Opinion issued March 7, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-12-00848-CV
———————————
THE CITY OF TEXAS CITY, Appellant
V.
EDITH SUAREZ, INDIVIUALLY AND AS SURVIVING PARENT OF AS
AND SS, DECEASED, AND AS SURVIVING SPOUSE OF HECTOR
SUAREZ, DECEASED, Appellee
On Appeal from the 212th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 11CV1108
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case arises from a sad and tragic event: the drowning deaths of nine-
year-old twin girls, AS and SS, and their father, Hector Suarez. The drownings
occurred in Galveston Bay at a recreational area located on a dike owned and
operated by the City of Texas City. Edith Suarez, the twins’ mother and Hector’s
wife, filed suit against the City asserting wrongful death and survival claims. She
alleges that the City was negligent and grossly negligent in failing to warn of
certain premises hazards that she claims led to the deaths of her daughters and
husband.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting that Suarez’s claims should
be dismissed because they are barred by governmental immunity. The trial court
denied the plea, and the City filed this interlocutory appeal. 1 The City presents one
issue challenging the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction.
We reverse the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction
and render judgment dismissing Suarez’s claims.
Background Summary
The Texas City Dike is a five-mile-long manmade structure surrounded on
three sides by the waters of Galveston Bay. The United States Corp of Engineers
constructed the Dike in 1915 to protect the Texas City ship channel from siltation.
Through the passage of special legislation, the State of Texas conveyed title of the
1
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon 2012)
(permitting interlocutory appeal from an order that “grants or denies a plea to the
jurisdiction by a governmental unit”).
2
Dike to the City of Texas City in 1931. The legislation required that the Dike be
used only for public purposes.2
In 1963, the legislature permitted the Dike to be used for recreational
purposes. Visitors to the Dike engage in activities such as boating, fishing,
picnicking, and swimming. An asphalt road runs the length of the Dike. The Dike
also has boat ramps, parking areas, and concrete picnic shelters. The Dike is
owned, maintained, and operated by the City of Texas City.
The Corp of Engineers also uses a designated area on the north side of the
Dike as a place to dispose of the sediment or “spoil” that it dredges from the ship
channel. This designated spoil area has over time developed into a man-made
beach.
The Dike was heavily damaged during Hurricane Ike in September 2008.
Relevant to this case, signs that had been posted on the Dike were destroyed during
the hurricane. Among those signs were postings warning visitors to beware of
water hazards such as undertow, rip currents, wakes from passing ships, and sink
holes. Signs also warned that no lifeguards were on duty and that persons should
swim in designated areas only.
For nearly two years after the hurricane, the Dike remained closed to the
public. During this period, the City made repairs and improvements to the Dike.
2
See Act “Granting Dike” to City of Texas City, 42nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 54, 1931 Tex.
Spec. Laws 134.
3
During the repair process, the City did not replace all of the signs that had, before
the hurricane, warned of water hazards. The City, however, did erect signs at two
of the Dike’s boat ramps warning of such hazards. These signs read in English and
in Spanish: “Warning! No Swimming-Diving.” The signs also caution in English:
“Beware [of] Undertow and Wake from Passing Ships.”
On September 10, 2010, the City reopened the Dike to the public for
recreational use. After the reopening, the City began charging a $5 per vehicle fee
on weekends for non-residents to enter the Dike. The City’s residents, pedestrians,
cyclists, and anyone entering during the week are not charged a fee. The $5 entry
fee is used for trash collection and maintenance of the Dike.
On Sunday, October 3, 2010, the Suarez family, including Edith Suarez, her
husband, Hector, and their nine-year-old twin daughters, AS and SS, went to the
Dike to attend a family gathering. After paying the $5 entry fee, the family parked
their car near one of the concrete picnic shelters adjacent to the man-made beach
area on the Dike’s north side.
