No. 2--06--1176 Filed: 11-26-07
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of McHenry County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 05--TR--20381
)
DANIEL STEFANSKI, ) Honorable
) Gordon E. Graham,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CALLUM delivered the opinion of the court:
The State appeals the trial court's award of sanctions to the defendant, Daniel Stefanski, under
Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137), after the State filed two notices of motion that violated
local court rules and one that was not properly placed on the court call. We determine that the trial
court erred when it determined that sanctions were appropriate for a "needless increase in the cost
of litigation" (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) in the absence of evidence of bad faith on the part of the State.
However, we affirm because the notices were also not well-grounded in law.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 15, 2005, Stefanski was arrested for driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11--
501(a)(2) (West 2004)). Stefanski refused a Breathalyzer test, resulting in the summary suspension
of his driver's license (625 ILCS 5/2--118.1(b)(3) (West 2004)). On April 21, 2005, he filed a
petition to rescind the summary suspension.
No. 2--06--1176
On May 31, 2006, the State filed a motion to advance the hearing date, with a notice of
motion stating that it would be presented on Friday, June 2, 2006. The State failed to show proof
of service. On June 1, 2006, the State filed a new motion to advance the date. The new notice of
motion stated that the motion would be presented on Monday, June 5, 2006, and included a proof
of service stating that the motion was sent by fax at or before 4:30 p.m. on Thursday, June 1, 2006,
and that a transaction statement from the fax machine was attached. However, the notice was silent
on who the fax was sent to and no transaction statement was actually attached to it.
On June 2, 2006, the State withdrew the first motion and the court granted Stefanski leave
to file a petition for fees. On June 5, Stefanski appeared in court and objected to the second motion,
asserting that the notice was insufficient. The court struck the motion from the call. See 19th
Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 2.01(j) (eff. January 2, 1997).1
In his brief, Stefanski states that on June 7, 2006, he appeared in court because he was
personally served with notice of a third motion to advance, to be presented that day. He was advised
that the matter had not been put on the call and therefore would not be heard. There is no record of
that proceeding, but the State does not deny that it occurred, and the trial court referred to the matter
when it provided its reasoning for awarding sanctions. Stefanski attached to his brief a copy of the
third motion.
On June 15, 2006, Stefanski filed a petition for $926.25 in fees under Rule 137, alleging that
defense counsel was summoned into court on three dates when notice was improper or when the
1
At the time of the proceedings, McHenry County was part of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit
and subject to its local rules. McHenry County was later separated from the Nineteenth Judicial
Circuit and is now the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit.
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matter had not been placed on the call. On July 14, 2006, the trial court granted the petition and
awarded $500 in fees. During discussion of the fee petition, the attorney for the State admitted to
"a comedy of errors on the part of my office," but argued that the mistakes were unintentional. The
trial court found that the notices were improper under local court rules and that the State could have
withdrawn the second motion once it learned that notice was insufficient. But the court also made
clear that it was not finding bad faith on the part of the State. In its order, the trial court wrote that
the State "did not act with gross negligence or inadvertence but it did needlessly increase [the] cost
of litigation."
After the court upheld the summary suspension of Stefanski's license, the State moved for
reconsideration of the fee award. At the hearing on the motion, the court repeated its belief that this
was a case of needlessly increasing the cost of litigation. The court also noted a lack of law about
sanctions for mistakes that needlessly increase the cost of litigation and stated that it welcomed
guidance from this court on the matter. The court denied the motion to reconsider, and the State
appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
The State argues that Rule 137 sanctions were inappropriate because, while the failures to
serve proper notice were "procedural missteps," the mistakes were not made in bad faith. In the
alternative, the State argues that an evidentiary hearing was required before the trial court could
award sanctions. Stefanski argues that an award of sanctions is proper when a party unnecessarily
increases the cost of litigation even in the absence of subjective bad faith. He also argues that the
notices were not well-grounded in law and that the State failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the
law.
