FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 04 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-10092
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 1:11-cr-00443-AWI-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ALBERT HOOD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 2, 2015**
Before: HUG, FARRIS, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.
Albert Hood appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges
the 96-month sentence imposed following his conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Hood contends that the district court procedurally erred at sentencing
because it never mentioned 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) generally, did not mention some
of the specific § 3553(a) factors, and never explicitly stated that the sentence was
sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth in §
3553(a). Because Hood did not object on these grounds below, we review for plain
error. See United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir.
2010). The district court did not plainly err. We presume that the district court
knows the law, and it was not required to discuss each factor or state that the
sentence was no greater than necessary. See United States v. Rodriguez-Castro,
641 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Hood contends that the 96-month sentence is substantively unreasonable
because the district court placed too much weight on his criminal history and the
need for deterrence and not enough weight on mitigating factors such as the
reasons he possessed the firearm and his family ties and educational efforts. We
review a sentence for reasonableness in light of the totality of the circumstances
and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
51 (2007). The “weight to be given the various factors in a particular case is for
the discretion of the district court.” United States v. Gutierrez-Sanchez, 587 F.3d
2
904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009). The sentence is not substantively unreasonable in light
of the totality of the circumstances and all of the § 3553(a) factors, including not
only the reasons Hood committed the offense, but also his recent prior felon in
possession conviction and his crimes of violence.
AFFIRMED.
3