34.810(2). To the extent that the petition raised claims which could have
been raised in a prior proceeding, the petition constituted an abuse of the
writ. NRS 34.810(1)(b). The petition was therefore procedurally barred
absent a demonstration of good cause and prejudice. NRS 34.726(1); NRS
34.810(1)(b), (3).
The State also pleaded laches. Under NRS 34.800, a petition
may be dismissed if the delay in filing the petition prejudices the State.
NRS 34.800(1). Prejudice is presumed when a petition is filed five years
after a decision on direct appeal of a judgment of conviction. See NRS
34.800(2). NRS 34.800 bars claims unless the petitioner can demonstrate
that he was reasonably diligent in discovering the facts underlying his
petition to overcome the presumed prejudice to the State in responding to
the petition, see NRS 34.800(1)(a), or that the failure to consider the
petition amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the
presumed prejudice to the State in retrying the defendant, see NRS
34.800(1)(b). NRS 34.800 may consequently bar petitions even though a
petitioner can show good cause and actual prejudice to satisfy NRS 34.726
and NRS 34.810. Therefore, even if Lopez could demonstrate that the
district court erred in concluding that he failed to demonstrate good cause
and prejudice, he has not asserted that the district court erred in applying
the more onerous laches bar set forth in NRS 34.800. His failure to
challenge the district court's application of laches warrants affirmance of
the district court's decision. Nevertheless, we address his arguments
concerning good cause and prejudice to determine whether the district
court erred in concluding that the allegations failed to overcome the
presumption of prejudice.
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As cause to overcome the procedural default rules, Lopez
contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) in
failing to disclose evidence related to: (1) hair fibers; (2) Arturo Montes, a
purported witness to Lopez's abuse; and (3) Maria Lopez, Lopez's wife.
Brady obliges a prosecutor to reveal evidence favorable to the defense
when that evidence is material to guilt, punishment, or impeachment.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 66-67, 993 P.2d 25,
36-37 (2000) (identifying the three components of a successful Brady
claim). As the State pleaded laches, Lopez must demonstrate that he
could not have discovered the Brady evidence "by the exercise of
reasonable diligence," NRS 34.800(1)(a), and that the evidence
demonstrates a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred, NRS
34.800(1)(b). See also Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1257, 946 P.2d 1017,
1028 (1997) ("[A] Brady violation does not result if the defendant,
exercising reasonable diligence, could have obtained the information."). A
fundamental miscarriage of justice requires "a colorable showing" that the
petitioner is "actually innocent of the crime or is ineligible for the death
penalty." Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001).
Hair evidence
Lopez contends that the State failed to disclose evidence
related to hair fibers that he asserts undermines the State's expert
testimony at trial. During the litigation of his federal habeas petition,
Lopez obtained (1) crime scene analyst Carla Noziglia's report about hair
recovered from the crime scene, (2) Noziglia's bench notes, and (3) a
property report noting that Deputy District Attorney (DDA) Ray Jeffers
instructed a detective to take possession of a brown extension cord that
was purportedly used to abuse the victim but was not introduced at trial.
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Lopez also deposed Dan Berkabile, the expert who testified at trial, about
Noziglia's notes.
We conclude that Lopez failed to demonstrate that he
employed reasonable diligence in discovering Noziglia's report and notes.
