IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1570
Filed October 28, 2015
PETER V. PAYLOR,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
DEE ZEE INCORPORATED and
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY
OF CT.,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur Gamble,
Judge.
Employee appeals from the ruling on petition for judicial review of agency
action. AFFIRMED.
Ryan T. Beattie of Beattie Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
James M. Ballard of Ballard Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Waukee, for appellees.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
This is an administrative appeal challenging a decision of the Iowa
Workers’ Compensation Commissioner. On November 10, 2010, Peter Paylor
suffered a work related injury to his lower back for which he sought medical care
on November 12, 2010. Paylor’s employer, Dee Zee Incorporated, stipulated the
injury caused temporary disability. Paylor underwent back surgery in April 2011.
He claimed the surgery was causally related to the work injury and filed a claim
for permanent disability benefits. The employer denied causation and denied
Paylor sustained a permanent disability related to his work injury. The deputy
commissioner found Paylor did not prove the April 2011 surgery and subsequent
treatment were related to his work injury. The commissioner affirmed the
decision. The district court affirmed the agency’s action.
“The appeal is controlled by our scope of review. A court’s review of
agency action is severely circumscribed.” Sellers v. Emp’t Appeal Bd., 531
N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). “On appeal, we apply the standards of
[Iowa Code] chapter 17A to determine whether we reach the same conclusions
as the district court. If we reach the same conclusions, we affirm; otherwise we
may reverse.” Mike Brooks, Inc. v. House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 2014).
“The administrative process presupposes judgment calls are to be left to the
agency. Nearly all disputes are won or lost there.” Sellers, 531 N.W.2d at 646
(citation omitted).
On appeal, Paylor contends the agency’s finding that his surgery and
subsequent treatment were unrelated to his work injury is not supported by
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substantial evidence. He contends, for the same reason, the agency’s decision
is irrational, illogical, and wholly unjustifiable. “‘Substantial evidence’ means the
quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral,
detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the
consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be
serious and of great importance.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1) (2011). On
substantial-evidence review, we do not reassess the evidence or make our own
determination of the weight to be given to various pieces of evidence. See Cedar
Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 849 (Iowa 2011). Instead,
the agency’s findings are broadly construed to uphold the decision made. See
Schutjer v. Algona Manor Care Ctr., 780 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2010).
We conclude the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
and is not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. In reaching its decision, the
agency carefully assessed the medical evidence as reflected in Paylor’s medical
records and the opinions of different physicians, including Drs. Twyner, Igram,
Munhall, Nelson, Neff, McGuire, Bansal, Jones, and Neiman. The agency
credited some of the medical professionals’ opinions over others based on their
respective training, experience, and area of practice and based on whether the
opinions jibed with Paylor’s symptoms. The agency further took into account the
quality of the opinion based on the medical history, or lack thereof, Paylor
provided to the respective medical professional. See Cedar Rapids Cmty Sch.
Dist., 807 N.W.2d at 845 (“Also, an expert’s opinion is not necessarily binding
upon the commissioner if the opinion is based on an incomplete history.”)
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“Medical causation presents a question of fact that is vested in the
discretion of the workers’ compensation commission.” Id. at 844. While there
may be evidence in the record contrary to the agency’s findings and conclusions,
“[e]vidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary
inferences.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Iowa
2003). The question is not whether the evidence would support a different
finding, the question is whether the evidence supports the finding actually made.
See Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 763 N.W.2d 842, 850 (Iowa 2009). There is
substantial evidence supporting the findings actually made, and the agency’s
decision was not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s decision on judicial review.
AFFIRMED.