ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Board of Education of Nippersink School District 2 v. Koch, 2012 IL App (2d) 120132
Appellate Court THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF NIPPERSINK SCHOOL
Caption DISTRICT 2 and THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF RICHMOND-
BURTON COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 157, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. CHRISTOPHER A. KOCH, State Superintendent of
Education, and THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-12-0132
Filed September 14, 2012
Held Defendant State Board of Education failed to meet its burden of proving
(Note: This syllabus that the venue selected by plaintiff consolidated school districts, the
constitutes no part of county in which the districts were located, was improper for plaintiff’s
the opinion of the court mandamus action to compel the Board to use the proper formula in
but has been prepared calculating the districts’ funding.
by the Reporter of
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County, No. 11-MR-263; the
Review Hon. Thomas A. Meyer, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on G. Robb Cooper and Ericka J. Thomas, both of Ottosen Britz Kelly
Appeal Cooper Gilbert & DiNolfo, Ltd., of Naperville, for appellants.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro,
Solicitor General, and John P. Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel), for appellees.
Panel JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Hudson and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case involves a dispute between the plaintiffs, the Board of Education of Nippersink
School District 2 and the Board of Education of Richmond-Burton Community High School
District 157, and the Illinois State Board of Education (State Board) regarding the proper
amount of general state aid that should be paid to the plaintiffs under article 18 of the School
Code (105 ILCS 5/18-1 et seq. (West 2010)). The only issue before us at this point, however,
is the proper venue for that dispute.
¶2 The plaintiffs, coterminous school districts that share a common superintendent, assert
that they are entitled to receive funding calculated under section 18-8.1 of the School Code
(105 ILCS 5/18-8.1 (West 2010)), which contains a funding formula for coterminous districts
based on average daily attendance in each district. On November 29, 2010, Dr. Dan Oest, the
superintendent of both districts, contacted the State Board to inquire whether section 18-8.1
applied to the plaintiffs and, if so, to ask that the plaintiffs’ state aid for the past three years
be recalculated using that formula. Dr. Oest repeated this request in writing on December 3,
2010. In a letter refusing the request, the State Board asserted that section 18-8.1 was
rendered “obsolete” following the 1998 enactment of section 18-8.05 of the School Code
(105 ILCS 5/18-8.05 (West 2010)). Thereafter, the parties’ attorneys exchanged e-mails on
the topic, the upshot of which was that the State Board would not reconsider its decision.
¶3 On September 2, 2011, the plaintiffs filed in McHenry County a complaint for mandamus
against the defendants, the State Board and its superintendent, Christopher A. Koch. In their
complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they were coterminous districts that shared the same
superintendent; they were entitled to funding based on average daily attendance in each
district, pursuant to the formula in section 18-8.1 of the School Code; they were required to
file claims for funding with the State Board; and the State Board had acted contrary to law
in refusing to calculate the plaintiffs’ funding based on the proper formula. The plaintiffs
attached to their complaint (a) the December 3, 2010, correspondence that Dr. Oest sent from
his office in Richmond to the State Board at its Springfield office, seeking recalculation of
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the state aid under the section 18-8.1 formula; (b) a letter dated December 21, 2010, sent
from a senior budget analyst at the State Board’s Springfield office to Dr. Oest in Richmond,
denying Dr. Oest’s demand; and (c) printouts of the e-mails exchanged between the parties’
attorneys. The plaintiffs sought to require the defendants to: recalculate the amounts owed
to them for the past four fiscal years using the section 18-8.1 formula; pay the plaintiffs the
difference; and use the section 18-8.1 formula in calculating their state aid in the future.
¶4 Six weeks after the suit was filed, the defendants filed a motion to transfer venue, arguing
that venue was not proper in McHenry County under section 2-103(a) of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-103(a) (West 2010)). As relevant here, that
provision states:
“Actions must be brought against a public, municipal, governmental or quasi-municipal
corporation in the county in which its principal office is located or in the county in which
the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose.” 735
ILCS 5/2-103(a) (West 2010).
The defendants argued that McHenry County was neither the site of their principal office nor
a county in which any part of the transaction at issue arose. They sought to have the action
transferred to Sangamon County, the location of their principal office. In support of their
motion, they argued that the only relevant “transaction” that gave rise to the mandamus suit
was the State Board’s denial of Dr. Oest’s demand for recalculation. As that letter was sent
from Springfield, the defendants argued that Sangamon County was the place where the
cause of action arose.