See NRS 34.800(1)(a); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 498 (1991) (noting a
"petitioner must conduct a reasonable and diligent investigation aimed at
including all relevant claims and grounds for relief' in a first post-
conviction petition). The trial record informed Lopez in 1985 that Noziglia
performed some work on the hair fiber evidence. Although the State
described her work as irrelevant, Lopez eventually disagreed with that
representation and sought her bench notes during discovery in his second
federal habeas petition. He did not allege that he requested the Noziglia
documents during the litigation of a prior state or federal petition or the
State improperly withheld them during either of those proceedings. Lopez
further failed to demonstrate that the reports and physical evidence were
exculpatory and therefore the withholding of them amounted to a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. See NRS 34.800(1)(b). Berkabile's
testimony and Noziglia's report were not so materially inconsistent as to
demonstrate his actual innocence. They agreed that the hairs taken from
the cords and macrame holder were consistent with Jessica's hair. The
testimony and reports indicate that the experts tested different hair fibers;
therefore, inconsistencies in the length of the hair fibers did not
undermine the trial testimony. Moreover, even if Noziglia's report and
notes impeached Berkabile's conclusion to some extent, Lopez failed to
demonstrate that no rational juror would have found him guilty. Maria's
testimony about Lopez repeatedly hanging Jessica by her hair was
supported by other physical evidence: hair removed from the macrame
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holder was only consistent with Jessica's hair; damage to the closet was
consistent with Maria's description of Jessica falling from the closet rod
she had been hung on; and the medical examiner testified that it would
take considerable force to remove the amount of hair from Jessica's head
that was missing at the time of her death. As Maria asserted that Lopez
used the cord that was not introduced at trial in the abuse, it was not
exculpatory evidence and the State had no duty to disclose it. See Furbay
v. State, 116 Nev. 481, 487, 998 P.2d 553, 557 (2000) ("The prosecutor is
under no general duty to provide inculpatory, as opposed to exculpatory,
evidence to the defense."). However, the failure to disclose this evidence
violated the State's open file policy. See id. ("When the prosecution
purports to give all inculpatory evidence in its control, it may not withhold
evidence for later use."). Nevertheless, Lopez has failed to demonstrate
that the failure to disclose evidence which could further inculpate him in
criminal activity amounted to a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Arturo Montes evidence
Lopez argues that the State withheld evidence that impeached
Montes' testimony that he saw Lopez abuse Jessica. During the litigation
of his federal petition, Lopez received (1) arrest and detention records from
the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) indicating that
Montes was incarcerated in the Clark County Detention Center on the
dates he claimed to have seen Lopez abuse Jessica; (2) witness vouchers in
the Clark County Comptroller's Office indicating that Montes had been
compensated by the Clark County District Attorney's Office for pretrial
interviews with the district attorney's office and three post-trial meetings;
(3) a declaration from Maria's aunt declaring that Montes was not a friend
of the family and did not baptize her daughter as he claimed during trial;
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and (4) a declaration from Montes' half-brother, Carlos Montes, stating
that Montes had never married and did not have a child as he claimed
during tria1. 1 When confronted with this evidence, Montes recanted his
trial testimony and accused the State of pressuring him to testify falsely
during the trial.
We conclude that Lopez failed to demonstrate that the facts
underlying his claim could not have been discovered sooner through the
exercise of reasonable diligence. Lopez knew Montes made false claims
about being Maria's brother in 1986. Based on that knowledge,
reasonably diligent counsel should have investigated Montes' credibility.
Lopez could have then uncovered that Montes lied about being married,
having a child, and baptizing Jessica's cousin within the time period for
filing a timely post-conviction petition. Further, as the evidence
undermining these aspects of Montes' testimony was provided by his
family members, Lopez cannot demonstrate that reliance on the State's
open file policy hindered his exercise of reasonable diligence. Post-
conviction counsel acknowledged that he could have run a background
check on Montes which would have revealed any arrests. Thereafter,
reasonable diligent counsel would have investigated Montes' custody
status as a result of those arrests. Lastly, Lopez failed to demonstrate
that the prosecution was in possession of evidence that Montes was in jail
'Lopez also asserted that the trial record indicated that the State
had conducted a National Crime Information Center check on Montes. He
contended that the report would have shown that the State was aware
that Montes was in custody at the time he purportedly witnessed abuse to
which he testified at trial and thus would prove that the State suborned
perjury. However, the disclosure revealed that the document had been
mislabeled and was actually a Department of Motor Vehicles report.
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during the time period he asserted he saw Jessica abused. See United
States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 393-94 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting obligation to
disclose Brady evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or
investigating agency). While the prosecution has an obligation to disclose
Brady evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or investigative agency,
the detention center holding Montes was not involved in investigating
Lopez. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F. App'x 743, 747 (9th
Cir. 2009) (providing that prosecution was not deemed to possess evidence
of attack on codefendant in prison because the prison was not an
investigating agency). In addition, considering Maria's testimony and the
physical evidence, Lopez failed to demonstrate that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him
Maria Lopez evidence
Lopez contends that a newly disclosed Notice of Denial of
Request to prosecute Maria and a detective's statements during her
interview demonstrate that the State's decision not to prosecute her was
arrived at too swiftly. He further contends that Rosaura Tanon's records,
statements that indicated that the police feared Maria might flee the
jurisdiction, statements that detectives made a deal with Maria for her
testimony, and evidence that immigration and other state benefits were
sought for Maria indicate that her testimony was not credible. 2
Lopez also contends that a correspondence between Ted Salazar
2
and the district attorney's office contradicts DDA Jeffers' representation
during argument on a motion for mistrial based on a Brady violation, that
he did not know that Salazar was translating for Maria's interviews.
