UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-30843
MICHAEL J. GACHOT,
Petitioner - Appellee,
VERSUS
RICHARD STALDER,
Respondent;
STATE OF LOUISIANA and KELLY WARD, WARDEN,
Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
July 15, 2002
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge
The State of Louisiana (hereinafter, “the State”) appeals from
the district court’s grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus
on the voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession under police
interrogation. We reverse.
I. Background.
1
On September 6, 1991, Appellee Michael Gachot (hereinafter,
“Gachot”), then 15 years old, shot and killed his father and then
his mother. The father had a history of openly suspecting that
Gachot was homosexual and publicly used demeaning language and
epithets toward him; he threatened that if he found out that Gachot
was homosexual, he would kill him. The parents were actively
discussing a divorce and it appears that neither wanted to take
custody of Gachot. The parents were both employed by Angola
Penitentiary, and the family lived on the grounds. They had a
second home off of the prison grounds, however, which is where the
shooting took place.
The parents had been arguing on that day about the divorce and
Gachot’s father threatened to kill Gachot and his mother. During
the heated argument, Gachot took his father’s pistol and shot him,
then shot his mother, killing them both. He claims that he “lost
awareness of his actions” until after the shooting.
Gachot then called his 23 year-old half-brother, Clay, who had
been a booking deputy in the Avoyelles Parish Sheriff’s
Department(Avoyelles Parish is where the shooting, interrogation,
and trial took place). Gachot told Clay that his father had shot
his mother and then had tried to shoot him but that the father was
killed in a struggle for the gun.
Clay arranged for friends, who were active deputies, to
assist. One of them went to secure the Gachots’ home. Gachot had
gone to his grandparents’ home, while officers and the coroner
2
conducted an investigation. That revealed evidence inconsistent
with Gachot’s story. The law enforcement agents asked Gachot to
the Sheriff’s office for a statement. Gachot did so, with his
grandmother’s permission, given the understanding that his older
half-brother, Clay, would be present. He had taken a tranquilizer,
Butisol, given to him by his grandmother.
Gachot went to the Sheriff’s office at about 11:30 p.m. and
remained there for about four hours. During that time, with Clay
present, Gachot gave three different statements. He and Clay had
been advised of Gachot’s Miranda rights prior to each of the three
statements and he agreed that he understood them. Initially, he
repeated his earlier story in a statement given between 12:19 and
12:51. He was then advised by the law enforcement officers and the
coroner that it was better to come across with a true statement,
and that the coroner would have to give testimony at trial to
discredit Gachot or “tear him apart.” He gave a sample of blood.
His second statement occurred between 2:14 and 2:25 a.m. and did
not result in a confession. He was then directly confronted by a
detective who abruptly told Gachot that his statement did not match
the physical evidence, upsetting Gachot. The detective left the
room and other officers attempted to calm Gachot down. He was
again advised to tell the truth. In his third statement, between
3:05 and 3:24 a.m., he confessed to the shootings.
Gachot was indicted on September 25, 1991, for two counts of
first degree murder. The District Attorney reduced these charges
3
to two counts of second degree murder on January 6, 1992, the date
of trial. Before trial, Gachot moved to suppress his inculpatory
statements, which was denied. He re-urged the motion on the date
of trial. Gachot was found guilty of manslaughter on count one
(the death of his father) and guilty as charged on count two (his
mother). Gachot filed a motion for post-conviction judgment of
acquittal, which included as a basis for relief the inadmissibility
of his confession. The motion was denied and Gachot was sentenced
to one to 21 years in prison on the first count and life
imprisonment without parole on the second count, to be served
consecutively.
His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The Louisiana
Supreme Court denied his application for writs and his request for
reconsideration of the application. He petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus on six grounds in the Louisiana district court, court
of appeals, and Louisiana Supreme Court, all of which were denied.
Gachot then applied to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana on July 2, 1999, for a writ of habeas corpus
on six grounds. The magistrate judge to whom the case was referred
recommended that Gachot’s conviction and sentence be reversed and
vacated on grounds three and five. Ground three reads:
The trial court denied the defendant his right against
self-incrimination by allowing his statement to the
police, by not allowing him a meaningful consultation
with an interested adult, other than his brother who
obviously could not meaningfully consult with the best
interest of Michael Gachot in mind.
4
The district judge concurred with and adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation as to ground three but did not accept his
recommendation as to ground five. On June 13, 2001, the district
judge granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and ordered
Gachot’s discharge unless he was returned to the Twelfth Judicial
District Court for the Parish of Avoyelles for re-arraignment
within 60 days, execution of which was stayed pending the instant
appeal.
