United States v. Abukar Beyle

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4895

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ABUKAR OSMAN BEYLE,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-4897

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHANI NURANI SHIEKH ABRAR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, Chief
District Judge. (2:11-cr-00034-RBS-DEM-2; 2:11-cr-00034-RBS-
DEM-3)

Argued: January 29, 2015 Decided: April 3, 2015

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Shedd joined.

ARGUED: James Ellenson, LAW OFFICE OF JAMES STEPHEN ELLENSON,
Newport News, Virginia; Lawrence Hunter Woodward, Jr.,
SHUTTLEWORTH, RULOFF, SWAIN, HADDAD & MORECOCK, PC, Virginia
Beach, Virginia, for Appellants. Benjamin L. Hatch, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Alexandria,
Virginia, Joseph E. DePadilla, Assistant United States Attorney,
Norfolk, Virginia, Brian J. Samuels, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News,
Virginia, for Appellee.

2
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellants Abukar Osman Beyle and Shani Nurani Shiekh Abrar

were each convicted on twenty-six criminal counts arising from

the armed abduction and murder of four U.S. citizens off the

coast of Somalia. Beyle and Abrar were part of a group of

nineteen pirates who seized a yacht and captured the four

Americans on board. The pirates headed for Somalia, but were

intercepted by the United States Navy. During a final

confrontation with the Navy, Beyle, Abrar, and another pirate

shot and killed the four American hostages. The Navy secured the

boat and apprehended the surviving pirates, who were transported

to the United States to face criminal charges. After a weeks-

long trial, a jury convicted Beyle and Abrar on all counts, and

each defendant received multiple life sentences.

Beyle and Abrar now challenge their respective convictions

on separate grounds. Beyle argues that the district court lacked

jurisdiction over the murder and firearms charges against him

because the Americans were not killed on the “high seas.” Abrar,

who maintains that he was kidnapped before the piracy operation,

contends that he was unable to present certain witnesses who

could have corroborated his duress defense. We conclude,

however, that the site of the murders, thirty to forty nautical

miles from the Somali coast, lay on the high seas and thus

beyond the territorial sea of any nation. We further conclude

3
that Abrar was not denied his Fifth Amendment right to due

process or his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses

material to his defense. The district court gave each of the

defendants the fair trial that he deserved, and we affirm in all

respects its judgment.

I.

In reviewing defendants’ convictions by a jury, we consider

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.

Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 257 (1992); see United

States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

A.

The United States and its allies are engaged in a

multinational battle against piracy in the waters off the Horn

of Africa. Through the Gulf of Aden and much of the Indian

Ocean, Somalia-based pirates have launched attacks against

commercial and recreational vessels, from large freighters to

personal yachts. See The White House, United States Counter

Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan annex A at 1 (June

2014); U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Sec’y-Gen. on the Situation with

Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of

Somalia, U.N. Doc. S/2014/740 (Oct. 16, 2014). Piracy poses a

threat not only to the free flow of global commerce, but also to

4
the individuals who navigate the seas. In 2011, armed Somali

pirates attacked an estimated 3,863 seafarers and took some 555

individuals hostage. Oceans Beyond Piracy et al., The Human Cost

of Maritime Piracy, 2012, at 3 (2013). Thirty-five of those

hostages were killed. Id. at 7.

This case arises from one such attack. In early February

2011, a group of pirates, with the assistance of several

investors and facilitators in Somalia, prepared to hijack a ship

at sea. The investors provided a primary “mothership” for the

voyage, as well as an attack skiff that the pirates would use to

launch fast-moving assaults on their targets. The mothership,

the Alqasim, was a captured Yemeni fishing boat, and four Yemeni

fishermen on board were forced to operate the boat for the

pirates. All of the pirates were Somali, except for one, another

Yemeni fisherman who had been captured by Somali pirates but

then decided to join their ranks. Among their supplies, the

nineteen men brought various automatic firearms and a rocket-

propelled grenade launcher.

Beyle and Abrar were part of this cohort. Beyle assisted

with acquiring an outboard motor for the attack skiff. Abrar

brought an AK-47 aboard the boat. One of the pirates drew up a

list of the individuals who had participated in the mission, to

allocate any eventual ransom shares. Both Beyle and Abrar were

5
on the list. The four captive Yemeni fishermen from the Alqasim

were not.

The pirates set to sea on February 9, 2011. During their

first nine days, they made a number of unsuccessful efforts,

including chasing a large container ship. In at least one such

attempt, Abrar carried the rocket-propelled grenade launcher.

