Sep 17 2015, 8:47 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Robert F. Hunt Jeremy M. Dilts
Hunt, Hassler, Lorenz & Kondras, LLP Carson Boxberger LLP
Terre Haute, Indiana Bloomington, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Donald Richardson, September 17, 2015
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
28A01-1503-CT-83
v.
Appeal from the Greence Superiour
Town of Worthington, Indiana, Court
The Honorable Lori Thatcher
Appellee-Defendant Quillen, Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
28D01-1405-CT-7
Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issue
[1] Donald Richardson sued the Town of Worthington (“Worthington”), seeking
the payment of overtime wages pursuant to Indiana’s Minimum Wage Law
(“MWL”). Worthington moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted. Richardson presents one issue for our review, namely, whether the
trial court erred when it concluded that the MWL did not apply to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 28A01-1503-CT-83 | September 17, 2015 Page 1 of 10
Worthington. Concluding that the MWL explicitly excludes from its purview
employers such as Worthington who are subject to the minimum wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Richardson was a marshal with Worthington’s police department. During the
time that Richardson worked there, the police department did not employ more
than three full-time officers. Richardson was employed by the police
department until March 2014.
[3] In May 2014, Richardson filed suit against Worthington seeking overtime
compensation, unpaid wages, penalties, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees
pursuant to the MWL. Worthington moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the MWL did not apply. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Worthington:
The only question presented is one of legal interpretation.
[Richardson] claims overtime under the Indiana minimum wage law
within IC 22-2-2 but the whole chapter does not apply to
[Worthington] because IC 22-2-2-3 specifically excludes any employer
who is covered by the federal minimum wage law. Indeed,
[Worthington] is covered by the federal law but it is exempt from the
overtime because it employed fewer than five (5) employees in law
enforcement activities in the relevant period, a fact which is not
contested, hence neither law would support [Richardson’s] claim.
Appendix at 8. Richardson now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 28A01-1503-CT-83 | September 17, 2015 Page 2 of 10
Discussion and Decision
I. Background and Relevant Statutes
A. Indiana Minimum Wage Law
[4] In 1965, the General Assembly enacted the MWL, which established, among
other things, a minimum wage for Indiana workers. Ind. Code ch. 22-2-2. The
public policy behind the MWL is to prevent the employment of workers below
a minimum wage, which “threatens the health and well being of the people of
the state of Indiana and injures the economy of the state.” Ind. Code § 22-2-2-
2. In 1998, the legislature amended the MWL to mandate overtime
compensation for workers who toiled in excess of a forty-hour workweek. Ind.
Code § 22-2-2-4(k), added by P.L. 39-1998, Sec. 1 (1998).
[5] In its “Definitions; exemptions” section, the MWL provides that
“[e]mployer” means . . . the state, or other governmental agency or
political subdivision during any work week in which they have two (2)
or more employees. However, it shall not include any employer who
is subject to the minimum wage provisions of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 201-209).
Ind. Code § 22-2-2-3 (emphasis added). Thus, any employer who is subject to
the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA is exempt from providing its
employees benefits under the MWL.
B. Fair Labor Standards Act
[6] The FLSA is the federal analogue of the MWL. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1938).
Like the MWL, the FLSA provides for a minimum wage to be paid to non-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 28A01-1503-CT-83 | September 17, 2015 Page 3 of 10
salaried workers. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (“Minimum wage”). It also provides for
overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of
pay for hours worked in excess of a forty-hour week. 29 U.S.C. § 207
(“Maximum hours”). Although the FLSA is a nationwide law, it does not
cover all employees with all of its protections. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e), 213.
One such exemption excludes employees of a law enforcement agency with
fewer than five employees from eligibility for overtime pay. 29 U.S.C. §
213(b)(20).
II. Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
[7] Our standard of review for a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary
judgment is well-settled. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Peoples State Bank v. Benton Twp. of Monroe Cnty., 28 N.E.3d
317, 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). All factual inferences are
construed in favor of the nonmovant. Peoples State Bank, 28 N.E.3d at 321.
“On appeal, the trial court’s order granting or denying a motion for summary
judgment is cloaked with a presumption of validity.” Van Kirk v. Miller, 869
N.E.2d 534, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The party appealing from
the summary judgment order has the burden of persuading us the decision is
erroneous. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 28A01-1503-CT-83 | September 17, 2015 Page 4 of 10
[8] In addition, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review
de novo. Peoples State Bank, 28 N.E.3d at 322. If a statute is unambiguous, it
will not be subject to interpretation. Id. Rather, the words and phrases will be
read in the plain, ordinary, and usual sense. Id. at 322-23.
