J-S40043-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.A., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: F.A., NATURAL FATHER No. 406 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order entered February 12, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Criminal
Division, at No(s): CP-25-DP-0000183-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE, and STRASSBURGER,∗ JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 31, 2015
F.A. (Father) appeals from the order entered February 12, 2015, in the
Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, which changed the permanency goal
of his minor daughter, J.A. (Child), born in January of 2014, to adoption.1
After careful review, we affirm.
On September 16, 2014, Mother took Child to the hospital, where it
was determined that Child had suffered a spiral fracture to her arm. Mother
provided several inconsistent explanations of how this injury took place,
none of which was medically acceptable. As a result of these events, Child
was placed in foster care. She was adjudicated dependent on October 14,
2014.
∗
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Child’s mother, S.F. (Mother), also has appealed from the subject order.
The disposition of her appeal is by separate memorandum.
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On December 18, 2014, the Erie County Office of Children and Youth
(the Agency) filed a petition for permanency hearing, in which it
recommended terminating Father’s parental rights to Child. A permanency
hearing was held on February 6, 2015. Following the hearing, on February
12, 2015, the court entered its order changing Child’s permanency goal to
adoption. Father timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Father now raises the following issue for our review.
1. Did the juvenile court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it determined that the concurrent placement
goal of reunification/adoption was no longer feasible, dispensed
with the concurrent placement goal of reunification after only
four months and directed the Agency to provide no further
services and/or visitation to [Father]?
Father’s brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We consider this issue mindful of the following.
[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the
lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we
review for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act,
when considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent
child, the juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the
continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement;
(2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the
extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances
which necessitated the original placement; (4) the
appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for
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the children; (5) a likely date by which the goal for the child
might be achieved; (6) the child’s safety; and (7) whether the
child has been in placement for at least fifteen of the last
twenty-two months. The best interests of the child, and not the
interests of the parent, must guide the trial court. As this Court
has held, a child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope
that the parent will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.
In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion
and/or erred by changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption, because the
court did so after only several months. Father’s brief at 12. Father
contends that he did not have sufficient time to demonstrate that he is
capable of parenting Child, and that he did not receive reasonable
reunification services from the Agency. Id. at 12-14. Father also
emphasizes that one of the primary purposes of the Juvenile Act is
promoting reunification, and that he continues to receive services with
respect to his other child, A.A., who is not involved in the instant appeal.
Id. at 12-13, 15-16.
In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the juvenile court
explained that it changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption because, inter
alia, Father has demonstrated that he will not, or cannot, remedy his
domestic violence issues to the extent that he can safely parent Child.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/31/2015, at 17. The court also emphasized
Father’s alcohol abuse. Id. The court stated that nothing in the Juvenile Act
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prohibited it from changing Child’s permanency goal at the time that it did,
and that the fact that Father may be receiving services with respect to A.A.
has no bearing on the instant matter. Id. at 14.
First, we agree with the juvenile court that there is no minimum period
of time that a child’s goal must be set at reunification before it can be
changed. See, e.g., In re M.S., 980 A.2d 612 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal
denied, 985 A.2d 220 (Pa. 2009). In M.S., a juvenile court set the child’s
initial permanency goal as adoption, despite the fact that aggravated
circumstances had not been found. A panel of this Court affirmed,
explaining that,
…. the lack of any aggravating circumstances attributable to the
parent Appellant … did not prohibit the trial court from
authorizing immediate termination of family unification. Stated
otherwise, the initial permanency goal for M.S. need not be set
at reunification, especially since [the Agency] has provided any
and all reasonable services to assist Appellant toward this end
without success.
Id. at 615-16.
Second, after a thorough review of the record in this matter, we
conclude that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in changing
Child’s permanency goal to adoption. During the February 6, 2015
permanency review hearing, Agency caseworker, Sharon Slubowski, testified
that Father has a history of engaging in domestic violence. N.T., 2/6/2015,
at 15. Ms. Slubowski noted that Father’s previous girlfriend filed for
Protection From Abuse (PFA) orders against him in 1996 and 2001. Id. at
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17. Ms. Slubowski also discussed a more recent incident which took place in
December of 2013, while Mother was pregnant with Child. Id. at 16.
During that incident, Father “got on top” of Mother and punched her in the
face. Id. As a result, Father was arrested and incarcerated for an
unspecified period of time. Id. at 15. Mother filed for a PFA order against
Father in September of 2014. Id. at 16. Ms. Slubowski did not describe this
incident in detail, but stated that it involved “[m]uch the same thing. . . . If I
can’t have you nobody else will, that kind of thing.” Id. at 16-17. Finally,
Ms. Slubowski received allegations that Father had assaulted Mother on
December 31, 2014, but Ms. Slubowski was not able to corroborate this
information. Id. at 18.
Ms. Slubowski further testified that Father has been attending a
domestic violence intervention program, but that he has done so
inconsistently. Id. at 7. At the time of the hearing, Father no longer was
permitted to attend the program, due to his prior bad behaviors. Id. at 7-9.
Ms. Slubowski specified that Father used “foul language” during class, that
he used his cellphone during class, and that “they smelled alcohol on his
breath a couple times.” Id. at 8. In order to return to the program, Father
would need to meet with the director of the providing agency. Id. at 9.
Relatedly, Ms. Slubowski explained that Father has either failed to attend
most of his drug screens, or tested positive for alcohol. Id. at 10-11. Ms.
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Slubowski expressed concern that Father becomes violent when he drinks.
Id. at 11.
With respect to mental health, Ms. Slubowski testified that Father is
enrolled in Safe Harbor Behavioral Health. Id. at 12. However, Ms.
Slubowski’s records indicated that Father does not attend his scheduled
appointments. Id. at 13. With respect to parenting and visitation, Father
was referred to the Time Limited Family Reunification Program. Id. at 14.
Ms. Slubowski explained that Father “did come to a few” meetings, but that
he is “not following the program, and he’s not achieving visits, so we can’t
assess his progress in the areas that have been identified.” Id. at 15. Ms.
Slubowski noted that Father has not “achieved a visit” since October 30,
2014, due to his failure to maintain sobriety. Id. at 13.
Father testified that he has been “going to domestic violence classes,
going to the fatherhood classes, and anything you asked.” Id. at 70. Father
admitted that he was asked to leave a domestic violence class on January
24, 2015, but denied that he did anything inappropriate. Id. at 71. Father
also admitted that he missed “a few” a random drug screens. Id. at 66.
Father stated that he now realizes that he must attend all of his screens, and
that he must be sober. Id. at 66, 70. Father stated that he will be
participating in a drug and alcohol assessment in about a week. Id. at 65,
70.
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Thus, the record demonstrates that Father has a history of engaging in
violent and abusive behavior, and that Father has made little, if any, effort
to remedy this issue. Father also has failed to address his mental health
concerns. Notably, Father has been unable to visit with Child since October
of 2014 due to his alcohol use. Rather than end his alcohol consumption in
order to visit with Child, Father has continued to drink. Based on this
evidence, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that Child’s
permanency goal should be changed to adoption. Accordingly, we affirm the
order of the juvenile court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/31/2015
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