On February 18, 2011, the pirates spotted a new target: a

U.S.-flagged sailboat with four U.S. citizens aboard. The

Americans had been sailing in the Arabian Sea as part of an

international yacht rally, traveling a leg from India to Oman.

Two of them, Scott Adam and Jean Adam, were husband and wife and

owned this vessel, known as the Quest. The other two Americans

were Phyllis Macay and Robert Riggle, who were friends of the

couple.

Six of the pirates, including Beyle and Abrar, boarded the

attack skiff. They moved swiftly to hijack the Quest and take

the four Americans hostage. As the skiff approached, Beyle fired

an AK-47 into the air. Once on board, Abrar first subdued the

two women, and he then cut the boat’s communication lines. At

the time the pirates gained control, the nearest land was Oman

or Yemen, approximately four hundred miles away. The pirates had

traveled 940 to 960 miles from the Somali coast.

With the Quest secured, the remaining pirates took the

supplies from the mothership and crowded onto the fifty-eight-

6
foot-long Quest. They released the four Yemeni captives, who

departed in the Alqasim. The nineteen pirates then set a course

for Somalia. They intended to hold the Americans hostage on land

and work through their coconspirators to secure a ransom. 1 The

Americans were kept primarily in a horseshoe-shaped bench area

around the helm. Beyle and Abrar were among the men assigned to

guard the Americans, with guns ready. After hijacking the Quest,

the pirates also used the Americans’ cellular telephones to take

photographs and record videos. Several pirates put on clothing

belonging to their victims, and Abrar can be seen wearing a

hostage’s sunglasses and smiling.

The U.S. Navy was soon alerted to the attack, and a carrier

strike group moved to intercept the Quest. After locating the

boat, which was still hundreds of miles into the Indian Ocean,

the Navy established radio communications with the pirates and

began following the Quest as it proceeded to Somalia. The Navy’s

objective was to stop the Quest from entering Somali territorial

waters and to secure the hostages’ safe release. Claiming they

lacked any negotiating authority, however, the pirates demanded

that they be allowed to reach Somalia and engage in hostage

negotiations through an interlocutor on land. The Navy made

1
The pirates’ English-speaking negotiator in Somalia was
later captured and convicted in a separate proceeding. We
affirmed those convictions. United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d
233 (4th Cir. 2013).

7
clear to the pirates that they would not be permitted to take

the hostages to Somalia. But time was running short: the pirates

were on pace to reach Somalia within days. At one point during

these exchanges, Abrar fired an AK-47 into the air above Scott

Adam, as a warning to the Navy. The pirates variously threatened

to kill the hostages and themselves.

On February 22, 2011, the Navy directed the pirates to stop

proceeding toward Somalia. The Navy was determined to keep the

Quest in international waters and prevent it from entering

Somali territorial waters. But the pirates refused. The Navy

began maneuvering to block the boat and informed the pirates

that these movements were peaceful. One pirate answered, “I will

eat them like meat.” J.A. 384.

Suddenly, another pirate fired a rocket-propelled grenade

toward the USS Sterett, the Navy destroyer that had been

following the Quest most closely. The rocket missed and splashed

into the water, between the Sterett and a set of smaller boats

carrying Navy SEALs. Bullets from the Quest began whizzing over

the Sterett, but the Navy did not return fire. At that point, a

group of three pirates -- Beyle and Abrar, together with Ahmed

Muse Salad, also known as “Afmagalo” -- fired their automatic

weapons and killed the four Americans. Scott Adam was shot seven

times; Jean Adam was shot seven times; Phyllis Macay was shot

eight times; Robert Riggle was shot nineteen times. At the time

8
of these events, it is undisputed the Quest was between thirty

and forty nautical miles off the coast of Somalia.

Within a matter of minutes, a team of Navy SEALs headed for

the Quest, boarded it, and secured it. By the time the SEALs

arrived, all four Americans had been mortally wounded. Many

pirates, including Beyle and Abrar, put their hands up and

surrendered. The other shooter, Afmagalo, was the last to

surrender. At the end of the encounter, four of the pirates were

dead: two from the discharge of the pirates’ own weapons, and

two from the SEALs’ raid.

