NUMBER 13-12-00401-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
GUADALUPE CORTEZ, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 148th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
By two issues, Guadalupe Cortez appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his
deferred adjudication community supervision, adjudging him guilty, and imposing a two
year prison sentence for the second degree felony offense of possession of four grams
or more but less than two hundred grams of cocaine. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 481.102(3)(d) (West 2010) (“Penalty Group 1 [includes] . . . [c]ocaine . . . .”); id. §
481.115(d) (West 2010) (“Possession of [a] [s]ubstance in Penalty Group 1 . . . is a felony
of the second degree if the amount of the controlled substance possessed is, by
aggregate weight, including adulterants or dilutants, four grams or more but less than 200
grams.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.33(a) (West 2011) (“An individual adjudged guilty
of a felony of the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2
years.”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West Supp. 2013) (“The
determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge is reviewable
in the same manner as a revocation hearing conducted under Section 21 in a case in
which an adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.”). For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In his first issue, Cortez contends that the evidence presented by the State at the
hearing on the State’s motion to revoke was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding
that he violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the new offenses
of unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of a controlled substance (namely,
cocaine) within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone with intent to deliver. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 46.04 (West 2011) (“Unlawful Possession of Firearm”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 481.112 (West 2010) (“Offense: Manufacture or Delivery of Substance in
Penalty Group 1”); id. § 481.134 (West Supp. 2013) (“Drug-Free Zones”). The State
alleged, and the trial court found to be “true,” fourteen different violations. Cortez pled
“true” to twelve of the fourteen violations, including failure to pay various fees, failure to
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report any change of residence, job, or job status, failure to attend “felony victim impact
panel,” failure to participate in the “specialized caseload for substance abuse program”
by failing to report in March, April, May, June, and July 2011, failure to attend “Coastal
Bend Outpatient Program,” and failure to complete 45.75 of 120 hours of community
service restitution. On appeal, Cortez has not challenged the trial court’s finding that he
committed the twelve violations to which he pled “true.” See Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d
469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (“Appellant’s plea of true, standing alone is sufficient to
support the revocation of probation.”). Since “proof of a single violation will support
revocation,” Cortez cannot establish reversible error by demonstrating that the evidence
is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding with respect to the two new offense
violations involving unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Accordingly,
Cortez’s first issue is overruled.
In his second issue, Cortez contends for the first time on appeal that the trial court
violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution by imposing a sentence that was disproportionate to the seriousness of the
alleged offense. See U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV. Cortez’s failure to specifically object
to an alleged disproportionate or cruel and unusual sentence in the trial court or in a post-
trial motion waived any error for the purposes of appellate review. See Rhoades v. State,
934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“Since, appellant is raising this argument
for the first time on appeal, any error is waived.”); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n order to preserve for appellate
review a complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and
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unusual punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request,
objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.”). Accordingly,
Cortez’s second issue is overruled.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
27th day of March, 2014.
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