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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SEAN CHRISTOPHER PAPPERT,
Appellant No. 1075 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 4, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013426-2011
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 09, 2015
Sean Christopher Pappert appeals from the judgment of sentence of
three to six years’ incarceration, imposed June 4, 2014, following revocation
of his probation. We affirm.
In March 2012, Appellant entered into a negotiated plea agreement of
guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
6312(d). The trial court accepted his plea and sentenced Appellant to five
years’ probation. The trial court also imposed certain special conditions,
including Megan’s Law registration, compliance with sex offender treatment,
no contact with minors, no computer usage unless work-related, no Internet
usage, and no possession of pornography. No appeal was taken.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S25008-15
A review hearing was held in October 2012, at which Appellant’s
probation officer, Michael Bowie, informed the court that Appellant had some
form of contact with a minor and had viewed pornography. Nevertheless,
Mr. Bowie indicated that he was generally satisfied with Appellant’s
compliance. The court reiterated the conditions of Appellant’s probation and
added a special condition of no alcohol consumption.
In June 2014, a second review hearing occurred. At that time, Mr.
Bowie informed the court (hereinafter, the revocation court) that Appellant
was discharged from a sex offender treatment program at Mercy Hospital for
failure to make progress. Prior to his discharge, Appellant failed two
maintenance polygraph tests, and a third test’s results were inconclusive.
According to Mr. Bowie, Appellant failed to follow directions in completing
the third polygraph test and attempted to manipulate the results. Mr. Bowie
recommended probation revocation; the revocation court agreed and
immediately imposed a sentence of three to six years’ incarceration.
Appellant did not immediately challenge his sentence, nor did he
thereafter file post-sentence motions. Nevertheless, Appellant timely
appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The
revocation court issued a responsive opinion.
Appellant raises three issues. First, he challenges the revocation
court’s reliance on the polygraph test results. Second, Appellant challenges
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discretionary aspects of his sentence. Third, Appellant challenges the
admissibility of the polygraph results. See Appellant’s Brief at 4.
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the revocation court revoked
Appellant’s probation based primarily on the results of polygraph tests
administered to Appellant in the course of his sex offender treatment
program. According to Appellant, the court’s reliance upon the results was
inappropriate, citing in support Commonwealth v. A.R., 80 A.3d 1180 (Pa.
2013).
Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court and that court's decision will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of law or
an abuse of discretion.
Commownealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 558 (Pa. Super.
2007)).
In our view, the record does not support Appellant’s contention.
Although the revocation court referenced the results of Appellant’s three
polygraph tests, it appears the court considered the results merely as
background information, explaining Appellant’s discharge from a treatment
program. This is permissible. See A.R., 80 A.3d at 1184 (permitting
polygraph evidence in the limited context of revocation proceedings to
explain why the appellant was dismissed from treatment). In addition, the
court noted Appellant’s contact with minors and possession and/or use of
pornography, both further violations of the special conditions of Appellant’s
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probationary sentence. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of the revocation
court’s discretion.
In his second issue, Appellant challenges discretionary aspects of his
sentence. However, “[i]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of a
sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the
claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings.”
Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here,
Appellant failed to preserve his challenge. Accordingly, we deem it waived.
Id.1
Finally, Appellant raises an evidentiary challenge to the admissibility of
the polygraph test results, suggesting that the Commonwealth failed to
establish standards of scientific reliability set forth in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Appellant did not seek to preclude
this evidence prior to this appeal. Accordingly, we deem this issue waived.
See Commownealth v. Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960, 975 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(finding waiver where the appellant never filed a motion in limine and did
not request a Frye hearing); Pa.R.A.P. 302 (“Issues not raised in the lower
court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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1
We note that Appellant’s sentence is well beyond the aggravated range of
the sentencing guidelines. But see Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893
A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“[T]he [s]entencing [g]uidelines do not
apply to sentences imposed following a revocation of probation.”).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/9/2015
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