGH COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
vs. No. 3101/2010
2165 EDA 2014
ROBERT LEE DAVIES,
Appellant
August 20,2014
Douglas G. Reichley, J.
1925(a) Opinion
Robert Lee Davies, Appellant, appeals from a judgment of sentence following a Gagnon
II hearing during which he conceded that he violated his parole and probation and was
resentenced to serve the remaining balance on his parole sentence and to an additional twelve to
twenty-four months in a State Correctional Institution consecutive to the balance. Appellant
contends this sentence is excessive and challenges the discretionary aspects ofthe Court's
sentence. For the reasons set forth herein, the sentence was proper and lawful and Appellant's
judgment of sentence should be affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
On September 2,2010, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of Retail
Theft and one count of Recklessly Endangering Another Person. He was sentenced by the
Honorable William H. Platt to not less than one year less one day to not more than two years less
one day in Lehigh County Prison on November 1,2010.
Appellant was paroled on or about April 20, 2011. Appellant's parole was revoked on
December 6, 2011 following a Gagnon II hearing where he conceded that he violated his parole.
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He was resentenced to serve the balance, but granted immediate parole. He was also sentenced to
two years' consecutive probation.
On May 28,2013, Appellant appeared before the undersigned for a second Gagnon II
hearing. At that time, he conceded the allegations of the violation and his probation and parole
were revoked. He was remanded to Lehigh County Prison to serve the balance of his sentence,
followed by probation for two years consecutive to a Berks County sentence. He was given
immediate reparole.
On November 24,2013, Appellant was an·ested for Retail Theft in Berks County. He was
sentenced to not less than one nor more than five years on May 8, 2014. This new arrest and
conviction served as the basis for a third violation in this case.
On June 24, 2014, Appellant again appeared before the Court for a Gagnon II hearing. He
conceded the allegation that he violated his parole and probation by incurring another retail theft
arrest on December 24, 2013 for a crime that occurred on November 24,2013. After that
hearing, Appellant was remanded to serve the balance of his sentence. His probation was
revoked and he was resentenced to an additional twelve to twenty-four months' incarceration in a
State Correctional Institution.
On July 24,2014, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal challenging his sentence. He was
directed to serve a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on the Court, and
said Concise Statement was filed on August 18, 2014.
This Opinion follows.
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Discussion
Appellant argues the Court abused his discretion by imposing a harsh and excessive
sentence. As a general rule, trial courts are afforded broad discretion in sentencing.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 835 A.2d 377,380 (Pa. Super. 2003); Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812
A.2d 617,621 (Pa. 2002). A sentence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.
Mouzon, 812 A.2d at 621 (citing Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 779 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super.
2001)). A sentencing court has not "abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the
judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill
will." Commonwealth v. Smith, 673 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1996) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lane, 424
A.2d 1325, 1328 (Pa. 1981)).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained that "[d]eference is accorded to the trial
court's pronouncement because of the perception that the trial court is in the best position to
detennine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual
circumstances before it." Commonwealth v. Ward, 568 A.2d 1242, 1243 (Pa. 1990). Thus, a
sentence will not be disturbed unless it was manifestly excessive or outside the statutory limits.
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 700 A.2d 948,958 (Pa. Super. 1997). Sentencing judges are guided by
the general principles of protecting the public, weighing the gravity of the offense in relation to
its impact on the community and the life of the victim, and the defendant's rehabilitative needs.
42 Pa.C.S. §9721(b).
"The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation 'is vested within the
sound discretion of the trial court, which, absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed
on appeal." Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2001) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910,913 (Pa. Super. 2000)). The range of sentences
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available to courts in resentencing following a revocation of probation are all of the sentencing
alternatives available at the time of the original sentencing. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b).
"Upon sentencing following a revocation of probation, the trial court is limited only by
the maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally at the time of the probationary
sentence." Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d at 792 (citations omitted). Once probation is revoked, a
sentence of total confinement may be imposed if any of the following conditions exist:
(1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or
(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit
another crime if he is not imprisoned; or,
(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of court
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c).
In this case, the sentence Appellant received is appropriate. Appellant has accumulated a
criminal history stretching back to the 1970s. More significantly, this was Appellant's third
violation on this case and each violation stemmed from a new arrest. Appellant continues to
commit criminal offenses, including a number of retail thefts. The Court took into consideration
Appellant's mental health challenges and recommended that his current sentence be served in
SCI Waymmi so that the Department of Corrections could better address his mental health needs.
However, under the circumstances, Appellant's sentence was both lawful and proper. It
considered both his rehabilitative needs and the needs of the community with respect to the high
likelihood that he will commit another crime.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's sentence was lawful and proper and did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. It was not an excessive or harsh sentence under the
circumstances of this matter. As a result, the within appeal is meritless and the Court
recommends that Appellant's judgment of sentence be affirmed.
By the Court:
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