¶5 In their response, the plaintiffs conceded that the defendants’ principal office was located
outside of McHenry County (although they noted that the defendants maintained a regional
office in McHenry County). The plaintiffs argued that venue was proper in McHenry County,
however, under the transactional prong of the venue statute. The plaintiffs argued that, under
that prong, courts look to “(1) the nature of the cause of action and (2) the place where the
cause of action springs into existence.” Lake County Riverboat L.P. v. Illinois Gaming
Board, 313 Ill. App. 3d 943, 952 (2000). Here, the cause of action was for mandamus. To
prevail in such an action, the plaintiffs would have to prove among other things a clear right
to the relief requested, which would require proof that the two school districts were
coterminous and shared a superintendent, that they applied for general state aid for the
relevant years, that they received the wrong amounts of such aid, and that they requested
recalculation of the aid. The plaintiffs suggested that they would present local witnesses such
as Dr. Oest to establish these facts.
¶6 The plaintiffs further noted that the place where the cause of action sprang into existence
was determined by considering where “ ‘any significant negotiations were carried on between
the parties, where an agreement was signed, the place where it was, or was supposed to be
performed, or where matters occurred that the plaintiff has the burden of proving.’ ” Williams
v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm’n, 139 Ill. 2d 24, 68 (1990) (quoting People ex rel.
Carpentier v. Lange, 8 Ill. 2d 437, 441 (1956)). The plaintiffs argued that most of these
factors were not present in this case–there were no negotiations and no agreement was
signed–but the matters that they had the burden of proving occurred in McHenry County. In
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addition, the School Code’s requirements regarding general state aid were supposed to be
performed or carried out in McHenry County.
¶7 Finally, the plaintiffs relied heavily on the argument that, in determining proper venue
in a suit against governmental actors, a court should look to where the effects of the
governmental action would be felt: “ ‘[i]t is where the shaft strikes ***, not where it is
drawn, that counts.’ ” Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co. v. Fisher, 351 Ill. App. 215, 221-22
(1953) (quoting Cecil v. Superior Court, 140 P.2d 125, 129 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943)). The
plaintiffs argued that “where the shaft would strike,” i.e., where the effects of the grant or
denial of their request for recalculation of their funding would be felt, was in McHenry
County. To this, the defendants countered that the effects of the mandamus action would be
felt solely in Sangamon County, as the recalculation sought by the plaintiffs would occur in
the State Board’s office there. The defendants emphasized that any additional funding due
would be paid from Sangamon County; the plaintiffs emphasized that the funding would be
received and used in McHenry County for schools there.
¶8 After considering the parties’ briefs and hearing oral argument on the venue issue, the
trial court ruled as follows:
“Well, I’m going to grant the [motion] to transfer venue.
I think the argument the way the shaft strikes is equally applicable to both here and
Sangamon County because there’re [sic] going to be acts here, but there’re also going to
be acts there. And I don’t believe that there’s any evidence otherwise that the
transaction–there’s any evidence supporting the argument that the transaction actually
touches McHenry County other than the effects are going to be felt here. But it’s not
going to be felt only here. And under the circumstances in this case, I don’t–I think
Sangamon County is the proper venue. So I will grant the motion.”
The plaintiffs filed a petition for leave to appeal, which we granted.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 General Principles
¶ 11 To obtain a change of venue, a defendant must establish that the original venue selected
by the plaintiff was improper. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 155 (2005).
In meeting this burden, the defendant must point to specific facts showing a clear right to a
transfer of venue and cannot rely on conclusory statements. Id. Thus, the sole issue in this
appeal is whether the defendants carried their burden of proving that venue was not proper
in McHenry County.
¶ 12 A trial court’s ruling on a motion to transfer venue is reviewed under a two-part standard.
A trial court’s factual findings will not be reversed unless they are against the manifest
weight of the evidence. However, its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id. at 154.
Further, where the facts are undisputed, the case as a whole is subject to de novo review. Id.
Here, the parties agree that the relevant facts are undisputed (they dispute only the
significance of those facts). Accordingly, we review the case de novo.