The twin girls immediately entered the water from the beach. Antonio
Esquivel, who had also arrived at the beach for the family gathering, later testified
in an affidavit as follows:
While the vehicles were being parked, [AS] and [SS] in their street
clothes began playing in the beach water. It was about 9:45 a.m. The
depth of the water was at about their knees. I saw both girls
struggling against the water. It appeared that they were about 10 feet
4
or so from the beach. I saw Hector running toward the water. I ran to
the water. After entering the water, I could feel the pull of the
current.· I could see Hector and [AS] in the water and tried to swim
out to them. I saw [AS] and Hector floating on their backs about 20
feet away. Because of the force of the current, [another man] who
also tried to assist and I had to help each other back to the beach.
AS, SS, and their father, Hector, drowned. Edith Suarez (“Suarez”) filed a
wrongful death and survival suit against the City. In her petition, Suarez alleged
negligence claims based on special defect and premises defect. She also identified
claims for gross negligence and attractive nuisance. Suarez alleged, inter alia, that
the City was aware of hidden dangers existing in the water at the beach where her
family drowned; namely, she alleged that the City knew of the strong currents and
an unstable submerged beach surface. She asserted that the City had been
negligent in permitting swimming at the beach and in failing to warn about the
dangerous conditions associated with entering the water at that location.
Suarez alleged that the City had actual knowledge of the dangerous
conditions because it had erected signs prohibiting swimming in certain areas on
the Dike. The signs warned of undertows and deep holes. Suarez averred that the
signage had been put up by the City “[b]ecause the area had been the subject of
other drownings and swimming incidents.” She pointed out that these signs had
been destroyed by Hurricane Ike. She further pointed out that, when it made
repairs to the Dike, the City had not placed a warning sign at the beach where her
family drowned.
5
Suarez asserted that the legislature had waived the City’s governmental
immunity in the Texas Wrongful Death Statute. Suarez alternatively alleged that
the suit was permitted under the Texas Tort Claims Act and the Recreational Use
Statute.
The City answered Suarez’s suit. In its answer, the City raised a plea to the
jurisdiction asserting that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because
the City’s immunity from suit had not been waived. The City later filed a
supplemental plea to the jurisdiction. The City argued that the Wrongful Death
Statute does not waive its immunity. It also asserted that its immunity had not
been waived under the Tort Claims Act. The City also argued that the Recreational
Use Statute limited the duty of care the City owed to the Suarez family to the duty
owed to a trespasser. The City asserted that Suarez had not pled sufficient
jurisdictional facts, and it challenged the underlying jurisdictional facts.
In support of its plea, the City offered the affidavit of its Director of Public
Works, Tom Kessler. Appended to Kessler’s affidavit are photographs of the signs
installed by the City at three different boat ramps on the Dike. The photos depict
the signs installed at the boat ramps as they appeared before the hurricane and after
the hurricane. The signs show that, after the hurricane, the City replaced signs at
two separate boat ramps warning people not to swim and informing them to
beware of undertow and wakes from passing ships.
6
Suarez filed a response to the supplemental plea. In support of her response,
Suarez offered the deposition testimony of the City’s mayor, Matthew Doyle, and
the deposition testimony of Tom Kessler. Suarez also offered the affidavit of a
coastal engineering expert, William Worsham.
Suarez discussed Worsham’s testimony as follows:
[Worsham] conducted a study of the incident forming the basis of this
lawsuit with the intent to characterize natural and man-made forces
that were potentially involved. Mr. Worsham reached several highly
pertinent conclusions, including the following:
• The Texas City dike is a man-made feature.
• The recreational beach upon which the subject incident occurred is a
manmade feature placed adjacent to the dike.
• The material placed adjacent to the dike to form the beach was
dredged from an adjacent navigation channel and included fine-
grained sediment that had the effect of making the submerged beach
surface noticeably slippery when standing in the water.
• The presence of tidal currents and wind-generated waves interacting
with the manmade beach on the morning of October 3, 2010, caused
water motion adjacent to the beach shoreline of a magnitude sufficient
to cause beachgoers standing in shallow water to lose their footing.
• The cuspate or scalloped surface of the subject beach is
characteristic of a beach that can generate seaward-moving water
motion known as rip currents when waves interact with the cuspate
surface.
• The dike and manmade beach interacted with the waves and tidal
currents naturally present to cause energetic breaking waves and
stronger currents, each of which·was highly variable in strength and
direction.