B. Is Worthington a Minimum Wage Law “Employer”?
[9] This is a case of first impression in Indiana. If a statute has not been construed
previously, then we look to the express language of the the statute and the rules
of statutory construction. Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Massey, 20 N.E.3d 853, 856 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014). The purpose of statutory construction is to implement the
legislature’s intent. Id.
1. Arguments of the Parties
[10] Richardson argues that Worthington is an employer under the MWL’s
definition, and thus that Worthington must pay him overtime compensation.
The linchpin of Richardson’s argument is that the reference in the MWL’s
definition of “employer” to the “minimum wage provisions of the [FLSA]” is a
reference to both the minimum wage provisions and the maximum hours
provisions of the FLSA. Richardson contends that the FLSA’s maximum
hours provisions are also “minimum wage provisions” because they set a
minimum wage for overtime compensation. According to Richardson, the
MWL’s drafters used the plural word “provisions” to indicate that an employer
must be subject to both the FLSA’s minimum wage and maximum hours
provisions in order to be exempt from the MWL. Richardson finds further
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 28A01-1503-CT-83 | September 17, 2015 Page 5 of 10
support for his reading of the MWL in the fact that at the end of the definition
of “employer” is a citation to sections 201 through 209 of the FLSA, which
encompasses both the minimum wage and maximum hours sections of that
statute. Richardson reasons that, because Worthington is exempt from the
FLSA’s maximum hours requirements—having employed fewer than five
people in its police department—it is not subject to the FLSA and is therefore
an “employer” for purposes of the MWL.
[11] Worthington counters that, because it is bound by the FLSA’s minimum wage
provisions, it is exempt from the MWL notwithstanding its exemption from the
maximum hours provisions. Worthington argues that reading the MWL’s
reference to “minimum wage provisions” in the FLSA to also include its
maximum hours provisions “is to twist the plain language of those sections
beyond recognition.” Brief of Appellee at 5. Worthington directs us to Vezina
v. Jewish Cmty. Ctr. of Metro. Detroit, No. 93-CV-74163, 1994 WL 762214 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 23, 1994), in support of its reading of the statutes at issue. Vezina
brought suit for overtime wages purportedly due to her under the FLSA and the
Michigan Minimum Wage Law. The Jewish Community Center (“JCC”),
moved for summary judgment, claiming that it was exempt from paying Vezina
overtime based on an FLSA exemption for executive employees. It also
claimed that the Michigan law did not apply because, like the MWL, it
excluded “any employer who is subject to the minimum wage provisions of the
[FLSA].” Id. at *10 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.394). The district court
found that Vezina was an executive for purposes of the FLSA exemption. The
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 28A01-1503-CT-83 | September 17, 2015 Page 6 of 10
district court concluded that, because the JCC was an employer subject to the
FLSA, the Michigan statute was not applicable. Id. However, unlike the
parties in this case, Vezina did not dispute the fact that the JCC was subject to
the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA. Therefore, Vezina is not helpful for
our analysis.
2. The FLSA’s Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Provisions
[12] Since the MWL references the “minimum wage provisions” of the FLSA, our
analysis necessarily must begin with an examination of how those words are
used in the FLSA itself. We begin by noting that the phrase “minimum wage
provisions” does not appear in the FLSA. However, the phrase “minimum
wage” does appear, most notably as the title of section 206, which sets forth the
minimum wage for different types of workers. The next section, 207, is titled
“Maximum hours” and sets forth the hours for the standard workweek as well
as the requirements for overtime compensation. Section 207 mandates
payment at one and one-half the “regular rate” for overtime. References in
section 207 to the minimum wage provisions of section 206 involve employees
for whom the minimum wage is the “regular rate” for purposes of overtime
compensation. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(b)(3), (f), (i).
[13] Notably for the case at hand, the exemption section of the FLSA has two
subsections. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(b). Subsection “(a) Minimum wage and
maximum hour requirements” lists types of employees who are exempt from
both the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of the FLSA.