¶ 13 When the issue is whether venue in a particular county is proper because the “transaction
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or some part thereof” from which the cause of action arose occurred there, a court considers
two factors: “(1) the nature of the cause of action and (2) the place where the cause of action
springs into existence.” Lake County Riverboat, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 952. In evaluating the
case under these factors, we must bear in mind that “ ‘[t]ransaction’ has been defined to
include every fact that is an integral part of a cause of action.” Reichert v. Court of Claims,
327 Ill. App. 3d 390, 395 (2002) (citing Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. McDougal, 20 Ill. App.
3d 615, 617 (1974)); see also Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 69-70 (considering whether events that
occurred were “integral” to the cause of action).
¶ 14 The Nature of the Cause of Action
¶ 15 The first factor–the nature of the cause of action–may weigh more heavily in some cases
than others; for example, in a suit concerning land or an injury that occurred in a particular
location. In such cases, the proof that the plaintiff must present may involve knowledge of
the local geography or the testimony of local witnesses. We view this factor as being
somewhat less significant here, where the suit is a mandamus action that primarily raises a
legal question about whether the State Board is properly carrying out its statutory duties. Cf.
Lake County Riverboat, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 954 (where the nature of the cause of action is a
request for declaratory judgment, the action is “neither legal nor equitable, and proper venue
depends on the issues involved and the relief sought”).
¶ 16 The only section 2-103(a) venue case we have found involving a mandamus action is
Southern & Central Illinois Laborers’ District Council v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning
Board, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1112 (2002), relied upon by the plaintiffs. In that case, the Illinois
Health Facilities Planning Board (Board) had issued a permit allowing the construction of
a hospital. The permit required the hospital to fairly resolve “local union issues,” among
other things. Id. at 1114. The union representing hospital employees notified the Board of
a National Labor Relations Board finding that the hospital had engaged in unfair labor
practices relating to the “local union issues,” and it requested action by the Board. The Board
put the matter on the agenda for one of its meetings, but at that meeting it allowed two
hospital representatives to speak while preventing the union representative from speaking.
The union filed a mandamus action seeking to compel the Board to initiate a proper
proceeding (a “contested case” under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS
100/1-1 et seq. (West 2000))).
¶ 17 The union filed the mandamus action in Williamson County, the location of the hospital.
The Board moved to transfer venue of the action to Sangamon County, the location of its
principal office. The union argued that the “transaction” out of which the mandamus suit
arose was its initial complaint about the violations of the construction permit and that the
outcome of the action would affect the rights and employment conditions of its members in
Williamson County. The trial court denied the motion to transfer venue, and the Board
appealed.
¶ 18 The reviewing court held that the motion was properly denied because venue was proper
in Williamson County:
“Although the procedures defendant allegedly violated in not conducting a contested case
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involved a transaction that occurred in Cook County [the Board meeting at which the
union representative was not allowed to speak], the procedures were to be performed for
the sole benefit of determining events and actions that occurred in Williamson County.”
Southern & Central, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 1118.
The court ruled that certain facts relating to Williamson County–the Board’s issuance of the
permit to build in that county and the alleged unfair labor practices that occurred there–were
not “incidental” but “central” to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Accordingly, venue was
proper in Williamson County.
¶ 19 The defendants argue that Southern & Central is not good law because the reviewing
court stated that it was applying the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. The supreme
court rejected the abuse-of-discretion standard in Corral, 217 Ill. 2d at 154, and held that the
bifurcated standard discussed above (manifest weight for factual determinations, de novo for
the significance of those facts and ultimate venue analysis) was the proper standard for
reviewing section 2-103(a) venue rulings. Corral therefore abrogated Southern & Central’s
holding regarding the applicable standard of review. The defendants argue that, since
Southern & Central wrongly applied a deferential standard of review, its ultimate affirmance
of the trial court’s finding that venue was proper in Williamson County cannot be relied
upon.
¶ 20 The defendants’ argument is, in general, correct, although a close reading of Southern &
Central raises some doubt about whether the reviewing court actually applied a deferential
standard, inasmuch as the court discussed at length the factors applicable in a venue analysis
and considered each factor in light of the specific facts of the case. All of this analysis
appears very much as if the court were conducting an independent evaluation of whether
venue was proper in Williamson County rather than simply checking to see whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Moreover, even if the ultimate holding of Southern & Central is
disregarded, its reasoning remains sound. The court’s improper application of the abuse-of-
discretion standard of review does not undermine its conclusion that, in determining where
venue is proper, it is relevant to consider the location of those persons who will particularly
be affected by the governmental action sought via mandamus.