7
• The breaking waves produced by this interaction were sufficient to
cause young persons and adults to lose balance. The likelihood of
losing balance increased rapidly in the surf zone, such that even water
depths of less than two feet were capable of causing loss of balance.
• The conditions found on the particular beach in question are unique
in the upper Texas coastal region and do not exist naturally anywhere
in Texas.
Suarez asserted that Worsham’s testimony “contradicts the City’s contention
that the wave forces and current forces that contributed to the drownings . . . were
entirely natural phenomena.” Suarez continued,
It is not simply the risk of drowning in any body of water that lies at
the heart of Suarez’s allegations. It is the risk of drowning in this
particular body of water at this particular beach that was created under
the authority of the City of Texas City; was owned, operated, and
managed by the City of Texas City; and where rip currents and a
“perfect storm” of man-made and natural forces converged in a way
that does not occur anywhere else on the Texas Gulf Coast.
Suarez asserted that the City had an actual awareness of the hazards existing
at the beach area. Suarez pointed to Mayor Doyle’s testimony indicating an
awareness by the City that people swam “all around” the Dike. She also pointed to
the mayor’s testimony in which he stated that the signs at the boat ramps
cautioning people not to swim were intended to warn people not to swim anywhere
on the Dike; the warnings were not intended to be limited to the boat ramp areas.
Suarez further asserted as follows in her response:
The presence of signs in some locations and not others is an
indication that the City was aware of the danger of rip currents. The
City’s failure to replace warning signs [after the hurricane] is evidence
8
of its indifference to that danger and, in particular, to the danger it
posed to beach users. While Mayor Doyle points to signs warning
users of the Dike’s boat ramps of undertows and rip currents, the City
afforded no such warning to swimmers, the Dike’s most vulnerable
users.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction
and its motion for summary judgment. This interlocutory appeal followed. The
City raises one issue asserting that the trial court erred by denying its plea to the
jurisdiction.
Plea to the Jurisdiction
A. Standard and Scope of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction seeks to dismiss a case for want of jurisdiction.
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004).
When reviewing whether a plea was properly granted, we first look to the
pleadings to determine if jurisdiction is proper, construing them liberally in favor
of the plaintiffs and looking to the pleader’s intent. Id. at 226. The allegations
found in the pleadings may either affirmatively demonstrate or negate the court’s
jurisdiction. Id. at 226–27. If the pleadings do neither, it is an issue of pleading
sufficiency and the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend the
pleadings. Id. “However, if a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of
jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when
necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised,” even when those facts may
9
implicate the merits of the cause of action. Id. at 227. If that evidence creates a
fact issue as to the jurisdictional issue, then it is for the fact-finder to decide. Id. at
227–28. “However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact
question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the
jurisdiction as a matter of law.” Id. at 228. In considering this evidence, we “take
as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant” and “indulge every reasonable
inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” Id.
B. Texas Wrongful Death Statute
Generally, the doctrine of governmental immunity protects political
subdivisions, such as cities, from suit and liability. See Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136
S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d
692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003). Immunity from suit, as distinguished from immunity
from liability, deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction unless the
government has consented to being sued. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224; Tex. Dep’t
of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). The governmental entity’s
consent to suit allows the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over the lawsuit.
Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638. A plaintiff bears the burden to affirmatively demonstrate a
trial court’s jurisdiction by alleging a valid waiver of immunity, which may be
either a reference to a statute or to express legislative permission. Id.
10
Suarez alleged in her petition that the Wrongful Death Statute waives the
City’s immunity. Section 71.002(b) of the statute provides, “A person is liable for
damages arising from an injury that causes an individual’s death if the injury was
caused by the person’s or his agent’s or servant’s wrongful act, neglect,
carelessness, unskillfulness, or default.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.002(b) (Vernon 2008). The statute defines “person” to mean “an individual,
association of individuals, joint-stock company, or corporation or a trustee or
receiver of an individual, association of individuals, joint-stock company, or
corporation.” Id. § 71.001(2) (Vernon 2008). The statute further defines
“corporation” to include a municipal corporation; that is, a city. Id. § 71.001(1).