However, as this evidence relates to the State's representations during a
motion and has no bearing on Lopez's guilt or innocence, it is insufficient
to demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
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We conclude that Lopez failed to demonstrate that he
exercised reasonable diligence in discovering this evidence. Much of the
evidence that Lopez relied upon concerning Maria was not in the
possession of the State. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 287-88
(1999) ("In the context of a Brady claim, a defendant cannot conduct the
'reasonable and diligent investigation' mandated by McClesky to preclude
a finding of procedural default when the evidence is in the hands of the
State."). He obtained the documents through record requests to a victims'
organization and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
Lopez could have also obtained statements about threats by the
prosecution prior to the instant petition. Because he received these
documents from individuals and other agencies, he could not assert that
the reliance on the State's open file policy impeded his ability to discover
these documents in prior post-conviction litigation. See Steese v. State,
114 Nev. 479, 495, 960 P.2d 321, 331 (1998) ("Brady does not require the
State to disclose evidence which is available to the defendant from other
sources, including diligent investigation by the defense.").
Moreover, Lopez failed to demonstrate that the failure to
consider the evidence would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. Tanon's opinion as to Maria's credibility was not admissible. See
Perez v. State, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 90, 313 P.3d 862, 870 (2013) ("A witness
may not vouch for the testimony of another or testify as to the
truthfulness of another witness."). Contrary to Lopez's assertion, the INS
records do not indicate that the State sought permanent immigration
benefits for Maria prior to her testimony; the State only requested that the
INS refrain from deporting Maria until after she had testified in the case.
Further, the records indicated that Maria was already familiar with and
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was receiving state welfare benefits and it does not indicate that the State
secured her benefits in addition to what she was already receiving Lopez
cannot demonstrate that no rational juror would have concluded that
Maria's testimony was believable because she received the alleged
inducements. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this
claim as barred by laches under NRS 34.800.
Fundamental miscarriage of justice
Lopez argues that the district court erred in denying his
separate claims of actual innocence of first-degree murder and of the death
penalty. A fundamental miscarriage of justice requires "a colorable
showing" that the petitioner is "actually innocent of the crime or is
ineligible for the death penalty." Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at
537 This requires the petitioner to present new evidence of his innocence.
See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006) ("[A] gateway claim requires
'new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was
not presented at trial." (quoting Schlup u. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995));
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316 ("Without any new evidence of innocence, even the
existence of a concededly meritorious constitutional violation is not in
itself sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice that would allow a
habeas court to reach the merits of a barred claim."). When claiming a
fundamental miscarriage of justice based on actual innocence, the
petitioner "must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable
juror would have convicted him absent a constitutional violation."
Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537. In this context, "actual
innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Mitchell
v. State, 122 Nev. 1269, 1273-74, 149 P.3d 33, 36 (2006) (internal
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quotation marks and citations omitted). Similarly, when claiming a
fundamental miscarriage of justice based on ineligibility for the death
penalty, the petitioner "must show by clear and convincing evidence that,
but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found him
death eligible." Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537.
Actual innocence of first-degree murder
Lopez argues that the district court erred in denying his claim
that he is actually innocent of first-degree murder based on newly
discovered evidence about Montes. 3 We conclude that, despite Montes'
perjury, having considered all of the available evidence, Lopez has not
satisfied his heavy burden to prove that the failure to consider his
constitutional claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice
because some reasonable jurors would believe Maria's testimony and not
have reasonable doubt about his guilt. At trial, the jury chose to believe
Maria and convict Lopez. Her subsequent recantation, in and of itself, is
not sufficient to undermine her trial testimony. See Baldree v. Johnson,
99 F.3d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that "affidavits which recant
witnesses' trial testimony are viewed with extreme suspicion by the
courts"). She recanted while surrounded by Lopez's family and repeatedly
3 Lopez also asserts that the district court employed the wrong legal
standard and excluded exculpatory evidence from its consideration, did
not consider the "cumulative exculpatory effect of Maria's recantation as
compared against her trial testimony," and failed to consider other
exculpatory physical evidence. We disagree. Although initially concluding
that it should not consider all of the post-trial information in its actual-
innocence analysis because it was not all newly discovered, the district
court also• concluded in its order that "even if [all of] this [post-trial]
information could be considered, the Court still cannot conclude, by the
appropriate standard, that no reasonable juror would have convicted
Petitioner or sentenced him to death."