¶ 21 Applying that same principle here leads to the conclusion that the goal of this mandamus
action–the recalculation of the plaintiffs’ state aid–would “be performed for the sole benefit
of” McHenry County schools. In addition, just as in Southern & Central, some of the facts
relating to the county where the suit was filed, including school attendance and district
boundaries, are integral to the plaintiffs’ claim.
¶ 22 The defendants also cite Reichert, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 390, as being on point. However,
Reichert is not good law. The supreme court vacated the appellate court’s judgment and
directed the trial court to dismiss the suit because it did not have jurisdiction to review the
Court of Claims nonfinal order appealed by the plaintiff. Reichert v. Court of Claims, 203
Ill. 2d 257, 263 (2003). The appellate court opinion in Reichert cited by the defendants is
thus a nullity. Moreover, the certiorari action in Reichert differs from a mandamus action
in important respects. As a part of a mandamus action, a plaintiff may be required to produce
evidence showing the “right to the relief requested.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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People ex rel. Glasgow v. Kinney, 2012 IL 113197, ¶ 7. By contrast, in a certiorari action,
the issue is whether, based solely on the record developed in the previous tribunal, that
tribunal “proceeded according to applicable law.” Reichert, 203 Ill. 2d at 260. It thus
involves only legal issues–no new evidence may be presented. The plaintiff in a certiorari
action therefore has little or no valid interest in the convenience of witnesses, unlike the
plaintiff in a mandamus action. Reichert is neither good law nor apposite.
¶ 23 Thus, to the extent that “the nature of the action” bears on the issue of venue, this factor
supports a determination that this mandamus action was properly brought in McHenry
County.
¶ 24 Where the Cause of Action Sprang Into Existence
¶ 25 The second factor in determining venue–where the cause of action sprang into
existence–considers among other things where “ ‘any significant negotiations were carried
on between the parties, where an agreement was signed, the place where it was, or was
supposed to be performed, or where matters occurred that the plaintiff has the burden of
proving.’ ” Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 68 (quoting Lange, 8 Ill. 2d at 441). Courts should also
consider where any direct dealings between the parties took place or where events occurred
that altered the legal relationship of the parties. Id. at 69; Lake County Riverboat, 313 Ill.
App. 3d at 953.
¶ 26 The difficulty is in applying these factors here. This is not a contract case, in which the
parties engaged in negotiations over terms or executed an agreement. One could argue that
the School Code imposes a duty similar to a contractual duty requiring the State Board to
provide school districts such as the plaintiffs with the funding to which they are entitled. The
plaintiffs contend that, viewed this way, the State Board’s duty was to be “performed” in
McHenry County by providing appropriate state aid there. Moreover, they note that they have
statutory duties of their own with respect to the calculation of their state aid, which require
them to gather attendance information from McHenry County schools, compile that data in
the correct form, and transmit it from their offices in McHenry County to the State Board.
The defendants, however, view any duty they owe as being “performed” solely in Sangamon
County, where their employees calculate the state aid that is owed to each district. There is
some case law to the effect that, where obligations under a contract are performed by the
parties in two counties, venue is proper in both. See ServiceMaster Co. v. Mary Thompson
Hospital, 177 Ill. App. 3d 885, 891 (1988). However, we view the contract analogy as of
limited relevance here.
¶ 27 There were no direct dealings between the parties here (i.e., no face-to-face meetings or
travel by one party to the other party’s location), only an exchange of correspondence via
traditional mail and e-mail, which took place equally in both counties. As to “events that
altered the legal relationship of the parties,” the defendants contend that this occurred when
the State Board wrote the letter denying Dr. Oest’s demand for recalculation, which took
place in Sangamon County. The plaintiffs, however, argue that the key event was Dr. Oest’s
demand for recalculation, written in McHenry County, which served notice upon the
defendants that the plaintiffs would not accept the previous funding calculations.
