MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Nov 30 2017, 8:48 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ruth Johnson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Valerie K. Boots Attorney General of Indiana
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Henry A. Flores, Jr.
Appellate Division Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Eric Ramon Davilla-Castro, 1 November 30, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1706-CR-1292
v. Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Angela Dow Davis, Judge
The Honorable
Peggy R. Hart, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1609-F6-36976
1
We note that, although defendant’s name is spelled Davilla-Castro throughout the record, at trial, the
defendant spelled his name as Davila-Castro, i.e., Davila was spelled with one “l.” Tr. Vol. II at 42.
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Kirsch, Judge.
[1] Eric Ramon Davilla-Castro (“Davilla-Castro”) appeals his conviction of Level 6
felony criminal recklessness,2 claiming that his conviction was not supported by
sufficient evidence.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The facts most favorable to the judgment follow. On September 17, 2016,
Diana Pizarro3 (“Pizarro”) and her fiancé, Ulises Grande (“Grande”), were
caring for Grande’s three children from his previous relationship with Alejandra
Tellez (“Tellez”). Around 3:00 a.m., the youngest child, still a baby, was
crying. This prompted Pizzaro and Grande to ask Tellez, who was living with
Davilla-Castro, if they could bring the baby to her. Tellez agreed.
[4] When Pizarro and Grande arrived at Tellez’s apartment, they saw Tellez
running into the street. Tellez was crying and said that she was hurt and that
Davilla-Castro had been strangling her. Pizarro, Grande, and Tellez decided to
go into the apartment. In the hallway, they found Davilla-Castro, who was
“very mad” and screaming. Tr. Vol. II at 15. Davilla-Castro threatened to fight
Grande, took off his belt, and approached Grande while wrapping the belt
2
See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b).
3
In the record before us, Diana Pizarro is also referred to as Diana Ticarro; however, we will use only
Pizarro. Tr. Vol. II at 4, 34, 40, 56, 57, 59.
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around his right hand. Id. at 15, 25. Based on Davilla-Castro’s aggression,
Grande told Pizarro and Tellez to leave. Tellez called the police.
[5] Soon thereafter, Pizarro, who was concerned for Grande’s safety, went back
into the apartment and found Davilla-Castro and Grande fighting. As she
entered, Pizarro saw Davilla-Castro with a knife in his right hand, and Grande
holding Davilla-Castro by the wrists. Grande told Pizarro to take the knife
from Davilla-Castro, which she did, and in the process cut Davilla-Castro’s
hand. Pizarro said that she “was very scared” at that moment because Davilla-
Castro was trying to “stab” Grande. Id. at 17. Pizarro was concerned for
Grande’s life. Id. To prevent Davilla-Castro from grabbing another knife,
Pizarro put the knife she had taken from Davilla-Castro, as well as all the other
household knives, into her vehicle.
[6] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Mitchell Farnsley (“Officer Farnsley”)
responded to the call of a domestic disturbance. There, he found four
individuals in the apartment and separated them for later interview.
Encountering Davilla-Castro, Officer Farnsley noted that he was agitated with
Grande. Davilla-Castro appeared heavily intoxicated and had a bleeding cut on
his hand. It was Officer Farnsley’s opinion that Davilla-Castro had sustained
that injury “during the struggle with the knife being taken away from him.” Id.
at 37. Talking with Grande, Officer Farnsley noted that Grande was “a little
relieved,” “exhausted,” “sweaty,” and “a little nervous.” Id. at 31-32. Grande
had “fresh cuts” on his face that were bleeding. Id. at 32. Officer Farnsley
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testified that he arrested Davilla-Castro for criminal recklessness based on his
conduct involving the knife. Id. at 38.
[7] In September 2016, the State charged Davilla-Castro with Level 6 felony
criminal recklessness.4 At the March 2017 bench trial, Pizarro and Officer
Farnsley testified for the State, and Davilla-Castro testified in his defense,
saying that he had not held the knife. Instead, he said that he had only touched
the blade when he tried to remove the knife from Grande, and that is when he
cut his hand. Tr. Vol. II at 53, 54. The trial court found Davilla-Castro guilty as
charged and sentenced him to 365 days with ten days executed in jail and the
rest suspended to probation. Davilla-Castro now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Indiana Code section 35-42-2-2 provides, “A person who recklessly, knowingly,
or intentionally performs an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another person commits criminal recklessness,” a Class B misdemeanor.
However, the offense is a Level 6 felony if “it is committed while armed with a
deadly weapon.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b). Davilla-Castro’s sole claim on
appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of Level 6
felony criminal recklessness.