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expressed a desire to end the interview. Although she denied that Lopez
burned Jessica and hung her by her hair, she did not disavow his other
abuse which included him striking her head on surfaces in the home. In
subsequent interviews, she was evasive about the details surrounding
Jessica's death but stated that she believed Lopez was guilty. In addition,
the remaining evidence Lopez contends undermines Maria's trial
testimony is insufficient to demonstrate actual innocence. The INS
records do not support the contention that the State sought permanent
benefits for Maria. The record also indicates that the family had already
been receiving state welfare benefits prior to the murder.
Actual innocence of the death penalty
Lopez argues that the district court erred in denying his claim
that he is actually innocent based on invalid aggravating circumstances.
He contends that the depravity-of-mind aggravating circumstance found
by the jury has no basis in law and the torture aggravating circumstance
instructions did not inform the jury that the torture "must be intended to
inflict pain beyond the killing itself."
We conclude that this argument lacks merit. The jury found
two aggravating circumstances: the murder involved (1) torture and (2)
depravity of mind. Since the verdict, this court has concluded that the
depravity-of-mind aggravating circumstance, in and of itself, is not a valid
aggravating circumstance upon which to find a defendant death eligible.
See Smith v. State, 114 Nev. 33, 37 n.3, 953 P.2d 264, 266 n.3 (1998);
Domingues v. State, 112 Nev. 683, 702, 917 P.2d 1364, 1377 (1996); Robins
v. State, 106 Nev. 611, 629, 798 P.2d 558, 570 (1990); see also Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Here, however, the jury also found a
separate aggravating circumstance, torture. Lopez contends that this
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aggravating circumstance is also invalid because the jury was not
instructed that the torture had to be some act of physical abuse beyond the
act of killing itself. See Robins, 106 Nev. at 629, 798 P.2d at 570;
Domingues, 112 Nev. at 702, 917 P.2d at 1377; Smith, 114 Nev. at 37 n.3,
953 P.2d at 266 n.3. 4 While Lopez may be correct about the instruction,
this instructional error does not make the torture aggravating
circumstance invalid. Had the jury been properly instructed that the
torture aggravating circumstance required some act of physical abuse
beyond the act of killing itself, some reasonable jurors would have believed
Maria's testimony and concluded that his acts of abuse satisfied the
torture aggravating circumstance making him eligible for the death
penalty. See Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537. For these
reasons, Lopez cannot demonstrate that the failure to consider his petition
would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.'
4 Lopez also contends that the torture aggravating circumstance
instruction removed the element of malice from the jury's consideration.
Lopez is mistaken. Malice is supplied by the definition of torture. See
Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev. 978, 985, 194 P.3d 1235, 1239 (2008),
overruled on other grounds by Armenta-Carpio v. State, 129 Nev., Adv. Op.
54, 306 P.3d 395 (2013).
"Lopez also argues that his substantive constitutional claims require
the reversal of his conviction and death sentence. However, as he failed to
demonstrate that the district court erred in applying the procedural bars,
consideration of these claims is unnecessary.
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Having considered Lopez's contentions and concluded that
they lack merit, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.G
At at-X.\
Hardesty
, C.J.
Parraguicre
J. J.
Dou
Gibbons
CHERRY, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the district court erred in
concluding that Lopez failed to overcome the bar of laches regarding his
claim concerning Arturo Montes' perjury. I further conclude that the jury
instruction regarding torture amounted to a fundamental miscarriage of
justice as Lopez was ineligible for the death penalty.
Montes' perjured testimony
As cause to overcome the procedural bars, Lopez argued that
the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in failing to
disclose evidence that Montes committed perjury. This evidence included
(1) records indicating that Montes was incarcerated on the dates he
6 We
deny the State's motion to strike portions of the reply brief as
moot. We also deny Lopez's "Motion to Transmit Prosecution File Under
Seal."
