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RENDERED: APRIL 2, 2015
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Suprrtur (Couti (71,firufurkv
2014-SC-000069-MR
MARKELLE D. WHITE APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE AUDRA JEAN ECKERLE, JUDGE
NO. 10-CR-002815
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Markelle White appeals as a matter of right from a Judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court convicting him of murder. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
White raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred to
his substantial prejudice when it allowed the Commonwealth to exercise
peremptory strikes against jurors. Second, White argues that the introduction
of a witness's interview with police officers was erroneous. We now find no
error and affirm the Judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
RELEVANT FACTS
Appellant Markelle White was convicted by a Jefferson County jury of
intentional murder for the shooting death of Lamont Wilson. At trial, the
Commonwealth argued that White and co-defendant Lakendrick Charlton shot
Wilson five times as he stood in the front yard of his home shortly after
midnight on September 8, 2010. Various neighbors and other witnesses
testified to observing a verbal altercation between White, Charlton, and Wilson.
Another neighbor testified to witnessing three men fire shots at Wilson after he
advised a large group of people assembled outside of his house to turn their
music down. A surveillance video at a nearby liquor store captured images of
White moving towards the scene, followed by visible gunfire. The
Commonwealth played a video of a police interview with a witness, Chris
Mayfield, who told the detectives that White confessed to shooting Wilson. The
jury deliberated and recommended a life sentence, which was then imposed by
the trial court. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
I. The Commonwealth is Entitled to Peremptory Strikes.
Before voir dire, the trial court allocated thirteen peremptory strikes to
the defense and nine peremptory strikes to the Commonwealth pursuant to
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.40. The challenges were
exercised without objection. White now maintains that the trial court
improperly allocated peremptory strikes to the Commonwealth, asserting that
the statute establishing a prosecutorial right to peremptory strikes, Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 29A.290, represents an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.
Under KRS 29A.290(2)(b), the legislature has provided that "parties shall
have the right to challenge jurors," and "[t]he number of peremptory challenges
shall be prescribed by the Supreme Court." The Court has promulgated RCr
9.40, our criminal rule prescribing the allocation of peremptory strikes in a
2
criminal prosecution. Under that rule, "the Commonwealth is entitled to eight
(8) peremptory challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly to eight (8)
peremptory challenges" in felony prosecutions, with the numbers increased to
nine and thirteen respectively in cases such as this where an extra juror was
seated and two defendants are being tried jointly. RCr 9.40. White maintains
that no right to prosecutorial challenges existed at common law, and, therefore,
the legislature cannot delegate its lawmaking authority to the Supreme Court
under KRS 29A.290(2)(b).
The Commonwealth urges this Court not to consider the merits of
White's claim because he failed to provide notice of the constitutional challenge
to KRS 29A.290(2)(b) to the Attorney General as required by KRS 418.075. 1 We
have held that the mandatory notification requirement of KRS 418.075 cannot
be satisfied by filing an appellate brief. Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d
528, 532 (Ky. 2008). As White has failed to comply with KRS 418.075, we
must decline to address the merits of White's argument.
Against this result, White urges this Court to revise our policy of strict
adherence to KRS 418.075 and assess his claim on the merits. While we find
this argument unpersuasive, 2 we note that this Court has recently addressed
1 KRS 418.075(1) provides: "In any proceeding which involves the validity of a
statute, the Attorney General of the state shall, before judgment is entered, be served
with a copy of the petition, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the ordinance or
franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General of the state shall also
be served with a copy of the petition and be entitled to be heard."
2Citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 423 S.W.3d 718 (Ky. 2014), White contends
that because the Attorney General cannot intervene in "ordinary criminal
prosecutions" without statutory permission to do so, the notice requirement of KRS
418.075 cannot serve as a procedural bar to a constitutional challenge of a statute. In
3
the propriety of prosecutorial peremptory strikes. In Glenn v. Commonwealth,
we declared that "although KRS 29A.290(2)(b) constitutes an encroachment by
the General Assembly upon the prerogatives of the judiciary, it is not
inconsistent with our rules, and is, therefore, upheld as a matter of comity."
