Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-14-2006
USA v. O'Keefe
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-4737
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 05-4737
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.
SEAN PATRICK O'KEEFE,
Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 03-cr-00278-1)
District Judge: The Honorable David S. Cercone
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 27, 2006
BEFORE: SMITH, WEIS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 14, 2006)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
I.
On December 1, 2003, Sean O’Keefe pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §§371
and 1343 as a collections agent for a fraudulent telemarketing scheme run from Canada.
The District Court sentenced O’Keefe to five months in prison, five months of home
detention, and 3 years of supervised release. The District Court also ordered him to pay
$90,000 in restitution, a $3,000 fine and a $100 assessment. O’Keefe appealed his
sentence. Following Booker, this Court vacated and remanded O’Keefe’s cause. The
District Court held a second sentencing hearing and imposed the same sentence. O’Keefe
timely appealed. We will affirm.
II.
A.
First, O’Keefe argues that, during his second sentencing hearing, the Government
breached his plea agreement by arguing he should be held accountable for the full harm
done by the telemarketing scheme, despite the parties’ stipulation that he only knowingly
took part in defrauding an individual named Doris Gilbert of $90,000.
We review the question of whether the Government breached a plea agreement de
novo. United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 290, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2004). We analyze plea
agreements according to contract principles and attempt to discern whether the
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Government’s conduct was inconsistent with the defendant’s reasonable understanding
when entering his plea. Rivera, 357 F.3d at 294-95.
O’Keefe’s plea agreement states, in relevant part:
[O’Keefe] will acknowledge his responsibility
for the full scheme to defraud by wire during
the period November 2001 through January
2002, as described in the information, and
stipulate (subject to the limitations of paragraph
C 4, below) that such conduct may be
considered by the Probation Office and by the
District Court in imposing sentence (emphasis
added).
Paragraph C-4 states:
In this regard, the parties agree that the
maximum amount of loss from the scheme to
defraud for which Mr. O’Keefe has
responsibility pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines
§1.B1.1.3, Relevant Conduct, is a sum not more
than $90,000, based on Mr. O’Keefe’s lack of
knowledge of the nature of the scheme prior to
December 5, 2001. However, the parties’
stipulation is not intended to limit any inquiry
by the District Court, and has no bearing on any
fact not expressly set forth in the stipulation.
Supplemental Appendix at 180, 184.
At the plea colloquy, O’Keefe’s counsel sought to clarify the meaning of
paragraph A-4, and explained to the District Court that it was nothing more than a venue
waiver. The U.S. Attorney agreed, stating:
That is basically correct, your Honor. It is
unquestionably the intent of this agreement that
the Defendant’s relevant conduct for purposes
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of the Guidelines is based on the 90 thousand
dollar figure, and that is provided both in
Paragraph C-4, and then the factual basis for
that is explained in the stipulation. And it is
correct that the issue of venue is underneath the
terms of Paragraph A-4.
Supplemental Appendix at 117-118.
O’Keefe contends paragraph C-4 prohibited the Government from advocating a
sentence based upon harm caused to senior citizens before he knew the scheme was
fraudulent. We disagree. Paragraph C-4 plainly refers to the maximum loss for which
O’Keefe’s offense level would be calculated pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines
§2B1.1(b). Under that provision, the $90,000 loss for which O’Keefe would be
responsible results in an eight-level increase in his offense level. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1(b)(E) (2006). This reading of paragraph C-4 is consistent
with the rest of the plea agreement and the parties’ statements before the District Court.
For instance, under paragraph B-3, the Government expressly reserved the right to
allocution on “the full extent and nature of” O’Keefe’s involvement in the fraud.
Although the Government conceded O’Keefe did not knowingly defraud senior citizens,
no provision of the plea agreement prevented the Government from explaining the overall
impact of his actions and his failure to alert authorities when he did become aware of the
nature of the scheme. We cannot reasonably infer such a specific prohibition from
paragraph C-4.
B.
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District judges must follow a three-step analysis in sentencing criminal defendants.
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). The district court must 1)
continue to calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as it would have before
United States v. Booker; 2) formally rule on the parties’ motions, stating on the record
whether it is granting a departure and how that departure affects the Guidelines
calculation; and 3) exercise its discretion by considering the relevant §3553(a) factors.
Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247. At step three, the sentencing record should demonstrate the court
considered the §3553(a) factors and any sentencing grounds properly raised by the parties
which have recognized legal merit and factual support in the record. Id.
