FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 15 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTY HUGHES, No. 13-35909
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00143-MAT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Mary A. Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted November 21, 2014***
Before: HUG, FARRIS, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
** *
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Christy Hughes appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. Hughes contends that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the
Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score from her treating psychiatric
nurse practitioner Susan Caverly, Ph.D., ARNP. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
The ALJ did not err in failing to address Dr. Caverly’s GAF score, because a
GAF score is merely a rough estimate of an individual’s psychological, social, or
occupational functioning used to reflect an individual’s need for treatment, but it
does not have any direct correlative work-related or functional limitations. See
Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).
We do not agree with Hughes that Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th
Cir. 2014) supports her position because Garrison is factually distinguishable. The
nurse practitioner in Garrison was the primary psychiatric care giver, who treated
the claimant for over two years, producing numerous reports, which included not
only GAF scores, but also identified functional limitations affecting the claimant’s
ability to work. See id. at 1002-05, 1014. In contrast, Dr. Caverly performed two
2
psychiatric evaluations years apart and her 2009 report included only a GAF score,
without identifying any corollary functional limitations.
Even assuming the ALJ erred by failing to address Dr. Caverly’s GAF score,
any such error was harmless, because the ALJ assessed Hughes’ mental
impairment as severe, and the ALJ’s residual functional capacity took into account
Hughes’ mental functional limitations, including moderate difficulties in social
functioning, concentration, and persistence, by restricting her to simple, routine,
repetitive tasks in a job where she could work independently with no more than
occasional public interaction. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1122 (9th Cir.
2012) (explaining that the ALJ’s failure to discuss certain evidence was
inconsequential to the ultimate disability determination). Aside from arguing
incorrectly that her low GAF score mandated a finding that she could not function
in a workplace on a sustained and regular basis, Hughes has not identified any
additional limitations the ALJ should have imposed in light of Dr. Caverly’s GAF
score.
AFFIRMED.
3