MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 27 2015, 8:53 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Suzy St. John Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Eric Dillon, August 27, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1412-CR-596
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stanley Kroh,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1409-CM-42762
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1412-CR-596| August 27, 2015 Page 1 of 5
[1] Eric Dillon (“Dillon”), appeals his conviction, after a bench trial, for Class B
misdemeanor criminal recklessness.1 On appeal, he argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not prove he
committed an act that created a substantial risk of injury to the victim.
Concluding that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s verdict, we affirm
Dillon’s conviction.
[2] Affirmed.
Issue
[3] Whether sufficient evidence supports Dillon’s conviction.
Facts
[4] Dillon and Rachel Riley (“Riley”) dated from December 2013 to June of 2014.
The two maintained contact after ending their relationship, and on August 13,
2014, Riley picked up Dillon from a family center on Illinois Street in Marion
County. While Riley was driving, the two began arguing. Dillon then called
an ex-girlfriend on his cellular phone. In response, Riley snatched away the
headphones Dillon used with the phone and threw them out of the window.
Dillon responded by taking Riley’s cell phone and throwing it out of the
window.
1
IND. CODE § 35-42-2-2(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1412-CR-596| August 27, 2015 Page 2 of 5
[5] Riley continued driving and arrived at the area of 16th and Rural Street. She
and Dillon were still arguing when Dillon grabbed the steering wheel, jerked it,
and caused the vehicle to swerve in and out of its lane of travel. At trial, Riley
testified that Dillon caused the vehicle to swerve in this manner at least three
times before she was able to stop the car at 10th and Rural Street. When Dillon
exited the vehicle, he struck Riley on the side of her head, causing pain.
[6] On September 16, 2014, the State charged Dillon with Class A misdemeanor
battery2 and Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness. A bench trial was held
on November 25, 2014, and the trial court found Dillon guilty as charged. The
trial court sentenced him to three hundred sixty-five (365) days in Community
Corrections on the battery conviction and a concurrent sentence of one hundred
eighty (180) days on the criminal recklessness conviction. Dillon now appeals
his conviction for criminal recklessness.
Discussion
[7] Dillon appeals his conviction for Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
2
I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1412-CR-596| August 27, 2015 Page 3 of 5
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
[8] In order to convict Dillon of criminal recklessness as charged, the State had to
prove that he recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performed an act that
created a substantial risk of bodily injury to Riley. I.C. § 35-42-2-2(a); (App.
16). A person engages in conduct “recklessly” if he engages in the conduct in
plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the
disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.
I.C. § 35-41-2-2(c).
[9] Dillon argues that insufficient evidence supports his conviction because the
State failed to present evidence that his act created a substantial risk of injury.
He relies on our opinion in Boushehry v. State, 648 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995), reh’g denied. There, the defendant went to a vacant lot and fired
two or three shots from his .22 caliber rifle at some geese. Id. at 1176. The
defendant fired the shots in the direction of Shelbyville Road, which bordered
the vacant lot. Id. We concluded that the possibility of a motorist passing by
on Shelbyville Road at the time the defendant fired his gun presented “only a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1412-CR-596| August 27, 2015 Page 4 of 5
remote risk of bodily injury.” Id. at 1177. Because the record contained no
evidence that anyone was in or near the defendant’s line of fire, we held that the
State had failed to prove the actual existence of substantial risk of bodily injury
to another person. Id.
[10] Dillon contends, similar to the argument in Boushehry, that because the State
presented no evidence of other vehicles or pedestrians in the road, or that a
collision almost occurred, we should reverse his conviction. We disagree. The
evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that Dillon repeatedly jerked
the wheel of Riley’s vehicle while she was driving, causing the vehicle to leave
its lane of travel at least three times. This behavior is certainly a substantial
deviation from acceptable standards of conduct, and the trial court could
reasonably infer that Dillon’s actions created a substantial risk of Riley losing
control of the vehicle, crashing, and suffering bodily injury. The fact that no
pedestrians or other vehicles were present did not lessen the risk of Riley losing
control of her vehicle. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports Dillon’s
conviction.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Robb, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1412-CR-596| August 27, 2015 Page 5 of 5