436 S.W.3d 186, 188 (2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794,
797 (Ky. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). Citing our authority under
Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution, we affirmed RCr 9.40 substantively,
and reaffirmed our constitutional power as a Court to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure—including our authority to set the rules for the
allocation of peremptory strikes. "We alone are the final arbiters of our rules of
`practice and procedure."' 436 S.W.3d at 188.
So although the Glenn decision did not squarely address the
constitutionality of KRS 29A.290(2)(b), this Court deemed the statute
acceptable by way of comity. "Comity, by definition, means the judicial
adoption of a rule unconstitutionally enacted by the legislature not as a matter
of obligation but out of deference and respect." Taylor v. Commonwealth, 175
S.W.3d 68, 77 (Ky. 2005) (internal citations omitted). In extending comity, we
the alternative, White argues that KRS 418.075 does not apply to criminal
prosecutions at all. The answer to both of White's contentions is a settled one: the
Attorney General is entitled to notice under KRS 418.075 "whenever the
constitutionality of a statute is placed in issue." Maney v. Mary Chiles Hosp., 785
S.W.2d 480, 481 (Ky. 1990) (emphasis added). By its plain language, KRS 418.075
permits the Attorney General to intervene in cases when the constitutionality of a
statute is put in issue. See Brashars v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 58 (Ky. 2000). Our
recent decision in Commonwealth v. Johnson affirming the Attorney General's
authority to enforce and investigate drug crimes in no way undermines the validity of
KRS 418.075. See 423 S.W.3d at 725.
4
recognized that KRS 29A.290(b)(2) is consistent with our rules of practice and
procedure. Glenn, 436 S.W.3d at 188.
White's appellate counsel ("counsel") takes great umbrage with what he
characterizes as this Court's refusal to "do anything about KRS 29A.290." Lest
counsel believes that he is shouting against the wind, we acknowledge that he
has repeatedly raised iterations of this precise issue in other recent matter of
right appeals. 3 Undaunted by our clear articulation of the Court's position on
the statute's validity in Glenn, counsel proceeded to raise the same issue in
three post-Glenn appeals (including this one). 4 These post-Glenn appeals follow
a familiar formula: first, there is a failure to comply with the notification
requirement of KRS 418.075 at the trial level; and second, there is an attack on
the constitutionality of KRS 29A.290 before an appellate court. Although Glenn
was rendered after the conclusion of White's trial, 5 counsel cites Glenn here,
and has contemplated its import having participated as appellate counsel in
that case. Moreover, counsel was effectively on notice that the Attorney
3 In Grider v. Commonwealth, appellant's counsel argued that RCr 9.40 exceeds
this Court's constitutional authority under Section 116, and that KRS 29A.290(2)(b)
violates the separation of powers. 404 S.W.3d 859, 861 (Ky. 2013). The Court
declined to address the issue in Grider because the appellant failed to notify the
Attorney General pursuant to KRS 418.075(1). See id. Months later in Glenn,
appellant's counsel (listed as one of three attorneys who handled appellant Glenn's
appeal) again challenged the validity of RCr 9.40 for essentially the same reasons
argued in Grider. 436 S.W.3d at 188. As with Grider, the Attorney General was never
notified, and the Commonwealth argued that this Court could not address the
constitutional challenge to RCr 9.40 in Glenn. Id. However, the Court concluded that
no notice is required when challenging the constitutionality of a Supreme Court Rule.
Id.
See also Adkins v. Commonwealth, 2014 WL 2810040, No. 2013-SC-000460-
4
MR (Ky. 2014) and Prickett v. Commonwealth, 427 S.W.3d 812 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).
5 The Glenn opinion was issued on November 21, 2013 and became final on
February 20, 2014.
5
General must be notified before a final judgment is entered in order to preserve
a constitutional challenge, and also that any attack on the validity of KRS
29A.290 would have to address Glenn's extension of comity.
