IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-1189-14
FRANCHESKA V. JAGANATHAN, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CHAMBERS COUNTY
M EYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
In this case, the court of appeals concluded that the judge erred in denying Appellant’s
motion to suppress because the State Trooper lacked reasonable suspicion that Appellant had
disobeyed the “Left Lane for Passing Only” sign. Jaganathan v. State, 438 S.W.3d 823 (Tex.
App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2014). The State Prosecuting Attorney brought this petition,
taking issue with the court of appeals’ conclusion. Agreeing with the State Prosecuting
Jaganathan dissent - Page 2
Attorney,1 the majority now comes back and says that the court of appeals’ analysis was
incorrect for multiple reasons, including that it focused on Appellant’s possible defenses to
not passing while in the left lane rather than whether the officer simply had a reasonable
suspicion that she had disobeyed the sign.
I am concerned, however, that Appellant’s actions in this case, regardless of whether
she was actually passing another vehicle, cannot constitute a crime at all. Transportation
Code Section 544.004(a) states that “The operator of a vehicle or streetcar shall comply with
an applicable official traffic-control device placed as provided by this subtitle. . . .” However,
it is unclear how an individual can comply with the “Left Lane for Passing Only” sign and
when his or her actions would become criminal activity. Can a driver proceed into the left
lane only if he or she intends to pass a vehicle? If so, how would the State ever prove the
driver’s intent? Is a driver required to actually pass another vehicle while in the left lane and
is there a specific amount of time in which this pass must occur? Once a driver passes
another vehicle, is he or she then required to move back into the right lane, or can the driver
stay in the left lane in anticipation of passing a car ahead? What if a driver needs to exceed
the posted speed limit in order to pass? What if a driver intended to pass but the car next to
him or her increases speed? What if a driver never comes upon cars to pass, but intended to
pass any that were on the roadway?
1
This court has become inordinately generous with the SPA’s theories lately. For
example, in Murray v. State, No. PD-1230-14, 2015 LEXIS 391 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 15,
2015), the majority upheld a DWI conviction based on an inference that the Appellant had
driven, although this was not supported by any direct or circumstantial evidence.
Jaganathan dissent - Page 3
“The purpose of regulatory signs is to provide drivers with notice of traffic laws or
regulations.” Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). However, this
particular sign leaves me with more questions than answers as I am unsure of how an
individual commits a crime under the language of it. Drivers themselves cannot know what
they are and are not able to do when they get into the left lane and at what point they become
criminally liable. Unlike a DWI offense, for example, which explicitly sets out the elements
to be proved, this statute uses vague terminology. It is just a generic mandate to follow road
signs without the setting out of elements as is done in traditional indictments or complaints.
This adds to the confusion motorists have in trying to comprehend this sign and statute, and
the benefit of the doubt of the reasonable suspicion should not go to the State. Reasonable
suspicion should not be based on a crime that no one understands how to commit or not
commit.
For these reasons, the presence of this sign, which provides no true notice or
instruction, is the equivalent of having no sign at all. And as discussed in Abney, when there
is no sign within a reasonable distance of the traffic stop, there can be no reasonable
suspicion that a traffic violation occurred. Id. at 550. Therefore, Appellant should not have
been pulled over and her motion to suppress the evidence found in the car should have been
granted. For these reasons I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and, therefore,
I respectfully dissent.
Meyers, J.
Jaganathan dissent - Page 4
Filed: September 16, 2015
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