Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 1 of 12
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13469
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00478-JSM-PRL
JASON A. CALHOUN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(April 23, 2015)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jason A. Calhoun, a Florida prisoner, appeals denial of his habeas petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 2 of 12
I. BACKGROUND
A. Crimes and Plea
Calhoun was the defendant in three state-court proceedings, in which he was
charged with a total of 20 crimes. Of relevance to this appeal, in one of those
cases, No. 2008-CF-1846, Calhoun was charged with four counts: (1) burglary of a
structure with a firearm that discharged, in violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 810.02(1),
810.02(2)(b), and 775.087(2)(a)(2) (Count I); (2) possession of a firearm while
engaged in a criminal offense, burglary, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 790.07(2)
(Count III); (3) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of Fla.
Stat. §§ 790.23 and 775.087(2)(a)(1) (Count V); and (4) possession of ammunition
by a convicted felon, in violation of § 790.23(1) and (2) (Count VI). According to
the charging information, all four offenses occurred on May 28, 2008, in Lake
County, Florida.
In case No. 2008-CF-1846, the state filed a notice that Calhoun qualified as
a prison-releasee reoffender, enabling the state to seek the imposition of a
mandatory-minimum sentence under Fla. Stat. § 775.082. At a change-of-plea
hearing, the state alleged that, if Calhoun were found guilty at trial, he would face
a mandatory-life sentence, because he was a prison-releasee reoffender. At that
same hearing, Calhoun pled nolo contendere to 17 of the 20 crimes, including
Counts I, III, V, and VI, under a plea agreement; the state judge confirmed
2
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 3 of 12
Calhoun had not been coerced or threatened. The plea agreement also stated no
person had used any threats, force, pressure, or intimidation to induce him to plead
nolo contendere. Calhoun was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment.
B. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 Proceedings
Calhoun filed a counseled motion for post-conviction relief in state court,
pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. In a general statement-of-facts section in his
Rule 3.850 motion, Calhoun represented his counsel had pressured him into
entering the plea agreement and told him he could withdraw the plea after entering
it. Calhoun further stated the same day he entered into the plea agreement, he sent
his trial counsel a letter requesting the counsel move to withdraw the plea, but no
motion was filed. In the argument section of his Rule 3.850 motion, Calhoun
stated generally a defendant, who received no advice from counsel about an
available defense, had a colorable claim his plea was involuntary. Pursuant to state
case law, Calhoun argued his simultaneous convictions of Count I (burglary of a
structure with a firearm) and Count III (possession of a firearm while engaged in a
criminal offense) violated double jeopardy principles. He further argued his
simultaneous convictions of Count V (possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon) and Count VI (possession of ammunition by a convicted felon) violated
double jeopardy principles under state case law. Regarding both double jeopardy
claims, Calhoun argued explicitly his trial counsel had rendered ineffective
3
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 4 of 12
assistance in failing to move to dismiss the allegedly problematic crimes, Counts
III and VI.
The state judge denied Calhoun’s Rule 3.850 motion without an evidentiary
hearing. The judge determined Calhoun had waived any double jeopardy
objections by entering into a plea agreement. Therefore, the judge did not conduct
an analysis under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984),
to determine whether Calhoun’s trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance.
Calhoun appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion to the state appellate court,
which summarily affirmed the denial.
C. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Proceedings
In his § 2254 petition and supporting memorandum, Calhoun again argued
his plea counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to inform him his
simultaneous convictions of Counts I and III, and Counts V and VI, respectively,
were barred by double jeopardy principles. He stated he would not have pled nolo
contendere to the allegedly problematic counts had counsel advised him of the
available double jeopardy defenses.
The district judge determined Calhoun had waived his claims by entering a
valid nolo contendere plea. Alternatively, the judge concluded Calhoun’s claims
would fail, even if examined on the merits. Regarding the first double jeopardy
claim, concerning Counts I and III, the judge determined Calhoun had failed to
4
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 5 of 12
demonstrate a double jeopardy violation; consequently, he had failed to show
ineffective assistance of counsel, because Counts I and III required proof of
different elements. Concerning the second double jeopardy claim, regarding
Counts V and VI, the judge explained, even if Calhoun had shown his counsel had
performed deficiently, he could not show prejudice, because he would have faced a
prison sentence of 20 years, even if Count VI were dismissed. The judge also
found Calhoun’s sentence would have been the same, even if Count III were
dismissed. Therefore, the end result of the proceeding would have been the same,
because Calhoun had failed to show prejudice.
