IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 72412-6-1
S.B.
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ro-
Respondent,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
S.B.,
Appellant. FILED: September 28, 2015
Schindler, J. — S.B. appeals an order committing him to inpatient mental health
treatment for a period of up to 14 days. S.B. argues he was denied due process and, in
the alternative, insufficient evidence supported the conclusion that he was gravely
disabled. We disagree, and affirm.
On August 11, 2014, a designated mental health professional (DMHP) filed a
petition for an initial 72-hour detention of S.B. The petition alleged S.B. "presents with a
mental disorder characterized by increased agitation, decreased sleep, paranoia,
delusions of grandeur, decreased intake, impaired judgment [and] insight." The petition
further alleged, in pertinent part:
[S.B.] has eaten very little since Friday [and] was making statements
about the food being "offerings," placing it outside for animals. He has
slept very little and talks about being the "heart of the world" [and] that he
has super powers. He has been agitated/yelling [and] pacing [and]
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jumped 10 feet off a balcony, injuring his back [and] rolling down a hill. He
has been in his father's face yelling, causing the father to fear for his
safety. Today 8/10/14, he threatened to tear down his parent's [sic] barn
[and] tear down their wood shed because the structures have "darkness."
The parents have observed him sleeping outside last night and today, was
observed ranting [and] screaming in the back yard for 4-5 hours — ifthe
parents attempt to approach him, he becomes very agitated and angry.
Because of the mental disorder [and] above behaviors, I believe he is a
danger to others, a danger to property, and has experienced a repeated
[and] escalated loss of cognitive [and] volitional control.
The court authorized a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment at MultiCare
Auburn Medical Center (MAMC).
On August 12, MAMC filed a petition seeking to involuntarily commit S.B. for a
period of up to 14 days for evaluation and treatment on the ground that there was "a
likelihood of serious harm to others and/or others' property." The petition alleges S.B.
was expressing delusional thoughts and "believes that he is not in need of any
treatment." The petition states S.B. was detained the previous week at Good Samaritan
Hospital "on grounds of grave disability after he presented with poor hygiene, poor eye
contact, and loud, pressured and rapid speech" but was released to his parents due to
lack of bed space. The petition states S.B. was experiencing "a repeated and escalated
loss of cognitive and volitional control."
On August 13, the court held a probable cause hearing on the petition to commit
S.B. for up to 14 days for evaluation and treatment. Before the hearing began, the
attorney representing the State informed the court that "we will be proceeding on a 14-
day hearing on the allegations of grave disability, prong A, as well as harm to property."
S.B.'s attorney responded, "I'm prepared to proceed to hearing."
The State presented the testimony of S.B.'s father Edward Bellack and DMHP
Melissa Silvers. Bellack testified that S.B. believed the family's house was "evil" and
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wanted to tear it down. Bellack testified S.B. refused to eat any food at home but ate
"two or three dinners" as soon as he was admitted to MAMC. Bellack testified that S.B.
would not sleep in the house and instead slept on a concrete slab in the barn. Bellack
said S.B. would yell obscenities in the backyard for up to an hour at a time. When
Bellack and his wife tried to talk to S.B. about his condition, S.B. became angry and
fled. S.B. jumped from an eight-foot balcony, "crashed across the lawn[,] and flipped
and ... cut his back up."
DMHP Silvers is a licensed clinical social worker. Silvers testified that she
evaluated S.B. following his initial detention. In conducting her evaluation, Silvers
interviewed S.B. and his parents and reviewed S.B.'s medical records. Silvers testified
S.B. was diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury and psychosis NOS1 with the
possibility of bipolar disorder.
According to Silvers, S.B. presented as extremely agitated, disorganized, and
delusional. For example, S.B. claimed police officers broke his hands when taking him
into custody but he cured his broken hands by drinking milk. S.B. also claimed a
paramedic sexually assaulted him in the ambulance on the way to the hospital and
stated, "I'm going to kill that guy." Silvers testified S.B. appeared to be experiencing
auditory hallucinations, "yelling out at intervals at persons who are not in the room."
Silvers testified S.B. denied that he needed to be hospitalized and repeatedly stated
that "he can just drink milk and that will cure him of all illnesses." Silvers testified that
S.B. refused psychiatric medications and showed very little insight into how to manage
his mental health conditions in the community. Silvers testified that in her opinion, S.B.
Not otherwise specified.
