Mar 16 2015, 9:28 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David Whitsett II Gregory F. Zoeller
Frankfort, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Henry A. Flores, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Johnnie M. Trout Jr., March 16, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
12A04-1409-MI-403
v. Appeal from the Clinton Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Bradley Mohler,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Case No. 12C01-1401-MI-014
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] According to Indiana Code section 35-38-9-3(b)(3), a person is ineligible for
mandatory expungement of their criminal records if they are “convicted of a
felony that resulted in bodily injury to another person.” Johnnie M. Trout Jr.
filed a petition to expunge records of his Class D felony convictions for criminal
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A04-1409-MI-403 | March 16, 2015 Page 1 of 9
recklessness with a deadly weapon and pointing a firearm, and the trial court
denied his petition. The trial court reasoned that although Trout was not
convicted of a felony that resulted in bodily injury to another person, it could
not “turn a blind eye” to the fact that Trout was acquitted of attempted murder
for shooting and injuring someone during the same incident.
[2] According to the plain language of the statute, the felonies that Trout was
convicted of must have resulted in bodily injury to another person. However,
the record shows that neither of his convictions resulted in bodily injury to
another person. Therefore, these convictions do not disqualify Trout from
mandatory expungement according to Section 35-38-9-3(b)(3). We therefore
reverse and remand this case.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In 1997 the State charged Trout with four counts stemming from an incident
that occurred at the Clinton County Fairgrounds under Case No. 12C01-9707-
CF-065 (“Case No. 65”):
Count I attempted murder
[Trout] on or about the 13th day of July, 1997, in Clinton County,
State of Indiana did attempt to commit the offense of Murder by
knowingly attempting to kill . . . Kimberly Langkop and in furtherance
of that attempt did perform a substantial step toward the commission
of that crime by shooting said Kimberly Langkop with a .45 caliber
handgun . . . .
Count II Class D felony criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon
[Trout] on or about the 13th day of July, 1997, in Clinton County,
State of Indiana did recklessly with a deadly weapon, to-wit: .45
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A04-1409-MI-403 | March 16, 2015 Page 2 of 9
caliber pistol, perform an act, to-wit: did shoot a gun into the air; that
created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person . . . .
Count III Class D felony pointing a firearm
[Trout] on or about the 13th day of July, 1997, in Clinton County,
State of Indiana did knowingly or intentionally point a firearm at
another person, to-wit: Charles L. Minnix II . . . .
Count IV Class D felony pointing a firearm
[Trout] on or about the 13th day of July, 1997, in Clinton County,
State of Indiana did knowingly or intentionally point a firearm at
another person, to-wit: Michael Lawson . . . .
Appellant’s App. p. 35-38. Following a jury trial in 1998, the jury convicted
Trout of Counts II and III and acquitted him of Counts I and IV. Id. at 34.
[4] Effective July 1, 2013, the Indiana General Assembly enacted Public Law 159-
2013, which codified a new chapter in Indiana Code Title 35, Article 38
entitled, “Chapter 9. Sealing and Expunging Conviction Records.” P.L. 159-
2013, Sec. 4. This new law allows people convicted of certain crimes to have
their records expunged. Taylor v. State, 7 N.E.3d 362, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
There are two general types of expungement available under Chapter 9:
mandatory and discretionary. Compare Ind. Code § 35-38-9-3 with Ind. Code §
35-38-9-5.1
[5] Based on the new law, in January 2014 Trout filed a petition to expunge
records of his Class D felony convictions for criminal recklessness with a deadly
1
Indiana Code section 35-38-9-5, a section that provides for discretionary expungement, requires the
prosecuting attorney to consent in writing. But because the prosecuting attorney here did not consent, we do
not review this case under Section 35-38-9-5.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A04-1409-MI-403 | March 16, 2015 Page 3 of 9
weapon and pointing a firearm in Case No. 65. Appellant’s App. p. 7-9. Trout
filed his expungement petition according to Indiana Code section 35-38-9-3,
which provides for mandatory expungement. When Trout filed his petition,
Section 35-38-9-3(e) provided2:
(e) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) the period required by this section has elapsed;
(2) no charges are pending against the person;
(3) the person does not have an existing or pending driver’s
license suspension;
(4) the person has successfully completed the person’s sentence,
including any term of supervised release, and satisfied all other
obligations placed on the person as part of the sentence; and
(5) the person has not been convicted of a crime within the
previous eight (8) years;
the court shall order the conviction records described in subsection (c)
expunged in accordance with section 6 of this chapter.
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-9-3(e) (West Supp. 2013). The State does not dispute
that Trout meets these requirements. However, Section 35-38-9-3 does not
mandate expungement if the person’s conviction resulted in bodily harm to
another person:
(b) This section does not apply to the following:
*****
(3) A person convicted of a felony that resulted in bodily injury to
another person.
2
According to Alvey v. State, 15 N.E.3d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), the version of the statute in effect when
the expungement petition is filed is controlling. Section 35-38-9-3 was amended effective March 26, 2014,
approximately two months after Trout filed his expungement petition.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A04-1409-MI-403 | March 16, 2015 Page 4 of 9
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-9-3(b)(3) (West Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).3
[6] The State objected to Trout’s expungement petition based on Section 35-38-9-
3(b)(3). Specifically, the State argued that according to the probable-cause
affidavit from Case No. 65, Trout shot a woman, who suffered bodily injury.
Appellant’s App. p. 15. Therefore, the State’s argument continued, according
to subsection (b)(3) Trout’s convictions were “ineligible to be expunged.” Id.