The Navy took the remaining pirates into custody. While

held aboard the USS Enterprise, an aircraft carrier, they were

given Miranda warnings and questioned by the FBI. (One pirate, a

juvenile, was released.) Abrar told the FBI that he had been

forced to participate in the piracy mission. In Abrar’s account,

he was offered work as a mechanic in the coastal Somali town of

Garacad, but was then kidnapped at gunpoint by two of the other

pirates, Mohamud Salad Ali, also known as “Juguuf,” and Mohamud

Hirs Issa Ali, also known as “Sarindaaq.” Abrar acknowledged

that he had been the first pirate to board the Quest, and he

contended that after the hijacking his role changed from

mechanic to guard. According to Abrar, he did not leave with the

four Yemeni fishermen who were released on the Alqasim because

he thought he would have been arrested in Yemen for piracy.

9
 Although Abrar admitted that he had been pointing a gun at

Jean Adam before the concluding moments of carnage, he denied

ever shooting any of the American hostages. Abrar, who is

considered a member of the Bantu minority ethnic group in

Somalia, claimed that he would not have received a share of any

ransom. When confronted with the pirates’ list of participants,

Abrar suggested that his name may have been included simply to

assuage his feelings.

B.

The fourteen remaining pirates, including Beyle and Abrar,

were transported to the United States for criminal prosecution.

A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment against

the pirates. Nine members of the group pleaded guilty to piracy

under the law of nations, and two leaders, Sarindaaq and Juguuf,

pleaded guilty both to piracy under the law of nations and to

hostage-taking resulting in death. Each of the eleven pirates

who entered guilty pleas was sentenced to at least one term of

life imprisonment.

On July 8, 2011, the grand jury returned a superseding

indictment containing twenty-six counts against each of the

three pirates who had not pleaded guilty -- Afmagalo, Beyle, and

Abrar. The superseding indictment charged the codefendants with

the following crimes: conspiracy to commit hostage-taking

10
resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (Count

1); hostage-taking resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1203(a) and § 2 (Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5); conspiracy to commit

kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (Count 6);

kidnapping resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1201(a)(2) and § 2 (Counts 7, 8, 9, and 10); conspiracy to

commit violence against maritime navigation resulting in death,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2280(a)(1)(H) (Count 11); violence

against maritime navigation resulting in death, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2280(a)(1)(G) and § 2 (Counts 12, 13, 14, and 15);

murder within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction

of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 and § 2

(Counts 16, 17, 18, and 19); piracy under the law of nations, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1651 and § 2 (Count 20); the use,

carry, brandish, and discharge of a firearm during a crime of

violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 2 (Counts 21

and 26); the use, carry, brandish, and discharge of a firearm

during a crime of violence resulting in death, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j) and § 2 (Counts 22, 23, 24, and 25).

The superseding indictment also included the requisite notice of

special findings for seeking capital punishment, and nine months

later the government filed notices of its intent to seek the

death penalty against Afmagalo, Beyle, and Abrar.

11
 Beyle and Abrar each filed pre-trial motions to dismiss.

First, Beyle moved to dismiss Counts 16 through 19 and Counts 22

through 25 on the ground that the murders had taken place in

Somali territorial waters, beyond U.S. jurisdiction. The

district court denied the motion in a memorandum order. Second,

Abrar moved to dismiss the indictment based on his inability to

investigate or corroborate a duress defense. Abrar identified

various witnesses located overseas -- several individuals in

Somalia, as well as the four Yemeni fishermen from the Alqasim --

who he believed could provide meaningful character evidence to

support his claim that he had been forced to join the piracy

operation. The district court denied this motion as well.

The guilt phase of the codefendants’ capital trial, which

lasted from June 4 to July 8, 2013, featured extensive testimony

from U.S. officials and from many of the pirates. The court

issued a jury instruction on Abrar’s duress defense for Counts 1

through 15 and Count 20 -- that is, for all the counts besides

the murders and the various firearms offenses.

At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the jury

convicted Afmagalo, Beyle, and Abrar on all twenty-six counts.

The jury recommended sentences of life imprisonment. The

district court eventually sentenced each of the codefendants to

three concurrent life sentences, plus eighteen consecutive life

sentences and thirty consecutive years.

12
 Beyle and Abrar now appeal. Each argues his claim

independently, and neither purports to join the other’s grounds.

The third convicted codefendant, Afmagalo, is not a party to

this appeal.

II.

Beyle contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction

over the charges of murder (Counts 16, 17, 18, and 19) and

concomitant use of a firearm (Counts 22, 23, 24, and 25) because

the underlying actions occurred within Somalia’s territorial

waters, not on the high seas. For many reasons, we find Beyle’s

claims unpersuasive.

A.

The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o define and

punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” U.S.

Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Congress has exercised this

enumerated power to punish maritime crimes since the earliest

days of the Republic. United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 455-

56 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing criminal piracy statutes from

1790 and 1819 and associated litigation).

The statutes under which Beyle was convicted fall well

within Congress’s constitutionally granted power to punish

felonies on the high seas. The first statute proscribes murder

13
“[w]ithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of

the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b). The second statute

defines the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of

the United States” as including the “high seas, any other waters

within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United

States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,” and

“[a]ny place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect

to an offense by or against a national of the United States.”

Id. § 7(1), (7). Finally, the statutory prohibition of the use

of a firearm to cause the death of another tacks onto the

underlying offense. Id. § 924(c), (j). Congress undoubtedly

possesses the authority under the Define and Punish Clause to

enact the criminal laws at issue in Beyle’s appeal.

That said, the crux of Beyle’s argument is not that the

statutes under which he was convicted are facially

unconstitutional, but rather that he was not on the high seas

when he committed the actions for which he is to be punished. He

asserts that the district court “mistakenly construed the law

regarding the limits of the territorial seas” of Somalia.

Appellants’ Br. at 6. Beyle’s appeal thus presents a single

issue: is a person thirty to forty nautical miles off the Somali

coast on the “high seas”? We review this question of law de

novo. United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir.

2005).

14
 B.

It is well-settled that the “high seas” encompass all those

waters beyond the boundary of the various territorial waters.

Simply put, “[o]utside the territorial sea are the high seas.”

United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 23 (1969); see also

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667

(2013) (“Piracy typically occurs on the high seas, beyond the

territorial jurisdiction of the United States or any other

country.”); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 259 (1893)

(“[A] large body of navigable water[,] . . . open and

unconfined, and not under the exclusive control of any one

nation or people, . . . must fall under the definition of ‘high

seas’” . . . .). As we have noted, “beyond the territorial

waters lie the high seas, over which no nation can exercise

sovereignty.” R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 965

(4th Cir. 1999).

Customary international law supports this definition. Two

international agreements are most relevant to the case at hand.

First, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which the

United States has ratified, defines “high seas” as “all parts of

the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the

internal waters of a State.” Convention on the High Seas art. 1,

opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.

82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962). Second, the United

15
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) states that

a nation’s sovereignty covers only “the territorial sea.” U.N.

Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2, opened for signature

Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16,

1994). Although the United States has not signed or ratified

UNCLOS, it “has recognized that [the treaty’s] baseline

provisions reflect customary international law.” United States

v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992) (internal quotation

marks omitted); Dire, 680 F.3d at 459; Statement on United

States Oceans Policy, 1983 Pub. Papers 378, 379 (Mar. 10, 1983)

(“[T]he United States is prepared to accept and act in

accordance with the balance of interests relating to traditional

use of the oceans . . . .”).

UNCLOS recognizes an exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) beyond

a nation’s territorial sea but within two hundred nautical miles

of the coastal baseline. See UNCLOS, supra, arts. 55-59. Beyle

insists that UNCLOS treats the EEZ as a distinct quasi-

territorial entity and that the high seas do not begin until two

hundred nautical miles from land. Because the Quest was within

the EEZ when the murders occurred, he thus asserts that he was

not on the “high seas” for the purposes of U.S. law.

While it is true that the part of UNCLOS that is titled

“High Seas” concerns the waters extending beyond the borders of

the EEZ, see UNCLOS, supra, art. 86, almost all of the treaty’s

16
high-seas provisions apply with equal force inside the EEZ as

they do outside it, see id. art. 58(1)-(2). The EEZ bordering a

particular nation’s territorial sea is merely a part of the high

seas where that nation has special economic rights and

jurisdiction. UNCLOS grants coastal nations certain rights to

natural resources within the EEZ, as well as jurisdiction over

marine scientific research and protection and preservation of

the marine environment. Id. art. 56(1)(a), (b); see also

Titanic, 171 F.3d at 965 n.3 (noting that the EEZ grants

“exclusive control over [certain] economic matters . . . , but

not over navigation”).

Any allocation of economic rights, however, is a far cry

from conferring on a nation the exclusive authority endemic to

sovereignty to define and punish criminal violations. In effect,

Beyle would have us use UNCLOS’s grant of certain specific

enumerated rights as a wedge to dramatically expand Somalia’s

plenary control past the twelve-nautical-mile maximum. But Beyle

points to no court that has declared that a nation’s full

sovereign rights extend two hundred nautical miles from the

coast. We decline to credit such a sweeping interpretation.

