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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOEL T. GROCE,
Appellant No. 1812 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 7, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005801-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, JENKINS, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 01, 2015
Joel T. Groce appeals from the judgment of sentence of one and one-
half to three years imprisonment to be followed by three years of probation
after the court found him guilty of robbery, theft, receiving stolen property,
recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), simple assault, and
harassment. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court related the following facts.
On January 11, 2012, at approximately 8:50 a.m., Crystal
Corbin, the complaining witness, dropped her son off at his
elementary school located at the intersection of Sharpnack
Street and Chew Avenue. As Ms. Corbin exited her vehicle, she
observed an SUV driving towards her, driving the wrong way
down a one-way street. As the SUV approached, Ms. Corbin
heard a male voice yelling something that she could not
understand. The driver of the SUV, identified as the defendant,
stopped and exited the vehicle and punched Ms. Corbin in the
face twice, striking her right eye with a closed fist. After the
defendant punched Ms. Corbin, the two continued “scuffling for
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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maybe 2 or 3 minutes.” Ms. Corbin sustained a black eye and
her shirt was torn. During the assault, Ms. Corbin screamed for
help and nearby crossing guards “tried to intervene by talking to
the defendant” and calling the police. At some point during the
assault, Ms. Corbin lost track of her car keys. After a few
minutes, the defendant stopped attacking Ms. Corbin and left the
scene in his vehicle. The defendant circled the block twice
before police responded.
Police Officer Toya Lee, responded to the call. After Officer
Lee arrived, the defendant returned to the location of the
assault. Officer Lee recovered Ms. Corbin’s keys from inside the
defendant’s vehicle. The defendant told Officer Lee that Ms.
Corbin had struck his vehicle earlier and fled the scene. The
defendant explained that he took Ms. Corbin’s keys to prevent
her from leaving the area again. However, Officer Lee testified
[that] she observed no damage to either Ms. Corbin’s or the
defendant’s vehicles.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/14, at 1-2.
The court found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned crimes on April
24, 2013. On June 7, 2013, the court sentenced Appellant on the robbery
charge only and did not impose any further sentence as to the remaining
charges. Appellant timely appealed. The trial court directed Appellant to file
and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal. Appellant complied, and the court authored its Rule 1925(a)
opinion. The matter is now ready for this Court’s review. Appellant presents
two issues for this Court’s consideration.
1. Was not the evidence insufficient to convict appellant of
robbery as a felony of the second degree, theft [by] unlawful
taking and receiving stolen property where the
Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant committed any theft because appellant did not
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take the complainant’s car keys with the intent to
permanently deprive the complainant of them, inasmuch as
he waited for the police to arrive, approached the police, told
police he had the keys and that he had taken possession of
the keys so that the complainant would not leave the scene
as she had done earlier, indicating an intent to restore the
keys to the complainant?
2. Was not the evidence insufficient to convict appellant of
recklessly endangering another person, where appellant’s
conduct of punching the complainant twice in the face did not
actually place the complainant in danger of death or serious
bodily injury?
Appellant’s brief at 3.
Each of Appellant’s issues implicates the sufficiency of the evidence. In
performing such a review, we consider all of the evidence admitted, even
improperly admitted evidence. Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108,
113 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc). We view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, drawing all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. Id.
The evidence “need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the
fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.”
Id. When evidence exists to allow the fact-finder to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of the crimes charged, the sufficiency claim
will fail. Id. In addition, the Commonwealth can prove its case by
circumstantial evidence. Where “the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
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combined circumstances[,]” a defendant is entitled to relief. Id. This Court
does not “re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
fact-finder.” Id.
Appellant’s initial argument is that the Commonwealth failed to prove
that he committed a theft of the victim’s car keys. He submits that because
he circled the block until police arrived and approached police after the
incident, the Commonwealth cannot establish a “thieving state of mind.”
Appellant’s brief at 10. According to Appellant, the facts of this matter
demonstrate that he did not intend to permanently deprive the victim of her
car keys or withhold them for an extended period. In Appellant’s view, his
actions are consistent with two different intentions and therefore his
conviction is based on mere suspicion and conjecture.
The Commonwealth counters that Appellant is viewing the evidence in
a light most favorable to him. It notes that the trial court, who was the fact-
finder, expressly deemed his version of events “incredible” in its Rule
1925(a) opinion. The Commonwealth adds that Appellant did not turn over
the victim’s car keys when police arrived. Rather, the officer questioned him
about the keys before he admitted to possessing them. Thus, the
Commonwealth maintains that Appellant did not voluntarily hand over the
keys. Since Appellant took the victim’s keys after repeatedly punching her
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in the face, the Commonwealth argues that it introduced sufficient evidence
to establish robbery, theft, and receiving stolen property.
An individual is guilty of the robbery count alleged herein if, in the
course of committing a theft, he inflicts bodily injury upon the victim. 18
Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(v). A theft is committed when a person “unlawfully takes,
or exercises unlawful control over movable property of another with intent to
deprive him thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a). To “deprive” a person of
property is defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3901 as follows:
(1) To withhold property of another permanently or for so
extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its
economic value, or with intent to restore only upon payment of
reward or other compensation; or
(2) to dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that
the owner will recover it.
Lastly, the elements of receiving stolen property are that a person
intentionally receives or retains movable property of another knowing that it
has been stolen. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).
Instantly, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, Appellant did not call police, nor did he turn over the keys
to police voluntarily. Rather, Appellant entered his own car and circled the
block. When confronted by police regarding his actions, he admitted to
having the keys. Police recovered the keys from his vehicle. His self-
serving hearsay statement to the officer that he only intended to prevent the
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victim from leaving was not believed by the trial court. Indeed, one could
infer from the evidence that Appellant was simply waiting for the crossing-
guard and other bystanders to leave before he again confronted the victim
only to have police arrive. The court was free to conclude that Appellant’s
driving around the block was intended to menace the victim rather than wait
for police. Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency argument as to robbery,
theft, and receiving stolen property fails.
Appellant’s second claim is that the Commonwealth introduced
insufficient evidence to prove that he recklessly placed the victim in danger
of serious bodily injury. He contends that his striking of the victim in the
face twice does not rise to creating “a known and foreseeable risk that the
complainant would die or suffer permanent disfigurement.” Appellant’s brief
at 14.
The Commonwealth responds that Appellant’s actions of punching the
victim in the face with a closed fist “very hard[,]” N.T., 4/24/13, at 13, put
the victim at risk of serious bodily injury. In support, it points out that the
head is considered a vital part of the body and a single punch can result in
serious brain injury. The Commonwealth posits that “[t]he fact that the
victim was fortunate enough to escape serious injury should not inure to
[Appellant’s] benefit.” Commonwealth’s brief at 10.
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In the present case, Appellant twice violently struck the victim in the
right eye with a closed fist. In addition, he grabbed the victim by the inside
lapels of her jacket and ripped her shirt. A crossing guard was unable to pull
Appellant away from the victim. The victim sustained a black eye and
testified that she still suffers from the effects of being hit. Punching a
person very hard in the eye on multiple occasions could cause orbital
damage and a severe injury. That the victim did not suffer permanent
disfigurement or serious bodily injury does not mean that Appellant’s actions
were not criminally reckless. The Crimes Code defines criminal recklessness
as follows.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and intent of the actor's conduct
and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor's situation.
18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3). The totality of Appellant’s actions demonstrate
conduct which may have placed the victim in danger of serious bodily injury.
See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705 (person must recklessly engage “in conduct which
places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily
injury.”).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/1/2015
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