With counsel, Calhoun has appealed the district judge’s decision. In this
court, Calhoun was granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) for the following
issues:
(1) Whether . . . Calhoun’s defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to advise Calhoun that he could raise a double jeopardy defense to the
charges in the indictment for burglary of a structure with a firearm
(Count I in Case Number 2008-CF-001846), and possession of a
firearm while engaged in a criminal offense (Count III in Case
Number 2008-CF-001846)?
(2) Whether . . . Calhoun’s defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to advise Calhoun that he could raise a double jeopardy defense to the
charges in the indictment for possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon (Count V in Case Number 2008-CF-001846), and possession of
ammunition by a convicted felon (Count VI in Case Number 2008-
CF-001846)?
5
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 6 of 12
II. DISCUSSION
A. Calhoun’s Guilty Plea Waived His Claims
On appeal, Calhoun first argues the district judge erred in determining he
waived his claims by pleading nolo contendere. The state responds Calhoun has
not attacked the voluntary nature of his plea; consequently, he has waived his
ineffective-assistance claims, because he did not allege his plea was involuntary
for his counsel’s ineffective assistance.
We review de novo a district judge’s denial of a § 2254 petition. Davis v.
Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 341 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003). Appellate review
is limited to the issues specified in the COA. Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d
1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998). Writs of habeas corpus “shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless” those proceedings “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the” United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Where a state judge
did not resolve the merits of a § 2254 petitioner’s claim, however, no deference
under § 2254(d)(1) is owed. See Davis, 341 F.3d at 1313 (concluding the state
judge failed to address the petitioner’s claim on the merits, resulting in no
§ 2254(d)(1) deference, where he raised a claim his counsel had failed to preserve
6
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 7 of 12
a Batson 1 challenge, and the state judge construed the motion as resting on an
assertion that counsel failed to raise the Batson challenge).
In Novaton v. State, 634 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1994), the Florida Supreme Court,
relying on United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569, 109 S. Ct. 757, 762, 102
L.Ed.2d 927 (1989), discussed the “general rule” that “a plea of guilty and
subsequent adjudication of guilt precludes a later double jeopardy attack on the
conviction and sentence.” Novaton, 634 So.2d at 609. The court explained,
however, an exception to this rule existed, where (1) the plea was general, rather
than negotiated; (2) the double jeopardy violation was apparent from the record;
and (3) nothing in the record indicated a waiver of the double jeopardy violation.
Id. That exception did not apply in Novaton, because the defendant had entered
into a bargained-for plea agreement. Id. In its decision, however, the state court
noted that “Novaton neither request[ed] that [his plea] agreement be vacated nor
claim[ed] that it was invalid because it was not voluntarily and intelligently entered
into.” Id.
The Supreme Court has held that a defendant, who pled guilty on the advice
of counsel, may attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea by
showing that counsel rendered ineffective assistance, described in Strickland. See
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369-70 (1985); see also
1
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
7
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 8 of 12
Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A defendant who
enters a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional challenges to the
constitutionality of the conviction, and only an attack on the voluntary and
knowing nature of the plea can be sustained.”). Similarly, a Florida appellate court
has explained “Novaton does not preclude a double jeopardy attack framed as a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rogers v. State, 113 So.3d 960, 961
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
We note a COA was not explicitly granted as to whether Calhoun waived his
Strickland claims. Nevertheless, the waiver issue is contained within the COA,
because the state judge relied exclusively upon the determination Calhoun had
waived the two claims at issue here. Even if we were to determine Calhoun met
both prongs of Strickland, we would still need to address the waiver issue before
granting § 2254 relief. See Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1195,
1199 (2012) (vacating and remanding, where § 2254(d) deference applied, because
the court of appeals did not examine “each ground supporting the state court
decision”).
Whether afforded deference under § 2254(d)(1) or not, the state judge’s
resolution of Calhoun’s claims was unreasonable. Calhoun’s Rule 3.850 petition
raised his claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel attacking the voluntary
and knowing nature of his plea; therefore, his plea did not waive the claim. See
8
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 9 of 12
Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-59, 106 S. Ct. at 369-70; see also Wilson, 962 F.3d at 997;
Rogers, So.3d at 961.