C.

If Beyle was beyond the bounds of Somalia’s territorial

sea, therefore, he was on the high seas and within the reach of

17
the U.S. criminal statutes under which he was convicted. The

question then becomes where exactly Somalia’s territorial sea

ends and the high seas begin. The weight of authority points to

an outer territorial limit of twelve nautical miles, which

places the Quest on the high seas at the time of the murders.

UNCLOS explicitly restricts territorial seas from extending

farther than twelve nautical miles from national coastlines.

UNCLOS, supra, art. 3. At the time of the piracy at issue in

this case, 161 nations had ratified UNCLOS, including Somalia.

With nearly 170 signatory nations today, UNCLOS enjoys

widespread acceptance in the international community. As noted

above, although the United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS,

this country recognizes the treaty’s place as an accurate

reflection of customary international law. It is, moreover, the

policy of the United States not to respect claims that a

territorial sea extends beyond twelve nautical miles. Office of

Ocean Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Pub. No. 112, Limits in the

Seas: United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims 7, 33

(1992); Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House,

United States Oceans Policy (Mar. 10, 1983); see 33 C.F.R.

§ 2.22(b); see also The White House, United States Counter

Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan annex B at 2 (June

2014). Consistent with UNCLOS, the United States itself claims a

territorial sea extending up to twelve nautical miles. 18 U.S.C.

18
§ 2280(e); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,

488 U.S. 428, 441 n.8 (1989); 33 C.F.R. § 2.22(a)(1)(ii), (iii),

(iv) (applying a U.S. territorial sea of twelve nautical miles

for determining U.S. criminal jurisdiction and the special

maritime and territorial jurisdiction, and for interpreting

international law); Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777

(Dec. 27, 1988) (extending the U.S. territorial sea to twelve

nautical miles “in accordance with international law”).

We, too, have repeatedly stated that a nation’s territorial

waters generally extend to twelve nautical miles. See United

States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2013); Dire, 680

F.3d at 460 n.11; Titanic, 171 F.3d at 965. The jury

instructions given by the district court reflected this

understanding, and earlier cases were predicated upon the same

definition. J.A. 2704 (“The ‘high seas’ include areas of the

seas that are outside the territorial seas of any nation. A

nation’s territorial seas are generally limited to an area

within 12 nautical miles of the nation’s coast.”); see, e.g.,

Excerpt of Proceedings (Jury Instructions) at 19-20, United

States v. Hasan, No. 2:10-cr-56 (E.D. Va. Nov. 22, 2010) (same),

ECF No. 356, aff’d sub nom. Dire, 680 F.3d 446.

Nevertheless, Beyle argues that customary international law

does not apply to the determination of the extent of Somalia’s

territorial sea, because Somalia passed national legislation in

19
1972 that extended its sea to two hundred nautical miles. 2 Even

if we could or would credit any such territorial claim, it does

not pass muster here. Somalia ratified UNCLOS in 1989, making a

clear international commitment to a territorial sea of no more

than twelve nautical miles. 3 Furthermore, Somalia also has never

submitted a declaration indicating non-adherence to any UNCLOS

provision, and in any event UNCLOS prohibits signatories from

opting out selectively from its provisions. UNCLOS, supra, art.

310. The United States, moreover, explicitly does not recognize

2
The validity of the 1972 Somali domestic legislation is
itself doubtful and unclear. In June 2014, Somalia’s president
issued a proclamation stating that the country’s exclusive
economic zone stretched for two hundred nautical miles, but made
no claim that full sovereignty extended so far. See Proclamation
by the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia (June 30,
2014), available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTR
EATIES/PDFFILES/SOM_2014_Proclamation.pdf. The following month,
the country submitted an executive summary to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, indicating in a table that a
twelve-nautical-mile territorial claim existed, consistent with
UNCLOS. See Continental Shelf Submission of the Federal Republic
of Somalia: Executive Summary 7 (July 21, 2014), available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/som74_14
/Somalia_Executive_Summary_2014.pdf.
3
We recognize that ratification of an international treaty
that is not self-executing typically does not supersede
inconsistent domestic law in a country that requires separate
implementing legislation. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491,
504-05 (2008) (discussing treaties that are not self-executing
in the context of U.S. law). Here, however, we need not decide
whether the UNCLOS provision is self-executing. Even if it is
not, the district court was justified in relying on Somalia’s
unequivocal international commitment, as embodied in its
ratification of UNCLOS, and indeed in this case Somalia’s own
treaty implementation procedures are opaque and the status of
its inconsistent domestic legislation is itself ambiguous.