Applying these definitions, Suarez contends that the statute waives the City’s
immunity from suit because it provides that a city may be held liable for wrongful
death damages.
To waive immunity, the statute at issue must contain a clear and
unambiguous expression of waiver. Rolling Plains Groundwater Conservation
Dist. v. City of Aspermont, 353 S.W.3d 756, 759 (Tex. 2011) (citing TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 311.034; Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 696). As pointed out by the City, the
Wrongful Death Statute expressly states that it applies only if the individual
injured would have been entitled to bring an action for the injury if the individual
had lived. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.003(a) (Vernon 2008).
11
Here, AS, SS, and Hector Suarez would not have been entitled to bring an action
against the City unless they first showed that the City’s immunity from suit had
been waived. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224.
Moreover, the Wrongful Death Statute can be reasonably construed as
consistent with governmental immunity. The statute applies to private individuals
and entities and municipal corporations alike; thus, the statute is not without
meaning when construed against an asserted waiver of immunity. See Rolling
Plains Groundwater, 353 S.W.3d at 759; cf. Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, 28
S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2000) (holding that the anti-retaliation statute had no meaning
absent waiver of sovereign immunity). Even if the statute’s definitions of “person”
and “corporation” created an ambiguity, we must construe ambiguities in a manner
that retains immunity. Rolling Plains Groundwater, 353 S.W.3d at 759. We hold
that the Wrongful Death Statute does not waive the City’s immunity from suit.
C. Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions
In her response to the City’s jurisdictional plea, Suarez asserted that a fact
issue exists with respect to whether the City is immune from suit because its
conduct of operating and managing the Dike is a proprietary function rather than a
governmental one, as the City argues.
The Texas Constitution authorizes the Texas Legislature to “define for all
purposes those functions of a municipality that are to be considered governmental
12
and those that are proprietary . . . .” TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 13; see Tooke v. City of
Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. 2006). A municipality engaged in a function
defined by the legislature as governmental is entitled to governmental immunity
absent a legislative waiver of immunity. Hudson v. City of Houston, No. 01–07–
00939–CV, 2011 WL 1376168, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 13,
2011, pet. denied); see Tooke, 197 S.W.at 343.
In contrast, governmental immunity does not protect a city from suit when
the claim arises from the performance of a proprietary function. See Dilley v. City
of Houston, 222 S.W.2d 992, 993 (Tex. 1949); see also Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 343.
As a result, a city is liable to the same extent as a private party if it is negligent
while engaged in the performance of a proprietary function. Gates v. City of
Dallas, 704 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. 1986); Hudson, 2011 WL 1376168, at *5.
In the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”), the legislature has described
governmental functions as “those functions that are enjoined on a municipality by
law and are given it by the state as part of the state’s sovereignty, to be exercised
by the municipality in the interest of the general public.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a) (Vernon 2011). On the other hand, the legislature has
defined a proprietary act as an act performed by a municipality in its discretion,
primarily for the benefit of those within its corporate limits rather than for the
general public. Id. § 101.0215(b).
13
In TTCA section 101.0215, the legislature provides a nonexclusive list of 39
municipal functions, classifying each function as either governmental or
proprietary. See id. § 101.0215(a)–(b). Among the designated governmental
functions, the legislature listed “parks and zoos” and “recreational facilities,
including but not limited to swimming pools, beaches, and marinas.” Id.
§ 101.0215(a)(13), (23). As interpreted by Texas courts and the legislature, the
terms “parks” and “recreation” have broad meanings. City of Plano v. Homoky,
294 S.W.3d 809, 814 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (citing Lewis v. City of
Fort Worth, 89 S.W.2d 975, 978 (Tex. 1936)). A municipal park has been defined
as “‘a place where the public generally may go for various kinds of recreation and
amusement.’” Id. (quoting Lewis, 89 S.W.2d at 978). Parks are also tracts of land
“‘ornamented and improved as a place of resort for the public, for recreation and
amusement of the public.’” Id. (quoting King v. City of Dallas, 374 S.W.2d 707,
710 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). “Recreational parks are
governmental in design because their purpose is to promote and benefit the ‘health
and pleasure of the people at large.’” Id. (quoting Wiggins v. City of Fort Worth,
299 S.W. 468, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1927), aff’d, 5 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.
