This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1025
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Daniel Dean Kruse,
Appellant.
Filed April 27, 2015
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-13-1359
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, David W. Merchant, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of fifth-
degree controlled-substance crime. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 14, 2013, an anonymous informant disclosed to Eveleth Police
Officer Anthony Goulet the location of appellant Daniel Dean Kruse. Officer Goulet
believed Kruse to have an active felony warrant and contacted dispatch for confirmation.
Officer Christopher Melin, who heard dispatch confirm the active felony warrant, arrived
at Officer Goulet’s location, and both officers proceeded to Kruse’s location. Officer
Goulet spotted Kruse and called out to him by name. Kruse ran for approximately a block
and a half, despite multiple orders by Officer Goulet to stop. When Kruse fell, the
officers apprehended him.
While performing a search incident to arrest, the officers discovered a glass
marijuana pipe, an aluminum marijuana pipe, a knife, and a small plastic container,
which held 21 blue round pills, on Kruse’s person. Of the blue pills, 12 were marked with
a “V” on one side and a “2684” on the other side, and 9 were marked with a “V” on one
side and a “10” on the other side. Kruse told officers that he got the pills from a friend
and that the pills were for C.B., with whom officers believed Kruse had had relations in
the past. Using the website Drugs.com, Officer Goulet identified the pills as “Diazepam
10 mg,” a controlled substance.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Kruse with fifth-degree controlled-
substance crime. Kruse waived his right to a jury trial, and the parties submitted the case
to the district court on stipulated facts under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. The parties
agreed that the court could consider the police report, to which printouts from Drugs.com
were attached. The parties also stipulated that C.B. had a prescription for diazepam and
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that the blue pills were not contained in a prescription bottle when the officers found
them on Kruse’s person. The parties agreed to a sentence and waived a sentencing
hearing in the event of a guilty finding. The district court found Kruse guilty of fifth-
degree controlled-substance crime, imposed a 13-month sentence, stayed the sentence for
12 months, placed Kruse on probation, and immediately discharged him from probation,
based on the parties’ agreement.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Kruse argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of fifth-
degree controlled-substance crime. “[Appellate courts] use the same standard of review in
bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v.
Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011). “[Appellate courts] review the evidence to
determine whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be
drawn from those facts, a [fact-finder] could reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty of the offense charged.” State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 306–07 (Minn. 2014)
(quotation omitted). Appellate courts undergo “a painstaking analysis of the record to
determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
conviction, was sufficient to permit the [fact-finder] to reach the verdict which [it] did.”
State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
“If a conviction, or a single element of a criminal offense, is based solely on
circumstantial evidence,” Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d at 307, “[appellate courts] apply a two-
step analysis in determining whether [that] circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
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support a guilty verdict,” State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). The first step
is to “identify the circumstances proved.” Palmer, 803 N.W.2d at 733 (quotation
omitted). The second step is to “examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might
be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a
hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Under the first step, “[appellate courts] assume that the jury resolved any factual
disputes in a manner that is consistent with the jury’s verdict. Put differently, [appellate
courts] construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict . . . .”
Moore, 846 N.W.2d at 88 (quotation and citation omitted). Under the second step,
“[appellate courts] examine independently the reasonableness of the inferences that might
be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Id. (quotations omitted). “To affirm the
conviction, [appellate courts] must conclude that the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt, not simply
that the inferences that point to guilt are reasonable.” Id. (quotations omitted).
“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a
whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable
doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469,
473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). “[Appellate courts] give no deference to the fact
finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320,
329–30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
“A person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the fifth degree” if “the person
unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures containing a controlled substance classified in
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Schedule I, II, III, or IV.” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a) (2012). The elements of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance are that the defendant (1) consciously
possessed a controlled substance, either physically or constructively, and (2) knew the
nature of the substance. State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 104, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610
(1975); State v. Ali, 775 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn.
Feb. 16, 2010). In this case, the state presented circumstantial evidence of both the
identity of the alleged controlled substance and Kruse’s knowledge of the identity of the
substance. Kruse challenges the sufficiency of the state’s evidence.