[7] A two-day hearing on Trout’s expungement petition was held. At the hearing,
defense counsel presented evidence from Case No. 65. The trial court took
judicial notice of Case No. 65 and the filings. Tr. p. 15. Trout testified that he
discharged the gun on two separate occasions: (1) when he fired warning shots
into the air (Count II) and (2) when Kimberly grabbed his gun and it
discharged, injuring her (Count I).4 Id. at 14-15. Defense counsel emphasized
that no one was injured when Trout shot the gun into the air (Count II) or
when Trout pointed the gun at Charles (Count III). Id. at 17-18. However, the
State argued that it did not matter because Kimberly was shot and injured
during the “same episode.” Id. at 16-17. The trial court framed the issue as
whether “we look at the entire sequence of events . . . or just the actual
particular charge . . . as it all relates to the bodily injury.” Id. at 18. The court
took the issue under advisement.
3
Subsection (b)(3) is the same under the pre-amended and amended versions of Section 35-38-9-3.
4
The probable-cause affidavit also identifies two separate shootings. See Appellee’s App. p. 1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A04-1409-MI-403 | March 16, 2015 Page 5 of 9
[8] The trial court later issued an order denying Trout’s expungement petition. The
court ruled in part:
7. That there is no dispute that [Trout’s] actions in firing a weapon
resulted in bodily injury (and serious bodily injury) to another person.
See: Count 1, Affidavit. The question is whether the Court is entitled
to look at all of the charges and the facts surrounding the entire
sequence of events, or, whether the Court is restricted to looking at
only the charges for which [Trout] was convicted. [Trout] argues that
Count 2, Criminal Recklessness, was strictly an act of firing a weapon
into the air, and, as such, did not result in any type of injury. See:
Exhibit A, jury instructions. The State argues that the Court should
consider all charges and facts.
8. That the Court recognizes there is little caselaw from the new
expungement statutes. See: Taylor v. State, 7 N.E.3d 362 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014), which does not provide guidance for the issues raised
herein.
9. That while the Court recognizes the purpose of the expungement
statutes [is] to provide defendants a second chance following a
conviction, this Court does not believe it is appropriate to turn a blind
eye to the facts of the entire case, i.e.[,] that a person suffered a
gunshot wound, to allow for a mandatory expungement under I.C. §
35-38-9-3.
*****
12. That for the foregoing reasons, the Court does not find that [Trout]
has satisfied the requirements under I.C. § 35-38-9-3 . . . .
Appellant’s App. p. 3-4.
[9] Trout now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[10] Trout contends that the trial court erred in denying his expungement petition
because the offenses he was convicted of—Class D felony criminal recklessness
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A04-1409-MI-403 | March 16, 2015 Page 6 of 9
with a deadly weapon and Class D felony pointing a firearm—did not result in
bodily injury to another person, as the statute requires. That is, a person is not
entitled to mandatory expungement if the “person [was] convicted of a felony
that resulted in bodily injury to another person.” Ind. Code Ann. 35-38-9-3(b)(3)
(West Supp. 2013) (emphasis added). The State responds that the statute is
clear and unambiguous and that there is “no language which prohibits a trial
court from considering the entirety of a petitioner’s course of conduct to
determine if injury to another occurred.” Appellee’s Br. p. 3-4.
[11] Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Wall v.
Plummer, 13 N.E.3d 420, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We must first determine
whether the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. Id. In interpreting
the statute, we will attempt to determine and give effect to the intent of the
legislature. Id. “The best evidence of legislative intent is surely the language of
the statute itself.” Id. (quotation omitted). We must give all words their plain
and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated by statute. Id. at 422-23.
[12] We find that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and we will
not read into it a legislative intent other than that which is clearly stated.
Indeed, the State does not cite, nor can we find, any other provision of the
statute that supports its interpretation of the statute. In other words, looking at
the statute as a whole, this provision does not require a different interpretation.
According to the language of the statute, a person is ineligible for mandatory
expungement if they were convicted of a felony and that felony resulted in
bodily injury to another person. The use of “that” in the statute is a restrictive
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A04-1409-MI-403 | March 16, 2015 Page 7 of 9
clause: “A person convicted of a felony that resulted in bodily injury to another
person.” “A restrictive clause is essential to the grammatical and logical
completeness of a sentence.” Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Modern American Usage
806 (3d ed. 2009). Therefore, the two felonies that Trout was convicted of must
have resulted in bodily injury to another person in order for him to be ineligible
for mandatory expungement. Trout was convicted of Class D felony criminal
recklessness with a deadly weapon and Class D felony pointing a firearm;
however, the record shows that neither of these convictions resulted in bodily
injury to another person. Therefore, these convictions do not disqualify Trout
from mandatory expungement according to Section 35-38-9-3(b)(3). And
because this is the only basis upon which the State challenges Trout’s petition to
expunge records of his Class D felony convictions for criminal recklessness with
a deadly weapon and pointing a firearm, we find that the trial court erred in
denying Trout’s expungement petition.
[13] We understand the State’s and the trial court’s concern that Trout does not
dispute that he shot and injured Kimberly (albeit accidentally) in the same
incident that led to his Class D felony convictions for criminal recklessness with
a deadly weapon and pointing a firearm. But the only charge related to
Kimberly’s shooting and bodily injury was attempted murder, and Trout was
acquitted of this charge following a jury trial. Section 35-38-9-3(b)(3) clearly
states that the felony conviction must result in bodily injury to another person.
Here, none of Trout’s felony convictions resulted in bodily injury to another
person. Therefore, facts from the same incident that do not result in a felony
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A04-1409-MI-403 | March 16, 2015 Page 8 of 9
conviction cannot be taken into consideration when determining whether a
person is disqualified from expungement according to Section 35-38-9-3(b)(3).
We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of Trout’s expungement petition
and remand this case to the trial court.
[14] Reversed and remanded.
Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A04-1409-MI-403 | March 16, 2015 Page 9 of 9