The State of Louisiana appeals on the basis that Gachot’s
confession was free and voluntary and that the federal district
court failed to give due deference to the state court under the
federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, et seq., as
modified by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”).
II. Standard of Review.
A. Habeas review under the AEDPA.
To prevail on a federal habeas application, a petitioner must
make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right, a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable
jurists could debate whether. . . the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Moore v.
Johnson, 225 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2000), quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).
5
In assessing whether a petitioner has demonstrated a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, the
deference scheme laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies. See
Moore, 225 F.3d at 501.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under that scheme, pure questions of law and
mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under § 2254(d)(1) and
questions of fact are reviewed under § 2254(d)(2). See 225 F.3d at
501. The objective standard of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000) is used in these analyses.
As a result, we must defer to the state court unless its
decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is contrary to
clearly established Federal law "if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the
Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set
of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v.
Taylor, [529 U.S. 362, 412-13] (2000). Under §§
2254(d)(1)’s "unreasonable application" language, a writ
may issue "if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions
but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
the prisoner’s case." Williams, [529 U.S. at 413].
Factual findings are presumed to be correct, see §
6
2254(e)(1), and we will give deference to the state
court’s decision unless it "was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding." Id. §§ 2254
(d)(2).
Moore, 225 F.3d at 501 (citing Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 484-84
(5th Cir. 2000)).
B. Juvenile confession/waiver of rights.
“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
[prohibits] states from securing criminal convictions through the
use of involuntary confessions resulting from coercive police
conduct.” Self v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir.
1992)(citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)). “In
addition to the due process prohibition against the use of coerced
confessions, the now-familiar procedural safeguards established in
[Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] also protect an accused’s
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during
custodial interrogation.” Id. “[W]hile the ultimate issue of
voluntariness is a legal question requiring independent factual
determination, subsidiary factual questions . . . are entitled to
the § 2254(d) presumption.”1 Id. at 1204 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
The “totality of the circumstances” approach established by
Miranda, for reviewing a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights by
1
Although Self v. Collins is a 1992, pre-AEDPA case, the AEDPA
only strengthens the stricture imposing a strong requirement of
deference for a state court’s findings of fact.
7
adults, is adequate for the determination of whether there is a
valid waiver by a juvenile of his rights to remain silent and to
have the assistance of counsel. See United States v. Saucedo-
Velasquez, 843 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1988)(citing Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)). The Michael C. “totality of the
circumstances” standard is the “clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” governing
this circumstance.
Under this approach, the circumstances to be considered
include “evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity
to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.”
Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725; Saucedo-Velasquez, 843 F.2d at 835.
III. Analysis.
At the time that Gachot was interrogated, the Louisiana
Supreme Court required that a juvenile in custody be given the
opportunity to consult with an interested adult before
interrogation. See State v. Dino, 359 So.2d 586 (La. 1978). That
court later overruled Dino and affirmed the “totality of the
circumstances” rule in Louisiana following an examination of Fare
v. Michael C., supra, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), and
the premises upon which Dino was decided. See State v. Fernandez,
8
712 So.2d 485, 490 (La. 1998).2 Therefore, under the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence at the time of Gachot’s trial in
1992, the Dino standard applied. Although Dino placed emphasis on
whether the interrogated juvenile had had the opportunity to
consult with an interested adult, however, the Louisiana Supreme
Court did not ignore a “totality of the circumstances” approach.
In fact, that court reviewed the “totality” factors in Dino, see
359 So.2d at 591, in addition to whether the juvenile had been
afforded the opportunity to consult with an interested adult.
Therefore, although the Michael C. standard as enunciated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1979 was not explicitly adopted by Louisiana
jurisprudence until Fernandez in 1998, the Dino standard in place
at the time of Gachot’s interrogation in 1991 and trial in 1992 may
be fairly understood as recognizing the same principles as in
Michael C.
Even if the Dino standard were read to obviate other
“totality” factors in favor of whether the juvenile was afforded
access to an interested adult, our review of this case indicates
that the Louisiana trial court did not unreasonably ignore a
“totality of the circumstances” analysis.
2
The State of Louisiana takes exception, here, with the wording
of Gauchot’s issue to the extent that it seems to evoke the earlier
Dino standard. Regardless, the preamble to the “interested adult”
language in Gachot’s issue, “[t]he trial court denied the defendant
his right against self-incrimination by allowing his statement to
the police,” sufficiently invoked a waiver of rights issue for the
magistrate judge and the district judge to consider.