Nature of pills
Kruse first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the blue pills contained diazepam. “[The supreme court] ha[s] not prescribed
minimum evidentiary requirements in identification cases, preferring to examine the
sufficiency of the evidence on a case-by-case basis.” State v. Vail, 274 N.W.2d 127, 134
(Minn. 1979). But “Minnesota law requires proof of the actual identity of the substance,
the defendant’s belief is insufficient.” Id.
In this case, the parties stipulated that the blue pills were not contained in a
prescription bottle when they were found in Kruse’s possession and that C.B. had a valid
prescription for diazepam. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, Moore, 846
N.W.2d at 88, the evidence proved the following additional circumstances: (1) Kruse fled
when confronted by police officers; (2) Kruse possessed a knife and contraband; (3) the
21 pills consisted of two varieties marked as diazepam; (4) the pills belonged to C.B.;
(5) Kruse had had past relations with C.B.; and (6) Kruse told police officers that he got
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the pills from a friend and that they were for C.B. These stipulated facts and proven
circumstances are consistent with Kruse’s guilt because they support a rational
hypothesis that the pills were prescription diazepam pills for C.B.
Kruse compares this case to State v. Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 2004), and
In re Welfare of J.R.M., 653 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. App. 2002), arguing that this case does
not involve the types of circumstances that have supported convictions of controlled-
substance crimes when the identity of the substance was challenged. Indeed, the
circumstances proved in Olhausen and J.R.M. are not the same as the circumstances in
this case. In Olhausen, the circumstances proved included
(1) respondent’s agreement to sell 1 pound of
methamphetamine, (2) respondent’s phone calls to arrange
the sale, (3) respondent’s representation of a small sample to
[an officer], a sample that [the officer] believed to be
authentic methamphetamine, (4) respondent’s various
statements, including an offer to sell “ten for one,” or 1 pound
of methamphetamine for $10,000, (5) respondent’s various
indications that the package he obtained from [his friend] was
1 pound of methamphetamine, (6) [the friend’s]
representations to the police that he furnished respondent with
1 pound of methamphetamine, and (7) respondent’s dramatic
flight from the scene of the incident.
681 N.W.2d at 23, 25–26. In J.R.M., the circumstances proved included the following:
A witness saw appellant smoking a substance and passing the
substance around between pinched fingers. Further, a
substance that smelled like marijuana was found in one of the
boy’s shoes. The assistant principal and liaison officer
testified at the adjudication hearing and described the
substance as a “joint.” Moreover, the officer testified that
appellant smelled of marijuana and that appellant’s eyes were
bloodshot and watery. Finally, both the assistant principal and
liaison officer testified that appellant admitted to smoking
marijuana.
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653 N.W.2d at 210–11. Notably, the circumstances proved in Olhausen are different from
the circumstances proved in J.R.M. and from those proved in this case. “[W]here the
identification of the drug is in question, the sufficiency of the evidence is examined on a
case-by-case basis.” Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d at 29. Because we examine the evidence on a
case-by-case basis, the lack of similarity between the facts in Olhausen and J.R.M. and
the facts in the case before us does not support Kruse’s insufficiency-of-the-evidence
argument.
Kruse next relies on State v. Robinson, 517 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 1994), for his
argument that “the fact that the pills are marked as diazepam does not eliminate the
rational possibility that they were, in fact, placebos.” Kruse’s reliance on Robinson is
misplaced. In Robinson, the defendant challenged his conviction of first-degree sale of a
controlled substance on the basis that the substance did not weigh at least ten grams. 517
N.W.2d at 337–38. The substance was a collection of 13 white “pieces” individually
wrapped in plastic, of which only 6 or 7 were tested for identification and determined to
contain cocaine base. Id. at 338. The supreme court assumed that the weight of the tested
“pieces” was less than 9 grams and considered the circumstantial evidence adduced to
prove the total weight of the substance, including
that the 13 white “pieces” were individually wrapped in
plastic and all the pieces were inside one larger plastic bag;
that this is a common method of packaging crack cocaine;
that crack is typically sold in $20 or $50 units and defendant
Robinson had fourteen $20 bills and one $50 bill in his sock;
and, finally, that defendant was carrying a beeper and was
arrested shortly after a report of drug dealing in a parking lot
at 3:30 a.m.