The state’s argument Calhoun did not actually attack the voluntary nature of
his plea falls short. In the first paragraph of the argument section of his Rule 3.850
motion, Calhoun stated the general standard for ineffective assistance claims in the
plea context, including reciting his counsel’s ineffective assistance in failing to
inform a defendant of a potential defense could render a plea involuntary. Calhoun
then argued his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the body of the argument
section by failing to move to dismiss the allegedly problematic counts. While
inartfully crafted, Calhoun’s claim was sufficient to attack the voluntary nature of
his plea by alleging counsel’s ineffective assistance.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As he did in district court, Calhoun argues (1) his simultaneous convictions
regarding Counts I and III, and Counts V and VI, violate double jeopardy
protections; (2) his trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to advise him of
these defenses; and (3) he would not have pled nolo contendere had he known of
the potential double jeopardy defenses. He further contends the district judge
failed to engage in the appropriate analysis of the second, or prejudice, prong of
Strickland, because the judge assessed whether Calhoun’s total sentence would
have been the same. Calhoun instead argues the judge should have assessed
9
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 10 of 12
whether he would have insisted on going to trial rather than plead nolo contendere,
but for counsel’s deficient performance.
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a § 2254 petitioner must show
(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. “Because
a petitioner’s failure to show either deficient performance or prejudice is fatal to a
Strickland claim, a court need not address both Strickland prongs if the petitioner
fails to satisfy either of them.” Cox v. McNeil, 638 F.3d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the context of a guilty plea, Strickland’s prejudice prong “focuses on
whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of
the plea process.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370. Thus, the § 2254
petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Id. The Supreme Court has explained that, “where the alleged error of counsel is a
failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime
charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether
the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Id. at 59, 106 S. Ct.
at 371.
10
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 11 of 12
Calhoun’s Strickland claims both fail, because he has not shown prejudice.
See Cox, 638 F.3d at 1362. He provided no substantive argument in state court,
federal district court, or this court to address meaningfully the prejudice prong with
respect to either of his two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. He instead
asserts in cursory fashion that, had he known of the potential double jeopardy
defenses, he would not have pled nolo contendere but would have insisted on
going to trial on the allegedly problematic counts. While Calhoun stated in his
Rule 3.850 motion he attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, he did not specifically
argue that his decision was related to the alleged deficient performance of his
attorney in failing to advise him of the double jeopardy defenses. Significantly, he
did not allege he knew of the potential double jeopardy defenses at the time he
requested his counsel move to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas.
Moreover, the record in this case casts doubt on whether Calhoun would
have insisted on going to trial, even if he had known of the potential double
jeopardy defenses. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370. The record shows
Calhoun faced the potential for enhanced sentences as a prison-releasee reoffender
and a habitual-violent-felony offender, which exposed him to the potential of life
imprisonment. Calhoun’s counsel successfully negotiated a plea in which Calhoun
received a total of 20 years of imprisonment, the mandatory minimum as to Count
I, for all 17 offenses to which he pled nolo contendere. While the pertinent inquiry
11
Case: 13-13469 Date Filed: 04/23/2015 Page: 12 of 12
under Hill is whether Calhoun would have insisted on going to trial rather than
plead nolo contendere but for his counsel’s alleged deficient performance, this
record contains no support for that proposition beyond Calhoun’s present
representation. Consequently, Calhoun has failed to show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, he would have insisted on
going to trial, because (1) his double jeopardy defenses likely would not have
lowered his sentencing exposure, and (2) the plea he had obtained afforded him the
lowest possible sentence. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.
Calhoun’s argument concerning alleged deficiencies in the district judge’s
analysis of Strickland’s prejudice prong is unconvincing. Even if the judge erred
as Calhoun contends, Calhoun has provided no meaningful reference to the record
to support his conclusory claim of prejudice under Hill and Strickland; our analysis
of the record has revealed no such support. Because Calhoun has failed to show
prejudice, we affirm the denial his § 2254 petition without consideration of
Strickland’s performance prong. See Cox, 638 F.3d at 1362.
AFFIRMED.
12