MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 27 2015, 8:42 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Gary L. Monday Gregory F. Zoeller
New Castle Correctional Facility Attorney General of Indiana
New Castle, Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Gary L. Monday, October 27, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
39A01-1506-CR-639
v. Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Darrell M. Auxier,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No. 1486
Crone, Judge.
[1] Gary L. Monday, pro se, appeals the denial of his motion to correct erroneous
sentence. We affirm.
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[2] In 1986, Monday was charged with the class A felony rape and murder of the
same victim. He entered a plea agreement under which he agreed to plead
guilty to both counts; the State would recommend a twenty-eight-year executed
sentence on the rape count and a forty-year executed sentence on the murder
count; and the sentences would run consecutively. Tr. at 9. The trial court
accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Monday to sixty-eight years per the
State’s recommendation.
[3] In 2014, Monday filed a pro se motion to correct erroneous sentence pursuant
to Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15, which states in pertinent part that if a
“convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render the
sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is given to
the convicted person.” Monday claimed that the trial court lacked statutory
authority to impose consecutive sentences. The trial court denied the motion.
Monday now appeals.
[4] The purpose of Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15 “is to provide prompt, direct
access to an uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous
or illegal sentence.” Davis v. State, 937 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
denied. Our supreme court has stated that “a motion to correct sentence may
only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the
judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Robinson v.
State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ind. 2004). Claims that require consideration of the
proceedings before, during, or after a trial or guilty plea may not be presented
by way of a motion to correct erroneous sentence. See State v. Arnold, 27 N.E.3d
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315, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. We review a trial court’s ruling on
a motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of discretion. Koontz v.
State, 975 N.E.2d 846, 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[5] We find no abuse of discretion here. Monday ignores the statutory authority
that was in effect at the time of his sentencing, which does not prohibit
consecutive sentences under the facts of this case. See Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2
(1986) (“(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the court shall
determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or
consecutively. (b) If a person commits a crime: (1) after having been arrested
for another crime; and (2) before the date he is discharged from probation,
parole, or a term of imprisonment imposed for that other crime; the terms of
imprisonment for the crimes shall be served consecutively, regardless of the
order in which the crimes are tried and sentences are imposed.”). Thus, any
sentencing error would not be clear from the face of the judgment. Moreover,
the caselaw that Monday cites either predates or postdates this version of the
statute or is simply irrelevant to the circumstances of this case: Monday pled
guilty to two nearly simultaneous crimes and agreed to the imposition of
consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm.
[6] Affirmed.
May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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