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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEANGELO SCOTT and RYAN )
PRATT, )
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-817 (GK)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )
)
Defendant. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs DeAngelo Scott and Ryan Pratt ("Plaintiffs") bring
this putative class action against the Government of the District
of Columbia ("Defendant" or "the District"), alleging violations
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, as well as common-law conversion, in relation to the
District's "post and forfeit" procedures.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Complaint [Dkt. No. 19]. Upon consideration of the Motion,
Opposition [Dkt. No. 22], Supplemental Opposition [Dkt. No. 23],
Reply [Dkt. No. 24], the entire record herein, and for the reasons
set forth below, the Motion shall be granted.
I . Background
A. Factual Overviewl
On April 05, 2008, Mr. Scott and Mr. Pratt, who is Mr. Scott's
stepson, were arrested outside their D.C. apartment at
approximately 8:00 p.m. Compl. at ~~ 15-36 [Dkt. No. 1]. Mr. Scott
was charged with possession of an open container of alcohol
pursuant to D.C. Code § 25-lOOl(a) (1), and Mr. Pratt was charged
with disorderly conduct pursuant to D.C. Code§ 22-1321(1). Compl.
at ~~ 47, 53.
The District's "post and forfeit" procedure allows persons
charged with certain misdemeanors to "post and forfeit an amount
as collateral . . . and thereby obtain a full and final resolution
of the criminal charge." D.C. Code § 5-335.01. When Mr. Scott and
Mr. Pratt arrived at the police station, they were given the option
to "post and forfeit" in return for their release that evening.
Mr. Scott posted and forfeited $25, and Mr. Pratt posted and
forfeited $35. Compl. ~~ 52, 58. Neither Mr. Scott nor Mr. Pratt
filed a motion to set aside the forfeiture within the 90-day
period, as set forth in the statute. D.C. Code§ 5-335.0l(d)(6).
1 For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the factual
allegations of the complaint must be presumed to be true and
liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Aktieselskabet AF
21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir.
2008); Shear v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., 606 F.2d 1251, 1253 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). Therefore, the facts set forth herein are taken from
Plaintiffs' Complaint [Dkt. No. 1]
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B. Procedural Background
1. The Fox Case
On December 15, 2010, Barbara Fox and Hamilton P. Fox, III
filed a Complaint comprised of both non-class claims for false
arrest and putative class claims challenging the District's "post
and forfeit" procedure. See Fox v. District of Columbia, 2010-cv-
2118 (D.D.C. 2010) (ABJ) ("Fox") [Dkt. No. 1]. The parties agree
that the Fox case, decided by Judge Amy Jackson, tolled the statute
of limitations for the Plaintiffs' claims in the present case, but
disagree as to when the tolling ceased.
On March 30, 2012, Judge Jackson dismissed all of the class
claims in Fox, but permitted the Foxes to amend their complaint to
add two new class claims. See Fox v. District of Columbia, 851
F.2d 20 (D.D.C. 2012) ("Fox I"). On February 15, 2013, Judge
Jackson dismissed the two new class claims, leaving only the Foxes'
individual claims. See Fox v. District of Columbia, 923 F.2d 302
(D. D. C. 2 Ol 3) ( "Fox I I" ) .
On April 26, 2013, Mr. Fox2 filed a motion to direct an entry
of final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) as to the
dismissal of his class "post and forfeit" claims. Fox, Dkt. No. 72.
2 Mrs. Fox was not included in the putative class action claims
challenging the "post and forfeit procedure. Her sole claim was
against a police sergeant in his individual capacity, which was
dismissed on February 20, 2013. See Fox v. District of Columbia,
924 F. Supp. 2d 264, 266 (D.D.C. 2013).
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Judge Jackson denied this motion on October 3, 2013. Fox, Dkt.
No. 80. On February 28, 2014, Mr~ Fox settled his individual claims
and final judgment was entered.
2. The Present Case
Plaintiffs filed this Complaint, which was assigned to this
Judge, on May 16, 2014. The Complaint alleges violations of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well
as common-law conversion. See Compl. at ~~ 111-146. The class
action claims in the present case are virtually indistinguishable
from those that were brought in the Fox case. The Plaintiffs are
also represented by one of the same attorneys that represented the
plaintiffs in Fox.