Subsection “(b) Maximum hours requirements,” provides that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 28A01-1503-CT-83 | September 17, 2015 Page 7 of 10
[t]he provisions of section 207 of this title shall not apply with respect
to—
***
(20) any employee of a public agency who in any workweek is
. . . employed in law enforcement activities (including security
personnel in correctional institutions), if the public agency
employs during the workweek less than 5 employees in . . . law
enforcement activities . . . .
Thus, the phrases “minimum wage” and “maximum hours” have very specific
uses in the FLSA. A reference to the “minimum wage” is to the content of
section 206. Any reference to “maximum hours” is to the content of section
207. Neither Richardson nor Worthington argues that the MWL is ambiguous,
and we agree. When the MWL refers to the “minimum wage provisions” of
the FLSA, it means the content of FLSA section 206, entitled “Minimum
wage.”
[14] Contrary to Richardson’s argument, the MWL’s use of the plural “provisions”
in conjunction with its citation to FLSA sections 201 to 209 does not dictate
another result. “Provisions” is not defined in the MWL. In such a case, we
give the word its ordinary meaning, which may be supplied by an English
language dictionary. Fort Wayne Patrolman’s Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., v. City of Fort
Wayne, 903 N.E.2d 493, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. A provision
may be defined as “[a] clause in a statute, contract or other legal instrument.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1420 (10th ed. 2014). There are many provisions in the
minimum wage section of the FLSA, including provisions pertaining to workers
in United States territories, seamen, and agricultural workers, 29 U.S.C. §
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 28A01-1503-CT-83 | September 17, 2015 Page 8 of 10
206(a); workers brought under the FLSA by other laws, (b); those providing
contract services to the United States government, (e); those in domestic
service, (f); and workers who are less than twenty years of age, (g), among
others. Thus, the use of the plural “provisions” does not necessitate that the
drafters of the MWL were referring to additional sections of the FLSA at all, let
alone specifically section 207 and its overtime compensation requirements.
Furthermore, the MWL’s citation to “29 U.S.C. 201-209,” which encompasses
both the minimum wage and maximum hours sections, does not support
Richardson’s argument. Ind. Code § 22-2-2-3. That citation includes other
sections that are not related to the minimum wage, such as section 201,“Short
Title”; section 204, “Administration”; and section 209, “Attendance of
Witnesses,” as well as sections 205 and 208, which were repealed in 2007.
Therefore, the inclusion of section 207 in the citation does not transform it into
one of the “minimum wage provisions” referenced by the MWL.
[15] The FLSA’s law enforcement exemption was added in 1974. See Pub. L. 93-
259, 88 Stat. 55, Sec. 6 (1974). The General Assembly has modified the
MWL’s definition of “Employer” multiple times since 1974, but it has never
modified its definition to state explicitly that employers must be subject to both
the minimum wage and maximum hours sections of the FLSA to be excluded
from the MWL. See P.L. 99-1989, Sec. 30 (1989); P.L. 3-1989, Sec. 131 (1989);
P.L. 133-1990, Sec. 1 (1990); P.L. 8-1993, Sec. 270 (1993). Richardson offers
policy arguments as to why we should accept his reading of the MWL.
However, we are bound by the intent of the legislature as manifested by the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 28A01-1503-CT-83 | September 17, 2015 Page 9 of 10
unambiguous language of the MWL. Peoples State Bank, 28 N.E.3d at 322 (“An
unambiguous statute will not be subject to interpretation . . . .”).
[16] Under FLSA section 203(d), an employer “includes any person acting directly
or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and
includes a public agency. . . .” (Emphasis added.) A political subdivision of the
State is a “public agency” for purposes of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(x).
According to FLSA section 206(a), an enterprise engaged in commerce must
pay its employees the minimum wage. The activity of a public agency is an
enterprise engaged in commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(C). Worthington is
subject to the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions. Therefore, it is exempt from
the MWL and its overtime pay requirements. Ind. Code § 22-2-2-3.
Conclusion
[17] The FLSA’s maximum hours provisions are distinct from its minimum wage
provisions. MWL’s reference to the “minimum wage provisions” of the FLSA
is to FLSA section 206, not sections 206 and 207. Worthington is an employer
subject to the minimum wage provisions but not the maximum hours
provisions of the FLSA. The MWL, therefore, excludes Worthington from its
purview. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.
[18] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 28A01-1503-CT-83 | September 17, 2015 Page 10 of 10