20
any claim by Somalia to a two-hundred-nautical-mile territorial

sea and has conducted operations well within the two-hundred-

nautical-mile limit to make that policy known. Office of the

Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Navy, Maritime Claims Reference

Manual: Somalia (2014). Indeed, the Navy maneuvered to block the

Quest where it did precisely because it did not want the pirated

vessel to sail into the twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea.

“The common and obvious meaning of the expression, ‘high

seas,’ is also the true legal meaning,” Daniel Webster once

argued before the Supreme Court. United States v. Bevans, 16

U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 341 (1818). “The expression describes the

open ocean, where the dominion of the winds and waves prevails

without check or control.” Id. Although Webster was not

conversant with UNCLOS, he plainly grasped the point that

expansive claims of territoriality would intrude upon the

natural domain of the seas and the multinational interests

therein. Nowhere is this truer than when litigants seek to

extend customary international law as memorialized in treaties

to claim territorial seas more than sixteen times the maximum

breadth. The Quest, Beyle, and the victims were on the high seas

when the murders occurred.

21
 D.

We are aware of no court that has held that Somalia’s

territorial sea extends past the twelve-nautical-mile boundary

prescribed by UNCLOS, much less to two hundred nautical miles.

We shall not be the first.

Piracy is an international problem. The primary anti-piracy

statute in our criminal code, 18 U.S.C. § 1651, “incorporates”

the “definition of piracy” under international law. Dire, 680

F.3d at 469. An essential element of the international crime of

piracy is that the violence against persons, vessels, or

property occurred “on the high seas” or “outside the

jurisdiction of any” nation. UNCLOS, supra, art. 101(a)(i)-(ii);

see Shibin, 722 F.3d at 240-44; Dire, 680 F.3d at 465. In a

reflection of that shared understanding, it has fallen to U.S.

and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) coalition forces

to combat Somalia-based piracy. These naval forces conduct

patrols in the Gulf of Aden, a vital shipping passageway between

the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Parts of the Gulf

of Aden off the Somali coast are under two hundred nautical

miles wide. In essence, Beyle asks this court to treat the Gulf

of Aden as a Somali territorial sea. As a practical matter, such

a ruling would prove especially problematic for NATO maritime

forces, which only operate in Somali territorial waters under

22
the consent of Somali authorities. Fact Sheet, Mar. Command, N.

Atl. Treaty Org., Operation Ocean Shield, at 2 (Nov. 2014).

The risks of an extension of the Somali territorial sea

include as well emboldened gangs of pirates, increased

“investment” in piracy by Somalia-based financiers, and bridled

NATO and multinational counter-piracy efforts. Such results

would offend the United Nations Security Council’s ongoing

apprehension over the threat “to international navigation, the

safety of commercial maritime routes and the safety of seafarers

and other persons” posed by the violence of piracy and hostage-

taking. S.C. Res. 1976, preambular ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976

(Apr. 11, 2011). We decline to allow Beyle’s challenge to his

murder and firearm convictions to undermine this broader

multinational effort.

In short, the structure of domestic and international law

that Beyle seeks to topple protects commercial peace against

piratical disruption, and we reject his challenge to his murder

and firearms convictions.

III.

Abrar argues that he was denied his Fifth Amendment right

to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to present

witnesses material to his duress defense. In particular, he

maintains that he was unable to access or subpoena certain

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witnesses located abroad who could have corroborated his story

that he had been kidnapped and forced to work as a pirate. Even

though he concedes that duress is not a valid defense to the

murder counts, he requests dismissal of the entire indictment as

the “only remedy.” Appellants’ Br. at 30. We disagree with

Abrar’s contentions. The district court properly denied his

motion to dismiss the indictment.

A.

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall

. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The right to due process

“is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend

against the [government’s] accusations.” Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). The Sixth Amendment

provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in his favor.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This

right is violated when the defendant is “arbitrarily deprived of

‘testimony [that] would have been relevant and material, and

. . . vital to the defense.’” United States v. Valenzuela-

Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (alterations in original)

(quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967)). Fifth

Amendment due process and Sixth Amendment compulsory process are

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closely related, for the right “to call witnesses in one’s own

behalf ha[s] long been recognized as essential to due process.”

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294; see also Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.

At root, then, we are asked to determine whether one of the

“elements of a fair trial” was absent in the proceedings below.

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295.