On June 12, 2014, before the District of Columbia had filed
an appearance in the case (and before Plaintiffs had even filed
their Affidavit of Service on the Court's docket), Plaintiffs filed
a Motion for Class Certification [Dkt. No. 5] . Prior to this
Court's Order on the Motion for Class Certification, the District
filed the present Motion to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot.") on August 29,
2014 [Dkt. No. 19]. On October 3, 2014, this Court denied without
prejudice the Motion for Class Certification due to the pending
Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' failure to comply with Local
Civil Rule 7(m).
In its Motion to Dismiss, the District argues that the case
must be dismissed because it is time-barred (Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 12(b) (1)) and because none of the six counts state a valid legal
claim (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6)). Plaintiffs filed their Opposition
("Pls.' Opp'n") on October 9, 2014 [Dkt. No. 22], and a
Supplemental Opposition ("Pls.' Supp. Opp'n) on October 17, 2014
[Dkt. No. 23]. The District filed its Reply ("Def.'s Reply") on
November 10, 2014 [Dkt. No. 24].
II. Legal Standards
A. Standard of Review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1)
As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts possess
only those powers specifically granted to them by Congress or
directly by the U.S. Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See Shuler
v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In deciding
whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under
Rule 12 (b) (1), the court must "accept all of the factual
allegations in [the] complaint as true [.]" Jerome Stevens
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253-54
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315,
327 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may also
consider matters outside the pleadings, and may rest its decision
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on its own resolution of disputed facts. See Herbert v. Nat'l Acad.
of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
B. Standard of Review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a plaintiff
need only plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face" and to "nudge [ ] [his or her] claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "[O]nce a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563.
Under the Twombly standard, a "court deciding a motion to
dismiss must not make any judgment about the probability of the
plaintiffs' success . [,] must assume all the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) [, and]
must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences
derived from the facts alleged." Aktieselskabet AF 21. November
2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The court does not,
however, accept as true "legal conclusions or inferences that are
unsupported by the facts alleged." Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign
Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted) . Furthermore, a complaint which "tenders 'naked
assertion [s] ' devoid of 'further factual enhancement'" will not
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suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in Iqbal):
III. Analysis
A. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Time-Barred
1. D.C. Statute of Limitations
The parties agree that Plaintiffs' putative class action
claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See
Carney v. American Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
("The Supreme Court has held that in states with multiple statutes
of limitations, claims under section 1983 are governed by the
residual or general personal injury statute of limitations (like
[D.C. Code] section 12-301(8)) .") (citing Owens v. Okure,
488 U.S. 235, 243-50 (1989)); D.C. Code § 12-301 (8) (providing
three year limitation for claims not otherwise prescribed) .
Plaintiffs' cause of action stems from their arrest and "post
and forfeiture," which took place on April 5, 2008. Therefore, the
three-year statute of limitations on their claims began running on
April 5, 2008.
2. Tolling by Fox
American Pipe and its progeny stand for the proposition that
the filing of a class action complaint freezes the statute of
limitations for all proposed class members. See American Pipe &
Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 539 (1974); Crown, Cork & Seal
Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 (1983) ("The filing of a
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class action tolls the statute of limitations 'as to all asserted
members of the class."') (quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554)
It is undisputed that under the American Pipe doctrine, the
filing of the Fox putative class action on December 15, 2010,
tolled the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' claims. At the
time of Fox's filing, Plaintiffs had 112 days remaining in their
three-year limitations period. Def.'s Mot. at 7. Therefore, once
tolling ceased, they had 112 days in which to file their claims.
See American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 538 ("Since the class action was
filed with 11 days yet to run in the period as tolled . . . , the
intervenors had 11 days after entry of the order denying them
participation in the class suit in which to move to file their
intervention motion.")
Whether Plaintiffs timely filed their case depends on when
the Fox case ceased to toll Plaintiffs' claims. American Pipe and
the subsequent cases expanding it deal predominately with denials
of class certification, which terminated tolling, but do not
address the present situation in which all the class claims in a
case were dismissed prior to the court reaching a class
certification decision.