4
The State also charged Davilla-Castro with Level 6 felony criminal confinement, Level 6 felony
strangulation, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, and Class A misdemeanor domestic
battery; however, those charges were dismissed at the commencement of the bench trial. Tr. Vol. II at 7-8,
19-20.
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[9] Sufficiency of evidence claims “face a steep standard of review.” Griffith v.
State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). When reviewing challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the
credibility of witnesses. Bell v. State, 31 N.E.3d 495, 499 (Ind. 2015). Instead,
“we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that
support the [judgment] and will affirm the conviction if there is probative
evidence from which a reasonable [fact-finder] could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. A conviction may be sustained on
appeal on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness or victim. Lay v.
State, 933 N.E.2d 38, 42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Moreover, a
conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone so long as the
circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt. Gonzalez v.
State, 908 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[10] Davilla-Castro’s charging information provided, in relevant part, as follows:
On or about September 17, 2016, [Davilla-Castro] did recklessly,
with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife, perform[] an act, that is:
walking at and toward the person of Ulises Grande and/or Diana
[Pizarro] with a knife, that created a substantial risk of bodily
injury to Ulises Grande and/or Diana [Pizarro].
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 19. Thus, to convict Davilla-Castro of Level 6 felony
criminal recklessness, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1)
he (2) recklessly, (3) with a knife, (4) walked at or toward the person of Grande
or Pizarro, (5) thereby, creating a substantial risk of bodily injury to either
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Grande or Pizarro. Davilla-Castro focuses on the fourth element,5 contending
that his conviction cannot stand because there was no direct evidence to
support the element that he walked at or toward Grande or Pizarro with a knife,
and the circumstantial evidence does not support a reasonable inference of
such. Appellant’s Br. at 8-10 We disagree.
[11] Here, the State presented evidence that Grande and Pizarro were at Davilla-
Castro’s apartment to drop off Tellez’s baby and were met outside by Tellez
crying and saying that Davilla-Castro had hurt her. Tr. Vol. II at 10, 11.
Pizarro, Grande, and Tellez all entered the apartment and found Davilla-Castro
very mad and screaming. Id. at 15. Davilla-Castro took off his belt and
wrapped it around his wrist as he approached Grande and threatened to fight
him. Id. Due to Davilla-Castro’s aggressive actions, Pizarro and Tellez left the
apartment. Id. Pizarro, concerned for Grande’s safety, returned to the
apartment and saw Davilla-Castro and Grande fighting. Id. at 16. Davilla-
Castro had a knife in his right hand, and Grande was holding onto Davilla-
Castro’s wrists. Id. at 16, 26. Pizarro said that she “was very scared” at that
moment because Davilla-Castro was trying to “stab” Grande. Id. at 17.
Pizarro was concerned for Grande’s life. Id. At Grande’s instruction, Pizarro
took the knife out of Davilla-Castro’s hand, and in the struggle, Davilla-Castro
5
To the extent Davilla-Castro argues that he did not have a knife, we are unpersuaded. Pizarro testified at
trial that Davilla-Castro held a knife. While Davilla-Castro testified at trial that he never held a knife, his
possession of a knife was a question of fact, which the trial court decided in favor of the State. We cannot
reweigh that evidence. Krueger v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1240, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
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cut his hand. Id. at 17, 18. Responding to the 911 call, Officer Farnsley noted
that Davilla-Castro was agitated with Grande. Id. at 32. It was Officer
Farnsley’s opinion that Davilla-Castro sustained the cut on his hand “during
the struggle with the knife being taken away from him.” Id. at 37. Grande
appeared exhausted, sweaty, and a little nervous and relieved. Id. at 31-32.
Officer Farnsley noted that Grande had fresh cuts on his face that were
bleeding. Id. at 32. From this evidence, the finder of fact court could have
made a reasonable inference that Davilla-Castro, agitated with Grande,
approached him with a knife in order to engage him in a fight and to attempt to
stab him, thereby creating a substantial risk of bodily injury.
[12] Davilla-Castro contends that the trial court drew an unreasonable inference
from the above facts. He argues that the evidence showed only that: Davilla-
Castro and Grande were involved in “a mutual fight”; Pizarro did not see how
Grande’s injuries occurred; “Grande’s minor injuries to his head were not stab
wounds, but appear more characteristic of a fist fight”; and the laceration
Davilla-Castro sustained to the webbing between his thumb and index finger is
consistent with his attempting to grab the blade of the knife as it was being held
by someone else. Appellant’s Br. at 11. Davilla-Castro’s alternative version of
the facts is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility
of the witnesses, which we cannot do. Krueger v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1240, 1244
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Accordingly, we conclude that the State
presented sufficient evidence to support Davilla-Castro’s conviction for Level 6
felony criminal recklessness.
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[13] Affirmed.
[14] Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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