Comm’n App. 1928)). By analogy, the legislature in the Recreational Use Statute
has broadly defined “recreation” to include swimming, boating, picnicking, and
14
“any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors.” TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.001(3)(C), (D), (F), (L) (Vernon 2011).
It is not in dispute that the Dike is a place where the public at large goes to
enjoy a variety of recreational activities, such as swimming, boating, and
picnicking. In other words, the Dike serves the same purposes as described in the
broad interpretation that the law has given “parks” and “recreational facilities.”
See Homoky, 294 S.W.3d at 814 (holding that operation of a golf course is
encompassed within the governmental functions listed in the TTCA). In addition,
Suarez’s claims center on her allegation that the City negligently managed the
beach area where her family drowned. The legislature expressly mentions
“beaches” as a specific example of a recreational facility. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a)(23). Given the broad interpretations afforded “parks”
and “recreational facilities,” we conclude that the governmental functions listed in
the TTCA encompass the City’s operation and management of the Dike. See
Homoky, 294 S.W.3d at 814–15.
Nonetheless, Suarez contends that evidence indicates that the City’s
operation of the Dike is not a governmental function because such operation is
more akin to an “amusement,” which the legislature lists as a proprietary function.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(b)(2). Suarez points to Mayor
Doyle’s testimony that the Dike is operated for the benefit of the City’s residents.
15
Suarez also points out that City charges non-residents $5 to enter the Dike. She
asserts that these payments benefit the City and its citizens. When read in context,
however, the evidence shows that the entry fees are used by the City for trash
pickup and maintenance of the Dike. Thus, the evidence indicates that the entry
fee benefits all who use the Dike, not just the City’s residents.
In any event, if a City’s actions are included as a governmental function in
the TTCA, we have no discretion, regardless of the City’s motives, to declare the
actions as proprietary. Homoky, 294 S.W.3d at 814; Tex. River Barges v. City of
San Antonio, 21 S.W.3d 347, 357 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied); see
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(c) (providing that “the proprietary
functions of a municipality do not include those governmental activities listed
under Subsection (a)”).
Having concluded that the City’s management of the Dike falls within the
classification of governmental functions listed by the legislature in the TTCA, we
are precluded from holding that any of the activities related to the management of
Dike are proprietary. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(c); see
also City of San Antonio v. Polanco & Co., L.L.C., No. 04–07–00258–CV, 2007
WL 3171360, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 31, 2007, pet. denied) (mem.
op.); City of Weslaco v. Borne, 210 S.W.3d 782, 792–93 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2006, pet. denied). Because the City was engaged in a statutorily defined
16
governmental function, the City’s immunity from suit is retained, unless it has
otherwise been waived by the legislature.
D. Tort Claims Act and Recreational Use Statute
The legislature has provided a limited waiver of governmental immunity
from suit for certain tort claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021, 101.025 (Vernon 2011). The TTCA
includes, among other things, a limited waiver of the state’s immunity from suits
alleging personal injury or death caused by premises defects.3 Id. §§ 101.021(2),
101.022. Here, Suarez’s petition raised allegations of premises defect.4 See State
3
Suarez also alleged in her petition that her claim, in part, arose from a special
defect in addition to a premises defect. A special defect is a subset of a premises defect.
See Davis v. Comal Cnty. Com’rs Court, No. 03–11–00414–CV, 2012 WL 2989220, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Austin July 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Under Texas law, whether a
complained-of condition is classified as a premise defect or a special defect controls the
entrant’s status, which in turn determines the duty of care owed to the entrant by the
governmental unit. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022; City of Dallas v.
Reed, 258 S.W.3d 620, 622 (Tex. 2008).
4
Suarez also alleges claims of general negligence and attractive nuisance in her
petition. A plaintiff asserting a premises defect claim is limited to the TTCA provisions
delineated by the section on premises defects and may not assert a general negligence
theory. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 233 (Tex.