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presented "as a substantial risk of harm to the property of others," and he was "currently
gravely disabled as a result of his mental disorder" because he was "in danger of
serious physical harm from the failure or inability to provide for his essential needs of
health and safety."
At the conclusion of the evidence, S.B. moved to dismiss arguing the petition did
not allege grave disability as a basis for the 14-day commitment. The attorney for the
State informed the court that the State had notified S.B.'s attorney in advance of the
hearing that the State planned to present evidence in support of the grave disability
allegation. The court denied the motion to dismiss and allowed the State to amend the
petition to allege grave disability based on the evidence presented at the probable
cause hearing. The court ruled, in pertinent part, "The Respondent did receive notice
prior to the commencement of the hearing and at the . . . commencement of the hearing
that the State wished to proceed on a grave disability claim in addition to the harm to
others claim."
The court found S.B. suffered from a mental disorder rendering him gravely
disabled. The court found that "as a result of this mental impairment, [S.B.] is in danger
of serious physical harm resulting from an inability to provide for his essential needs of
health and safety." The court found that S.B. jumped over a balcony "eight feet down to
the ground; falling and hurting his back," and "appeared to be unaware of the risk
associated with his actions." The court found S.B. refused to sleep in his parents'
home, instead sleeping on a concrete floor in a barn, and was "not eating at home with
his family because he believes that there's evil in the home or in the house." The court
found these behaviors demonstrated "a decreased connection to reality and [an]
increased impulse control impairment such that he is putting his physical safety in
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jeopardy because of the delusions and the mental illness." The court found there was
insufficient evidence to establish S.B. presented a likelihood of serious harm to others'
property, finding that "[although there's evidence that he has certainly suggested or
indicated he wants to demolish his parents' home, there is no evidence that he's
actually taken any steps to do so." The court entered an order committing S.B. for
further treatment for a period of up to 14 days.
S.B. appeals the 14-day commitment order. S.B. argues the court erred in
allowing the State to amend the petition to allege he is "gravely disabled" under RCW
71.05.020(17) after the close of evidence. S.B. contends his due process rights were
violated because he did not receive adequate notice of the allegation that he is "gravely
disabled."
Washington's civil commitment statutes authorize the State to detain an
individual for evaluation and treatment after establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the individual poses a substantial risk of harm to him or herself, others, or
the property of others, or is gravely disabled. RCW 71.05.240(3); In re Pet, of LaBelle,
107 Wn.2d 196, 201-02, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). RCW 71.05.020(17) provides that an
individual is "gravely disabled" when, as a result of a mental disorder, the individual
(a) [i]s in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to
provide for his or her essential human needs of health or safety; or (b)
manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by
repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or
her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her
health or safety.
To meet its burden of establishing an individual is "gravely disabled" under RCW
71.05.020(17)(a), the State must present "recent, tangible evidence of failure or inability
to provide for such essential human needs as food, clothing, shelter, and medical
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treatment." LaBelle. 107 Wn.2d at 204-05. The State must also show the failure or
inability to provide for essential needs presents "a high probability of serious physical
harm within the near future unless adequate treatment is afforded." LaBelle. 107 Wn.2d
at 204-05.
Due process requires the State to provide the respondent with sufficient notice of
the facts supporting the petition for commitment. In re Pet, of R.P.. 89 Wn. App. 212,
216, 948 P.2d 856 (1997).
The central purpose of providing a person with notice is to apprise the
affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending
hearing. ... To accomplish this purpose, the notice must indicate the
issues which will be addressed at the hearing.
In re Cross. 99 Wn.2d 373, 382, 662 P.2d 828 (1983).2 Mental Proceedings Rule 6.2
requires that a petition for 14-day treatment contain "[t]he facts upon which the
allegations of the petition are based." MPR 6.2(c). The petition must also contain the
following:
A statement that the professional staff of the evaluation and treatment
facility has examined and analyzed respondent's condition and finds that
as a result of mental disorder respondent presents a likelihood of serious
harm to himself or others or is gravely disabled.
MPR 6.2(e).