The question is therefore, when a court never reaches the
issue of class certification, when does a putative class action
cease to toll the claims of its proposed class members? The
Defendant argues that tolling ceased for Plaintiffs' claims when
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the last of the class claims in Fox were dismissed. Plaintiffs
argue that tolling did not cease until final judgment was entered
on Mr. Fox's entire case, including his individual claims. Under
Defendant's interpretation, Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit
342 days after the limitations period ended, while under
Plaintiffs' interpretation, their Complaint would be considered
timely. See Def.'s Mot. at 7-8; Pls.' Mot. at 34-38.
3. Tolling Ended Upon the Dismissal of the Class
Claims
The question of whether the dismissal of all class claims in
a putative class action terminates tolling for purported class
members is a question of first impression for this Court. Indeed,
the parties do not identify any courts that have previously
addressed this specific issue. For the reasons below, the Court
finds that dismissal of all class claims in a suit term_inates
tolling and causes the limitations period for each absent class
member to resume running.
The Seventh Circuit held in Sawyer v. Atlas Heating and Sheet
Metal Works, Inc. that "[t]olling lasts from the day a class claim
is asserted until the day the suit is conclusively not a class
action." 642 F. 3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2 011) (voluntary dismissal of
class action terminates tolling) . Plaintiffs argue that a case is
only "'conclusively not a class action' when class action treatment
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has been denied or the case is entirely over." Pls.' Opp'n at 36.
Plaintiffs read Sawyer too narrowly.
Allowing tolling to continue for all absent class members
through the entire pendency of what had become an individual
lawsuit by Mr. Fox--due to the dismissal of all class claims--
would not further the objectives and justifications for class
action tolling. The American Pipe court found that unless the
filing of a class action tolled the statute of limitations,
potential class members would be induced to file motions to
intervene or separate actions in order to protect themselves
against the possibility that certification would be denied.
414 U.S. at 553. It found that not permitting class action tolling
would frustrate the principal purposes of the class action
procedure--promotion of efficiency and economy of litigation. Id.
The efficiency of the class action mechanism evaporates once
the class claims are dismissed, and it becomes necessary for the
absent members to pursue their own individual interests. To permit
tolling to continue for all absent class members beyond the
dismissal of all class claims furthers neither the efficiency nor
the economy of litigation. Indeed, such a rule would only serve to
draw out litigation, effectively extending the statute of
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limitations long past what the Supreme Court envisioned in American
Pipe.
In Crown, Cork & Seal, the Supreme Court "signaled that
American Pipe tolling extends as far as is justified by the
objectively reasonable reliance interests of the absent class
members." Bridges v. Dep't of Maryland State Police, 441 F.3d 197,
211 (4th Cir. 2006); 462 U.S. at 353-54. Once all class claims are
dismissed from a case, proposed class members are no longer
justified in relying on the case to protect their interests, and
therefore the rationales underlying class action tolling are no
longer applicable.
Plaintiffs' proposed rule--that tolling continue after the
dismissal of all class claims- -would prejudice defendants and
expose them to unreasonably protracted tolling. Courts are
required to make a class certification decision "at an early
practicable time." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23 (c) (1) (A). This requirement
ensures that the tolling period is limited in scope and protects
against "abuse and perpetual tolling" under American Pipe.
Bridges, 441 F.3d at 212. Plaintiffs' rule would have the opposite
effect, all but ensuring perpetual tolling.
Such a rule would also create the undesirable result that a
plaintiff need only plead a class claim in order to toll claims
for countless absent class members throughout the course of the
plaintiff's entire individual litigation--even class claims that
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were quickly dismissed as non-meritorious would still suffice to
attach tolling to the entire life of the plaintiff's individual
case. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the rationales of
American Pipe and the reasonable reliance interests of absent class
members.
Plaintiffs put forward several arguments for why a case cannot
be considered "conclusively" not a class action even when all class
claims have been dismissed. Plaintiffs' first argument for why
tolling continued until the final resolution of the Fox case is
that the order dismissing the class claims in Fox was merely
interlocutory. Pls.' Opp'n at 38. They argue that because the class
claims "could have been resurrected at any time," the case could
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not be considered "conclusively not a class action." Id.
This argument is unpersuasive for the. very simple reason that
orders denying class certification are also interlocutory, and yet
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that class certification
denials cause tolling to cease. See American Pipe, 414 U.S.
at 552-53; Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 345. The fact that an
order is interlocutory does not mean that a case cannot
conclusively be "not a class action."