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¶ 28 On this point–where events occurred that “altered the legal relationship of the
parties”–both parties cite Williams, a 1990 supreme court decision. Williams involved a class
action against the Illinois State Scholarship Commission (ISSC) filed by defaulting student
loan borrowers who did not live in or obtain their loans in Cook County, seeking to enjoin
the ISSC from filing all of its Illinois collection actions in Cook County. The ISSC argued
that venue over the collection suits was proper in Cook County because it prepared loan
documents and officially “approved” the loan guarantees in its Cook County office.
¶ 29 The supreme court rejected this argument on several grounds. First, it noted that there
was no evidence unequivocally establishing that, in fact, loan documents were prepared in
Cook County. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 68. More importantly, however, the ISSC’s preparation
of the loan documents and its approval of the loans were not “integral” to the loan
transaction; they were simply preliminary steps. Rather, the crucial events were the execution
and performance of the loan agreements, both of which occurred in the counties where the
borrowers lived or where the lenders were located. Id. at 69. The supreme court noted that
there was no legal relationship or dealings between the borrowers and the ISSC before that
point. As the “mere act of approving the loan” did not alter the legal positions of the parties,
that could not be considered an integral part of the loan transaction. Id. at 69-70.
¶ 30 Under Williams, courts must focus on the event or events that are “integral” to the
transaction or that change the legal relationship between the parties. The defendants argue
that here the only event that was “integral” to the transaction that gave rise to the plaintiffs’
mandamus action, and the event that altered the parties’ relationship, was the State Board’s
denial of Dr. Oest’s demand for recalculation, which occurred outside of McHenry County.
Of course, the plaintiffs argue that it was Dr. Oest’s initial demand that altered the parties’
relationship by seeking a different aid calculation process.
¶ 31 Neither of these arguments is particularly persuasive. Indeed, it does not appear that the
parties’ legal relationship was ever actually “altered” in the manner described in Williams.
Rather, the parties remained in essentially the same legal relationship. The State Board had
the obligation to provide proper funding to the plaintiffs both before and after the exchange
of correspondence (the demand letter and its rejection). The plaintiffs had the duty to gather
and submit the information necessary to calculate that funding both before and afterwards.
To the extent that there has been any change in the parties’ relationship, we lean slightly
toward the view that the change was initiated by Dr. Oest’s demand letter rather than the
State Board’s refusal (which simply restated its original position). Overall, however, we do
not find any significant alteration in the parties’ relationship. Rather, we view the factor of
“where the action sprang into existence” as evenly balanced between events occurring within
McHenry County and those occurring outside.
¶ 32 Where the Effects Will Be Felt
¶ 33 Perhaps because the above venue factors are fairly evenly balanced, both the parties and
the trial court focused primarily on the “effects” test applied in Fisher. The facts in Fisher
were somewhat similar to those in this case. A utility company serving the Rock Island-
Moline area sued a governmental entity (the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission))
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for an injunction to prevent the Commission from enforcing a temporary rate order that
would reduce the rates charged by the utility. The utility brought suit in Rock Island County,
its home county, and the Commission sought to transfer the case to either Cook or Sangamon
County (counties where it had offices). The trial court denied the motion and eventually
entered the injunction requested by the utility. The Commission appealed, arguing in part that
the motion to transfer venue had been wrongly denied, because venue was not proper in Rock
Island County. As in our case, the issue was whether “some part of the transaction” occurred
in Rock Island County.1
¶ 34 Lacking any Illinois case law on point, the Fisher court turned to foreign case law,
including a case from the Montana Supreme Court involving a similar suit by a utility against
a state body (Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 107 P.2d 533, 534
(Mont. 1940)), and a California case in which a business owner sought to forestall the
implementation of a court order obtained by a state agency (Cecil, 140 P.2d at 129). In both
of these cases, the courts focused on the place where the order or rule was to be put into
effect, not where it was issued, in concluding that at least part of the transaction from which
the cause of action arose took place in the plaintiffs’ home counties. See Fisher, 351 Ill. App.
at 220-21. The Fisher court adopted this same approach, quoting the “where the shaft
strikes” language from Cecil. It then held that venue was proper in Rock Island County
because part of the transaction out of which the cause of action arose occurred there, in that
the plaintiff utility was based there and the Commission’s order would take effect there. Id.
at 222.