2004). We further note that the Tort Claims Act expressly excludes attractive nuisance
as a basis for waiver of sovereign immunity. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.059 (Vernon 2011). In addition, Suarez alleges that the City’s immunity is waived
based on its failure to replace certain warning signs after the hurricane. She alleged that
this constituted a use of tangible personal property sufficient to waive immunity under
TTCA section 101.021(2). That section provides, in part, that a governmental unit is
liable for personal injury or death caused by the use of tangible personal property. Id.
§ 101.021(2) (Vernon 2011). The Supreme Court of Texas has recently reiterated, “It is
well settled that mere nonuse of property does not suffice to invoke section 101.021(2)’s
17
v. Schumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tex. 2006) (citing TTCA provision waiving
sovereign immunity for premises defect claim in case involving drowning death of
child swimming in a state park river who was sucked underwater by a powerful
undertow and trapped in man-made culvert); see also City of Weston v. Gaudette,
287 S.W.3d 832, 836 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (defining premises defect
as a defect or dangerous condition arising from a condition of the premises).
The type of duty owed to a plaintiff is part of the waiver analysis. City of
Dallas v. Hughes, 344 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citing
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021, 101.022). In premises-defect
cases, the governmental unit owes “only the duty that a private person owes to a
licensee on private property, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises”
in which case the duty owed is that owed to an invitee. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 101.022(a); see City of Irving v. Seppy, 301 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.); Garcia v. State, 817 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
The TTCA further modifies a governmental unit’s waiver of immunity from
suit by imposing the liability limitations prescribed in the Recreational Use Statute.
waiver.” City of N. Richland Hills v. Friend, 370 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Tex. 2012). Here,
Suarez’s allegation that the City failed to replace certain warning signs does not allege a
use of tangible property but is an allegation of non-use of such property. Accordingly, it
does not fall within the waiver of immunity defined in section 101.021(2). See id. at
372–73.
18
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.058). The Recreational Use Statute limits the governmental unit’s liability
as a premises owner when the plaintiff engages in recreation on the premises. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 75.001–.003 (Vernon 2011 & Supp. 2012);
Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn, 228 S.W.3d 653, 659–60 (Tex. 2007). In
such a case, chapter 75 controls over the TTCA. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 75.003(g) (providing that chapter 75 controls over chapter 101 to extent
chapter 75 limits liability of governmental unit under circumstances in which
governmental unit would be liable under chapter 101); id. § 101.058 (Vernon
2011) (providing same). When injury or death results on government-owned,
recreational land, the Recreational Use Statute limits the governmental unit’s duty
to that owed by a landowner to a trespasser. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 75.002(c)(2), (f) (defining duty as that owed to trespasser); see Schumake, 199
S.W.3d at 283. Thus, when applicable, the Recreational Use Statute elevates the
plaintiff’s burden to require a showing of gross negligence, malicious intent, or bad
faith. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002(d); Flynn, 228 S.W.3d at
659.
Because it is not in dispute that the Suarez family entered the Dike to engage
in recreation, the Recreational Use Statute applies to limit the City’s liability. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.001(3) (defining “recreation”); see also
19
Homoky, 294 S.W.3d at 817. Our analysis involves only the standard for gross
negligence. Suarez has not alleged that the City acted with malicious intent or in
bad faith.
Gross negligence is “an act or omission involving subjective awareness of an
extreme degree of risk, indicating conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or
welfare of others.” Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 287 (citing Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel,
879 S.W.2d 10, 21 (Tex. 1994)). Gross negligence, as applied under the
Recreational Use Statute, involves two components: (1) viewed objectively from
the actor’s standpoint, the act or omission must involve an extreme degree of risk,
considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and (2)
the actor must have actual, subjective awareness of risk involved, but nevertheless
proceeds in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others. See
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225.
Speaking to the second subjective component, the Supreme Court of Texas
has explained: “[W]hat separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence is the
defendant’s state of mind; in other words, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant knew about the peril, but [its] acts or omissions demonstrate that [it] did
not care.” Louisiana–Pacific Corp. v. Andrade, 19 S.W.3d 245, 246–47 (Tex.
1999); see also City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412, 414–15 (Tex. 2008)
(holding that “actual knowledge” element of a premises defect cause of action
20
requires knowledge that the dangerous condition existed at the time of the
accident).
