UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4535
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
WINARD MONTEZ EADY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(2:12-cr-00415-DCN-3)
Submitted: March 26, 2015 Decided: April 10, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mario A. Pacella, STROM LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney,
Nathan S. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Winard Montez Eady appeals his convictions for conspiracy
to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a) (2012), and possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 924(c) (2012). Prior to trial, the district court denied
Eady’s motion to exclude the testimony of the Government’s
proffered expert witness, Special Agent Mike Sutton. Agent
Sutton’s testimony concerned historical cell site analysis,
which involves using cellular phone records and tower locations
to determine a cell phone’s general location at a given point in
time. On appeal, Eady argues that the district court abused its
discretion by making a clearly erroneous factual finding when it
admitted the expert’s testimony. We affirm.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
incorrectly found that Agent Sutton had conducted a drive test
to prepare his testimony against Eady. A drive test involves
driving to cell towers and recording information about the
strength of their signals. Agent Sutton sometimes uses drive
testing in his analysis, but he did not in Eady’s case.
Eady argues that the district court erroneously found that
Agent Sutton had performed a drive test and, therefore, that
admitting Sutton’s testimony was an abuse of discretion. We
disagree. Although the district court’s order briefly mentioned
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drive testing as an example of Agent Sutton’s methods, the court
did not state that a drive test occurred in this case. Because
the district court never made the factual finding that Eady
claims is erroneous, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting Agent Sutton’s testimony. See
United States v. Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 390 (4th Cir. 2014)
(discussing standard of review).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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