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claimed to have seen Lopez abuse Jessica; (2) vouchers indicating that
Montes had been compensated for pretrial interviews and post-trial
meetings; (3) a declaration from Maria's aunt declaring that Montes was
not a friend of the family and did not baptize her daughter as he claimed
during trial; and (4) a declaration from Montes' half-brother, Carlos
Montes, stating that Montes had never married and did not have a child
as he claimed during trial When confronted with this evidence, Montes
recanted his trial testimony and accused the State of pressuring him to
testify falsely during the trial.
To overcome the burden of laches, Lopez needed to
demonstrate that he was reasonably diligent in discovering the facts
underlying his petition to overcome the presumed prejudice to the State in
responding to the petition, see NRS 34.800(1)(a); see also Rippo v. State,
113 Nev. 1239, 1257, 946 P.2d 1017, 1028 (1997) ("[A] Brady violation does
not result if the defendant, exercising reasonable diligence, could have
obtained the information."), and that the failure to consider the petition
amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the
presumed prejudice to the State in retrying him, see NRS 34.800(1)(b);
Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001) (providing
that a fundamental miscarriage of justice requires "a colorable showing"
that the petitioner is "actually innocent of the crime or is ineligible for the
death penalty"). The majority concludes that Lopez failed to overcome the
bar of laches because much of the evidence could have been obtained
sooner by diligent counsel and that Lopez failed to demonstrate that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him had this evidence been
presented. I disagree with both these conclusions.
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I conclude that diligent counsel could not have discovered all
the evidence underlying Lopez's claim regarding Montes. Arguably, much
of the evidence presented was obtained from interviewing members of
Montes' and the victim's families. However, defense attorneys do not have
unlimited resources to chase down every lead that presents itself. See
Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d 951, 960 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that a
defense case does not "contemplate the employment of wholly unlimited
time and resources"). They must make reasonable investigations with the
time and resources at their disposal. The majority conclusion hinges a
great deal on the fact that counsel could have launched an investigation
into Montes based on his comment to a reporter in 1986. This issue was
litigated in a motion for a new trial that was denied. Defense counsel
could not be expected to deploy more of its resources on an avenue of
investigation that did not yield results. Moreover, Montes' arrest and
detention records, which conclusively refuted his testimony about
witnessing abuse by Lopez, were in the possession of the State. Therefore,
even the most diligent counsel could not be expected to have recovered this
evidence absent the cooperation of the State. See Banks v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 668, 695-96 (2004) (noting that "[o]ur decisions lend no support to the
notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady
material when the prosecution represents that all such material has been
disclosed").
The majority also concludes that, even if counsel was
reasonably diligent in uncovering the evidence related to Montes, Lopez
failed to demonstrate that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.
I do not share the majority's view of the strength of the evidence against
Lopez. Physical evidence showed that Jessica had been abused and what
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implements were used to perpetrate this abuse. But that evidence did not
identify the abuser. The only evidence that Lopez was responsible for the
abuse was Maria's testimony that Lopez abused Jessica on many occasions
and Montes' testimony that he witnessed Lopez drag Jessica off by her
hair. Thus, the only witnesses that pointed to Lopez's guilt were Maria—
the only other adult responsible for Jessica's care and another possible
perpetrator of the abuse—and Montes, whose testimony was rendered
wholly incredible by the undisclosed Brady evidence.
The majority relies on Maria's testimony as a sufficient basis
on which the jury could have concluded that Lopez was responsible for
Jessica's death regardless of the veracity of Montes' testimony. However,
Maria's testimony is problematic for many reasons. First, Maria's
testimony contained notable inconsistencies. When questioned by police,
she was not forthright with the investigators and did not immediately
implicate Lopez in the abuse. Her testimony was inconsistent regarding
when she contends that Lopez burned Jessica, how the burns occurred,
and how she discovered the burns. Further, her testimony that much of
the abuse occurred in her home without her knowledge or intervention
and that she left her severely burnt four-year-old child alone to attend a
party at her in-laws' residence was inconsistent with what one would
expect of a reasonable person exercising common sense. Second, when
questioned by the police about the crimes, whether or not the belief was
encouraged by the officers, Maria appeared to believe that the State
offered her a plea deal and would not prosecute her if it prosecuted Lopez.