In her petition, Suarez alleged that the City had actual knowledge of
“dangerous currents and an unstable bottom.” Suarez alleged that, “[b]ecause the
area has been the subject of other drownings and swimming incidents, the [City],
in the past put up signs giving warning of undertows, deep holes and areas where
swimming was not allowed.” Suarez also averred,
There were dangerous currents and an unstable bottom that had been
created through erosion, ship movements in the Houston ship channel
and various weather conditions including hurricanes and storms over
the years. In addition, there had been numerous drownings and
swimming events to where [the City], knew dangerous conditions
existed in the area where these drownings occurred.
Suarez’s petition did not contain allegations that the City had knowledge of
the unique danger resulting from a confluence of man-made and natural conditions,
which she later alleged in her response to the plea. Rather, in her petition, she
alleged only naturally occurring conditions as the premises peril causing her family
to drown. This is noteworthy.
In City of Waco v. Kirwan, the Supreme Court of Texas clarified the duty
owed by landowners to recreational users under the Recreational Use Statute,
holding that a landowner does not generally owe a duty “to protect or warn against
the dangers of natural conditions on the land.” 298 S.W.3d 618, 626 (Tex. 2009);
see also Tex. State Univ.–San Marcos v. Bonnin, No. 03–07–00593–CV, 2010 WL
21
4367013, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 5, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding
plaintiffs could not plead valid gross negligence claim under Recreational Use
Statute for failure to warn of a turbulent undertow, which led to their son’s
drowning death because undertow was a naturally occurring condition). In
Kirwan, the supreme court held that the City of Waco retained its governmental
immunity in connection with a premises liability claim based solely on the collapse
of a naturally occurring cliff in a city park. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 625–29.
The Kirwan court drew a distinction between premises liability claims based
solely on naturally occurring conditions and those based on artificial or man-made
conditions. Id. at 622. The court distinguished its earlier holding in Shumake, a
case in which a nine-year-old girl, tubing in a state park river, had drowned after
being sucked into a man-made culvert by a strong undertow. Id.; see Shumake,
199 S.W.3d at 288. The Kirwan court noted that the claims in Shumake were not
based on a naturally occurring condition as were the claims in Kirwan. Kirwan,
298 S.W.3d at 622.
In its plea to the jurisdiction, the City relied on Kirwan, asserting that,
because she was alleging her family drowned because of naturally occurring
conditions, it had no duty to warn of those conditions. The City asserted that
Suarez’s pleading affirmatively negated jurisdiction.
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When she responded to the City’s plea, Suarez effectively amended her
allegations against the City. In her response, Suarez stated, “It is not simply the
risk of drowning in any body of water that lies at the heart of [her] allegations. It is
the risk of drowning in this particular body of water at this particular beach.” She
described the dangerous condition present at the beach as “a perfect storm of man-
made and natural forces that converged in a way that does not occur anywhere else
on the Texas Gulf Coast.”
Suarez relied on the affidavit of her expert, William Worsham, to explain the
unique perils existing at the beach. In his affidavit, Worsham explained that “[t]he
presence of tidal currents and wind-generated waves interacting with the manmade
beach on the morning of October 3, 2010, caused water motion adjacent to the
beach shoreline of a magnitude sufficient to cause beachgoers standing in shallow
water to lose their footing.” He explained that dredged sediment or “spoil,” placed
on the beach by the Corp of Engineers, had made the submerged beach slippery.
Worsham opined that the beach had a cuspate or scalloped surface that generated
rip currents. He stated that “[t]he dike and manmade beach interacted with the
waves and tidal currents naturally present to cause energetic breaking waves and
stronger currents, each of which·was highly variable in strength and direction.”
According to Worsham, “The breaking waves produced by this interaction were
sufficient to cause young persons and adults to lose balance. The likelihood of
23
losing balance increased rapidly in the surf zone, such that even water depths of
less than two feet were capable of causing loss of balance.”
