COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00347-CR
GEREMIE GERMAINE JONES APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. Introduction
In one issue, Appellant Geremie Germaine Jones appeals his sentence for
aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, claiming that forty-five years’
confinement is an excessive and disproportionate punishment. We affirm.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
In October 2010, at around 3:00 a.m., Jones went to a Waffle House,
pulled out a gun, pointed it at a waitress, Wanda McDaniel, and demanded that
she give him all of the money in the cash register. McDaniel gave Jones the
money, and he left the restaurant. James Smith, one of the cooks, dialed 911
and then followed Jones and confronted him. Jones pointed his gun at Smith
and said, “I’ll shoot you. Don’t you follow me. I’ll shoot you.” Shortly thereafter,
the police apprehended Jones.
After Jones pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon,
McDaniel testified during the punishment phase that she feared for her life during
the robbery, and the trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 24, the Waffle House
surveillance video of the incident, and allowed the State to publish it to the jury.
The State also introduced evidence to show that Jones had a gang affiliation;
had been classified in the county jail as a high-risk offender; had been involved in
a physical altercation with a deputy while in jail, which had been videotaped and
which was published to the jury; had threatened three deputies; and had been
arrested for public intoxication, possession of crack cocaine, theft, and
possession of a knife. Jones stipulated to his prior convictions for possession of
a prohibited weapon, possession of a controlled substance of less than one
gram, criminal trespass, assault causing bodily injury, and theft.
During Jones’s case-in-chief, Dr. Mansoor Mian, a psychiatrist with Tarrant
County Mental Health and Mental Retardation, testified that Jones had attempted
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suicide several times; suffered from emotional turmoil due to family problems;
suffered from depression, irritability, anger, and impulsive behavior; heard voices;
had been prescribed various anti-depressants and anti-psychotic drugs; had
been treated in more than one state mental hospital; and could be helped with
proper care. During the State’s cross-examination, Dr. Mian agreed that Jones’s
mental health records showed that one of his treating physicians had ruled out
bipolar disorder and showed that Jones had a history of abusing alcohol,
cocaine, and marijuana. On redirect, he noted that other portions of his medical
records indicated that Jones had been diagnosed as bipolar.
Jones testified that he was not a bad guy but that he had done some bad
things. Jones gave his childhood history of foster care, described hearing voices,
and said that he could accept the consequences of his actions. He also testified
that he had taken the gun from a family member; that he did not know whether
the gun was loaded; that he was high at the time of the incident; and that the
voices, brought on by drugs, told him to do it. Jones admitted to using crack
cocaine while awaiting his trial, with his most recent use being a week before
trial. He also admitted that he paid for crack cocaine with his disability check and
that he had threatened the deputies while he was incarcerated. However, he
denied having a gang affiliation.
Jones’s older brother testified that Jones had acted “crazy” since age four
and that Jones’s father had been paranoid schizophrenic. Jones’s mother
testified that all five of her children had been removed from her because of her
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drug use and neglect of them, that she used drugs while pregnant with all of her
children, and that she stopped using drugs after going through rehabilitation
while incarcerated. She acknowledged that of all five children, Jones was her
only adult child committing aggravated robbery.
The jury found Jones guilty of aggravated robbery as instructed by the trial
court and then assessed his punishment at forty-five years’ confinement. This
appeal followed.
III. Preservation of Error
In his sole issue, Jones argues that his sentence is excessive and
disproportionate to the actions for which he was convicted and to his past record
and future prospects for rehabilitation. Specifically, Jones complains that, in light
of the mitigation evidence that he presented, the punishment is disproportionate
for the offense and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by
the United States and Texas Constitutions. However, Jones did not object to his
sentence when it was imposed, and although he timely filed his motion for new
trial complaining of excessive and disproportionate punishment, the record does
not show that he presented this motion to the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P.
21.6, 33.1(a)(2); see also Means v. State, 347 S.W.3d 873, 874 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2011, no pet.) (“Because Appellant did not object to his sentences when
they were imposed or present his motions for new trial to the trial court, he failed
to preserve his sentencing complaints for appellate review.”); Laboriel-Guity v.
State, 336 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d) (same).
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Because Jones failed to preserve his sentencing complaint for our review, we
overrule his sole issue.2
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Jones’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MCCOY, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: July 19, 2012
2
Even if Jones had preserved this complaint, however, punishment
imposed within statutory limits, as here, is generally not subject to a challenge for
excessiveness. See Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475–76 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (stating that subject only to a very limited, “exceedingly
rare,” and somewhat amorphous Eighth Amendment gross-disproportionality
review, a punishment that falls within the legislatively prescribed range, and that
is based upon the sentencer’s informed normative judgment, is unassailable on
appeal); see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 29.03(b) (West 2011) (stating
that the sentencing range for a first-degree felony such as aggravated robbery
with a deadly weapon is imprisonment for life or for any term not more than
ninety-nine years or less than five years, as well as a fine not to exceed
$10,000).
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