Third, several years after Maria testified, she left the country and
recanted her testimony.
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Therefore, as the State failed to turn over evidence that
completely undermined Montes' testimony and the remaining evidence
against Lopez did not conclusively point to his guilt, I conclude that the
district court erred in denying Lopez's petition as barred by laches.
Torture instruction
I also conclude that the district court erred in denying Lopez's
claim that he is actually innocent based on an invalid torture aggravating
circumstance because, in my view, but for the instructional error, "no
reasonable juror would have found him death eligible." Pellegrini, 117
Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537. The jury found two aggravating
circumstances: the murder involved (1) torture and (2) depravity of mind
As recognized by the majority decision, the latter circumstance is invalid.
See Smith v. State, 114 Nev. 33, 37 n.3, 953 P.2d 264, 266 n.3 (1998);
Domingues v. State, 112 Nev. 683, 702, 917 P.2d 1364, 1377 (1996); Robins
v. State, 106 Nev. 611, 629, 798 P.2d 558, 570 (1990); see also Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Although the jury also found the torture
aggravating circumstance, the instruction failed to includeS necessary
language that "the murderer must have intended to inflict pain beyond the
killing itself." Domingues v. State, 112 Nev. 683, 702, 917 P.2d 1364, 1377
(1996).
I conclude that had the jury been properly instructed that the
torture aggravating circumstance required some act of physical abuse
beyond the act of killingS itself, no reasonable juror would have found
Lopez death eligible. "[M]ost murders do not qualify as torture murders."
Id. at 702 n.6, 917 P.2d at 1377 n.6. It is difficult to prove that the murder
was committed with the "intent to inflict pain beyond the killing itself'
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and for the purpose of "revenge, extortion, persuasion," or some "sadistic[ 7 ]
purpose." Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev. 978, 984, 194 P.3d 1235, 1239
(2008), overruled on other grounds by Armenta-Carpio v. State, 129 Nev.
Adv. Op. 54, 306 P.3d 395 (2013). Thus, the burden of showing a murder
by torture is a difficult one to meet as demonstrated by cases with far
more compelling evidence that nonetheless failed to meet that burden. In
Chappell v. State, 114 Nev. 1403, 1410, 972 P.2d 838, 842 (1998), the
defendant severely beat the victim and stabbed her in the groin, chest, and
neck. Some of the wounds even penetrated the spinal cord. Id. This court
concluded that the pattern of violence against the victim was not sufficient
for the jury to conclude that "the [defendant] intended to cause [the
victim] cruel suffering for the purposes of revenge, persuasion, or other
sadistic pleasure" and did not "rise to the level of torture." Id. And in
Domingues, 112 Nev. at 702-03, 917 P.2d at 1378, this court concluded
that the defendant's attempted electrocution and repeated stabbing of a
child did not amount to torture.
The facts presented in this case do not show that Lopez
engaged in acts intending to inflict pain beyond the killing itself. The
evidence showed that Lopez's repeated acts of abuse occurred while
disciplining Jessica. His reactions to her perceived misbehavior were
excessive and the methods employed to address the behavior were rash
7 TheAmerican Heritage Concise Dictionary defines "sadism" as
"[t]he association of sexual gratification with the infliction of pain on
others" or the "delight in cruelty." The American Heritage Concise
Dictionary 722 (3d ed. 1994); see also Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1997-98 (2002) ("the infliction of pain upon a love object as a
means of obtaining sexual release" or the "delight in physical or mental
cruelty").
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and horrendously cruel. But the evidence did not indicate that Lopez
delighted or took sadistic pleasure in the cruelty in which he engaged.
Further, the acts, in and of themselves, caused pain, but were insufficient
to cause the victim's death. In fact, the victim died due to an ulcer that
was caused by the aggregate abuse. As no act by Lopez was sufficient to
cause the victim's death, the acts could not be viewed as intended to inflict
pain above and beyond the killing. Accordingly, I conclude that the
district court erred in concluding that Lopez failed to demonstrate a
fundamental miscarriage of justice based on this claim.
Consequently, I would reverse the district court order denying
Lopez's petition and remand with instructions to grant the petition.
cc: Hon. Kenneth C. Cory, District Judge
Federal Public Defender/Las Vegas
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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