[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-16282 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 8, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-60232-CR-WJZ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
AUDIE WATSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 8, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Audie Watson appeals his convictions and sentences for: conspiracy to
commit mail fraud and to encourage foreign nationals to remain in the United
States unlawfully, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; three counts of mail fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2; five counts of engaging in financial
transactions using criminally derived property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957
and 2; and one count of encouraging foreign nationals to unlawfully remain in the
United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i).
I.
First, Watson argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to
dismiss the superseding indictment based upon prosecutorial vindictiveness. We
review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment based upon
prosecutorial misconduct only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones,
601 F.3d 1247, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Barner, 441 F.3d
1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006)). We review de novo “the legal question of whether a
presumption of vindictiveness arises from the facts of the case.” Id.
“As a general rule, as long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe
the accused has committed a crime, the courts have no authority to interfere with a
prosecutor’s decision to prosecute.” Barner, 441 F.3d at 1315. Where a
presumption of vindictiveness does not apply, the defendant has the burden of
demonstrating actual vindictiveness. Id. at 1317, 1322. Furthermore, this Court
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recognizes a distinction between “instances in which the prosecutor substitutes a
more serious charge for the original charge and those in which new charges are
based on independent acts.” United States v. Jones, 601 F.3d 1247, 1261 n.5 (11th
Cir. 2010). When a prosecutor brings additional charges for independent acts, even
if they are part of “the same spree of activity,” a defendant must show proof of
actual vindictiveness. United States v. Taylor, 749 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir.1985)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the government obtained a superseding indictment against
Watson before trial and after Watson declined a plea offer. These facts, without
more, do not give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. As the Supreme Court
explained in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–65, 98 S.Ct. 663 (1978), a
prosecutor does not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights merely by obtaining
a superseding indictment after the defendant has rejected a plea offer. Moreover,
the additional charges contained in the superseding indictment were for
independent acts within the same spree of activity, and Watson has not presented
any evidence of actual vindictiveness. Because Watson failed to establish that the
prosecutor had a vindictive motive, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Watson’s motion to dismiss the superseding indictment.
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II.
Second, Watson contends that the district court should have suppressed
evidence seized during a search of his residence because the warrant authorizing
the search was not supported by probable cause. “In reviewing a district court’s
denial of a motion to suppress, this court examines the district court’s findings of
fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.” United
States v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936, 942 (11th Cir. 2009). “[P]robable cause to search a
residence exists when ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place.’” Id. at 942–43 (internal citations
omitted). An affidavit in support of a search warrant for a suspect’s residence
“should establish a connection between the defendant and the residence to be
searched and a link between the residence and any criminal activity.” United
States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002).
The search warrant for Watson’s residence was supported by probable cause.
The warrant affidavit explained that Watson sold memberships in the Pembina
Nation Little Shell Band (“Pembina Nation”) to unlawful aliens after falsely
representing that tribal membership would allow the aliens to reside and work in
the United States. Therefore, there was probable cause to believe that Watson had
committed criminal acts. The affadavit also established a connection between the
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defendant, his residence, and the suspected criminal activity. Watson and one of
his employees told undercover agents that all of the files related to his business,
Universal Service Dedicated to God, Inc., were located in Watson’s residence, and
Florida records listed Watson’s residence as the corporate address for Universal
Service. Because the search warrant for Watson’s residence was supported by
probable cause, the district court properly denied Watson’s motion to suppress.
III.
Next, Watson argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to
support his convictions, or, more specifically, that the government failed to prove
that he acted with criminal intent. “We review de novo whether sufficient evidence
supports a conviction, resolving all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict.”
United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010). “We will not
reverse unless no reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id.
When a criminal defendant testifies in his own defense, the jury is entitled to
reject the defendant’s testimony and to consider it as substantive evidence of his
guilt. United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995). “Where some
corroborative evidence of guilt exists for the charged offense (as is true in this
case) and the defendant takes the stand in [his] own defense, the Defendant’s
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testimony, denying guilt, may establish, by itself, elements of the offense. This rule
applies with special force where the elements to be proved for a conviction include
highly subjective elements: for example, the defendant’s intent or knowledge.”
United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that Watson acted with criminal intent, that he encouraged unlawful aliens to
remain in the United States, that he knew the money received by Universal Service
from its clients constituted criminally derived proceeds, and that he knowingly
engaged in a scheme to defraud using the United States mail system. Watson knew
that the Pembina Nation documents were routinely not accepted, which was
evidenced both by his letters to Immigration and Customs Enforcement
acknowledging that an 1863 treaty only applied to those who were then members
of the tribe and their lineal descendants, as well as the testimony of two of his
clients, illegal aliens named Lauriston and Demelus, who complained to Watson
that their documents were not accepted. Federal agents also testified that Watson
assisted an undercover agent in procuring Pembina Nation documents for workers
lacking “papers,” and that Watson admitted in an interview that the people he
sponsored for tribal membership were in the United States illegally. Watson told
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the illegal aliens who sought out his services that they would be able to live and
work lawfully in the United States if they joined the Pembina Nation, even though
he knew that the Pembina Nation documents were not recognized by the federal
government or many employers. Thus, a reasonable jury could have concluded that
Watson intentionally misled the clients of Universal Service when he told them
that adoption by the Pembina Nation would allow them to live and work in the
United States. Finally, the prosecution submitted evidence that Watson used the
mail system in furtherance of his scheme to defraud by mailing Universal Service
materials to clients and letters to ICE on behalf of clients. Accordingly, the
evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support all of Watson’s convictions.
IV.