9
The state court, when evaluating the admissibility of Gachot’s
confession, considered his age, experience, education, background,
and intelligence to determine whether he had had adequate access to
the counsel of his half-brother, Clay, in the role of an interested
adult. The court noted that the interrogation was “conducted in a
very, very non-oppressive manner” and that Gachot had been
explained his Miranda Fifth Amendment rights at each turn.
Although the state court did appear to place more emphasis on
whether Gachot had been allowed access to an interested adult,
which it found that he had, we cannot see that the court
unreasonably ignored the total framework in which the interrogation
occurred.
Two U.S. Supreme Court cases guide us in making this
“totality” assessment. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a 15-year old who had been arrested at
midnight and subjected to continuous interrogation by a rotation of
several police officers, without counsel or friend, until he
confessed to participating in a robbery and shooting, had been
subjected to a violation of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 599-601. There, the youth had been taken from
his home, held incommunicado, and subjected to continuous
interrogation until the early morning hours when he confessed after
having been shown the alleged confessions of two other boys
involved in the robbery. He was not informed of his right to
10
counsel but was presented with a prepared confession that started
off with a statement that he could make the statement or not at his
decision, that it could be used against him at trial, and that he
was under no duress. It went on with the pre-printed question-and-
answer, “[d]o you still desire to make this statement and tell the
truth after having had the above clause read to you? A. Yes.” He
then signed the statement. Id. at 598.
The boy’s mother was denied access to him. When she brought
fresh clothing for him, she found that his old clothes had been
torn and bloodied. An attorney hired to represent him was denied
access to him, although a newspaper photographer was allowed access
to take his picture immediately after the 15 year-old signed the
confession. He was held for three days before being taken before
a magistrate. In court, he appeared bruised and skinned. Id. at
597-98. The Court reviewed the boy’s age, experience, the
conditions of his interrogation and methods of the interrogating
officers, and held that, “[i]f the undisputed evidence suggests
that force or coercion was used to exact the confession, we will
not permit the judgment of conviction to stand, even though without
the confession there might have been sufficient evidence for
submission to the jury.” Id. at 599.
On the other hand, in Michael C., the U.S. Supreme Court found
that, given the totality of the circumstances, a 16 1/2 year old
juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment
11
rights under an interrogation in a murder case. There were nothing
to indicate that he was unable to understand the nature of his
actions; he had considerable experience with the police, having a
record of several arrests. There was no indication that he was of
insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving,
or the consequences of that waiver. Further, he was not worn down
by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning by
trickery or deceit. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 726-27. He had had
his Miranda rights explained to him and answered that he understood
them. He had wanted his probation officer present, but agreed to
answer questions without an attorney present when the police
declined to bring his probation officer to the interrogation. Id.
at 700-11.
The instant case is dissimilar in many ways from each of the
situations just described, but is substantially closer to the
latter. Unlike Haley, Gachot was not arrested and pulled from his
home, without counsel, in the middle of the night. He agreed to go
to the Sheriff’s office to answer questions after having consulted
with his grandmother and with the knowledge that Clay would be
present. Clay in fact was present throughout the interrogation.
Gachot was not subjected to physical abuse nor was he subjected to
relentless, continuing questioning by callous police officers for
over five hours. Instead, he was questioned three times, ranging
from 11 minutes to 32 minutes, over about a three-hour period. His
12
questioning was described as “non-oppressive” and “with kid
gloves.” To the extent that he was confronted, it was with
inconsistencies between his story and the physical evidence at the
scene, not with spurious untruths. His interrogators advised him
repeatedly of his full Miranda rights, including his right to
counsel, unlike the officers in Haley.
Although Gachot did not have a considerable police record as
did the defendant in Michael C., he had been exposed to law
enforcement personnel and procedures for years. His parents were
employed by Angola Penitentiary, and they lived on the grounds.
His half-brother, Clay, had been employed by the Sheriff’s
department. He was not “worn down” any more than the Michael C.
defendant was during questioning. Although Gachot had taken a
Butisol given by his grandmother, there is no evidence that it
affected his intelligence, understanding, or judgment in deciding
to make his statements. Gachot clearly understood his actions and
the consequences of them and understood his rights, which had been
equally communicated to Clay. Finally, if Clay had harbored ill
will toward Gachot after the shootings, there is no manifestation
of it in the evidence, which suggests that he fulfilled the role of
“interested adult.”
Under these circumstances, the decision of the Louisiana state
court did not “result[] in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
13
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because that is the case,
the federal court must defer to the findings of the state court and
may not issue a writ of habeas corpus. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-
13.
IV. Conclusion.
For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the district
court in this case is REVERSED and the conditional writ of habeas
corpus is hereby REVOKED.
14