Here, the record establishes S.B. received adequate notice that the State sought
to commit him on the basis of grave disability. The petition for an initial 72-hour
detention filed on August 11 alleged facts supporting a finding of grave disability. For
instance, the petition alleged S.B. was not adequately eating or sleeping and had
injured himself jumping off a balcony. The petition also alleged S.B. was experiencing
2 Internal quotation marks omitted.
72412-6-1/7
"a repeated [and] escalated loss of cognitive [and] volitional control," symptoms that are
part of the definition of "gravely disabled." RCW 71.05.020(17)(b). The petition for a
14-day detention filed on August 12 also alleged facts supporting a finding of grave
disability including that S.B. lacked insight into his need for mental health treatment,
was experiencing "a repeated and escalated loss of cognitive and volitional control," and
had recently been hospitalized on the "grounds of grave disability."
The attorney for the State informed S.B. in advance of the probable cause
hearing on the petition to commit S.B. up to 14 days for evaluation and treatment that
the State sought to commit S.B. on the grounds of grave disability. At the beginning of
the probable cause hearing, the attorney informed the court that the State planned to
introduce evidence of grave disability. S.B.'s attorney did not object. Rather, S.B.'s
attorney expressly stated, "I'm prepared to proceed to hearing."
Dunnerv. McLaughlin. 100 Wn.2d 832, 676 P.2d 444 (1984), supports our
conclusion. In McLaughlin, the State filed a petition for a 90-day commitment but failed
to check any of the boxes in the petition alleging grounds for the commitment.
McLaughlin. 100 Wn.2d at 834. However, the petition was supported by an affidavit
stating McLaughlin suffered from depression and suicidal ideation, refused to follow
through with outpatient treatment, and was unable to care for himself. McLaughlin. 100
Wn.2d at 834-35. The State formally amended the petition at the close of its case in
chief to allege likelihood of serious harm and grave disability. McLaughlin. 100 Wn.2d
at 836. The court held McLaughlin was not denied due process by the amendment
because he had adequate notice and opportunity to prepare a defense. McLaughlin.
100Wn.2dat849.
72412-6-1/8
S.B. also claims the court violated his right to due process and the appearance of
fairness doctrine by allowing the State to amend the petition. " '[T]he Due Process
Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and
criminal cases.'" Tatham v. Rogers. 170 Wn. App. 76, 90, 283 P.3d 583 (2012)
(quoting Marshall v. Jerrico. Inc.. 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182
(1980)). " 'Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, a judicial proceeding is valid only
if a reasonably prudent and disinterested observer would conclude that all parties
obtained a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing.'" State v. Bilal. 77 Wn. App. 720, 722,
893 P.2d 674 (1995) (quoting State v. Ladenburg. 67 Wn. App. 749, 754-55, 840 P.2d
228(1992)).
S.B. argues the court exhibited "partiality" by indicating the State could amend
the petition before the State formally moved to amend. The record does not support
S.B.'s argument. Before the hearing, the State clearly asserted it planned to present
evidence of grave disability. Without objection, the State presented testimony
establishing S.B. was gravely disabled. In denying the motion to dismiss, the court
ruled, in pertinent part:
Under the Civil Rules of Procedure, which govern these proceedings, a
party has the ability to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence
that is presented at a trial. ... I am interpreting the State's behavior and
the Hospital's behavior in this case as a constructive Motion to Amend.
I'm gonna grant that to allow them to proceed on grave disability.
The court did not violate due process or the appearance of fairness by allowing
the State to amend the petition to conform to the evidence under CR 15(b).
In the alternative, S.B. contends insufficient evidence supports the conclusion
that he was "gravely disabled." Where, as here, a court has weighed the evidence, our
review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings and,
8
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if so, whether the findings support the conclusions of law. In re Pet, of A.S.. 91 Wn.
App. 146, 162, 955 P.2d 836 (1998). Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence
sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true. A.S., 91 Wn.
App. at 162.
Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that S.B. was gravely disabled.
Bellack testified that when he and his wife tried to speak to S.B. about his mental health,
S.B. jumped off an eight-foot balcony, injuring his back. Bellack also testified S.B.
refused to eat any food. Silvers testified S.B. refused psychiatric medications and
showed no understanding of how to manage his mental health conditions in the
community, claiming drinking milk would heal him. Silvers also testified S.B. was
experiencing auditory hallucinations and paranoid delusions about being physically and
sexually assaulted. This evidence supports the court's finding that S.B. was "in danger
of serious physical harm resulting from an inability to provide for his essential needs of
health and safety" and the conclusion that S.B. was "gravely disabled" under RCW
71.05.020(17).
Affirmed.
•MifVCQPa,
WE CONCUR: