This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1805
Bank of America, National Association,
Respondent,
vs.
Terry Alan Thornberg, et al.,
Appellants,
John Doe, et al.,
Defendants.
Filed May 18, 2015
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge
Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-14-5035
Curt N. Trisko, Schiller & Adam, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
William Bernard Butler, Butler Liberty Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellants)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
respondent and its denial of their motion requesting a stay of the proceedings. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 2, 2005, appellants Terry Thornberg and Marci Thornberg executed a
mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for
Prime Mortgage Corporation. The mortgage was filed with the Anoka County Registrar
of Titles (Anoka) on March 17, 2005. On September 23, 2010, Bank of America
National Association (Bank of America) filed an assignment of the mortgage with
Anoka.
Appellants stopped making payments on their mortgage sometime in 2009 or
2010. Bank of America initiated foreclosure proceedings on August 7, 2010. A sheriff’s
sale was held on January 10, 2014. Bank of America was the high bidder. A sheriff’s
certificate was recorded on January 14, 2014. The six-month redemption period expired
July 10, 2014. Appellants did not redeem and remained on the premises.
On August 25, 2014, Bank of America served an eviction summons. At some
point, appellants initiated a separate Torrens proceeding. On September 18, 2014,
appellants filed a motion to stay the eviction proceedings pending a decision in the
Torrens action. Appellants claimed that they were entitled to a stay because “discovery
will be required to ascertain the legal owner of the [appellants’] mortgage.”
The next day, September 19, Bank of America moved the district court for
summary judgment. On September 29, 2014, appellants moved the district court for
summary judgment in their favor and submitted a memorandum opposing Bank of
America’s motion for summary judgment. Appellants argued that either summary
judgment should be denied to Bank of America and granted to appellants, or a stay
2
should be granted. Appellants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment
because “[t]he factual record shows clearly that no default occurred here, meaning that
[Bank of America] was not entitled to foreclose.” In addition to appellants’ argument
that Bank of America does not have standing, appellants argued that “equity bars [Bank
of America] from taking possession” of their home because they “have invested over
$600,000 in their home.” Appellants also argued that the underlying foreclosure was
improper. The only argument in appellants’ motion in support of staying the proceeding
was that there was a pending Torrens proceeding.
The district court granted Bank of America’s summary judgment motion, denied
appellants’ request for a stay, and denied appellants’ counterclaims. The district court
found that appellants defaulted on their mortgage, that Bank of America was the high
bidder at the sheriff’s sale, that appellants did not redeem the property before the
expiration of the redemption period, and that the appellants remained on the property.
The district court held that “[Bank of America] has met its burden under Minn. R. Civ. P.
56 by demonstrating that it is a person entitled to the premises under Minn. Stat. §
504B.285, subd. 1(1)(ii)” and that there were no issues of material fact. Further, the
district court held “[appellants] are not entitled to a stay of this action merely because
they have commenced another action challenging the validity of the underlying
foreclosure,” citing Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Hanson, 841 N.W.2d 161 (Minn.
App. 2014). The district court later granted a conditional stay of the writ of recovery,
requiring appellants to post security of $82,867.60. This appeal followed.
3
DECISION
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review de novo “whether there
are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its
application of the law. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
against whom summary judgment is granted.” STAR Centers, Inc. v. Faegre & Benson,
L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Minn. 2002) (citations omitted). “Eviction actions are
summary proceedings that are intended to adjudicate only the limited question of present
possessory rights to the property. Parties . . . generally may not litigate related claims in
an eviction proceeding.” Hanson, 841 N.W.2d at 164 (citations omitted).
“A party entitled to possession of real property may recover possession by eviction
when any person holds over real property after the expiration of the time for redemption
on foreclosure of a mortgage.” Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Nedashkovskiy, 801
N.W.2d 190, 192 (Minn. App. 2011); see Minn. Stat § 504B.285, subd. 1(1)(ii) (2014).
A sheriff’s certificate is prima facie evidence of a valid sale and conveyance of title.
Minn. Stat. § 580.19 (2014).
Appellants submitted evidence to the district court which indicates that they were
not in default but, rather, two years ahead of their mortgage payments. Even viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to appellants, this information would not compel the
conclusion that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. This evidence
goes to whether the underlying foreclosure was valid, an issue not properly litigated in an
eviction proceeding. See Hanson, 841 N.W.2d at 164; Fed. Home Loan Mort. Corp. v.
Mitchell, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1401595, at *4 (Minn. App. Mar. 30, 2015).
4
Appellants do not dispute that respondent is reflected by the sheriff’s certificate as the
successful buyer at the January 10, 2014 sheriff’s sale.
Appellants also argue that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to
unconditionally stay the proceedings. Appellants assert that “the case-specific reason for
stay [is] the fact that they will regain possession upon successful resolution of the
contested case Torrens proceeding.” Appellants also assert that the district court erred in
granting Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment, principally because the
underlying foreclosure was in error.
We review a district court’s decision to deny a stay for an abuse of discretion.
Hanson, 841 N.W.2d at 164. “[P]ending litigation alone does not mandate a stay.” Id. A
dispute concerning the underlying foreclosure is not a case-specific reason to grant a stay.
Id. Further, “the district court is not obligated to grant a stay even when the party does
provide a case-specific reason.” Id.
The only reasons identified by appellants to the district court, and to us, for staying
the eviction proceedings is that there is a pending Torrens proceeding and that the
underlying foreclosure was invalid. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the stay and, in fact, analyzed the issue correctly.
Affirmed.
5