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Id. The court rejected the state’s argument that these circumstances were sufficient to
prove the identity of the “pieces” that were not tested and “conclude[d] that random
sampling in a case such as this one is insufficient to establish the total weight required of
the mixture containing a controlled substance.” Id. at 338–39. The court noted that “in the
case of substances not homogeneously packaged, drug dealers are known to substitute
placebos for the real thing” and referenced the Minnesota Legislature’s decision to
criminalize the sale of simulated controlled substances under Minn. Stat. § 152.097
(1992). Id. at 339. But the court also stated that “[t]here may be instances where the
seized material consists of pills or tablets where the individual items are so alike and the
risk of benign substitutes so unlikely that random testing may legitimately permit an
inference beyond a reasonable doubt that the requisite weight of the whole mixture is
established.” Id. at 340.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence proved that Kruse possessed blue pills
marked as diazepam, not “some amount of some kind of white substance.” See id. at 340.
Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence proved that the blue pills belonged to C.B. and
that she had a valid prescription for diazepam, which is inconsistent with Kruse’s
hypothesis that the pills were manufactured to appear as diazepam, when in fact they
were placebos or counterfeits. “[Appellate courts] will not overturn a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 330
(quotation omitted). We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the pills possessed by Kruse contained diazepam.
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Actual knowledge
Kruse next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had actual knowledge that the pills contained diazepam.
“Possession crimes require proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the nature of
the substance in his possession.” Ali, 775 N.W.2d at 918. “[P]roof that the defendant was
aware that he possessed a controlled substance satisfies the [fifth-degree controlled-
substance crime] statute’s actual-knowledge requirement.” Id. at 919.
Kruse attempts to undermine his conviction by highlighting the following
allegedly erroneous factual finding by the district court: “By telling officers he had
retrieved the substance from one residence with the intent to transport the substance to
another individual, Defendant admitted he consciously possessed the substance and had
actual knowledge of its nature.” (Emphasis added.) We agree that the stipulated facts do
not support the court’s finding that Kruse admitted that he knew that the pills were a
controlled substance. Arguably, the court’s finding regarding Kruse’s admission should
be set aside. See Vail, 274 N.W.2d at 133 (stating that “the judge’s findings of fact are
entitled to the same weight on review as a jury verdict” and “will not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous”). But setting aside the court’s finding of an admission does not
necessitate setting aside the court’s finding that Kruse had actual knowledge that the pills
were a controlled substance.
Kruse attempts to bolster the hypothesis that he possessed the pills without actual
knowledge that they were a controlled substance by isolating the circumstances proved.
He first argues that the stipulated fact that C.B. had a valid prescription for diazepam
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does not foreclose the rational hypothesis that he did not know what the pills were and
simply obtained them from a friend for her. He argues that his flight from police officers
can rationally be explained by his outstanding warrant and his possession of other
contraband at the time of flight. And he argues that he did not attempt to discard the pills,
suggesting that he lacked knowledge that they were a controlled substance. But the
hypothesis that Kruse did not know that the pills were a controlled substance is irrational
in light of the combined circumstances that the pills were marked as diazepam, a
prescription drug; the pills were for C.B., with whom Kruse had had past relations; the
pills were in two varieties; the pills were in a nonprescription container when Kruse was
arrested; Kruse possessed the pills while also possessing other drug paraphernalia and a
knife; and Kruse ran when confronted by police officers.
We conclude that the stipulated facts and circumstances proved in this case
support the hypothesis that Kruse had actual knowledge that the pills were a controlled
substance. We also conclude that the circumstances proved in this case are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
Affirmed.
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