MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 30 2015, 8:39 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Suzy St. John Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
Christina D. Pace
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Danean Childress, September 30, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1501-CR-35
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court Criminal Division, Room 10
State of Indiana, The Honorable Linda E. Brown,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49F10-1306-CM-40212
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Following a bench trial, Danean Childress was convicted of class A
misdemeanor Prostitution.1 Childress now appeals, contending that the State
presented insufficient evidence to support her conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] On June 19, 2013, Detective Henry Castor of the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department was conducting an undercover investigation into
advertisements placed on the website Backpage.com. Detective Castor and his
fellow officers had previously made several prostitution arrests using this
website. On this occasion, Detective Castor went to the escort section of the
website and found an ad Childress had placed offering reflexology massage and
good conversation. The advertisement also said something like “pick your
flavor for the favor.” Transcript at 12. Based on his training and experience,
Detective Castor believed the ad was soliciting prostitution, so he called the
listed telephone number to set up an appointment. Detective Castor agreed to
pay $225 for one hour of Childress’s services, although they did not discuss
what specific services would be offered. Childress instructed Detective Castor
to meet her at a hotel.
1
Ind. Code § 35-45-4-2.
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[4] Detective Castor met Childress at the hotel, and they both entered a room
Childress had rented. Once inside, they engaged in casual conversation, during
which Childress stated that she was nervous and told Detective Castor that he
was cute. Childress asked Detective Castor if he was a police officer. When
Detective Castor stated that he was not, Childress responded that “[t]hey’re
allowed to say they are not a cop.” Id. at 38. Detective Castor asked about
reflexology massage, and Childress explained reflexology and massaged his
hand. Childress then stated that some of her clients had foot fetishes and stated
“[y]ou need some more fetishes in this line of work.” Id. at 43. Childress also
told Detective Castor that she “d[id]n’t do Greek”, which she explained meant
anal sex. Id. Detective Castor asked if he could pay extra for anal sex, and
Childress responded that she would not do it. Detective Castor asked if
“everything else” was okay, and Childress responded affirmatively. Id. at 15.
Childress then told Detective Castor to place his things on the counter, which
he understood to mean he was to place the agreed-upon payment on the
counter. Childress then got a condom out of a drawer and opened it. At that
point, Detective Castor told Childress that he was a police officer. Childress
became upset and asked if Detective Castor was taking her to jail. Childress
was then placed under arrest.
[5] As a result of these events, Childress was charged with class A misdemeanor
prostitution. A bench trial was held on January 6, 2015, at the conclusion of
which Childress was found guilty as charged. Childress now appeals.
Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
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Discussion & Decision
[6] Childress argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her
prostitution conviction. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.
Atteberry v. State, 911 N.E.2d 601, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we
consider only the evidence supporting the conviction and the reasonable
inferences flowing therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative
value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the conclusion
that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt,
the judgment will not be disturbed. Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1137
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008). It is not necessary that the evidence overcome every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an
inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the conviction. Drane v.
State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).
[7] In order to convict Childress of prostitution as charged, the State was required
to prove that Childress knowingly or intentionally agreed or offered to perform
sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct for money. See I.C. § 35-45-4-2. On
appeal, Childress argues that there was no agreement to pay for sex.
Specifically, Childress argues that the amount Detective Castor agreed to pay
was for “reflexology massage and conversation”, not a sexual encounter.
Appellant’s Brief at 5. Childress admits that she indicated a willingness to engage
in sexual activity with Detective Castor, but asserts that she did not request any
additional remuneration in exchange.
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[8] Childress’s argument amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence. Under the
circumstances presented here, it was reasonable for the factfinder to infer that
the “reflexology massage and good conversation” Childress advertised were
merely a front for prostitution. Id. Specifically, Childress placed the
advertisement in the escort section of a website that Detective Castor and his
fellow officers had used to make several prostitution arrests in the past. Based
on his training and experience and the wording of the advertisement, which
Detective Castor testified said something like “pick your flavor for the favor”,
Detective Castor believed the ad was soliciting prostitution. Transcript at 12.
When Detective Castor called to make an appointment, Childress instructed
him to meet her at a hotel. They also agreed that he would pay $225 for one
hour of Childress’s services. Although they did not discuss what specific
services would be offered on the telephone, Detective Castor testified that this
was typical in prostitution transactions. When Detective Castor met with
Childress at the hotel, she asked him if he was a police officer. After briefly
massaging Detective Castor’s hand, Childress began talking about sexual
fetishes and told him she did not do “Greek”, which she explained meant anal
sex. Id. at 43. Detective Castor asked if he could pay extra for anal sex, and
Childress said no. Detective Castor then asked if “everything else” was okay,
and Childress responded affirmatively. Id. at 15. Childress then got out a
condom and opened it. At that point, Detective Castor told Childress he was a
police officer, and she became upset and asked if he was taking her to jail.
These facts were more than sufficient to support a reasonable inference that
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Childress agreed or offered to perform sexual intercourse or other sexual
conduct for money.
[9] Judgment affirmed.
[10] Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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