[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12714 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MAY 23, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
Agency No. A097-625-373
JORGE ALBERTO PINZON PULIDO,
MARIA FERNANDA PALAU ECHEVERRY,
lllllllllllllllllllll Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
lllllllllllllllllllll Respondents.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(May 23, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jorge Alberto Pinzon Pulido petitions for review of the BIA’s final order
affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum and
withholding of removal. First, he argues that the IJ incorrectly concluded that he
was not a member of a “particular social group.” Second, he argues that his right
to due process was violated by a delay of nearly six years between the date he filed
his application for asylum and the date of his asylum hearing.
I.
To establish asylum eligibility, an alien must show (1) past persecution or
(2) a “well-founded fear” of future persecution on account of “race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” INA §
101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d
1226, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). To qualify for withholding of
removal, an alien must show that if returned to his country, his life or freedom
would be threatened because of his “race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.” INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3). Because the evidentiary standard for withholding of removal is higher
than the “well-founded fear” standard for asylum, an applicant who does not meet
the latter generally fails the former. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262,
1292–93 (11th Cir. 2001).
Pinzon argues that he is eligible for asylum or withholding of removal
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because, as a volitional informant, he is a member of a particular social group. In
assessing whether the alien’s alleged group constitutes a particular social group,
we consider the group’s immutability and social visibility. Castillo-Arias v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1194, 1196–97 (11th Cir. 2006).
In Castillo-Arias, we upheld as reasonable the BIA’s determination that
“noncriminal informants working against the Cali drug cartel” do not constitute a
particular social group within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”). Id. at 1191. We upheld the BIA’s reasoning that while activity as an
informant is immutable to the extent that it is a historical fact, “the social visibility
of informants is different in kind from the particular social groups that have been
afforded protection under the INA” because “the very nature of the activity
prevents them from being recognized by society at large.” Id. at 1197.
Pinzon, like the appellant in Castillo-Arias, was a noncriminal informant
who worked against a Colombian drug cartel. He attempts to distinguish Castillo-
Arias because he was paid for his work and was an informant for several years.
But it is irrelevant that Pinzon was paid because “those who engage in risks
similar to those of the police or military, regardless of motive, do not receive
protection as a particular social group under the INA.” Id. at 1198 (emphasis
added). The BIA did not err when it found that “noncriminal informants” do not
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constitute a particular social group.1 Accordingly, we deny Pinzon’s petition as to
this claim.
II.
We review constitutional due process challenges de novo. Avila v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 560 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). To establish a due
process violation, Pinzon must show deprivation of a liberty interest without due
process of law. Id. He must also show that the deprivation substantially
prejudiced him by affecting the outcome of the proceedings. Id. It is
well-established that an alien has a due process right to a full and fair deportation
hearing. See Ibrahim v. U.S. I.N.S., 821 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987). As a
threshold matter, Pinzon’s due process claim has no merit because the government
is not statutorily (or otherwise) required to process asylum applications within a
specific time frame. Moreover, Pinzon does not offer examples of testimony or
evidence that he was unable to obtain because of the delay in his case. And
Pinzon never requested an earlier hearing date—instead, he requested more time to
prepare his case, which the IJ allowed. Accordingly, we deny Pinzon’s petition as
1
The Government argues that Pinzon has abandoned any challenge to the BIA’s
determination that Pinzon did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution because Pinzon did not raise these claims in his initial brief. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw.
Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining “a legal claim or argument that has
not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed”). We
do not address this argument because Pinzon’s claim fails on the merits.
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to his due process claim.2
PETITION DENIED.
2
Because Pinzon’s wife, Maria Fernanda Palau Echeverry, seeks derivative relief based on
Pinzon asylum application, we also affirm the denial of her petition.
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