Next, Plaintiffs argue that the District could have avoided
the present class action by litigating the class certification
motion in Fox prior t"o moving to dismiss the claims. Pls.' Opp'n
at 40. This is an impractical solution. Requiring defendants to
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litigate class-certification prior to moving to dismiss meritless
claims, or else run the risk of facing perpetual tolling, does not
make sense. It would force defendants to waste time and resources
litigating the validity of a class, even if the underlying claims
are baseless.
Plaintiffs' next argument is that "tolling continues through
the date of the decision on an appeal if an appeal reverses a
dismissal where there has been no final adverse determination of
class claims." Pls.' Opp'n at 41. Plaintiff argues that it
logically follows that tolling has to extend until the end of the
case before it can extend to the end of the appeal. Id. The cases
Plaintiffs cite provide very little support for this argument,
however. If class action allegations were explicitly reinstated,
tolling might be made retroactive. But it does not necessarily
follow that tolling must continue through the end of a case,
particularly where no appeal has been taken.
Plaintiffs' final argument relies on the "forfeiture rule,"
as discussed in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l Student Mktg.
Corp. 461 F. Supp. 999, 1012 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). The contours of the "forfeiture
rule"· are not well-defined, but suggest that an individual who
pursues a separate lawsuit while a class action is pending may
forfeit the benefits of the class action. In Wachovia, the court
found that plaintiffs who had filed a separate, individual action
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while class certification was pending, and later opted out of the
class, had forfeited the benefits of the class, including tolling.
The court reasoned that to permit plaintiffs to benefit from class
action tolling in order to file otherwise time-barred suits would
"sanction duplicative suits and violate the policies behind
American Pipe." Id. at 1013.
Plaintiffs attempt to show that the "forfeiture rule"
conflicts with a holding that tolling ceased upon dismissal of the
class claims. This is not the case. Once the class claims in Fox
were dismissed, the case ceased to be a class action. At that
point, the Plaintiffs in this case were at no risk of forfeiting
anything upon filing their individual case. Contrary to
Plaintiffs' argument, the policy rationales of efficiency and
avoiding duplicative suits are not burdened by the Court's holding.
Plaintiffs caution that the Court's holding today "would have
required Mr. Scott and Mr. Pratt and other absent class members to
file their own suits while Mr. Fox's suit was still pending,"
thereby discouraging efficiency and sanctioning duplicative suits.
Pls.' Opp'n at 42. Yet this is precisely the point. Once the Foxes'
case was no longer a class action, the case no longer represented
class interests, and Mr. Scott, Mr. Pratt, and absent class members
were required to pursue their own individual remedies.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that a case is
"conclusively not a class action" once all class claims have been
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dismissed. The Fox case, when filed, included individual claims
relating to Mr. Fox's alleged wrongful arrest and class claims
challenging the "post and forfeit" process. On March 30, 2012,
Judge Jackson dismissed the "post and forfeit" claims. On February
15, 2013, Judge Jackson declined to reconsider the dismissal and
dismissed the two remaining post and forfeit claims. This left
only Mr. and Mrs. Fox's individual claims. It was at that point
that the case was "conclusively not a class action." Sawyer, 642
F. 3d at 563.
On February 16, .2013, the 112 days remaining in Plaintiffs'
statute of limitations period began to run again. 3 The limitations
period expired on June 8, 2013, 342 days before Plaintiffs filed
the present lawsuit. Def. 's Mot. at 8. Therefore, Plaintiffs'
Complaint was not timely filed and this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case.
3 In their Supplemental Opposition, Plaintiffs note that tolling
of their conversion claim is governed by 28 U.S.C. § l3q7(d), in
addition to American Pipe. Section 1367 (d) provides that "[t] he
period of limitations for any [related state law] claim asserted
. . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period
of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a
longer tolling period." Even with the additional 30 days,
Plaintiffs' conversion claim was filed 312 days late and is time-
barred.
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B. Failure to State a Claim
Having found Plaintiffs' Complaint to be untimely, the Court
need not reach Defendant's contention that Plaintiffs have failed
to state a claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Complaint shall be granted. An Order shall accompany this
Memorandum Opinion.
April 9, 2015
Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF
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