Guadalupe Cortez v. State

NUMBER 13-12-00400-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG GUADALUPE CORTEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. On appeal from the 148th District Court of Nueces County, Texas. MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez, and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria By two issues, Guadalupe Cortez appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his deferred adjudication community supervision, adjudging him guilty, and imposing a two year jail sentence for the state jail felony offense of possession of less than one gram of cocaine. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.102(3)(d) (West 2010) (“Penalty Group 1 [includes] . . . [c]ocaine . . . .”); id. § 481.115(b) (West 2010) (“Possession of [a] [s]ubstance in Penalty Group 1 . . . is a state jail felony if the amount of the controlled substance possessed is by aggregate weight, including adulterants or dilutants, less than one gram.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.35(a) (West Supp. 2013) (“Except as provided by Subsection (c), an individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony shall be punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or less than 180 days.”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West Supp. 2013) (“The determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation hearing conducted under Section 21 in a case in which an adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. In his first issue, Cortez contends that the evidence presented by the State at the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the new offenses of unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of a controlled substance (namely, cocaine) within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone with intent to deliver. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04 (West 2011) (“Unlawful Possession of Firearm”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112 (West 2011) (“Offense: Manufacture or Delivery of Substance in Penalty Group 1”); id. § 481.134 (West Supp. 2013) (“Drug-Free Zones”). The State alleged, and the trial court found to be “true,” fourteen different violations. Cortez pled “true” to twelve of the fourteen violations, including failure to pay various fees, failure to report any change of residence, failure to attend “felony victim impact panel,” failure to 2 participate in the “specialized caseload for substance abuse program” by failing to report in March, April, May, June, and July 2011, failure to attend “Coastal Bend Outpatient Program,” and failure to complete 45.75 of 120 hours of community service restitution. On appeal, Cortez has not challenged the trial court’s finding that he committed the twelve violations to which he pled “true.” See Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (“Appellant’s plea of true, standing alone is sufficient to support the revocation of probation.”). Since “proof of a single violation will support revocation,” Cortez cannot establish reversible error by demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding with respect to the two new offense violations involving unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Accordingly, Cortez’s first issue is overruled. In his second issue, Cortez contends for the first time on appeal that the trial court violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by imposing a sentence that was disproportionate to the seriousness of the alleged offense. See U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV. Cortez’s failure to specifically object to an alleged disproportionate or cruel and unusual sentence in the trial court or in a post- trial motion waived any error for the purposes of appellate review. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“Since, appellant is raising this argument for the first time on appeal, any error is waived.”); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n order to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, 3 objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.”). Accordingly, Cortez’s second issue is overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. NORA L. LONGORIA Justice Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 27th day of March, 2014. 4