To see this argument raised once again conjures up images of Justice
Scalia's oft-referenced ghoul who "repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried[.]" 6 As explained above, Glenn
held that the allocation of peremptory strikes falls within the Court's
procedural rulemaking authority and extended comity to KRS 29A.290(2)(b).
Id. Therefore, to appellant's counsel's spirited charge that this Court has failed
to "do anything" concerning the alleged invalidity of prosecutorial peremptory
strikes, let us be clear: the Court has upheld KRS 29A.290(2)(b) under the
principles of comity. We reaffirm that decision today.
H. Police Interview With Witness Was Properly Admitted.
On the second day of trial, the Commonwealth called the victim's former
neighbor, Christopher Mayfield, to testify. On direct examination, Mayfield
explained that he suffered a recent brain injury that prevented him from
remembering any details about Wilson's shooting, including whether he was in
the vicinity at the time of the shooting, whether he spoke with police officers
after the shooting, or whether he spoke to White after the shooting. On cross-
examination, Mayfield reiterated that he could not remember anything about
the events of September 8, 2010.
6 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(J. Scalia, dissenting).
6
Detective Chris Middleton was then called to testify about a September 9,
2010 interview with Mayfield. Before Detective Middleton took the stand, the
prosecutor asked the trial court how a video of the interview should be played
for the jury. White's counsel objected to the introduction of the video on two
grounds: 1) that Mayfield was incompetent to testify, and; 2) that the statement
was hearsay. White's counsel asserted that effective cross-examination would
be impossible if the video interview was substituted for Mayfield's live
testimony. In response, the Commonwealth maintained that White's
competency objection was untimely given that Mayfield had testified the day
prior. As to the hearsay objection, the Commonwealth •argued that Mayfield's
testimony that he could not remember what he had said to the officers
established the proper foundation for impeachment under McAtee v.
Commonwealth.? The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth that White's
objection to Mayfield's competency was untimely, and further held that the
Commonwealth had laid the proper foundation for impeachment. The video of
Mayfield's interview was then played for the jury.
White now charges that the video violated our evidentiary rules against
the introduction of hearsay statements, specifically asserting that the
Commonwealth failed to lay the proper foundation for the video's introduction
pursuant to KRS 613. We disagree.
As a general rule, hearsay statements, that is, out-of-court statements
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, are inadmissible. KRE 802.
7 413 S.W.3d 608 (Ky. 2013).
7
Our rules against the admission of hearsay are designed in part to protect the
accused from the introduction of unreliable statements that have not been
submitted to the rigors of cross-examination by the accused. This guarantee
is, of course, rooted in the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). One exception to our prohibition against
hearsay statements concerns the prior inconsistent statements of a witness, as
provided in KRE 801A as follows:
(a) Prior statements of witnesses. A statement is not excluded
by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness, if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
examined concerning the statement, with a foundation laid as
required by KRE 613, and the statement is:
(1) Inconsistent with the declarant's testimony;
(2) Consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive; or
(3) One of identification of a person made after perceiving
the person.
In our recent McAtee v. Commonwealth decision, we were asked to
determine whether prior inconsistent statements can be admitted to impeach a
witness who claims to not remember making the statement. 413 S.W.3d at
618. The factual scenario in McAtee is very similar to what we have before us
in the case at bar. In McAtee, the trial court admitted a witness statement
given to police officers—a statement that the witness later testified to having no
memory of making. Id. at 617-18. Relying on the Supreme Court's seminal
8
Crawford v. Washington decision, we reiterated that the Confrontation Clause
does not constrain the use of a prior inconsistent statement when the
"declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it." Id. (quoting Crawford, 541
U.S. at 59 n.9). Going further, McAtee applied United States v. Owens, 484
U.S. 554 (1988), where the Supreme Court held that a defendant is not denied
the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine a witness simply because that
witness claims memory loss. 8 Reading Crawford alongside Owens, we
concluded that "the Confrontation Clause is not implicated by a witness
claiming memory loss if he or she takes the stand at trial and is subject cross-
examination." McAtee at 619. Because the forgetful witness in McAtee was
subjected to cross-examination about the prior statements, we found no error.