A criminal defendant’s right to compulsory process is not

unlimited. “Few rights,” to be sure, “are more fundamental than

that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense,” Id.

at 302, and the right to compulsory process is “imperative to

the function of courts” in our adversary system, United States

v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). But the right to compulsory

process does not scorn practicality. Crucially, “the Sixth

Amendment does not by its terms grant to a criminal defendant

the right to secure the attendance and testimony of any and all

witnesses.” Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867 (emphasis added).

In concrete terms, the right to compulsory process is

“circumscribed . . . by the ability of the district court to

obtain the presence of a witness through service of process.”

United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 463 (4th Cir. 2004).

Those practical limits are significant for the

transnational context in which Abrar’s claims arise. It is

a “well[-]established and undisputed principle that the process

power of the district court does not extend to foreign nationals

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abroad.” Id. at 463-64. A conviction does not become

unconstitutional simply because the federal courts lack power to

secure the appearance of a foreign national located outside the

United States. Id.; United States v. Theresius Filippi, 918 F.2d

244, 246 n.2 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d

1249, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d

247, 251 (2d Cir. 1962); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (providing

for subpoenas of “a national or resident of the United States

who is in a foreign country,” but not referencing foreign

nationals abroad); Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(e)(2). After all, “the

Sixth Amendment can give the right to compulsory process only

where it is within the power of the federal government to

provide it.” Greco, 298 F.2d at 251.

All of the witnesses proffered by Abrar are foreign

nationals located abroad. In his pretrial motion, Abrar named

five individuals in Somalia, including a former landlord, his

brother-in-law, and others who he believed could testify about

his prior work as a driver or mechanic. He also wished to call

the four Yemeni fishermen from the Alqasim, although he did not

know their full names or their precise whereabouts. When Abrar

renewed his motion at trial, his counsel identified two

prospective witnesses for his duress defense, a shopkeeper and a

garage manager in the Somali town of Garacad. All of those

individuals are foreign nationals located outside the United

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States, and as such they lay beyond the subpoena power of the

district court.

Abrar’s inability to access the proffered witnesses arose

primarily from the security situation in Somalia -- a matter

beyond the control of the U.S. government. See Security and

Governance in Somalia: Consolidating Gains, Confronting

Challenges, and Charting the Path Forward: Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on Afr. Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,

113th Cong. (2013); U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Sec’y-Gen. on Somalia,

U.N. Doc. S/2014/699 (Sept. 25, 2014). The investigators who had

traveled to Somalia on Abrar’s behalf had been unable to leave

the capital city of Mogadishu because of ongoing security

threats. The domestic troubles within Somalia may complicate

independent investigations or a potential service of process,

but such exogenous difficulties need not halt the operations of

the criminal justice system in the United States. This is

especially the case where the immediate obstacles are not of the

government’s making.

Significantly, we do not even know whether the witnesses

proffered by Abrar actually exist. During their visit to

Mogadishu, Abrar’s investigators apparently did contact some of

Abrar’s family members, but failed to obtain the cooperation of

any witnesses. They did not even speak with the shopkeeper or

the garage manager -- the two witnesses identified at trial by

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Abrar’s counsel as “key” to his duress defense. J.A. 2364. Even

if the district court were to direct individuals to travel

through the dangerous conditions in Somalia to try to serve

subpoenas on Abrar’s proffered witnesses, it is uncertain how

long such an effort would take or whether it would be fruitful.

This is especially the case where the witnesses may be

fictitious.

We owe substantial deference to the district court for

these kinds of evidentiary determinations, and we review such

decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Medford, 661

F.3d 746, 751 (4th Cir. 2011). After all, the district court has

a bird’s-eye view of the trial, knowledge of the intricacies of

the case, and a sense of the context and background in which

each evidentiary claim arises.

B.

Abrar cannot establish a constitutional violation from the

“mere absence” of his proffered witnesses’ testimony.

Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867. It is further doubtful that

“their testimony would have been both material and favorable to

his defense.” Id. (emphasis added). The anticipated testimony of

Abrar’s proffered witnesses was relatively far afield: it would

have consisted primarily of broad references to his activities

before the events at issue in this case. According to Abrar’s

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own submission, the testimony would have pertained to his “trade

as a mechanic and driver, his character for peacefulness, and

the series of events leading up to his detainment by the other

pirates.” J.A. 121. Conceivably, the testimony may also have

covered the discrimination Abrar confronted as a Bantu, although

several of the pirates called by the government and other

witnesses called by the defense did discuss that issue at trial.