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Proceedings to rescind a summary suspension are civil and are subject to the rules of civil
procedure. People v. McClure, 218 Ill. 2d 375, 385-86 (2006). Rule 137 applies to the State in the
same manner as any other party. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. Generally, the trial court's decision regarding
sanctions under Rule 137 will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Doe v. Roe, 289
Ill. App. 3d 116, 131 (1997). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful,
or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. See
In re Marriage of Lindman, 356 Ill. App. 3d 462, 467 (2005).
The construction of a supreme court rule presents a question of law, which we consider de
novo. People v. Trimarco, 364 Ill. App. 3d 549, 551 (2006). We construe supreme court rules
according to the principles that govern the construction of statutes. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill.
2d 324, 332 (2002). The primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the drafter's intent. Robidoux,
201 Ill. 2d at 332. " 'The most reliable indication of intent is the language used, which should be
given its plain and ordinary meaning.' [Citation.]" Robidoux, 201 Ill. 2d at 332. Because Rule 137
is penal, it must be strictly construed. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 487 (1998).
Rule 137 provides in part:
"Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be
stated. *** The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
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that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.
Thus, under Rule 137, sanctions may be granted under two different circumstances: (1) when a
pleading, motion, or other paper is not "well grounded in fact" or is not "warranted by existing law
or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," or (2) when
it is interposed for purposes such as to "harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation." 155 Ill. 2d R. 137; see Penn v. Gerig, 334 Ill. App. 3d 345, 354 (2002).
The State argues that the phrase "not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation" requires a finding of
subjective bad faith. We have never decided whether bad faith is required for sanctions to be awarded
when there has been a needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Because Rule 137 is almost identical to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11), we may seek guidance from the federal courts' interpretation of that rule. See Edward
Yavitz Eye Center, Ltd. v. Allen, 241 Ill. App. 3d 562, 569 (1993). The Seventh Circuit has held that
the rule contains two parts, one with a subjective component, and the other with an objective
component. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1989). The
subjective component is that "[a] paper 'interposed for any improper purpose' is sanctionable whether
or not it is supported by the facts and the law, and no matter how careful the pre-filing investigation.
The objective component is that a paper filed in the best of faith, by a lawyer convinced of the justice
of his client's cause, is sanctionable if counsel neglected to make 'reasonable inquiry' beforehand."
Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 931-32.
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Here, "any improper purpose" is necessarily a subjective purpose, "such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. Thus, to
award sanctions for a needless increase in the cost of litigation, there must be subjective bad faith.
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it relied on a needless increase in the cost of litigation for its
award of sanctions, because it specifically found no subjective bad faith on the part of the State.
However, that determination does not end our inquiry, because by failing to follow local court rules,
the notices of the motions were also not warranted by existing law.
Even if the trial court's reasoning was in error, we can affirm the judgment on any grounds
that are called for by the record. Seith v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 371 Ill. App. 3d 124, 133 (2007).
Also, to avoid further expense to the parties, when the record contains the information necessary to
reach a determination about sanctions, we may perform our own review of the petition without
remanding for further proceedings in the trial court. See Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541,
562-63 (2006) (appellate court may conduct its own review of a fee petition when an evidentiary
hearing is unnecessary).
Although the trial court did not find subjective bad faith on the part of the State, an objective
determination of reasonableness under the circumstances applies when determining whether a filed
paper is grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. See Baker v. Daniel S. Berger, Ltd., 323
Ill. App. 3d 956, 963 (2001). When that portion of Rule 137 is at issue, it is not sufficient that the
party "honestly believed" that the allegations raised were grounded in fact and law. Fremarek v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1074-75 (1995).
The State argues that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to reach a determination whether
the notices were warranted by existing law. But the State does not deny that the notices were
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ineffective and it conceded a "comedy of errors" on its part. The trial court also specifically found
that the notices were improperly filed and that the State could have avoided repeating the mistake.
The State had several opportunities to cure the matter, it failed each time, and with each failure
Stefanski incurred costs. Thus, the record is sufficient to show that the notices were not warranted
by existing law and that Rule 137 sanctions were appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the award of
sanctions.
The judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GROMETER, P.J., and HUTCHINSON, J., concur.
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