Suarez also pointed to evidence offered in the jurisdictional proceedings
showing that, before Hurricane Ike, the City had erected signs at various locations
on the Dike warning visitors to swim only in designated areas and cautioning them
to beware of undertows and rip currents. In her response, Suarez wrote, “The
presence of signs in some locations and not others is an indication that the City was
aware of the danger of rip currents.” As the City pointed out, Suarez did not
explain, nor is it apparent, how such warnings indicate that the City had actual
knowledge of the uniquely perilous conditions, caused by a confluence of man-
made and natural conditions, she alleged existed on the day of the drownings. To
the contrary, the signs warned of naturally occurring marine hazards commonly
found in the ocean. The evidence showed that the City had placed the signs at
various locations around the Dike but no evidence indicated that a warning sign
had at any time in the past been erected at the beach.
In addition, the warning signs, to which Suarez pointed, were erected before
the hurricane. The evidence showed that the Dike was damaged by the hurricane
and then repaired. The evidence also showed that, since the hurricane, the Corp of
Engineers had placed additional spoils on the beach area, indicating that the area
had been changed since the signs were erected. In short, no reasonable inference
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may be drawn that the City had actual awareness of the alleged unique and perilous
conditions present at beach at the time of the drownings based on its placement of
signs warning of common marine hazards at other locations on the Dike more than
two years before the drowning deaths in this case. Cf. Prairie View A & M Univ. v.
Brooks, 180 S.W.3d 694, 707 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)
(holding that actual knowledge requires finding State knew of dangerous condition
that caused injury, not just proof State was aware of related condition creating
danger).
Manager of Public Works, Tom Kessler, did acknowledge in his deposition
that there had been other drownings at the Dike before October 3, 2010, and some
had involved children. He stated that he did not know how many drownings there
had been. No evidence was presented or allegations made when the drownings had
occurred, where they had occurred on the five-mile-long Dike, or under what
circumstances they had occurred. The record contains no allegations or
jurisdictional evidence that any drownings had been attributed to the unique
conditions described by Worsham in his affidavit. See Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 625
(noting that, although it had received reports of other falls from cliffs in the park,
the city had received no reports of a cliff crumbling, which was the dangerous
condition underlying the plaintiff’s premises claim); cf. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at
281, 288 (concluding that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to
25
show gross negligence in drowning case in which it was undisputed that the park
had received complaints, only days before, of others that had nearly drowned from
the same alleged risk at the same spot on the river).
The record also contains affirmative evidence indicating that the City had no
actual knowledge of the unique perils Suarez alleges existed at the beach at the
time of the drownings. Evidence was presented showing that the City had not
commissioned any studies to determine the effect of the Dike on wave action or
other naturally occurring conditions. Mayor Doyle testified in his deposition that
the City had never conducted any type of analysis or risk assessment to determine
whether there were dangerous currents that could affect swimmers at the beach
area. The mayor also testified that he was not aware that the presence of the Dike
created rip currents. The evidence showed that Mayor Doyle was the person who
made the decision with respect to what signs should be erected and where they
should be erected. The record also shows that the drowning deaths occurred less
than one month after the reopening of the Dike following its nearly two-year
closure.
After a review of the jurisdictional evidence in the record, we conclude that
there is no evidence that creates a factual dispute with regard to whether the City
had actual knowledge or awareness of the alleged unique and dangerous property
condition existing at the beach at the time of the drowning deaths of Suarez’s
26
family. In other words, the record conclusively shows that the City did not have
actual awareness of the unique peril. The record indicates that Suarez has been
given a full and fair opportunity to develop the record in this case, having deposed
city officials, obtained written discovery, and retained expert assistance in
developing her claim. See Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, No. 10–0548, 2012 WL
3800218, at *6 (Tex. Aug. 31, 2012).
We conclude that Suarez cannot bring a valid gross negligence claim under
the Recreational Use Statute; thus, the City’s immunity from liability for that claim
is not waived. As a result, the City’s immunity from suit also remains intact. See
Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 629.
We hold that the trial court erred when it denied the City’s plea to the
jurisdiction. We sustain the City’s sole issue. 5
Conclusion
We reverse the order of the trial court and render judgment dismissing
Suarez’s claims against the City of Texas City.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Brown.
5
We need not address other sub-issues and arguments that the City raises in support
of its plea to the jurisdiction.
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