Watson also contends that the district court erred by declining to give his
requested jury instructions. We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested
jury instruction only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Culver, 598 F.3d
740, 751 (11th Cir. 2010). A court abuses its discretion only if “(1) the requested
instruction was substantively correct, (2) the court’s charge to the jury did not
cover the gist of the instruction, and (3) the failure to give the instruction
substantially impaired the defendant’s ability to present an effective defense.” Id.
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give Watson’s
proposed instructions. Watson’s first proposed instruction concerning a tribe’s
ability to adopt new members was substantially covered by the court’s instruction
that a tribe has the right to determine its own membership, just as any other
corporation or association does. The district court also rejected Watson’s third
proposed instruction concerning the ability of a tribe to determine its own
substantive law. The court’s refusal to give either proposed instruction did not
impede Watson’s ability to present an effective defense because he was still able to
argue to the jury that he legitimately believed that he had the authority to solicit
new members on behalf of the Pembina Nation and that membership in the tribe
would allow unlawful aliens to reside and work in the United States.
V.
Watson also raises several challenges to his sentences.
A.
First, Watson contends that the district court violated Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738
(2005), by enhancing his sentence based upon facts not found by the jury. We
addressed a district court’s ability to make factual findings at sentencing in United
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States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005), noting that Booker does not
prohibit a district court from making extra-verdict factual findings at sentencing by
a preponderance of the evidence, provided that the court treats the resulting
guideline range as advisory. Id. at 1301. That decision and others foreclose
Watson’s arguments concerning Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.
B.
Next, Watson contends that the district court clearly erred by applying two
sentencing enhancements based on extra-verdict factual findings concering the
number of victims of his fraud scheme and the number of illegal aliens that he
harbored. We review a district court’s factual findings under the sentencing
guidelines only for clear error. United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d
1202, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 2010).
First, Watson challenges the district court’s sentencing enhancement for a
fraud offense involving 250 or more victims. Section 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) of the
sentencing guidelines states that a six-level sentencing enhancement should be
imposed if a defendant’s fraud offense involved 250 or more victims. A “victim”
under Section 2B1.1 is “any person who sustained any part of the actual loss”
attributable to the fraud. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1.
The evidence showed that Universal Service charged $1,500 for each person
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who completed a membership application and that Universal Service had earned
and deposited approximately $1,126,0781 based on the fees it had collected with
applications as part of the fraud scheme. Dividing that amount by $1,500 per client
yields a total of over 750 victims, a total that is well over the threshold. Federal
agents also recovered over 600 client files from Watson’s residence, most of which
contained information from applicants who were natives of South American
countries, and Watson admitted that he had sponsored over 2,000 illegal aliens for
membership in the Pembina Nation. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err
in finding that Watson perpetrated his fraud on 250 or more victims.
Watson also challenges the district court’s finding that his offense warranted
a sentencing enhancement because it involved the harboring of 100 or more
unlawful aliens. Section 2L1.1(b)(2)(C) of the sentencing guidlines provides that a
defendant’s base offense level should be increased by nine levels if the offense
involved the smuggling, transporting, or harboring of 100 or more unlawful aliens.
The district court did not clearly err by concluding that Watson harbored
over 100 unlawful aliens based on his own testimony that he sponsored over 2,000
unlawful aliens for membership in the Pembina Nation, thereby encouraging them
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Watson takes issue with calculating the number of victims based on the total amount of
money earned by Universal Service because there was evidence that he issued refunds to some
of his clients. However, the $1,126,078 figure is the amount of the deposits into the two accounts
belonging to Universal Service minus any identifiable refunds.
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to reside in the United States when he knew that their adoption by the Pembina
Nation would not affect their status as unlawful aliens. The district court’s
conclusion was further supported by both the calculation that the fraud involved
well over 250 victims and the fact that agents found over 600 client files in
Watson’s residence, most of which were from applicants originating from South
American countries.
C.
Watson also argues that his sentences are procedurally unreasonable because
the district court did not adequately consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors or
explain why it rejected his arguments for a downward variance. When reviewing
sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion, we utilize a two-step process. “First,
we review to ‘ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.’” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007)). The
district court need not specifically discuss each § 3553(a) factor, provided that the
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court acknowledges that it considered all of the factors. United States v. Talley,
431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005).
If the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, we move on
to the second step where we must determine whether the sentence is substantively
reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128
S.Ct. at 597. The district court’s sentencing decision will be set aside only if we
determine, “after giving a full measure of deference to the sentencing judge, that
the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable.” United States v. Irey, 2010 WL
2949465, at *26 (11th Cir. 2010). “Although we do not automatically presume a
sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable, we ‘ordinarily . . . expect a
sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.’” United States v. Hunt, 526
F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Talley, 431 F.3d at 788)).
Here, the district court did not commit any procedural errors in sentencing
Watson. The district court was not required to specifically respond to Watson’s
arguments for a downward variance, and the court indicated that it had considered
the parties’ arguments as well as the § 3553(a) factors in determining an
appropriate sentence. The court explained that a sentence at the low end of the
guideline range was sufficient to provide adequate punishment and to deter future
criminal conduct. The court’s explanation showed that it considered Watson’s
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arguments and the statutory factors, and that the court had a reasoned basis for the
sentence it elected to impose.
D.
Finally, Watson asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
Since Watson’s total sentence is at the low end of his advisory guideline range and
well below the statutory maximum, we ordinarily expect it to be reasonable, and
there is no evidence to suggest that the sentence “truly is unreasonable.” Irey,
2010 WL 2949465, at *26. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by sentencing Watson to a total term of 168 months imprisonment.
AFFIRMED.
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