First, O’Keefe contends he was entitled to a four-level decrease in his offense level
as a “minimal participant” in the fraud. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §3B1.2 provides for a
four-level decrease in the offense level of a “minimal participant” in any criminal activity
and a two-level decrease in the offense level of a “minor participant.” A “minimal
participant” is one who plays a minimal role in concerted activity and is “plainly among
the least culpable of those involved.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §3B1.2
cmt. n.4 (2006). This adjustment is to be applied infrequently. Id. A “minor participant” is
one who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role cannot be described
as minimal. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §3B1.2 cmt. n.5 (2006). The
District Court concluded he was a “minor participant” entitled only to a two-level
decrease.
In applying §3B1.2, the district court must weigh the totality of the particular
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circumstances in a defendant’s case, and is not required to grant an adjustment based
solely upon the defendant’s assertions. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §3B1.2
cmt. n.3(C) (2006). The district court’s inquiry involves weighing factors such the
defendant’s relationship to other participants, his knowledge of others’ activities, the
importance of his actions to the success of the venture, his economic interest in the
scheme and his physical participation. District courts exercise broad discretion in
applying §3B1.2 and their rulings are left largely undisturbed on appeal. United States v.
Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236,
238-39 (3d Cir. 1998).
Following the first sentencing hearing, the District Court noted O’Keefe
discovered the scheme was fraudulent and nonetheless failed to notify authorities and
collected $90,000 from Doris Gilbert. In addition, O’Keefe enjoyed an economic interest
in the scheme by retaining between five and ten percent of his collections for himself. The
District Court did not err by concluding O’Keefe was a minor, not minimal, participant in
the fraud.
Next, O’Keefe argues the District Court violated the Ex Post Facto clause when it
applied the 2003 Sentencing Guidelines Manual to reduce his offense level for his role in
the offense before it reduced his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Because
O’Keefe did not present this argument to the District Court, we review it for plain error.
United States v. Dyer, 325 F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir. 2003).
When O’Keefe committed his offense in 2001, the Sentencing Guidelines Manual
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Application Instructions simply listed the steps to be taken in calculating a sentence
sequentially, (a) through (i). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1B1.1 (2001). In
2003, the Sentencing Commission added text specifically directing district courts to make
adjustments sequentially, such that a district court adjusts an offense level for role in the
offense before it adjusts for the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1B1.1 (2003).
The District Court properly calculated the adjustments applicable to O’Keefe’s
offense. Generally, a district court should apply the Guidelines in effect at the time of
sentencing, unless doing so would expose the defendant to greater punishment than if he
were punished under the Guidelines in effect at the time he committed his crime. The
2003 amendment merely clarified the formulaic application of the Guidelines we directed
district courts to employ in previous cases. It did not alter “the definition of criminal
conduct or increase the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” California Dep’t of
Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995).
O’Keefe also challenges the District Court’s application of §2B1.1(b)(9)(B), which
requires a two-level enhancement where “a substantial part of a fraudulent scheme was
committed from outside the United States.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§2B1.1(b)(9)(B) (2006). O’Keefe argues the enhancement is inapplicable to his offense
because he was a resident of Canada at the time of his offense and did not know he was
involved in extracting money from persons in the United States. O’Keefe’s position lacks
merit. First, O’Keefe’s Canadian residence does not except him from the §2B1.1(b)(9)(B)
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enhancement’s coverage. Second, O’Keefe stipulated he “understood that Gerlach and
others acting with him expected to receive money sent by wire transfer from Americans”
and stated at his sentencing hearing that he “knew the money was coming from the United
States.” The District Court did not err when it applied the §2B1.1(b)(9)(B) enhancement.
C.
Next, O’Keefe argues the District Court failed to make findings regarding his
sentence objections as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B).
The District Court made the requisite Rule 32 findings during the first sentencing
proceedings, and reaffirmed those findings at the second sentencing hearing. At the
second hearing, the District Court stated, “[N]othing in my view has fundamentally
changed.” The District Court was under no obligation to reconsider and re-issue its initial
findings following our Booker remand.
D.
Finally, O’Keefe contends the District Court misapplied Booker when it accorded
the Sentencing Guidelines “great weight” and imposed an unreasonable sentence.
The Guidelines continue to carry considerable weight in the sentencing process.
See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, the District Court
properly recognized the “highly advisory” quality of the Guidelines, and gave meaningful
consideration to the relevant statutory factors and O’Keefe’s particular circumstances.
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006). The Guidelines range
applicable to O’Keefe was 10-16 months. O’Keefe’s sentence – five months in prison and
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five months of home detention – was entirely reasonable.
III.
We conclude the Government did not breach O’Keefe’s plea agreement and that
the District Court imposed a proper and reasonable sentence. We will affirm.
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