COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00252-CR
NO. 02-14-00253-CR
VIKRAM S. CHAUHAN APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NOS. 1248464D, 1248466D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Vikram S. Chauhan was convicted by a jury of two counts of
aggravated robbery. Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously allowed
Appellant to be tried in violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act
(IADA). We affirm.
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Background Facts
On September 8, 2011, Appellant was indicted on two counts of
aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon committed on July 7, 2011. On
November 14, 2011, while out on bond, Appellant robbed a bank. He was
convicted of the bank robbery in federal district court and sentenced to sixty-six
months’ confinement in federal prison.
On February 7, 2013, Appellant received notice that Tarrant County had
lodged a detainer on him for the two aggravated robbery charges. Between
July 1, 2013, and December 27, 2013, Appellant filed five pro se motions seeking
dismissal of the charges. The State claimed that all five motions were defective
and inadequate to invoke the IADA. On March 20, 2014, Appellant was
transferred from federal prison to the Tarrant County jail.
A jury trial was held on Appellant’s aggravated robbery cases in
June 2014. The jury found Appellant guilty of both counts and assessed
punishment at twenty years’ confinement on each count. The trial court
sentenced Appellant accordingly and ordered the sentences to run concurrently.
Appellant filed a motion for new trial arguing that he was tried in violation of the
IADA. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
The IADA
The IADA is a congressionally-sanctioned compact between the federal
government and the states. See Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148,
121 S. Ct. 2079, 2082 (2001) (citing 18 U.S.C. app. § 2). It creates uniform and
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cooperative procedures to be used for lodging and executing a detainer when
one state seeks to obtain temporary custody of and prosecute a prisoner in
another state or federal facility. Id. Texas adopted the IADA in code of criminal
procedure article 51.14. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14 (West 2006);
State v. Votta, 299 S.W.3d 130, 134–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
When an IADA-party state has an untried indictment, information, or
complaint against the prisoner, it files a detainer with the institution in the state
that is holding the prisoner. Votta, 299 S.W.3d at 135. The prison is required to
promptly inform the prisoner that a detainer has been filed against him and that
he has the right to request final disposition of the charges. Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 51.14 art. III(c); Votta, 299 S.W.3d at 135. The prisoner, in order
to invoke the IADA, “shall have cause[] to be delivered to the prosecuting officer
and the appropriate court of the prosecuting office’s jurisdiction written notice of
the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of
the indictment, information, or complaint.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 51.14,
art. III(a). The prisoner’s written request must also be accompanied by
a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner,
stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being
held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the
sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole
eligibility of the prisoner, and any decision of the state parole agency
relating to the prisoner.
Id.
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“The prisoner bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with the
procedural requirements of article III.” Walker v. State, 201 S.W.3d 841, 846
(Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d) (citations omitted). Once the prisoner meets
the requirements under Article III(a), then the prisoner must be brought to trial in
the receiving state within 180 days from the date on which the prosecuting officer
and the appropriate court receives the written request for a final disposition,
unless a continuance is granted under the IADA. Id.; Votta, 299 S.W.3d at 135.
If the prisoner is not brought to trial within 180 days, the trial court must dismiss
the indictment with prejudice. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14, art. III(d);
Votta, 299 S.W.3d at 135.
Appellant’s motions
In Appellant’s first point, he argues that he was tried in violation of article III
of the IADA. As discussed above, Appellant must properly request a final and
speedy disposition under the IADA for the act’s requirements to apply. We must
therefore determine whether Appellant’s motions meet the statutory requirements
necessary to invoke the IADA.
Under the IADA, Appellant is first required to request a final disposition of
his indictments before he requests dismissal of the indictments. Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 51.14, art. III(a). Appellant’s third motion is the only motion that uses
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the term “final disposition.” 2 But Appellant’s third motion, despite the title
including a “request for disposition of indictments,” does not actually request a
final disposition of the indictments. The motion states, “[Appellant] is now
imprisoned in the Federal Correctional Institution . . . , and pursuant to the
detainer lodged against [him] . . . . , that a request for final disposition shall be
made to the above referenced . . . causes against [him].” [Emphasis added.]
Appellant goes on to claim that the 180-day period in which the State was
required to bring him to trial had already passed, that he had filed a “Motion to
Dismiss for violations of the Speedy Trial Act,” and that “[w]hen the Petitioner’s
right to a speedy trial has been violated, dismissal is ‘the only possible remedy.’”
[Citations omitted.] The prayer of Appellant’s third motion likewise only
requested the dismissal of his indictments. Appellant’s third motion therefore did
not request a “final disposition” of the indictments as required by the IADA, but a
dismissal based on the State’s alleged failure to comply with the IADA deadline.
See Votta, 299 S.W.3d at 137 (“Appellee’s motion to dismiss the charges was
not proper notice to the district court of his request for disposition.”). Absent a
proper request for a final disposition, the IADA time period had not begun to run,
and dismissal was not mandated. See id.
2
Both parties agreed during oral argument that Appellant’s third motion
was the most relevant in determining whether Appellant’s filings were statutorily
adequate to invoke the IADA.
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Furthermore, none of Appellant’s filings were accompanied by the
statutorily required certification from the prison warden of the prison in which he
was serving his federal sentence. A request for dismissal of the indictments
must include the required documentation to sufficiently invoke the IADA.
See State v. Chesnut, 424 S.W.3d 213, 218 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no
pet.) (holding that a prisoner complies with his obligations under the IADA when
he mails a “proper request for final disposition along with all the required
documentation”) (emphasis added); Lara v. State, 909 S.W.2d 615, 617–18 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet ref’d) (holding that appellant’s proper request for
disposition alone, unaccompanied by a certificate from the official having custody
of him, was insufficient to invoke the IADA). Even viewing all five of Appellant’s
pro se filings together, the motions are still inadequate to invoke the IADA.
Because Appellant’s motions did not invoke the IADA, the 180-day period did not
start, and Appellant was not tried in violation of the IADA. We overrule
Appellant’s first point.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
In his second point, Appellant argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by not moving to dismiss the underlying charges for the
alleged violation of the IADA. Appellant’s second point of error is based solely on
the first point of error, and he acknowledged in oral argument that if the first point
of error is overruled, then no grounds exist to support the second point of error.
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Because we have overruled Appellant’s first point, we overrule Appellant’s
second point.
Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s points, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
/s/ Lee Gabriel
LEE GABRIEL
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: October 29, 2015
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