¶ 35 The defendants here argue that, for several reasons, Fisher’s “effects” test is not a proper
consideration in determining venue. First, they note that section 2-103(a) makes no reference
to where the effects of state action will be felt. This is not a particularly persuasive argument,
in that section 2-103(a) does not refer explicitly to any of the factors traditionally used to
determine where part of the transaction giving rise to the cause of action arose, such as where
negotiations took place, where an agreement was formed or was to be performed, the nature
of the cause of action, or where direct dealings occurred. Rather, all of these factors–the use
of which is well established–were adopted by courts interpreting venue statutes. Thus, the
lack of an explicit statutory reference to the “effects” test is no bar to applying it, if it is
otherwise in line with the applicable law.
¶ 36 Next, the defendants note that one of our more recent cases, Lake County Riverboat,
distinguished Fisher and declined to apply the “effects” test. See Lake County Riverboat, 313
Ill. App. 3d at 955. We did so in that case because, in Fisher, the rate reduction order issued
by the Commission “directly affected the [plaintiff] utility’s business” in Rock Island
County, and therefore venue was proper in that county. Id. In Lake County Riverboat,
however, the plaintiff did not operate any business in Lake County, the county where it had
1
Fisher was decided under an earlier version of the general venue statute, now codified as
section 2-101 (735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2010)), but the transactional venue analysis is the same
under both that provision and section 2-103(a), the public corporation venue provision applicable
in this case. See Superior Structures Co. v. City of Sesser, 277 Ill. App. 3d 653, 657 (1996).
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sued the Illinois Gaming Board. Further, the plaintiff had no direct dealings with the Gaming
Board at the time it filed suit (it hoped to apply for a casino license if one were made
available, but did not actually have any application pending). For both of these reasons, we
held that the Fisher “effects” test was not applicable in Lake County Riverboat. Id.
¶ 37 In comparing the facts of Fisher and Lake County Riverboat to the case before us, we
find Fisher more similar. Like this case, Fisher involved a dispute between a plaintiff entity
that provided essential services to the public and a state body that controlled the plaintiff’s
funding in certain ways. As in Fisher, the present dispute involves the terms under which an
ongoing legal relationship will be conducted, not a material change to that relationship itself.
And unlike Lake County Riverboat, the denial of the demand for recalculation “directly
affects” the plaintiffs’ ongoing operations in their home county. Thus, we see no reason why
the Fisher “effects” test would not be an appropriate consideration in determining venue. In
this case, the application of that test supports the plaintiffs’ argument that venue of the action
was proper in McHenry County, because the plaintiffs conduct their business in McHenry
County and the effects of any recalculation of general state aid (or the lack thereof) will be
felt there. Accordingly, at least part of the transaction out of which the cause of action arose
occurred in McHenry County.
¶ 38 CONCLUSION
¶ 39 As we noted at the outset, the party seeking a change of venue bears the burden of
showing that venue is not proper in the county in which the action was filed. Corral, 217 Ill.
2d at 155. The trial court erred in granting the motion to transfer venue, in part because it
wrongly placed this burden on the plaintiffs, requiring them to show why McHenry County
was a proper venue rather than requiring the defendants to show why it was not. In addition,
the trial court failed to make any explicit finding regarding the threshold issue of whether
venue was proper in McHenry County, although its comments suggest that it viewed the
relevant “transaction” underlying the mandamus suit and the effects of that suit as occurring
in both McHenry and Sangamon counties–a finding that would support the conclusion that
venue was proper in McHenry County. As our review is de novo, we leave aside these errors
by the trial court and simply consider whether the defendants met their burden.
¶ 40 We conclude that they did not, for the following reasons. First, the nature of this
mandamus action suggests that the plaintiffs may be required to present evidence regarding
McHenry County school attendance and district boundaries. Second, the cause of action
sprang into existence equally in McHenry County and elsewhere. Finally, the effects of the
governmental action or inaction will be felt in McHenry County. As all of these factors
support venue in McHenry County, the defendants did not carry their burden of showing that
venue was not proper there.
¶ 41 For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the January 5, 2012, order of the circuit court
of McHenry County that granted the defendants’ motion to transfer venue and we remand
the cause for further proceedings.
¶ 42 Reversed and remanded.
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