Critically, however, the proffered testimony would not directly

substantiate Abrar’s story that he was kidnapped at gunpoint by

Juguuf and Sarindaaq, nor would it concern the events aboard the

Quest or his relationship with the other pirates.

It is unclear -- indeed doubtful -- that such oblique

testimony would be material to Abrar’s duress defense. The

testimony adduced at trial painted a deeply incriminating

portrait of Abrar. Several of the other pirates testified that

Abrar was a willing participant. Like all the other Somalia-

based pirates who had boarded the Alqasim, including the one of

Yemeni origin -- and unlike the four captive Yemeni fishermen

who were released after the hijacking of the Quest -- Abrar

would have received a share of any ransom. Abrar brought an AK-

47 to the operation and, during at least one of the initial

unsuccessful attacks, carried the rocket-propelled grenade

launcher. He was the first pirate to board the Quest, and he

promptly took control of the two American women and cut the

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boat’s communications lines. He stood guard over the hostages

and had his gun trained on Jean Adam before the fatal shots were

fired. From its viewing of the video evidence, the district

court told Abrar at sentencing that, “if one were concluding,

you were probably the shooter of Jean Adam.” J.A. 3596. In that

light, it is hard to imagine how testimony about Abrar’s prior

professional work could have been material to the determination

of his guilt or punishment.

Despite the powerful evidence marshaled against him at

trial, Abrar did not try to take advantage of the other sources

available to him. The government represents that, in other

piracy prosecutions in the Eastern District of Virginia, it has

worked with defense counsel to develop various evidentiary

accommodations for defendants, which might include testimony by

telephone, depositions, and stipulations. Appellee’s Br. at 52-

53. Notably, Abrar also did not elicit testimony about his

abduction from his two alleged kidnappers. Juguuf and Sarindaaq

were in federal custody with the other pirates who had already

pleaded guilty, and the government offered to make either of

them available to testify on this point. But Abrar’s counsel

declined the offer. He informed the court that he had spoken

with Juguuf and Sarindaaq and knew that both would deny Abrar’s

story. While Abrar was certainly free to structure his defense

as he thought best, his failure to adduce any direct evidence of

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his story or to counter effectively the overwhelming case

against him undermines whatever vague advantage he sought to

gain from elusive overseas witnesses.

C.

In the proceedings below, the district court gave Abrar

multiple opportunities to develop his duress argument. Of

course, as a criminal defendant, Abrar was entitled not to take

the stand. U.S. Const. amend. V. Had he chosen to testify,

however, Abrar generally would have been subject to the same

evidentiary rules as other witnesses. Portuondo v. Agard, 529

U.S. 61, 69 (2000). In particular, the government would have

been allowed to attack his credibility on cross-examination.

Fed. R. Evid. 608(a), 611(b). The district court, though, was

prepared to make an exception: if Abrar took the stand and his

counsel asked only about the facts surrounding his duress

defense, the district court would limit the government’s cross-

examination of Abrar to that issue. But Abrar elected not to

testify even in that controlled capacity. In addition, the court

ultimately instructed the jury on Abrar’s duress defense for

most of the counts, despite the absence of significant

evidentiary support. Although the government objected to this

instruction below, it bears note that, even with a duress

31
instruction, the jury proceeded to convict Abrar on all twenty-

six counts charged in the indictment.

Despite the opportunities afforded to Abrar, the weight of

the evidence against him was simply overwhelming -- and

virtually uncontroverted. The district court ably presided over

a twenty-eight-day jury trial spanning nearly two months and

“watched every video and heard every piece of evidence.” J.A.

3597. In the final analysis, the court’s view of the matter was

clear:

Four people were murdered, and they were murdered in a
particularly heinous manner. The whole process of the
conspiracy and the kidnapping was horrendous. . . .
Frankly, you looked like you were having a good time
at certain instances. I would challenge anyone to sit
and look at all of these videos and any of these
pictures and come to any conclusion other than you
were a willing participant . . . . [N]one of the
evidence, when you put it together, meets common sense
of you being under duress. . . . You were a major
player and you were a major shooter, and there is no
question in my mind.

J.A. 3595-97. From all the evidence adduced at trial and the

inferences that might have been drawn from it, the court

concluded, Abrar’s claim of duress “defie[d] . . . credibility.”

J.A. 3597. We see no reason to disturb the jury’s and the

court’s assessments, much less to invoke the extraordinary

remedy of dismissing the indictment. We thus affirm the district

court’s denial of Abrar’s motion.

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 IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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