Id.
As a threshold matter, we agree that defense counsel's objection at trial
was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Defense counsel's
hearsay objection concerned White's right to cross-examine Mayfield, referring
to White's right to confrontation. The Commonwealth cited McAtee as
controlling. Under McAtee, as explained supra, a prior inconsistent statement
used to impeach a witness who claims to suffer from memory loss does not
implicate a defendant's right to confrontation. 413 S.W.3d at 618. In order to
introduce a prior inconsistent statement, the proponent of the statement must
8 "If the ability to inquire into these matters suffices to establish the
constitutionally requisite opportunity for cross-examination when a witness testifies as
to his current belief, the basis for which he cannot recall, we see no reason why it
should not suffice when the [witness's] past belief is introduced and he is unable to
recollect the reason for that past belief." Owens, 484 U.S. at 559.
lay the proper foundation pursuant to our rules of evidence. KRE 613. The
issue of an improper foundation here (that is, where a declarant has claimed
memory loss) is so closely intertwined with the confrontation/hearsay objection
that we are satisfied that the trial court properly considered the question before
making its ruling so as to preserve the issue for our review.
As for the introduction of the statement to police, we find no error. In his
taped interview, Mayfield stated that White confessed to shooting Wilson,
claiming that Wilson tried to punch him, prompting White to shoot him. As
noted previously, Mayfield testified at trial that he had no knowledge of the
shooting, nor did he recall giving a statement to detectives. 9 That testimony
was subjected to examination. Therefore, Mayfield's statements constituted
prior inconsistent statements because they were "[i]nconsistent with the [his]
testimony," and he was "examined concerning the statement[.]" KRE 801A(a).
Under the principle espoused in McAtee, the Commonwealth was entitled to
introduce any prior inconsistent statements made by Mayfield, so long as it
first established the proper foundation under KRE 613.
,
A party seeking to admit a prior inconsistent statement must first
"[inquire of the declarant] concerning [the statement], with the circumstances
of time, place, and persons present, as correctly as the examining party can
9 White argues that no KRE 804 exception applies here. Exceptions to our
prohibition against out-of-court statements include some instances where a witness is
unavailable to testify, such as when a witness "[t]estifies to a lack of memory of the
subject matter of the declarants statement." KRE 804(3). Mayfield undoubtedly
qualifies as an unavailable declarant. However, the application of the KRE 804(b)
(hearsay exceptions when the declarant is unavailable) is immaterial, as our prior
inconsistent statement rule applies whether or not the declarant is available. KRE
801A(a)(1).
10
present them[.]" KRE 613. White now insists that the Commonwealth failed to
meet its burden under KRS 613, arguing that the Commonwealth was required
to lay a foundation for each utterance made during Mayfield's police interview.
To the contrary, we agree that under McAtee, the Commonwealth established a
proper foundation for the introduction of the police interview. The
Commonwealth asked Mayfield if he remembered giving a statement to
Detective Middleton; Mayfield testified that he did not. When asked about
specific statements, Mayfield replied that he could not recall making any
statements. Mayfield's testimony was unequivocal that he would be unable to
answer any questions concerning Wilson's shooting or his interview with
Detective Middleton.
It was abundantly clear that nothing more could have been gained by
questioning Mayfield as to the specifics of his interview with police. Rather,
because Mayfield was available for cross-examination at trial, at which time he
claimed to not recall giving a statement to the police, the Commonwealth was
entitled to impeach him with the video of the police interview. McAtee, 413
S.W.3d at 619. As such, we agree that the trial court did not err in allowing
the Commonwealth to introduce Mayfield's police interview.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment and sentence of
the Jefferson Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur.
11
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville Metro Public Defender
James David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
12